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The Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Limited \& Others

Day 1

June 26, 2020

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(10.29 am)
Friday, 26 June 2020
Case Management Conference
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Good morning, everyone. Unless there is somebody who isn't in the hearing who should be, so far as I can tell from running down the list, it looks as though everyone is here.
MS MATTHEWS: Thank you. Before we begin, could I remind everyone that this is a court hearing and as such as a criminal offence for anyone other than those authorised by the court to record the proceedings.
In the matter of the Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Limited and Others.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Good morning, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: Morning, my Lord. If you'd just allow me,
I'm trying to add Mr Justice Butcher to my screen, which
l've now managed to do.
My Lord, I hope that you have received the agenda that was sent through with comments of the parties. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, thank you.
MR EDELMAN: Now, my Lords, I would ordinarily at the beginning of a hearing introduce the cast list. I tried to do that last time, but it was a very long list LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think it would be completely exhausting for all of us. I think we know who the cast
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list are, and they will identify themselves, to the extent it's necessary, for them to speak.
MR EDELMAN: My Lords, I hope that the list of counsel speaking to an issue would help the court to identify (inaudible) the submissions.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, if I can get straight down to business on the agenda, the first item was due to have been the intervention applications, but Mr Howard, busy member of the Bar as he is, has another hearing which is due to conclude I think within an hour or so, maybe shorter, and he asks the court's indulgence to put that matter back, and we have no objection to that. So as long as my Lords are happy, then we'll move that item back.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, not overly happy, but we'll have to be, won't we?
MR EDELMAN: My Lords, I'm sorry about that. We tried to organise the agenda in a logical --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, if you had warned us earlier, we might have started at 10 o'clock, because those matters are matters which can be dealt with very shortly indeed. MR EDELMAN: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The other issue about that, which is problematic in a sense, is that there is an intervention by a gentleman called Mr Sheehan, I think, who is
a publican in Isleworth who is a policyholder of RSA, whose counsel is on the line, I think, who wants to apply to be joined.

Now, that obviously ought to be dealt with at the same time as the applications to intervene.
I'm slightly concerned that his counsel is kept on the line for as long as he will be.
MR EDELMAN: Well, my Lord, I am afraid we were only told very late last night of this difficulty
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, we didn't know until this morning.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, I forget what time it was, but I think it was around 10.00 pm or maybe later.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Well, I think Mr Hendron is there. If Mr Hendron is happy to wait for Mr Howard's availability then we will put him back until we deal with those applications as well.
MR HENDRON: My Lord, I have no problem waiting. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much, Mr Hendron.

Right, Mr Edelman, where do we go from there?
MR EDELMAN: Right, so we're on to the applications for permission to adduce factual evidence, which I hope, as far as items 3 and 4, can be dealt with briefly, but I don't know whether Mr Kealey has more to say.

On item 3, I know it is Mr Lockey's application, but

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it 's right that I record the position. They asked us to agree four facts. We have been able to agree three of them. There is a fourth fact which, for reasons I needn't go into, the FCA is unable to agree but does not dispute.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: What is the fourth fact, Mr Edelman? MR EDELMAN: Well, my Lord, it's about authority and so on in relation to this agreement, which the Chancellor referred to in a statement, and we don't dispute that. We can't -- we're not in a position to agree it, so what we are amenable to is not opposing the application, the witness statements go in, we don't challenge the evidence.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Mr Lockey, do you want to say something about that?
MR LOCKEY: My Lord, no. Mr Edelman has correctly summarised the position that we've reached by way of agreement yesterday evening.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, thank you very much. Okay.
MR EDELMAN: So, my Lord, the application should be allowed on the basis that we don't agree it but we don't oppose it and that we don't -- the FCA will not challenge that evidence.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that evidence, presumably, will be in the form of the witness statement from Ms Valder,

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    is that right?
MR EDELMAN: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's not proposed that anyone give live
    evidence at the trial ?
MR EDELMAN: No, they're not being put to proof, they're not
    being required to give live evidence.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Very good, I think we can take that as
    read in that case. Let's move on to the next one.
        Submissions by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, as far as we're concerned, the same
    applies to this application for witness evidence from
    Mr Kealey's clients, a similar position to Arch, and we
    are prepared not to oppose the application on the same
    terms. I hope that is sufficient for Mr Kealey. As far
    as we're concerned, that is the application that's made
    and that is the disposal of the application. Mr Kealey
    says more about the subject in his skeleton, but that is
    the sum total of his application and it's now dealt
    with.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Well, the Scilly Isles point is
    now dealt with by a statement of agreed fact, isn't it ?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, that's been dealt with.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Kealey, do you want to say something
        about the other part of your application?
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            Submissions by MR KEALEY
MR KEALEY: Yes, my Lord, I would. Mr Edelman is absolutely
    right we haven't made any other application than to
    adduce fact evidence in order to deal with this matter,
    but it is slightly more serious. It 's a very small
    point, my Lords, but it's slightly more serious than
    I think the FCA gives credit for, and it's a serious
    issue of case management and the court has inherent
    jurisdiction in the exercise of its case management
    jurisdiction and functions to do essentially what it
    considers is appropriate for the fair disposal of any
    action. And this being such a special action,
    your Lordships should consider the exercise of your
    inherent jurisdiction in relation to this matter.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You want us to strike out the relevant
    part of his pleading because your clients weren't at the
    meeting, and there's a sort of slur about insurers
    should have basically told the government if they
    weren't going to play ball, if I can put it that way?
        I mean, Mr Justice Butcher and I have discussed
        this. We are singularly unimpressed by the pleading
        anyway, but we're not going to strike it out.
MR KEALEY: Very well. Then I'm not going to trouble
    your Lordships any more.
        I'm just going to make one point, and you will tell
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me off for making it.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I won't tell you off, Mr Kealey.
MR KEALEY: I'm grateful. This is a case where time is precious and space is precious, and the fact that it
lies on the pleading, and we expressly asked for what I call the incumbency point to be withdrawn and that was explicitly declined and it remains on the pleading.

Now, my learned friend Mr Edelman wants to have a limit on the amount of paragraphs or pages in the skeleton argument. That's the first thing. He wants to have a limited amount of time, obviously, for insurers to make oral submissions, and he wants to have a mutual exchange of skeleton arguments.

Now, I have to say, my Lord, I share your view about the quality of the allegation, but nonetheless it stays there.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, rest assured, you will not have to deal with this at the trial. Your clients were not at the meeting, so whatever the pleading may or may not amount to so far as insurers who were at the meeting are concerned -- and speaking for myself I can't see what it 's -- other than knocking copy, if I can put it that way, I can't really see what its relevance is to the issues we have to decide.

But so far as insurers like your client who weren't

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actually at the meeting are concerned, it's totally irrelevant. You needn't spend any of your precious pages in your skeleton and your precious time in your oral submissions dealing with that point.
MR KEALEY: On that note, my Lord, I will withdraw from the screen, and indeed orally, with my customary lack of grace.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, thank you very much, Mr Kealey.
Well, there we are, Mr Edelman. You have heard what the court has said. But so far as the actual application is concerned, the application will be allowed and the evidence will go in uncontested.

Submissions by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, can I just make two observations: firstly, as my Lords will appreciate, the FCA's position is that it wishes to put forward all of the arguments that policyholders would have wanted to put forward had they been in the position of doing so, and secondly, this may be relevant to whether or not certain actions or advice by the government should be treated as satisfying certain of the three requirements.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I follow that point, but the difficulty with these particular defendants -- we're not talking about people who were at the meeting. I see there's an argument. We understand that. But insurers who

Mr Turner.
MR TURNER: It's page 213 of the PDF. It's 30(b).
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.
MR TURNER: It's a plea of matrix.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR TURNER: It's a very short plea, and if this matter were at trial, it would consume considerably less time and resource than it has consumed for the purposes of today's CMC.

Subparagraph (b)(i) sets out an uncontroversial proposition, which your Lordship will recognise --

## LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

MR TURNER: -- and immediately know the source of that. And
( ii) is unsurprising, and (iii), so far as it refers to wordings which sought to nullify or alter the reasoning in Orient Express Hotels, speaks for itself.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why does it need evidence to support it then?
MR TURNER: Because it is not accepted as a fact. It requires factual evidence to prove the existence of such wordings.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think Mr Edelman says you were offered a fact or you were offered an agreed fact and you turned it down.
MR TURNER: We were offered an agreed fact that would have
been entirely devoid of meaningful context because the agreed fact that was offered was that there was a single wording in existence which we said purported to change or alter the effect of the reasoning expressed in Orient Express Hotels without your Lordships being told as a matter of evidence in what respects the wording sought to alter the effect of the decision in Orient Express Hotels.

So, as an offer goes, it was entirely unconstructive, and the Framework Agreement specifically requires the parties to cooperate and to do so in a constructive manner.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR TURNER: The offer that was made would have left the court in ignorance as to the provenance of the wording in question, and we say that when one comes to consider the question of matrix and what is reasonably available to the parties to the contract, it is relevant, although this is an argument for trial, that this is a wording being put out there by one of the largest brokers in the country.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: But we have to decide the meaning of -the meaning and construction of a whole series of wordings, Mr Turner, and amongst the issues you have to decide is whether, because of Orient Express, those

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wordings have the effect that you contend they do have.
The fact that there's another wording out there which deals with the Orient Express point, which isn't a wording we actually have to construe, doesn't seem to me to be of very much assistance to the court in the task that we face.
MR TURNER: Well, my Lord, whether it is of great assistance or minimal assistance is, in my submission, a matter for trial. If your Lordship takes the view that it cannot be of any assistance, then I will end here and we can move on to the next agenda item.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Let us hear what Mr Edelman has to say. MR TURNER: Can I just finish my submissions?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, sorry, I thought you had. Sorry.
MR TURNER: Well, I was seeking to shortcut, if it were necessary to do so.

In relation to the proposal that was made, we say that it is certainly relevant, if this is a fact that is admissible evidence in relation to matrix, it is relevant that the provenance was from Aon, and we say that the actual wording is relevant because it is relevant to say the wording sought not merely to alter the reasoning, but it sought to do so in a way that was more advantageous for insured, for policyholders. But neither of those features was encompassed in the offer

## LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

MR TURNER: My Lord, those are my submissions.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much.

## Mr Edelman.

## Submissions by MR EDELMAN

MR EDELMAN: My Lord, the full policies issued by the RSA, which are the lead policies in this litigation, are the Cottagesure policy for holiday cottage owners bearing the Gallagher logo and three other forms of policy covering, amongst other things, pubs, restaurants and retail facilities and bearing the logo of Eaton Gate, and a managing general agency.

There's no evidence advanced either by the policyholders who purchased these policies or their brokers, if they used brokers, were aware or had any means of being aware of the particular wording, and only one wording has been produced, now relied on by RSA, and
there's no obvious reason why they should have been aware of it.

So we say this just simply doesn't pass the test for factual matrix at all.

Our offer to agree a fact was simply to avoid this sort of spat, and then we could have dealt with it very briefly at trial. But that's been turned down, so the matter is now being argued, and this just simply doesn't cross the threshold. It's another matter -- if Mr Turner had said: well, here's a standard market clause that any broker in the market should be aware of --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That's a different point, isn't it? MR EDELMAN: It's a different point. A different point. You've got a one-off example.

There is also then the other issue to which we've alluded of introducing another wording into the policy, into the trial, because if one does introduce another policy wording, then one starts -- one ends up having a bit of satellite litigation in construing that policy and seeing what else it's doing.

So I'm only giving brief reasons because we've dealt with it in writing, but in summary, those are our primary reasons for objecting to this.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Edelman.

Mr Turner, do you want to say anything?

## Submissions by MR TURNER

MR TURNER: Yes, very briefly on the last point, if I may, my Lord. Sorry, there's a bit of echo.

We would have been content for the proposal that we advanced to have been adopted, which would have addressed Mr Edelman's concern about an entire wording going into the bundle. We would equally be content for just the front page and the relevant page from the definitions section of the policy to go into the trial bundle. No one is going to be seeking the court's ruling as to whether or not a claim under the Aon Trio wording would have been covered in these circumstances.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay, I'll ask Mr Justice Butcher to give our ruling as to this.
(10.49 am)

Ruling (pending approval)
( 10.51 am )
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much, there we are.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I'm grateful. There was a momentary pause. I was turning my microphone on again to avoid echo, and just I would perhaps remind other counsel when they speak also to do so because I omitted to do so. When Mr Turner was speaking, I think that was the cause or may have been the cause of some echo, for which

## I apologise.

So, my Lord, I've now had a message from Mr Howard that he has arrived, and seeing as that is the end of a sort of mini section of the agenda dealing with matters related to factual evidence, it's perhaps now appropriate to deal with the interventions, if that's convenient for my Lords, and if that is, then those applications will be dealt with on behalf of the FCA by Ms Mulcahy.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, if Mr Justice Butcher is content we deal with the interventions now, then we will do so.

## MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes, certainly.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay. All right, Mr Edelman.
Mr Howard is there someone. I think, strictly speaking --
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, apologies for interrupting. I realise that I omitted to give an introduction, which is that Mr Edey will be leading on introducing the application. So I think it is Mr Edey to go first.

## LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

## Submissions by MR EDEY

MR EDEY: Good morning, my Lords. My Lords, as you know, I represent various insureds under business interruption policies written by QBE and Aviva, whose claims under those policies for the losses they have suffered as
a result of what I will try and describe neutrally as "the COVID situation" have been declined.

Those insured seek your permission under paragraph 2.5(a) of PD51M, which is set out in the FCA skeleton at paragraph 52, to intervene in this test case so that they can be heard at the trial on the test case issues and only those issues, as those issues relate to their policy wordings, and that is only then to the extent that those policy wordings, or wordings on very similar terms, are included for consideration in this test case.

My Lords, it has been agreed between me and Mr Lynch, who represents the Hiscox Action Group, which is also, as you know, applying to intervene, that I will go first, and in doing so 1 expect to pick up all or most of the points that are common to us both, as well as anything specific to us, and if convenient to your Lordships, what we then propose is Mr Lynch will say anything necessarily extra in relation to his application. The FCA will then deal with both applications before the insurers respond, as we understand it through Mr Howard QC for QBE, who is taking the lead in respect of our application, and then Mr Gaisman QC for Hiscox, who is taking the lead in relation to Mr Lynch's application.

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[^0]argument, which I just ask you to turn up and read for yourselves. My Lord, I can read it out if you don't
have it immediately to hand. (Pause)
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, we've read that.
MR EDEY: My Lord, that is in short form coming from the FCA exactly what Ms Campbell had said she believed to be the position at paragraphs $34-46$ of her witness statement, which I don't invite you to turn up, but you will have found in volume 5, tab 1A, E17-20 in support of our application and indeed what we submit in our skeleton at paragraph 16.

But, of course, coming first -hand from the FCA, it obviously has all the more force. Indeed, we say, with respect, it really is the beginning and the end of the debate, because paragraph $2.5(\mathrm{a})$ to which I referred and under which our application is made provides that you need to be satisfied that the arguments of all those with opposing interests in relation to the issues in question will -- and I emphasise that word; not "may", but " will" -- be properly put before the court by those represented, and it goes on to provide that for those purposes, in appropriate cases, third parties affected by the determination of the issues may, with the permission of the court, be joined as a party or otherwise allowed to be represented.

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My Lord, that reflects what has been said in the authorities about test cases or academic appeals, including by Lord Justice Aikens in the Rolls-Royce case and before that by Sir Anthony Clarke, the Master of the Rolls, in the Gawler case, to which we refer in footnote 3 of our skeleton argument. If I can invite my Lords to turn it up, it 's in volume 9 at tab 21, and the relevant paragraphs is reference $1-487$ and it's paragraph 37 where the Master of the Rolls was dealing with the circumstances in which the court should allow an appeal which had by then become academic between the parties, whether it should be allowed to proceed. And he says, you see it at the beginning, it all will depend -- does my Lord have that? Does my Lord, Lord Justice Flaux, have that?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, give me the reference again.
MR EDEY: I'm so sorry, my Lord. It's bundle 9, tab 21.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, sorry, the problem is that bundle came loose, as it were, and I'm not sure what I've done with it.
MR EDEY: My Lord, I can read the relevant words out again, if that's helpful.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDEY: Essentially the bit I rely upon is paragraph 37 where what was said by the Master of the Rolls is :
"Whether an academic appeal should be allowed will all depend upon the circumstances, upon the facts of the particular case and in what follows I do not intend to be too prescriptive. However, such cases are likely to have a number of characteristics in addition to the additional requirement that an academic appeal is in the public interest. They include the necessity that all sides of the argument, and I underline the word necessity, will be fully and properly put."

Then there's a reference there to what
Lord Justice Bingham, as he then was, said in National Coal Board v Ridgeway and the decision in Bowman v Fels. Then he goes on to say:
"It seems to me that in the vast majority of such cases, this must involve counsel being instructed by solicitors being instructed by those with a real interest in the outcome of the appeal."
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDEY: My Lord, we say the same is true of the test cases, as reflected indeed in paragraph 2.5(a) of the relevant Practice Direction, and of course my clients have the very strongest interest in the test case. It is effectively theirs, amongst other insured's, rights that are actually being determined by this test case. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

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MR EDEY: Now, my Lord, once the FCA, as the party that is otherwise putting the points for all insureds, has acknowledged, as it has at paragraph 55 of the skeleton argument that I've just shown you, that it may not be able to put all the points that the applicant might wish to put on their policies in relation to the test case issues, in our respectful submission, it becomes absolutely plain that my client should be permitted, and indeed we respectfully say must be permitted, to intervene in order to comply with 2.5(a), because otherwise, my Lords, the effect is that the court would effectively be saying to these insureds: we are going to proceed to determine certain issues in this test case which will determine in practice your rights under your business interruption policies in a case which insurers themselves rightly describe as of the greatest significance for policyholders -- and that's Mr Gaisman's skeleton argument for Hiscox at paragraph 20, where he also describes this case as "truly unprecedented" and he refers to the fact that the consequences of adverse rulings either way will be of the greatest importance for insureds and policyholders and has the highest level of public interest in its outcome. And you would be saying: notwithstanding all of that, and it is your clients who are the people
affected, we are going to have the points dealt with without the ability, necessarily, to hear all the points.

My Lords, we say that simply can't be right. It would be inconsistent with paragraph 2.5(a) of the Practice Direction. It would be inconsistent with the overriding objective. It would be inconsistent, we say, with our right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR, including the right to access to the court, the right to be heard and the right to equality of arms, and it would also be inconsistent with the authorities which I've just shown you.

So, my Lords, against that background, what do insurers say the other way? And the answer is, nothing of substance. Indeed, none of them even oppose the application, but they can't quite bring themselves to consent to it .

We served them with this application last Friday, and then on Monday we asked them to indicate their position by midday on Tuesday. However, it was not until Wednesday afternoon that we first heard from Clyde \& Co on behalf of five of the eight defendants insurers, including RSA and Hiscox. And that letter, for your reference, is in volume 5, tab 1D at page E57(a), and my Lords, you don't need to turn it up

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if you don't want to, I can deal with it --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The reality is, Mr Edey, there is no principle objection to your intervention any more than there is to Mr Lynch's intervention. The points that are taken, insofar as points are taken, are really to do with case management at the trial, which, if we allow the interventions, is a matter for Mr Justice Butcher and myself.
MR EDEY: My Lord, with respect, that's exactly how we would put it. We've moved beyond the point of principle, about which we would respectfully say there can be no doubt, and the case management issues that then arise we must then deal with.

In fact, as we see it, we are agreeing to almost everything we are being asked to agree to, with only a very few exceptions, including on the question of whose time our very limited oral submissions come out of, and really that's more a matter for my Lords, the FCA and the insurers.

We are, as it were, neutral whose time it comes out of. The FCA has obviously consented to our application, including the time we're given, so the insurers will no doubt say it comes out of their time.

But, my Lord, we don't much mind. It's a case management question, perhaps, once the principle has
been dealt with, which we say: it should be dealt with in the way in which I've described.

The only point which my learned friend Mr Howard raises in his skeleton, while not opposing, and it is, as he says in paragraph 7, they have no objection to us intervening, but say we would abide by the same rules as other parties. We're happy to do that. We're not asking for some special treatment.

But they do nonetheless say at paragraph 12: well, you haven't identified with precision -- this is paragraph 5 of the skeleton argument, QBE, Mr Howard's skeleton argument. He says we have not identified with any precision the argument or arguments which we say the FCA has failed to plead in its particulars of claim and which will therefore not properly be before the court.

My Lords, I hope I've already dealt with that by reference to what the FCA have themselves said, but we would also say this, my Lords: it is particularly surprising to find QBE even raising that query given that its own pleaded case, as my Lord will find in volume 1B, tab 6, page 858 at paragraphs 54 to 55 -LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Give me that reference again. MR EDEY: Yes, my Lord. It's volume 1B, tab 6, page A858.

It 's paragraphs 54-55, and the very point QBE make there is that the FCA has not pleaded its case in

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a policy-specific manner, and it says it may be
a problem to do with the fact that it has chosen to represent all the insureds under all the policies.

My Lord, I don't enter into the debate about whether that's right or not or whether it's a fair criticism, but what on any view QBE is saying is the court would be more assisted by a policy-focused argument. My Lord, that is exactly what we wish to give the court by reference to the policies of the policyholders who I represent.

So, my Lord, of course we are unconstrained in doing that by the consideration which, entirely understandably, will play a part in the way in which the FCA presents it .

My Lords, the only point, then, other than whose time it comes out of -- I don't know whether my Lord wants to hear anything on the case management issues. I've dealt with, I think --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think we feel very strongly that the case management issues are a matter for us at trial. Trials are fluid events, in my experience, and I'm pretty certain that we will find the necessary time somewhere in a manner which doesn't inconvenience or prejudice anybody.

I mean, in principle I can see a strong argument
that your time, as it were, should be carved out of the FCA's time. If it transpires that we need to sit later one day, then no doubt we can do that. We're not saying we will, and we're not particularly enamoured of doing so, not least because combined experience, I think, is that these remote hearings are quite tiring compared with the real thing.

So I think case management really is best left for trial.

So far as skeletons are concerned, we've discussed that between ourselves and we have a strong view that your and Mr Lynch's client should be limited to 50 pages each, not between you, but 50 pages each, on the express understanding, Mr Edey, that if you want to apply to put in a longer skeleton, we will listen sympathetically. We're dealing with sensible counsel all round and we wouldn't expect sensible counsel to be repeating themselves and putting in points that were dealt with by other parties to the action.
MR EDEY: My Lord, on that basis, I'm not going to oppose a page limit at all. I was alarmed to see Mr Gaisman suggesting what he described as a "stringent " page limit for any interveners, notwithstanding the fact that he spent six pages in the skeleton argument explaining why there should be no page limit for him or anybody else,

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including on the basis you can trust all counsel in this case. I wasn't quite clear why that didn't apply to me. But nonetheless, in the light of your Lordship's indication, I am content to accept 50 pages, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, for the moment, Mr Edey, you can take it that it's a rebuttable presumption that counsel in the case are sensible enough not to put in excessively verbose skeleton arguments.
MR EDEY: I'm grateful, my Lord.
Can I just deal with one final point, then, before I leave this, a principle which relates to me only and not to Mr Lynch. You will have seen in our application that we complained or Ms Campbell explained that we anticipate that the number of insureds for whom we act will grow, and all we simply ask is they can be added as interveners without that in any way affecting the issues that arise, but simply that if we act for them, they, we say, should be, as it were, part of the intervention. Formally I will be acting on all their behalves.

Mr Howard appears to object to that at paragraph 6.1 of his skeleton argument, without explaining why, and without knowing what I'm shooting at, I can do no more than -- (overspeaking) --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We will hear from Mr Howard in due course on that point if it arises. Sorry, Mr Edey, I've
cut across you. Is that it?
EDEY: My Lord, I don't think I have anything further in light of your Lordship's tentative indication of the direction of travel.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Would it be sensible if we heard
Mr Lynch next?
MR EDEY: My Lord, yes.
Submissions by MR LYNCH
MR LYNCH: My Lord, thank you. Can your Lordships hear me?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I can hear you and see you.
MR LYNCH: My Lord, thank you. In light of my learned friend Mr Edey's very helpful submissions and your Lordship's tentative indication, I will be brief. If I could first point out that what the Hiscox applicants seek is consistent with, in fact identical to, what Mr Edey's clients seek, and so that overtakes what was set out in the draft order appended to my client 's application.

We have attempted to send a draft order to your Lordships this morning, but I don't know if it has made it. But, in any event, what is sought is simply in accordance with what Mr Edey's clients seek.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: For my part, Mr Lynch, I have not seen that.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No.
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MR LYNCH: My Lord, absolutely. And that's an important
    point of clarification, which is if the FCA are given
    that permission, then we would seek the same, but again
    limited to whatever page limits your Lordships indicate,
    if your Lordships give that permission at all. But if
    your Lordships don't, then we don't seek it either.
            2.2 remains, }30\mathrm{ minutes. }2.3\mathrm{ remains, }15\mathrm{ minutes.
        2.4 is removed entirely. I am afraid that was
    a misunderstanding. We do not seek to serve written
        closing submissions at all. No party, as I understand
        it, seeks permission to serve written closing
        submissions, and nor do we. I am afraid that should
        have been "reply skeleton arguments", but it got lost in
        the mix, I am afraid, so please strike that.
            So what my clients seek is the same as what
        Mr Edey's clients seek, and that is what the FCA has
        consented to, and so that was the --
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: And, Mr Lynch, that includes as to
        costs?
MR LYNCH: It includes as to costs, exactly. No order as to
    costs of the applicant's application or their role in
    the trial
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: All right.
MR LYNCH: My Lord, as to practicalities, one important
    point is obviously timings, and we recognise time is
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extremely short. As I hope I will indicate now, I will not repeat Mr Edey's points, there will be close collaboration between the interveners and the FCA and, as far as possible, amongst interveners, to avoid any repetition.

Time is tight. To the extent that we are able to sit early or late, which I realise is another request that the FCA makes on your Lordship's time, then obviously we would be extremely grateful. But we recognise that there are limits, and there are difficulties in sitting early and sitting late, and we recognise that. But we would be very grateful for any time the court can permit.

So that was just to clarify what we actually seek.
A second point was a point of clarification as well, which is that your Lordships may have seen from our skeleton arguments that I have in various parts referred to the FCA as being neutral. To be clear about that, what was not meant was neutral as against the insurers. What was meant was neutral in the sense set out at paragraph 55 of the FCA's skeleton, and that is important precisely for the reasons that Mr Edey has already explained, and it's that element of neutrality, not another element of neutrality. But I hope that was clear, at least read in context.

Then very briefly as to substance, as to which I will be guided by your Lordship, so I can be extremely quick, which is really to say Hiscox accept that the Hiscox applicants are affected parties, and there's a very good reason why they accept that, and that's because Hiscox say that the issues in the Hiscox applicants' case are going to be determined in these proceedings. Therefore, shutting them out would be to shut them out of the proceedings which would determine their own rights. So they are affected parties.

The only issue of principle is whether or not it's been adequately established that the proposed joinder is needed in order to ensure that all the arguments of those with opposing interests are properly put, as to which I simply adopt and repeat the very clear points put by Mr Edey and admitted by the FCA.

We can't forget that the background to this, indeed the basis for this, appears in the Framework Agreement. In particular, I would highlight recital E, which is that the insurers acknowledge that there is a dispute between them and certain policyholders in respect of the coverage issue and the causation issue, and the correct interpretation in respect of the terms of the policies relevant to those issues.

The FCA say: well, at paragraph 55 we recognise

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those tensions. The very party that would be putting
the arguments against the insurers recognises that there are or may be other arguments. In those circumstances, in order to satisfy the court, as the court must be satisfied, that, as my learned friend Mr Edey emphasised, all proper arguments will be put to the court, the only way to achieve that is by allowing the applications, we would respectfully submit.

It's also, just very briefly, realistic that points will be missed, no matter how excellent the legal team is for the FCA; more realistically because one would feel that Mr Edelman and team would never miss a point. It may be more a case of them selecting points because they've got so much to deal with.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think we understand the point you and Mr Edey are making.
MR LYNCH: Thank you.
Finally, my Lord, there will be no disruption if the order is made in the terms that we have now clarified. There are some points of detail addressed in the Hiscox skeleton. I wouldn't propose to deal with those, unless my learned friend Mr Gaisman addresses them, I would deal with them in reply.

Unless I can help with anything further.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, thank you very much.

Mr Edelman, I think you're next, aren't you?
MR EDELMAN: It's Ms Mulcahy.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Sorry, Ms Mulcahy. I did know it was you.

## Submissions by MS MULCAHY

MS MULCAHY: Apologies, my Lord, I was just switching on my video; can you hear me?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MS MULCAHY: I'm grateful.
My Lord, in relation to the Hiscox Action Group and the Hospitality Insurance Action Group interventions, as explained in our skeleton at paragraph 56, the FCA has given its consent for those applications to be permitted to intervene on the basis of the limited and non-duplicative role proposed by both interveners, and now Mr Edey's clients no longer pursue their application for them to potentially diverge from the general no costs rule, the FCA is able to fully consent to their application.

As the court is aware, it 's necessary for interveners to establish that they are both affected by the determination of the issues and that joinder is needed to ensure that the arguments of all those with opposing interests in relation to those issues are properly put before the court by those represented.

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Now, no one is disputing that the interveners are directly affected by the determination of the issues in question, even though the court is not going to be determining individual claims as part of the test case litigation.

But can I just say this: in relation to the issue of whether joinder is necessary and appropriate, the FCA has consented to these applications for three reasons: the first is fairness, given the importance to the interveners of their own claims and the consequences for them if they don't establish coverage.

The second is because the FCA cannot at this point in time, when pleadings are still not closed and written submissions have still not been fully worked up, rule out the possibility that the FCA may decide to advance on behalf of all policyholders under the relevant policies different arguments from those that the interveners would wish to advance, or they may wish to put a different emphasis on something. That will not become clear until relatively close to trial and clearly an attempt at intervention at that late point would be disruptive.

But thirdly and most importantly, it 's because the test case scheme permits interventions, and these potential parties have proposed to put their own
arguments before the court in a time-limited and reasonable way which doesn't threaten the process or seek to be duplicative and the FCA does not wish, in those circumstances, to stand in the way of some of the very kinds of people these proceedings are intended to help in the current circumstances.

However, can I say one thing, because some reasons have been advanced by each intervener, both in evidence and skeleton arguments, in support of their application to the effect that, firstly, that the FCA has not advanced certain points on behalf of policyholders because of its "neutral role", or that it must adopt what is described as a lowest common denominator approach, and those are suggestions which, in the interests of the potentially tens of thousands of policyholders which have policies that are the same or materially the same as those being tested in this case and who are depending on the FCA to argue the case, they don't have the benefit of funding enabling them to apply to intervene, the FCA would wish firmly to rebut.

If I may just say this: the FCA is confident that it can properly advance the interests of policyholders. It has done so to date; it will continue to do so. And whilst it has been suggested by the Hiscox Action Group that certain points have not been run by reference to
the particulars of claim, that is merely because those points are matters for submission rather than for the statement of case. So it would be incorrect to assume that the FCA is not intending to take these points.

And finally in terms of the FCA's position, its role in these proceedings is not neutral, although
I'm grateful to Mr Lynch for clarifying what he means by
"neutral ", which I think is "neutral as between different groups of policyholders ".

As explained last week by Mr Edelman, my learned friend Mr Edelman, the FCA has initiated this litigation in its role as regulator to achieve legal certainty in its response to certain selected wording to COVID-19 losses, because that is in everybody's interests, policyholder and insurers, to achieve certainty and to achieve it quickly, and by bringing a test case, the FCA is in a position to get or help achieve the earliest possible determination of those issues, and it is recognised many policyholders simply wouldn't have the resources to bring proceedings of this nature and complexity.

What was also made clear in the evidence before the last proceedings and in Mr Edelman's submissions is that the FCA's role in this test case is adversarial. Its role is to take up an opposing position to insurers, to
advance the case on behalf of policyholders properly and robustly and to test the arguments being advanced by insurers fully.

And this it will do to the best of its ability, and in that regard it is not acting as an amicus trying to assist the court in these proceedings. The FCA is seeking to establish that cover is available for business interruption losses under the policies that are the subject of this claim, and that's clear from the declaratory relief it is seeking.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, I think it is contemplated, Ms Mulcahy, that -- it may not be part of a formal order, but it's contemplated that if the interventions are permitted, that the interveners will liaise with the FCA, so far as possible, that the arguments that the interveners wish to put forward will be dealt with by the FCA. That's certainly what we contemplate will happen; that there will be, as it were, an iterative process.

I mean, I think what your skeleton argument is accepting though is that there may be certain arguments or as you put -- certain ways of putting things and certain emphasis that might be put on things that the particular interveners might wish to put in a more forceful way, and that's why they say intervention is

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appropriate in this case.
MS MULCAHY: My Lord, I can confirm that the FCA will liaise closely with the interveners in order to ensure that the submissions being made are not duplicative, that they are supplementary, and it is accepted that if they wish to put matters differently or to have a different emphasis -- my Lord says "more forcefully " -- it may be, in certain respects, that is the case, but they're in a position to do so.

But the idea is that the FCA will advance arguments on behalf of all policyholders, including the clients of the --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I don't think anybody thought that
it was being suggested the FCA was going to, as it were,
go soft. So I don't think you need be concerned about that.
MS MULCAHY: Well, I'm grateful.
In terms of practicalities, the FCA has seen a revised draft order which deals with both of those interventions. My learned friend Mr Lynch went through that with your Lordship.

I think it additionally has points about the service of documents on the interveners. The FCA, for its part, is content with the order that is proposed by the interveners.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Than you mery muth
Mr Howard, I think.

## Submissions by MR HOWARD

MR HOWARD: Yes, my Lord. Firstly, I apologise for delaying things this morning when I wasn't available, and I'm grateful that we were able to delay things for a shorter period of time.

My Lord, you will have seen that the position of QBE is it's not objecting to the hospitality group's joinder. Our position is simply we want to ensure that the joinder does not affect or prejudice the way in which the test case is being conducted or the interests of QBE and the other insurers, and so what we wanted to ensure was that the interveners would be confined to submissions in respect of the representative terms, and as I understand it, that is now common ground; that they will be so confined.

Now, on that basis we don't have any objection if Mr Edey's solicitors gather in more clients. I'm not sure I understand, really, what the purpose is in adding them formally to the proceedings, in that it doesn't seem to make a great deal of difference either way. But if they want to, that's a matter for them.

So our concern is simply that we're confined to the

So far as timetabling is concerned, the FCA hasn't suggested that this -- the time for the interveners come out of the insurers' time. I would simply say this: the FCA has a lot to get through in three days, with no less than 21 wordings, and clearly has a responsibility to all policyholders, including those that are not represented by the interveners, and accordingly whilst fully appreciating the burden that this litigation will place on the court as well as the parties, it has invited the court to at least consider sitting for perhaps a slightly longer period on certain days in order to --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, as I indicated earlier, that's something that Mr Justice Butcher and I have discussed. We think that's a case management issue for us at trial . MS MULCAHY: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If it transpires it is necessary -- in order to deal with the interventions it's necessary to sit late, then we will do so. We're not encouraging it or agreeing to it, but we will have to see how we go.
But we understand all the constraints that everybody is working under.
MS MULCAHY: Yes. I'm very grateful for that indication, and clearly it's a matter for the court, and I understand it will be left for trial.

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Do either Mr Edey or Mr Lynch want to say anything in reply?
MR EDEY: My Lord, there's nothing that I need to add. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Lynch?
MR LYNCH: My Lord, thank you, only to clarify that my learned friend Mr Gaisman makes a very fair point as to paragraph 31, and of course your Lordship's comments have been heard, and what of course was intended was only to refer to any policies that are already within the proceedings and any inaccuracy in the skeleton 1 am afraid is my own poor drafting.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That's a helpful clarification, thank you.
MR LYNCH: Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think it would be sensible if, before we go any further, we were to hear from counsel for Mr Sheehan, don't you, Mr Justice Butcher?
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Hendron, you are there, I think, somewhere.

Submissions by MR HENDRON
MR HENDRON: I am. Good morning, my Lord.
My Lords, I appear for Mr Sheehan. 51, Practice Direction 2.5(a), we ask the court for three things. First is permission to apply for witness statements

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limited to 25 pages. Secondly, permission to file skeleton arguments. Happy to limit that to 50 pages. And, lastly, my Lords, permission for oral submissions limited to 30 minutes.

Mr Sheehan is a sole trader and a publican. There are tens of thousands of people in his position across England and Wales.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Has your client liaised with the FCA at all to see whether the arguments you want to raise on his behalf are already being dealt with by the FCA?
MR HENDRON: My client has had various communications with the FCA. Insofar as the arguments that I wish to raise on his behalf, I don't believe they are, but I say that with a massive caveat.

In any event, my client, from his perspective as a publican and sole trader, may like to add a different emphasis as to those arguments pursued by the FCA, and as he repeats the submissions that the FCA make via Ms Mulcahy as to fairness, and the different perspective that Mr Sheehan, through his evidence and submissions on his behalf, may bring and can bring to the determination of the issues involved.

It seems, my Lord, that in these circumstances where all the other parties are either the insurers or the FCA, and granted the FCA share a mutual -- in principle
a mutual interest with that of my client, that there must be or there ought to be, if fairness has its way, a place for people such as Mr Sheehan, my client, to make representations from his unique perspective, as a publican who was affected and has been affected directly by the COVID-19 outbreak. And, my Lord, in my submission, his evidence and submissions on his behalf can only add to create an important context to which submissions can be built to the court.

I don't really have much further to add other than the Practice Direction envisages that applications from people such as my client can be made. He has
a qualifying claim. He was in business at the relevant time, in accordance with the Practice Direction, and he is a relevant market. So he meets the criteria as to whether it is desirable and as to whether he can add further to what is already being said or what is likely to be said. I don't need to repeat my submissions on that.

So for those reasons, my Lord, I would ask for what is a very short, relatively short, time out of the FCA's time to make submissions at the trial .
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Well, Ms Mulcahy, do you want to deal with this?

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## Submissions by MS MULCAHY

MS MULCAHY: Yes, my Lord. Mr Sheehan did make submissions to the FCA as part of the consultation process with policyholders. However, it only became aware of this application this morning. It doesn't appear to have been served with it, but we have had a look at the application and, indeed, at the policy which Mr Sheehan is insured under, which is a RSA pubs policy wording, it's a matter for the --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is that one of the ones -- is that one of the Eaton Gate wordings?
MS MULCAHY: No, it isn't. It's not a test case representative wording and if the intervention is permitted, it will expand the existing scope of the litigation.

But there is a further issue; that the clause in question, which is clause 4 in that policy, requires damage to property and that, again, is not within the scope of the test case.

What the FCA has sought to do, having had to restrict what it could achieve to the time -- to being able to do it in a quick time period, it has not sought to test wordings that involve damage. It has sought to test non-damage wordings. And that is clear, if you need a reference to it, from the Framework Agreement --

## LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, I think we've got that point.

MS MULCAHY: So if extended to include damage, that would be a major further stream and one that would involve different issues of law and principle.

Mr Sheehan has made a point in his witness statement by reference to the clause in question, which is a loss of attraction clause. It relates to where there is a fall in the number of customers attracted to the vicinity of the premises, whether the property used by you for the purposes of the business should be damaged or not. And he tries to contend that that's not property damage, but it's clear from the clause itself that it covers damage to property in the vicinity of the premises.

So we read those words as requiring damage to property in the vicinity, but not necessarily damage to the insured property. But it's clear that this is a policy requiring property damage, and for that reason, as I said, it's not within scope and it seems that Mr Sheehan is not affected by the issues being determined in the test case for the purpose of paragraph 2.5(a).

Now, ultimately it 's a matter for the court, but I hope that that will assist in terms of identifying what the intervention covers.

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## LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

MS MULCAHY: I believe Mr Turner for RSA would wish to -LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, I was going to say, Mr Turner is most obviously affected. It would be appropriate, I think, if we hear from him. Submissions by MR TURNER
MR TURNER: My Lord, RSA has enormous sympathy for Mr Sheehan, as it does for all of its policyholders who have been impacted by COVID-19.

We unfortunately oppose Mr Sheehan's application , essentially for the reasons given by Ms Mulcahy. Mr Sheehan will not be affected by the determination of the issues in the test case, that being the gateway criterion for intervention, because those issues do not include whether an outbreak of COVID-19 amounts to damage to property in the vicinity of his premises.

That's all I have to say.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Do you want to say anything in reply, Mr Hendron?

Submissions in reply by MR HENDRON
MR HENDRON: Well, I hear what my Lord said insofar as the court making clear it doesn't want to widen the policy wordings in consideration. I don't want to knock on that door too much, but I would ask if that is a determinative consideration of my client's
application, that the court reconsiders its position as to widening the policy point just to include damage to the property.

Putting that ask aside, and I see my Lord shaking his head and I will move on, my client is affected insofar as he has a policy which, under clause 3(a) -clause 4, rather. Sorry, 3(a) and 4(b), 4(b) is a clause that relates to the fall in the business premises revenue. So I would say, in my submission, my Lord, that my client is affected by issues to be determined.

If I'm wrong on that, then I would ask in my first submission to be joined to the proceedings because of the unique contribution that he could give in his evidence and the context he can put, as a publican, into the proceedings.

Those are my submissions.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much, Mr Hendron. I' II ask Mr Justice Butcher to give the ruling of
the court in relation to the intervention applications. (11.46 am)

Ruling (pending approval)
(11.51 am)

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much. Right.
MR EDELMAN: My Lords, it's Mr Edelman back. Just looking
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at the time, I anticipate that the transcribers might appreciate a break at this point, and it does seem a natural point.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, presumably this works as with other Skype; that when we press our red buttons, there's a thing that says " rejoin the meeting" and we then re-press that.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, can I suggest that the easier way would be simply to turn off video and microphone. It saves everybody having to log back in again.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Or just leave the room, Mr Edelman.
Well, it's now just after 11.50. So if I say 12 o' clock.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, yes, that sounds suitable.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much.
(11.52 am)
(A short break)
( 12.00 pm )
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, Mr Edelman, by my reckoning it's 12 o' clock. Have we got everyone here?
MR EDELMAN: Impossible for me to say, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, I'm not asking you; I'm asking generally whether --
MR EDELMAN: Well, that might cause everyone to turn on their microphones and that might cause chaos.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Are we now on to number --
MR EDELMAN: 6.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: -- 6. So this affects Mr Kealey,
doesn't it?
So, Mr Kealey.
MR EDELMAN: If Mr Kealey is here, then...
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If Mr Kealey is here. Are you here,
Mr Kealey?
MR KEALEY: I'm here. I hope you can see me somewhere.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I can.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I've had a request, and obviously as
he is there with his jacket on, not from Mr Kealey, but
from one of the members of the Bar, a request for them
to remove their jackets if possible when they're
speaking. I have the advantages of having an air
conditioning unit in my study, but I suspect others may
not do so and may be suffering in the heat.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, it's funny you should mention
that, because I was going to say, actually, at the
outset of the hearing, if anybody wants to take his
jacket off -- and I suppose her jacket off as well,
Ms Mulcahy -- then by all means feel free to do so.
Mr Kealey I'm sure won't want to.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I'm sure he won't.
MR KEALEY: I'm very conservative, my Lord. I' II keep my
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jacket on.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Kealey, precisely the point I was
about to make.
MR EDELMAN: Conservative in style, but not necessarily in
colour.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No. Very well, Mr Edelman. When you
two have finished, perhaps we could continue.
Submissions by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, we now move on to our application to
adduce expert evidence, and as I hope you have seen from
our skeletons, we don't intend to pursue an application
in circumstances where Ecclesiastical say they want to
get expert evidence to deal with this and can't do so.
We're a little surprised that they've been unable to do
so, but so be it. We don't doubt that they've made
efforts.
But the question is: what do we do now? Is the
court, as we would say is appropriate, prepared to
assume the facts pending Ecclesiastical obtaining any
evidence and indicating to us whether they are able to
agree or disagree, and is that assumption, if they can't
find an expert, to continue to trial, which we say it
should do? It should be an assumed fact at trial. Or
is Mr Kealey prepared to stand by his offer of an agreed
fact, if that's available from him? Is that
an alternative, or should I -- should the FCA be
debarred from this at all ?
Can I just paint the background to this. I think my Lords have seen from the skeletons the issue that arises on the Ecclesiastical wording, but if you want to see the main wording, that's at bundle 1, page 393 in our particulars of claim. That's probably the easiest place to see it.

> (Pause)

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: You will see that it provides cover where:
"... access to or use of the premises is prevented or hindered by any action of government, police or a local authority due to an emergency which could endanger human life or neighbouring property."

And there is an exclusion at (iii):
"Closure or restriction in use of the premises due to the order or advice of the competent local authority as a result of the occurrence of an infectious disease ..."

Et cetera.
And the main issue at trial on the scope of the language is going to be as to the meaning of the words "competent local authority ". I'm not suggesting there aren't other issues, to prevent Mr Kealey from saying
anything about that, but there's going to be a question as to whether "competent local authority ", construed in the light of the earlier reference to "government, police or local authority ", encompasses action by the government.

We anticipated from declinature letters that
Ecclesiastical would say that relevant to the construction of the words "competent local authority" is a Specified Diseases clause, which Mr Kealey has referred to in his skeleton and which relates to certain Specified Diseases and it provides cover if those diseases cause restrictions in the use of the premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority.

Now, this is a selective list of diseases in that clause, and if my Lords can turn on to page 396 of the bundle you were looking at -- you had 393 open, so it's just two or three pages on, three pages on.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Hang on. 396?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. You will see there is a table there, "Example reasons for declining cover", and if you go down to the fourth paragraph in that --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: -- you will see this is a fairly standard letter of declinature:
"We do provide businesses with cover for established
infectious diseases whose impact is assessable, known as Specified Disease cover. These diseases are set out in the policy and only those listed are covered. COVID-19 is not included on the list of diseases covered by this insurance. This is because, in common with most of the market, our insurance policies are not designed and priced to cover pandemics."

So we had anticipated that it would not be contentious that the diseases listed in the Specified Diseases exclusion would not reasonably be anticipated to be capable in the modern age of causing a pandemic. Of course, Mr Kealey is very keen to pick out some of those which might cause a stir. Something like smallpox in the past would have been capable of creating a pandemic, but that --
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: When you say "pandemic", Mr Edelman, it's not a question of a pandemic, is it? "Pandemic" means more than one country. We're not really concerned with that, are we?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: What we're concerned with is whether or not any of these -- I say "what we're concerned with"; an issue is whether any of the diseases in the list is capable of being widespread in the sense that it 's capable of covering more than, as it were, a confined area of one local authority.

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MR EDELMAN: Exactly.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Speaking for myself, I would have
    thought there are a huge number of diseases on that list
    which might very well, even in the modern age. I mean,
    the plague is an example. Mercifully we haven't had
    a plague in this country for a long while, but if we did
    have one...
MR EDELMAN: Well, our expert says --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The other thing, Mr Edelman, is we
        don't know how long this Specified Disease wording has
        been in use in one form or another, but the reality is
        that within our respective lifetimes there have been
        serious outbreaks of several of these diseases which
        have been widespread in this country. Measles, mumps
        and rubella; certainly there have been serious and
        widespread outbreaks of those diseases within the last
        20 or 30 years.
MR EDELMAN: I think my Lord needs to be careful about
        judicial memory because --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that may be right, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: -- there may well have been localised outbreaks
        amongst particular communities or --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Anyway, that's not the real point, is
        it?
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, the real point is whether -- because
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our experts, the expert from whom we've obtained evidence, has expressed an opinion as to the extreme unlikelihood of those diseases, in the modern age, being other than localised.
Of course they will have outbreaks. My Lord is quite right. But my Lord may only have a vague recollection of matters which is not accurate, and the expert is giving the expert opinion as to what is accurate.
Now, we're not asking at this stage or insisting that that evidence go in as expert evidence in circumstances where Ecclesiastical have yet to obtain an expert. But something needs to be done to have an assumption, and it can be an assumption one way or the other, and my Lord may or may not reach a decision which is affected by the assumption.
But in order to enable us, the FCA, to put forward policyholders ' case at the hearing in the best way that we feel is appropriate, we would invite the court not to shut out this evidence, even as an assumed fact, simply on the basis of either judicial recollection or any other basis.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, very well.
MR EDELMAN: That's what we -- can I just make some further observations about the criticisms that Mr Kealey makes.

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I should also observe that the declinature letter describes these diseases as being diseases whose impact is assessable, and assessable means, in our submission, that you can assess the extent of the impact that they will have, and that, we say, is a localised impact.

But Mr Kealey says this is all too late. Well, he will hopefully know the time pressures that all the parties have been under. And the insurers entered into the Framework Agreement knowing full well that things would have to be done under time pressure, and that that would necessarily mean that things were done at the last minute.

And I can tell the court that it was like a battlefield, as far as the FCA was concerned yesterday, receiving applications and representations right, left and centre. We haven't complained about that. It's a tight timetable. We appreciate it. But a complaint that something comes in in time but not earlier is, we submit, not a valid complaint.

He says that what we're trying to do is not relevant to the factual matrix. What we've sought to put in is something that we've considered in light of what
Ecclesiastical said to its own policyholders as a reason for declining cover, that the impact of the listed diseases was something that was assessable and they did

MR KEALEY: The order that is sought, in the middle of the page, is that:
"The Claimant shall have permission to rely on the expert report of Dr Samir Bhatt, dated 19 June, in relation to whether the expressly listed diseases in the Third Defendant's policy definition of "Specified Disease, could lead to a widespread outbreak in the UK or are likely to be localised in nature."
not insure un-assessable diseases. We had thought that in the spirit of the Framework Agreement, some agreement could have -- some agreed fact could have been offered.

As my Lords have seen, we've made strenuous efforts with other parties, despite the fact we don't accept the relevance of the alleged facts, to agree on things like events in Sweden, because that is the spirit of the Framework Agreement.

So it is unfortunate that Ecclesiastical is not even prepared to agree to this as an assumed fact, but, my Lord, that's where we are. We submit that it is relevant to the construction of the clause because it is evidence about the impact of these diseases and it would be unsatisfactory for the court to reach conclusions without some evidential basis for it.

As I've said, we're content to accept assumed facts, in the circumstances, but if my Lords are against me on that, then we would invite you to apply the approach that Mr Kealey seems to be prepared to accept in paragraph 39, but of course he may either say that's not available or he may resile from it, but he will, no doubt, say what his position is.

My Lords, those are my submissions.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Kealey.

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\section*{Submissions by MR KEALEY}

MR KEALEY: My Lord, there's a fundamental problem with this application. I just want to put paid to one thing before I go to the fundamental problem. The way in which Mr Edelman made his submissions is almost as though it's our fault that this has come out late, and that we can't possibly agree it. Far from that.

Can I just remind your Lordships, if I may, what this evidence is supposed to be. If you go to, I think it 's bundle 6 at F1, you' II see the application.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR KEALEY: I'm sorry to take you there. It's referred to in our skeleton, but it 's worth seeing it, as it were, facially, so you can see how it simply doesn't work.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Just a moment, Mr Kealey. It's F1. MR KEALEY: It's F-1, I think it's bundle 6, F-1.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Got it.
. Claimant shall have permission to rely on the
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mm. ..... 1
MR KEALEY: Then the reason is given, because the expertevidence is supposed to be "reasonably required toresolve the proceedings":
            "Whether the listed diseases could require
    a national response may be relevant to the breadth of
    the meaning of 'competent local authority' in the
    disease clause and whether it could include the national
    Government and potentially also therefore the meaning of
    the same term in the exclusion of the prevention of
    access clause."
        Mr Paul Lewis has signed a witness statement to
    exactly the same effect, which goes no further
        Could I just remind your Lordship before we go any
    further to what Mr Edelman's skeleton says in relation
    to the RSA's application, which your Lordships
    dismissed.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR KEALEY: It's in his supplemental skeleton argument at
    paragraph 8. Could I please adopt it mutatis mutandis.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, you say what's sauce for the goose
    is sauce for the gander.
MR KEALEY: Yes, and I wouldn't necessarily describe
    Mr Edelman as necessarily a goose or a gander, but
    certainly the direction of your Lordship's comment is
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    certainly accepted.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR KEALEY: Although it's sought to be justified as factual
    matrix, it patently fails to pass the test for
    admissible factual matrix. There is no suggestion that
    RSA is, for it to read my client's, Ecclesiastical 's,
    policyholders, or any brokers they may have used in
    relation to the selected test case wordings were aware
    that these Specified Diseases were or were not such as
    would lead to a widespread outbreak in the UK or are
    likely to be localised in nature.
    In fact, given your judicial recollection, my Lord,
    it may actually be that the policyholders being in the
    main clerics and nursery school owners and people who
    operated nursery schools may actually think that they
    are epidemic in nature, rather than what Dr Bhatt, who
    is a rather specialist - specialist from Imperial College,
    after much cogitation, it would appear, and consultation
    with probably innumerable, although not actually
    numbered in his report, colleagues have concluded.
    So go on with Mr Edelman's skeleton. Indeed, the
    second statement doesn't even say that RSA was aware of
    it when the policies were entered into. Well, what you
    have is a complete absence from or on behalf of the RSA
    or any policyholder or, indeed, in relation to any
underwriter at Ecclesiastical that it was aware of anything in relation to this, let alone the evidence sought to be adduced through Dr Bhatt.

So the idea of going back to the application notice or the application form, whatever it is to be described as, the idea that this is admissible evidence as it stands is, I would respectfully suggest, simply wrong.

At page 12 of the [draft] transcript this morning, Mr Edelman said that -- or, rather, it 's [draft] page 12, so if you could go down for a little while. He says that there was no evidence, my Lord:
"There's no [evidence] advanced either that the policyholder or their brokers, if they used brokers, were aware or had any means of being aware of the particular wording..."

For which read: what this expert evidence is relied upon:
"... and there's no obvious reason why they should have been aware of it."

It's really on the basis of that that Mr Edelman advanced his arguments against the RSA application. It was on the basis of that that your Lordships dismissed the application, rejected it, and quite rightly, if I may respectfully say for the RSA, forgive me. But that's as it goes.

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Can I just take your Lordships, if I may, to Dr Bhatt and what and who he is. You've probably seen that. I don't know where you would like to see it, but you see his report attached in F1 where I was just before.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So it's attached to Mr Lewis' witness statement, isn't it?
MR KEALEY: It's attached to Mr Lewis' witness statement. Mr Lewis' witness statement, I've already referred to, says absolutely nothing about what a policyholder or an underwriter knew or should have had available to him or to her to be known.

If you go to the witness statement itself, the expert report, forgive me, at F12, this is from a gentleman of quite considerable specialism and expertise, and I don't think many policyholders quite live up to his qualifications. I'm not sure that there are many clerics who actually share his expertise.

But he is currently employed by Imperial as a senior lecturer / associate professor in Geostatics, something which I have to confess that, until I looked it up, I wasn't sure what it meant, in the Department of Infectious Disease, Epidemiology and Faculty of Medicine in the School of Public Health:
"I have been involved in the study of infectious
diseases since 2006 and have co-authored publications relating to a number of diseases below."

And there are nine of them.
Then in paragraph 3 he tells us what he was instructed to provide an independent expert in relation to:
"Whether outbreaks in the UK of the specified diseases in the table set out at paragraph 15 below are likely to be localised in nature."

He has been provided copies of various documents.
Then at paragraph 13, my Lords, at bundle F,
page 15 , at paragraph 13 , he says:
"In the preparation of this report, I have been assisted by a number of my colleagues from Imperial College."

So one has the impression of a veritable team of expert specialists in infectious disease, epidemiology and probably geostatics who have come up with the conclusions set out in this report which, of course, are the expression of Dr Bhatt's opinion and only his own.

Then paragraph 14 tells you what he has been asked to consider, and he says in the fifth line of paragraph 14:
"Whilst the characteristics of some of the diseases listed below are such that outbreaks could give rise to

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nationwide epidemics, and historic outbreaks of some of the diseases have been widespread, it 's my view that given current healthcare standards and practices in the UK that it's extremely unlikely that any of the diseases listed below could lead to a widespread outbreak in the UK. This is because, aside from existing treatments and vaccinations, none of the diseases listed below is a novel virus where both the level of susceptibility is very high and no preventive measures exist."
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Then if your Lordships could turn -well, then you have the reference to something which is now, of course, very well known in the United Kingdom; "herd immunity".

Then at paragraph 15 , he says -- he explains the specific reasons why an outbreak of each disease would be localised in nature, unlikely to be the type to give rise to a nationwide epidemic affecting 21st century UK. Then you have anthrax, cholera, measles, mumps, rubella, scarlet fever, typhus fever, viral hepatitis, whooping cough, et cetera.

So what we say, my Lord, is a fundamental point. It's not a question of: oh, well, what can we do about this? Why don't we have a couple of assumed facts? It's not a question of that at all: it's a question of the admissibility and relevant of this evidence, and our
respectful submission, put briefly, is that it 's wholly irrelevant and wholly inadmissible.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, thank you.
MR KEALEY: That doesn't even deal, my Lord, with the only prepared fact that we were prepared to give, which is no more and no less than at paragraph 39 of our skeleton, which is merely that someone who happens to be an associate professor in geostatics in the Department of Infectious Disease, Epidemiology, Faculty of Medicine, School of Public Health at Imperial College London, after assistance from a number of his colleagues at Imperial, has concluded that he is able to set out the opinions expressed in that report; in other words, the report.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: How does that help us to decide the issues with which we are concerned?
MR KEALEY: It doesn't help you at all. It's rather like saying a nuclear physicist will be able to tell you what he, a nuclear physicist, is able to tell you.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR KEALEY: It tells you nothing more about that. Certainly it doesn't help you or the FCA or justice to determine what the proper interpretation of these wordings is. And that's a fundamental issue, and that's why we say that you shouldn't even contemplate going any further.

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If you want me to go further, you have it all in writing. It is far too late. Factual matrix evidence is quintessentially something to be pleaded. It is quintessentially something in this case which was not pleaded. So we are in absolutely no position to deal with this.

As to the reference to what is described by my learned friend as one standard declinature letter, well, in this country, as I recall, the proper interpretation of contracts is not to be determined by reference to post-contractual conduct or words or expressions or opinions. That's as I had always understood the law, but it 's been such a long time since I went to university I can't really remember whether that still subsists, but I think it probably does. Therefore, all those references are equally irrelevant, inadmissible and should not have been made.

So those are my submissions, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Kealey. Mr Edelman.

Submissions in reply by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: It's interesting to just remember what the issue actually is in this case on the clause. The clause the FCA relies on refers to a government or local authority. The exclusion only refers to a local
authority, and one might, therefore, think that it only refers to a local authority and not to a government.
But no, no, no, say Ecclesiastical, and this is what we anticipated. It's suggested that we should have pleaded factual matrix for an anticipated construction argument. No, no, no, they say; look at this other clause where we use the same phrase, and although we use the word "local" in that clause, we actually meant "government" as well as "local " in that clause, even though we've distinguished between the two of them in the clause you're relying on.

Really, what we're doing is just seeking to defuse that argument on the basis that " local " makes perfect sense in the other clause in the context of the diseases referred to, in the sense that it is a sensible construction of the words to say that it is local.

But that needs the court to understand something about the diseases. Now, that's not factual matrix; we're construing the words. We're trying to understand what the implications of those words are.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's seeking to construe the words in the contract by reference to some other extraneous fact. If that's not part of the factual matrix, I don't know what is. Nice try, Mr Edelman, but I am afraid you won't get out of it that way.

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MR EDELMAN: Well, my Lord, what it's doing is it's explaining that one sometimes has technical words used in a contract. One doesn't say that the evidence -LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's not a dictionary definition at all.
MR EDELMAN: No, but, my Lord, one sometimes has language used in a policy where one needs some technical assistance to understand what it means and what its implications are, and that is what this evidence is going to.

What are the implications of smallpox, for example? Is that a disease in the context of the use of these words? Does it make sense only to be referring to a local authority in the context of smallpox? A few centuries ago, certainly not, but nowadays it will be -it will make sense.

And that's the simple point that we try to make; that the court needs to understand and not have a misappreciation of the implications of the diseases to which this clause is referring.

If Mr Kealey is going to say that he accepts that what Dr Bhatt says as being actually correct but Ecclesiastical won't, which is perhaps surprising -- but the concern that the FCA has is that Mr Kealey, with his usual enthusiasm, will start saying how terrible all
these diseases -- smallpox can be a real killer everywhere, and that needs to be restrained.

We submit that the appropriate way forward would be to assume the fact. My Lord --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Edelman, if Mr Kealey tries to make submissions like that, he's likely to be met by the court with exactly the point that he resisted the adducing of expert evidence on that issue. So I don't think -- I think your fear in that respect is probably misguided in this context. Even allowing for Mr Kealey's boundless enthusiasm, I'm sure that the members of the court are capable of restraining him in that sort of respect if he raises points which are not appropriate, given the history of the case management.
MR EDELMAN: But it also, with respect, my Lord, then involves the court imposing its own self-restraint, and the court must not make any assumptions one way or the other as to the capability of those listed diseases to have an impact beyond a particular locality.

Local authority can be a regional one. We say it's not a national one because the other clause draws a distinction between "government" and "local", but as long as the court also is not going to approach the construction of this clause with any conclusion in mind or inclination in mind as to the capability of these

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diseases to cause some impact beyond a locality, then it may be that the problem is resolved. But that was our concern.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I'm not going to restrain our approach to construction. I think the issue for us is whether this expert evidence is admissible for the reasons you've given.

Very well. Is there anything else you want to say? MR EDELMAN: No, my Lord.
( 12.35 pm )
Ruling (pending approval)
(12.39 pm)

\section*{Submissions by MR EDELMAN}

MR EDELMAN: Thank you. May I then move on to the next item, which is item 7, assumed facts.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: It's raised in QBE's skeleton by Mr Howard, who I think is the appointed person to deal with that, and he refers to the scenarios that have been sent.

I'm not sure whether it's an appropriate subject for the hearing today, but all I can say is they have sought to simplify the scenarios, but they do still seem to us to be unduly complex. I can elaborate on that if the court -- if it would assist the court, but our concern is that some of the -- if my Lords have had
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    an opportunity to read the pleadings, some of the issues
    that are raised are issues of principle, and that's what
    this case was supposed to be about.
            For example, do you prevent access to premises only
        when you're required to close them or do you prevent
        access to premises when you prevent people from visiting them?
    MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: What are we meant to be doing about this now, because --
MR EDELMAN: Well, nothing.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: -- if the example is unduly complicated, then it won't help us.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, but I'm concerned -- there is a concern that insurers are trying -- there is a principle involved, and that is that the insurers are trying to turn what the FCA regards as issues of principle -- for example, how do you apply under a trends clause? How do you apply the but-for test? Are these clauses different from Orient Express? Is Orient Express correctly decided, or I should say was the decision of the tribunal, arbitration tribunal, in Orient Express correct? It was, of course, endorsed by Mr Justice Hamblen, so his decision may need to be revisited. But those are issues of principle which will need to be considered and decided by the court.

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What we don't want to turn this into is a trial of many sample cases so that -- one does, of course, in litigation have sample cases selected and the facts of those sample cases investigated by the court in the hope that the answer to those sample cases will provide an answer to others. That's not the purpose of this litigation.
The purpose of this litigation is to try and extract from the defences and reasons for declinature that insurers have been giving some defences of general application which raise issues of principle which can be argued and decided by the court. It's not, as
I emphasise again, a trial of sample cases.
That is the only issue of principle, I think, that arises, and where the parties may be missing each other.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: What are you actually inviting us to do?
MR EDELMAN: We didn't raise it. I think it was Mr Howard who raised it in his skeleton, and so --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, perhaps we'd better hear from Mr Howard.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, perhaps we'd better hear what he wants to say about it.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Mr Howard, are you still there?

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\section*{Submissions by MR HOWARD}

MR HOWARD: I am, my Lord.
My Lord, we recognise there's nothing that your Lordship is actually required to do today, but bearing in mind this is the case management conference, it probably is appropriate just to ventilate the point so that your Lordships can have any input into how this is going forward.

Can I say this: I don't actually think there is any disagreement between the insurers and the FCA on this,
in that this is a test case whose purpose is essentially to determine issues of principle as to -- we're calling it construction; it's slightly more than matters of construction because it's also approach to causation. But whether one calls that a construction point or a legal principle doesn't really matter.

Now, the only point that we are making, and I think the FCA make, is that when the court is considering these questions, one is obviously not going to be considering it purely as arid questions isolated from real-world issues, and so the assumed facts are -- the court is obviously not determining those. They're simply meant to be factual scenarios against which the court can consider the issues of construction and the approach to causation.

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Now, the problem is if we don't agree the assumptions, people then in their skeleton arguments may refer to different hypotheses and different factual scenarios and the matter potentially gets out of hand. So the idea is that one has got, as it were, an agreed playing field against which one is going to try these things.

Now, I think it might be helpful if your Lordships -- I don't know whether you have had a chance to look at what we're talking about, if I just showed it to you very briefly. The latest version of the assumed facts has been added into the bundle at I, page 511 in bundle 9 .

At 511 is a composite document which contains the different factual assumptions which are set out in seven different categories. It may be simpler, rather than looking at the composite, if one goes on to 519. You have category 1, and we can just take that as an example. What one sees is one is looking at, on page 520, a restaurant business operating in Central London, operating from one premises and so on. Then it 's looking at different potential scenarios where a business like that has been affected by COVID-19 outbreak, and what your Lordships can see, and I'm sure you are aware of, is there are permutations about how

\section*{a business was affected.}

So one has, firstly, got the period in early March prior to the government lockdown, as it's being called, later in March. So one is looking at factually what potentially happened and one is then trying to understand how, if at all, any of the clauses respond to that. One is then looking at questions of downturn in business that was suffered at that stage, how that fits into the trends clause and so on.

Now is not the time to argue the point, but you can see, if you take category 1 , it isn't actually particularly complicated: it's just laying out some factual scenarios and variants on the factual scenarios, and we believe that the court ultimately will be assisted when considering the various arguments, particularly the application of the but-for test, causation and the trend clause, to bear in mind these different permutations, and will probably want to express some sort of view on them.

That's not making this into a trial of sample cases, but it is trying to deal with the questions not in the abstract, but apply them to potentially real-world situations.

The situations that have been set out in these different -- there are altogether eight -- categories
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are ones which are based upon information input from loss adjusters in relation to real claims that are coming forward. So it's not, as it were, some flight of fancy. This does actually represent what real insureds experience and the types of situations in respect of which they are seeking an indemnity.

Now, my Lord, as I said --
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: So, Mr Howard, it's like what happens in lots of cases, where counsel says assume -- I mean, just take the example, for example. This is going to put those examples, which counsel might otherwise invent on the hoof, on paper in advance; is that really right?
MR HOWARD: Essentially, and it also ensures that we only -we don't invent more examples, but the examples that people want to use by way of reference points, if I can put it like that, in their argument are the ones that are defined because, as \(I\) say, the danger is -- and I think everybody recognises we needed to do this. I think the only issue that my learned friend Mr Edelman raised is he says these are too complicated. But, as I understand his skeleton from last night, they're now going to look at them and look at them, I'm sure, constructively .

So, as I say, I don't think there's anything for the court to do today, unless the court has a view, looking
at these, as to whether they are or are not helpful.
We believe they are helpful. Indeed, we say it is essential that one doesn't just look at this purely in the abstract and that one has in mind actually what has happened in the real world and how the policy questions we're asking you to decide relate to real-world issues.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, in a sense, since you're not inviting us to decide anything today, there's probably a limited amount we can say.

Speaking for myself, I would have thought that if a series of factual scenarios can be agreed between the parties, that would be helpful to the court at the trial in due course. So we would encourage, in the spirit of the framework agreement, that the parties endeavour to agree these. I'm sure both sides have heard their respective arguments addressed by you and Mr Edelman and can go away and endeavour to resolve any differences between you.
MR HOWARD: Yes, for my part --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I mean, it's quite difficult really,
Mr Howard, because I don't think -- it would be difficult to see what, as it were, our jurisdiction would be to say -- we can't force you to agree things between yourselves, but I suppose that if you were unable to agree the assumed facts, you might have to

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come back to court, I think probably on paper, for Mr Justice Butcher and I to say whether we think your assumed facts are helpful and they would form the basis upon which we would consider issues of construction at the trial.
MR HOWARD: I think a point that is probably worth bearing in mind; these assumed facts, it doesn't mean that every single one is necessarily going to be referred to, and obviously the position of the different insurers depends upon what type of business they were writing as to the extent to which they, in relation to their policy terms, will want to look at them.

So, for instance, number 7 as to (a) and (b), they relate to the position of Ecclesiastical , who wrote insurance cover covering different types of schools, church schools and I think private schools. So it's simply looking at the different variants.

Now, it may well be that when people come to their written arguments that they won't need to go into a lot of detail about this, but this is -- as I say, it 's intended as an aid to the court in reaching its decisions.

But I think for my part, unless there's anything Mr Edelman says, we're content with that direction and we will seek to agree these insofar as we can.
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MR EDELMAN: My Lord, can I just say it is very
unsatisfactory for Mr Howard to say: well, insurers will
take a look at these and see whether they need to deploy
them, because if examples like this are on the table,
the FCA will use up -- and are there to be addressed,
will have to use up a huge amount of its resources
addressing all these examples, not knowing whether
insurers, when they come to write their arguments,
whether these are to be exchanged or sequential, the
same problem will arise, without knowing whether the
insurers, in the fullness of time when they come to put
pen to paper, will say: oh, we didn't really need that.
Before leaving this subject, I know the court can't
do much more, but I just want to show you, for example,
the skeleton argument of today of Argenta.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: I wonder if my Lord could just look at
paragraphs 7-9. This is not an unusual type of policy.
It's got a 25-mile radius clause, disease within
a 25-mile radius. The point that Argenta make -- and
it 's made by a number of insurers -- is your loss wasn't
caused by an outbreak within 25-miles; it was caused by
the national outbreak.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: Whilst there may be odd cases where you can

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prove that the outbreak locally caused it, on a general level, the loss is attributable to the national pandemic.

Now, we will have our causation arguments to address that, but we do struggle to see what examples at all are necessary to deal with that fundamental causation point. We have an answer to it. We will -- insurers will see it and -- but it's a matter of principle as to how you apply the causation test.

But we can't -- and this is, as I say, not a -- I've not picked Argenta as being exceptional, because a number of insurers --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's a point that's taken by many of them, isn't it ?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, and you don't need probably any examples, but let alone examples of the complexity you were just shown, to answer that point.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, the difficulty is, you very skillfully picked on an issue of construction in relation to which you say that none of this would be of any assistance to the court.

No doubt if we spent enough time on this question, Mr Howard could point us to other scenarios which might be of assistance in relation to some of the issues of construction we have to determine, given that nobody is
actually inviting us to do anything or to rule on anything today, it doesn't seem to me it's actually a particularly helpful use of our time given, as ever, we have a limit.

All I would say is at least in principle, unless Mr Justice Butcher disagrees with me, and I don't think he does -- he will speak out if he does -- in principle it would seem sensible that we have some sort of -- that we're not deciding issues in a vacuum, so we need to have some sort of assumed factual scenarios against which some of these issues we decide.

So it does seem to me to be sensible if the parties could endeavour to agree those matters, and if they can't agree them then the court will have to look at them on paper and decide whether or not we think they would be helpful. But I don't think we can go any further than that today.
MR EDELMAN: We've never said that we won't agree these. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, no. I understand your point, but it does seem to me that at least an effort should be made to put something before the court for the trial, a series of assumed scenarios that we can look at in the context of some of the issues of construction that we have to decide.
MR EDELMAN: It may be that that's best finalised in light

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of the list of issues.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That may be right, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: And identify which issues actually would benefit from examples rather than examples in the abstract, because there are some real threshold issues for example as to the application of Orient Express, whether it is rightly decided, how it applies where you've got an insuring provision with multiple triggers in it. One has those issues, which are issues which probably don't need examples, but I'm not ruling out the fact that there may be others that would benefit from examples.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, okay. Right, well I don't think we can take that any further for now. It's almost 1 o'clock, so it might be sensible if we broke there. MR EDELMAN: Yes, I can probably, if my Lord -- well, I could deal with something -- maybe it would be better deal with it after lunch.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, the next matter is your application for permission to amend.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, that's obviously a major one.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: And the disease prevalence issue, which is obviously something that is going to take longer than two minutes.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, I was just seeing if there was something
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        that could be dealt with in two minutes.
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Then I think once we've dealt with
that, we're really then -- agreed facts I think we don't
need to worry about, because I think that's been sorted.
We're then on to, really, the procedural issues for
trial.
MR EDELMAN: Well, there are some timing of response issues
on the agreed --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. I mean, we've discussed all these
points and we've formed preliminary views on them, we'll
obviously hear counsel's arguments, but they shouldn't
take an immense length of time.
So we'll adjourn until 2 o'clock and we'll pick up
on disease prevalence at 2 o'clock, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: Right. I'm grateful, my Lord.
(12.59 pm)
(The Luncheon Adjournment)
(1.59 pm)
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, I think we're all here,
Mr Edelman.
Submissions by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: Yes, I think we are, and so I will move on to
the next item on the agenda, which is item 8, and
I intend to deal with that by reference to its
subparagraphs and not collectively, if I may --

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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: -- because the first item needs separate treatment because it may affect what is said about the rest, is our application to amend, which I understand the opposition to which is being led by Mr Gaisman.

He says, as I understand it, the ground for opposing our application to amend is said to be that it is demurrable as a matter of law. Our submission, in a nutshell, is that we are entitled to put before the court in July a methodology for insureds to discharge their burden of proof, which it has been treated as sufficient for doing so, and in that regard, insureds should be entitled to rely on the same data and information that the government is relying on for the purposes of running the affairs of the country.

Now, my Lords cannot decide whether it is or is not legally permissible for the FCA to advance that case. What I am inviting the court to do is to allow the FCA the opportunity at the trial to advance such a case, and it would only be if you could exclude that as being utterly hopeless and unarguable that, in my submission, it would be appropriate to refuse an application to amend, and particularly given the importance of these insurance issues to so many businesses, if it is possible for this amendment to be allowed, the court
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ought to do so, so that all possible avenues of solving what is a real logjam for policyholders can be overcome. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Edelman, can I just try and understand your rebuttal presumption point? Is it this: that you say that what you would argue at the trial is that, other things being equal, the methodology which you would advocate, should the court decide that that is effectively an appropriate methodology save in cases where insurers can show that in the particular case it isn't an appropriate methodology, for whatever reason? MR EDELMAN: Yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is that --
MR EDELMAN: Yes, and my Lord saw that I sent you, although
I referred to it on the last occasion, so insurers
should not be taken by surprise by it --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: -- I sent you that decision in Equitas v R\&Q; I recognise it was a very different situation but with some important analogy. And both my Lords will be familiar, I'm sure, with that case; the difficulties that the decisions of the courts here not to allow reinsurance recoveries for the Exxon Valdez disaster and the decision of the courts to divide up the Kuwait Airport losses so as to treat British Airways as a separate loss, the implications that had for losses

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which were already circling around the LMX spiral. And the defendant in the Equitas case insisted on adequate proof being only by an undoing of all the settlement and proof down to the last penny of --

\section*{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Liability.}

MR EDELMAN: -- liability. What Equitas did was to get an actuarial report which did a probability analysis on how that should all work out.

If my Lords have the cases at hand -- I don't know if you do; it was sent in soft copy to you -- there's a helpful passage in the judgment at paragraph 70.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Just a moment, Mr Edelman. I know we received it, but the problem is there are so many emails.
MR EDELMAN: I know, yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's finding the right one. Hang on. (Pause)

Yes, l've got it.
MR EDELMAN: Right, I'm very grateful.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: If you go to 613 , it's paragraph 70. One of
the advantages the court will have is I don't need to
paint too much of a background to the case.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I'm just getting there.
MR EDELMAN: Page 613 of the original.
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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I've got it.
MR EDELMAN: What's said there by Mr Justice Gross is:
"There is a danger of over-complicating the analysis
or the terminology by straying into ' legal ',
' evidential ', ' shifting' and ' provisional ' burdens of
proof."
Then he gives references:
"That said, a consideration of and the distinction
between, the nature of the burdens involved may be
helpful in shedding light on this issue."
He's adopting the phraseology of Mr Justice Evans,
and he cites the case:
"... it can be suggested that the concern here lies
with the ' evidential and therefore a shifting burden of
proof'. If this be right, then Equitas is entitled to
discharge the legal burden resting upon it (of
satisfying Lord Mustill's first rule) by the use of the
best evidence it has available; should such evidence
prima facie suffice to discharge that legal burden,
Equitas does not need to undertake a progress of
regression ; it would be for R\&Q to mount a sufficient
response which necessitates Equitas doing so."
So the question posed, firstly, is it the best
evidence that a policyholder would have available? And
insurers make a point of saying: there is no other

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evidence and we would have to go off and find another expert to find it.

So, in a sense, their defences tell you that the government statistics and the analyses through Public Health England, which is what the Cambridge analysis is, in collaboration with Public Health England, the evidence they are relying on is the best evidence that any policyholder would have available, and one of the reasons that the FCA was so concerned about insurers' attitude to all this is that it is the best evidence available even if the implications of it aren't to insurers ' liking.

Then the next question is: it may be the best evidence available, but the court may not regard it as sufficient prima facie to discharge the legal burden. So the question the court has to ask itself : is it, on the face of it, sufficient to discharge a legal burden?

Of course, in the Equitas case they were dealing with an individual actuary's report. He prepared a report for the purposes of the case in the form of an expert report. Here, we would say, that actually this is data relied on by the government. It's a methodology and model relied on by the government and that prima facie should suffice to discharge the legal burden, and as the judgment goes on to say, that's not
the end of the matter, because by recognising that it's not the perfect evidence, one necessarily acknowledges that the other party should have the opportunity to say: well, that may be the best evidence, it may be sufficient prima facie to discharge the legal burden, but it 's wrong and doesn't -- or doesn't apply in an individual case for reasons \(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}\).

I make it clear, I'm not asking you to decide all this now; all I am doing is simply to explain the nature of the case and why it is not, as Mr Gaisman would say, demurrable as a matter of law and why we should be permitted to advance it.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Mr Edelman, I understand, I think, roughly what you're saying as to the case you want to advance. What I don't understand at the moment is how that relates to wider questions of how this matter might be proved.

So just suppose that you were allowed to make this amendment and just suppose that at the hearing it was found that, for whatever reason, \(R \& Q\) was not a very good analogy and that this proof wasn't sufficient. Let's just assume that. Where does the FCA then go? Does it say: okay, we do want to try and prove it by some other means, or what?
MR EDELMAN: I think there would then have to be discussion

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and consultation with the insurance industry as to how to move forward, because I don't -- my understanding is that the FCA would not regard it as an acceptable position for policyholders, as they may well be, to be required -- we all know when you put in an insurance claim, you're required to submit certain elements of proof, and the concern is that insurers will continue to say to policyholders: thank you for your accounts, thank you for this piece of information, thank you for that piece of information. In order to consider your claim, we also need your evidence of incidence, which most of the policyholders -- and you've heard of the range of policyholders we're concerned with today, you have had a sample, at least, of the type of policyholder -- they would just not know where to start.

And so there has to be a solution to this logjam, and it was one of the aims of the FCA to try and overcome this problem somehow, because I think we'd debated it at the last hearing. It was in the very first draft of the questions for determination and there are various routes which the FCA might wish to consider.

Certainly if you were against me on this today, the application to amend, the FCA would want to go away and think about where it was going to go next, because the prospect of another trial -- it 's not just the cost, but
it 's also the delay -- is not something that the FCA would enter into lightly and would need some time to consider it, but also to discuss with insurers whether that was what they really wanted to do and to be seen to be doing.

And there may be other regulatory alternatives that the FCA may want to consider. I'm not privy to those. I couldn't comment on those. I just raise it as a possibility.

But what we want to do is to at least have the opportunity to see if we can persuade the court to find a solution. Courts have done it in different scenarios where exceptional circumstances create difficulties that wouldn't arise in other cases. Sometimes exceptional cases require exceptional remedies, and we would submit that this is just such a case.

One asks oneself also, where would a trial go? Let's say that insurers find an expert who comes up with different projections. How is the court going to choose between the two experts? It's very difficult because these are, as I've said, estimates. The government has relied for its whole policy on estimates. The question is: is an estimate a sufficiently reliable estimate to discharge prima facie the burden of proof? And, as l've said, our argument is if it's --
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\begin{tabular}{ll} 
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: There's no particular difficulty, is & 1 \\
there, in the court deciding between two different \\
experts' estimates? I mean, that is not an unusual & 2 \\
situation. & 3 \\
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, and indeed if, for example -- and & 4 \\
I know it's said by the insurers that they can't & 5 \\
actually find an appropriate expert, but assume for the & 6 \\
sake of argument that there did have to be a subsequent & 7 \\
trial, which would not be -- well, it won't be in & 8 \\
August, but it might well be in the first week or so of & 9 \\
September, if we had to have one, and it might only be & 10 \\
a few days, which would give the insurers the time to & 11 \\
find the experts they say they want. And then the court & 12 \\
is faced with rival expert evidence, for example, as to & 13 \\
the accuracy of the Public Health England figures, the & 14 \\
accuracy of the Cambridge analysis and so on and so & 15 \\
forth. Just as in any other case where there's rival & 16 \\
expert evidence about, in this case, statistics, the & 17 \\
court will have to make its mind up. & 18 \\
I mean, the difficulty -- I mean, we haven't heard & 19 \\
Mr Gaisman on this yet, but I can see the force of your & 20 \\
point, that you should at least be allowed to argue & 21 \\
this. But it seems to me in one sense that you will be & 22 \\
faced with exactly the same arguments at trial, whether & 23 \\
Mr Gaisman is right that it 's to do -- you know, your & 24 \\
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point is demurral as a matter of law may be debatable, but the insurers will still say, will they not: this is not a satisfactory way of proceeding because there are all sorts of ifs and buts about this approach, and we haven't had a chance to produce our own expert?
MR EDELMAN: Well, that will then be a matter for them to say what was sufficient to discharge the burden of proof should not be treated as such in particular cases, because it may be that even if they do --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: They would be saying, I think -I think what's being said is it's inaccurate across the board, as it were.
MR EDELMAN: Well, they are making no admissions, by and large, as to accuracy, or no admissions as to accuracy or relevance. They've raised one or two points which actually we believe to be based on their misunderstanding of the data, but by and large it 's a series of non-admissions.

I haven't taken you to the pleading. I can, if you want to be refreshed as to what RSA actually says. But it is, by and large, not admitting, and not admitting relevance.

So our primary goal at the moment is to seek to argue at trial about methodology. If that is not to be permitted, then we would ask the court not to make any

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further orders today and the FCA can consider what to do about the issue. Not ruling out the possibility of a further trial, but those are --
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: The problem -- Mr Edelman, the difficulty about your inviting us not to make any further orders is suppose that we allowed the amendment but if we made no further orders. That might actually potentially, supposing that your argument based on or analogising \(R \& Q\) were not accepted, it might actually slow down the process of determining any matter as a matter of expertise, supposing that still arose.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that's right.
MR EDELMAN: My Lords, it may do, but...
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: One possibility, Mr Edelman, is that we allow your amendment so you're free to run that case at trial, but we also provisionally fix a further trial in the event that there has to be one.

It may be that insurers, in the time between now and the trial, which is nearly a month, maybe they do find an expert and it may be that their expert forms a view that, by and large, the material on which you rely is the best evidence and you're never going to get any better. And it's just not worth the candle, as it were, trying to run a contrary case.

But, of course, the problem that they face, and
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or eight minutes, so I apologise if I appear to be more
than usually slow.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Oh dear.
MR GAISMAN: Is your Lordship calling upon me to make
submissions?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I am.
MR GAISMAN: Yes.
My Lords, this is only, in one rather limited sense,
about whether or not permission to amend should be
given. It's much more about what happens at the trial
in July.
The short answer -- and I will give the longer
one -- is that there is no time for prevalence to be
addressed in July, as the court decided at its ruling in
the first CMC on the basis that expert evidence would be
adduced if prevalence were to be debated.
Now, the court's ruling last time was to the effect
that there would be no expert evidence on prevalence at
the July trial, and we have set out the key paragraphs
in paragraph 47.4 of our skeleton.
Now Mr Edelman says he wants to do something which
he coyly calls "relying on the same data". The data is
put forward in the context of expert evidence. The
expert evidence that was considered in the debate
between Mr Kealey -- sorry, the expert evidence that --

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the report that we were served on the day before our defence was due.

So Mr Edelman claims a right to rely on what he calls the same data. That is expert evidence, because the data is underpinned by expert evidence, and as Mr Justice Butcher held, it's expert evidence that we have not had a chance to rebut. That is clear from his ruling at I think it's paragraph 3, but I may be wrong, at the last hearing.

Now, we need to pick up a word used by my Lord, Lord Justice Flaux. We need to be clear what is and isn 't meant by "methodology". It's a potentially slightly ambiguous word.

The court last time said, and we have never disputed, that what is not precluded at the July trial is deciding questions about what methods of proof might be permitted, for example, on assumed facts.

So, for example, it could be debated whether it is appropriate or legitimate for an assured to prove its case as to the existence of disease within a contractually stipulated radius by relying on certain elements which the FCA propose: element number 1, for example, the selection of local government zones as units of proof. Selection or factor number 2, the application of an evenly distributed average across that

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chosen local government zone. Application number 3, the applicability in principle of an undercounting ratio as a tool. All of that, of course, is methodology, and all of that -- and no doubt other questions too -- can be debated in July.

Now, we are, as I say, quite happy to enter into that sort of debate, and we will say that the very fact that the FCA proposes recourse to such unorthodox methods of proof itself tells one something about whether phenomena such as this pandemic were ever objectively intended to fall within these policies. So we can have that sort of argument.

What cannot happen, as the court ruled last time, is this. Now, this is what the FCA put in its original particulars of claim and we need to see how it is now put forward in a different way. The original particulars of claim are at \(1(a)\), tab 5 , and we're looking at paragraphs 28(c) and 28(d), pages 343-345. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Hang on a moment.
MR GAISMAN: Well, you can look at the original or you can look at the proposed amendment, because you can see... LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Volume 1?
MR GAISMAN: Tab 5, page 343. I hope that's right, my Lord.
My bundles arrived at 11.45 last night, so --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Electronic page 359.
MR GAISMAN: Thank you very much. So we're on paragraph 28.
            Now, what in the original particulars of claim the
    FCA sought to do, in paragraph 28(c), was to say the
    undercounting ratio was, in fact, \(X\), and in 28(d) it 's
    therefore said on the balance of probabilities there was
    a case of COVID in every required radius by
    such-and-such a date. That was the case that was put
    forward in the original particulars of claim.
MR TURNER: Could I just interrupt Mr Gaisman very briefly,
    because the paragraph numbers in the amendment are
        different to the original, which may be causing
    confusion, looking at faces on the screen. 28(c) as in
    the amendment was 28.3 on page A345, and 28(d) in the
    amendment was a successor to 28.4 in the original
    pleading.
MR GAISMAN: Thank you. Thank you.
    With that correction, I think the submission I made,
    I hope, was accurate. So the reason why the court ruled
    that that could not happen is because these were
    non-agreed issues of fact and required expert evidence
    which insurers were in no position to adduce and the
    trial was in no position to accommodate.
    Now, in paragraph 12 of its supplementary skeleton
    of last night, the FCA says that it "opposes any
    suggestion of postponement of the prevalence issue ".
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    But, as is obvious, it has already lost that argument.
    What it has done now was to come back, and now I want to
    look at the amended particulars of claim, so with any
    luck, my paragraph numbers will become accurate.
    It still wants issues of fact determined. It just
    wants slightly different ones, and we can see this from
    the amendments to paragraph 28(c) and paragraph 28(d),
    because now it seeks findings that the undercounting
    ratio not was \(X\), but may have been \(X\), and not that there
    was a case of COVID within the relevant policy area, but
    that there was a rebuttable presumption that there was.
    Now, what's going on with paragraph 12 of my learned
        friend 's supplementary skeleton, my learned friend
        Mr Edelman seeks to persuade -- wants an opportunity to:
            "... seek to persuade the court that policyholders
        ought to be able to rely on a rebuttable presumption of
        disease prevalence based on the data and analyses that
        the UK Government itself relies on in order to run the
        country's affairs."
            Now, I'm sure I yield to nobody in my respect for
        the UK Government, but with respect, none of this makes
        the slightest sense. What the FCA continues to propose
        entails the determination at the July trial of
        non-agreed factual questions, just to a different
        standard, and that exercise was ruled out at the last

CMC.
And so we come, none too soon, to the question of the rebuttable presumption. Now, my Lord, I always get nervous when people talk about rebuttable presumptions, but what the FCA is doing here is pulling itself up by its bootstraps. Where on earth does this rebuttable presumption come from? By the way, without wishing to look ahead, it doesn't come from Equitas \(v R \& Q\).

The legal burden is on the FCA and on policyholders to prove the occurrence of an insured peril on the balance of probabilities. There is no basis as a matter of law for imposing some sort of reversal of the burden of proof merely because, on the present facts, that is in policyholders' interests.

The FCA still has to establish on the evidence that it 's more likely than not. Nothing in Equitas v R\&Q says anything different. The claimants in that case still had to prove their loss on the balance of probabilities, and all that that case decides is that the evidence presented was sufficient, unless it was rebutted, to discharge that burden. It established the prima facie case that was necessary to shift the evidential burden.

If we can go back to paragraph 70 and just look at one other paragraph, picking it up, perhaps, where my

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friend stopped reading, towards the end of paragraph 70, there's a sentence:
"Of course, should the evidence relied upon by Equitas be incapable of satisfying the burden resting upon it ... or if such evidence in fact falls short of doing so ... then Equitas claim/s must fail. The risk that Equitas runs... is one of fact or evidence; it does not [run] foul of any rule of law."

Then 71( iii), if we can go down to 71( iii ):
"Once it can be demonstrated that an Equitas liability does, as a matter of the balance of probabilities, fall within the cover of the policy reinsured ... liability would be established."

Of course, in this case, in order for a policy cover to exist on the basis of disease within the required radius, we're dealing with a liability question.

Then the learned judge, Mr Justice Gross, as he then was, goes on to consider the approach as to quantum, which is a different question.

Now, my learned friend talks about the fact that he has got the best evidence. Well, whether it's the best evidence depends on whether it's right or wrong, and whether it 's right or wrong depends upon it being tested, and whether or not it is tested depends upon insurers having an opportunity to test it,
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    an opportunity which Mr Justice Butcher has already held
    they have not yet had, through no fault of their own.
            So coming back to the rebuttable presumption, the
    legal burden is on the insured. How that legal burden
    is discharged is a question of fact in each case, but
    the notion of a rebuttable presumption amounts to
    a shift not in the evidential burden but in the legal
    burden, and there is simply no basis for saying that the
    burden should be shifted. The burden always stays where
    it was. And it's for that reason that the plea in
    paragraph 28(d) is demurrable because it is simply
    unsustainable in law.
            My learned friend says: well, if it turns out to be
    no good, well, then the FCA will propose something else.
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Presumably -- I mean, I wasn't
participating in the first case management conference
last week, but my Lord refused the application to adduce
this by way of expert evidence on the basis that you
hadn't had an opportunity or that you couldn't in the
time available produce an expert and there probably
wasn't time to deal with the issue at trial.
MR GAISMAN: Both.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Well, quite. So what that
presumably contemplated at that stage is that unless
this could be agreed --

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\section*{MR GAISMAN: Yes.}
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: -- there would have to be
    a second trial of some description --
MR GAISMAN: That is exactly my understanding.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: -- albeit not eight days; possibly
    two days or three days or whatever. But that must have
    been what was contemplated by the parties ten days ago.
MR GAISMAN: Well, my Lord, Mr Justice Butcher will correct
    me, but that is exactly what happened. If you look at
    paragraph 6 of the order, which is quoted at the end of
    our skeleton -- sorry, in the ruling, which is quoted at
    the end of our skeleton, you will have a sense of
    déjà vu, because Mr Edelman is doing exactly what he was
    doing last time.

Has your Lordship got it, paragraph 47.4 in our skeleton?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Hang on a moment. Yes.
MR GAISMAN: Mr Edelman's argument is in effect that the insurers should not dispute the conclusions of the expert report -- or, sorry, of the Cambridge and the Imperial analysis, or should not dispute it to such an extent that it makes any difference. He may be right ; he may not be. But I find it impossible to say that I should proceed on the basis that he is right, or more specifically to make orders which proceed on the
basis that he is right.
So I'm going to say -- and then he says "no expert evidence". Then he says a number of things, and paragraph 9 picks up my points on methodology and paragraph 12 is where my Lord, Lord Justice Flaux, pointed out he contemplated making directions for a future resolution of this, and indeed that is something that RSA has addressed in its skeleton argument.

May I just finally -- I've dealt with demurrability . There is a slightly unsatisfactory suggestion, not quite as unsatisfactory as being told that the FCA will consider other regulatory possibilities , but no doubt that was just advocates' high spirits, that we're going to have several bites at the cherry on this one. Well, I don't think Mr Justice Butcher, with respect, contemplated that either. It can either be tried in July or, because it can't be tried in July, it should be tried within a short space of time after that.

Of course, the alternative is that the FCA is seeking to do what the claimants did in R\&Q, in other words to prove its case as best it could. But it can't do that in July because that would require evidence, just as evidence was submitted and evaluated by Mr Justice Gross in R\&Q, and the court has ruled that
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that's not going to happen.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Even if my Lord hadn't ruled as he did ten days ago, if one thinks about it in practical terms, we get to a trial in a month's time. Mr Edelman stands up and says: this is my case. You stand up and say: okay, well, prove it ; how are you going to prove it? The answer is you can only prove it by calling expert evidence, which is what my Lord decided wasn't going to happen.
MR GAISMAN: Exactly. Exactly. That's the point I was labouring to --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So what you're really saying -Mr Edelman says: oh, well, I' II get round that by getting the court in effect to say in the event that I could prove this, it would give rise to some sort of rebuttable presumption. But your point is that you don't get to first base.
MR GAISMAN: No, because the evidence has never been tested. That's exactly right, my Lord. I won't take up much longer.

All I then have to deal with is the half suggestion with which my learned friend buttresses his position that my clients have been in some way, or insurers generally have been in some way, dragging their feet in relation to this. There is no basis for that suggestion
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and it is inconsistent with my Lord's ruling on the previous occasion.

We put in evidence at the last hearing, and there is evidence at this hearing that we were taken by surprise and that we have not had time to instruct an expert. Indeed, we haven't found an expert, for good reason, and we keep being met -- and paragraph 42, if I can ask your Lordships to look at it, the FCA skeleton, paragraph 42, this is the sort of attitude we have to deal with. I speak with some feeling because we have been dealing with it for some time.

What this paragraph reveals is that on 19 June, the FCA had a report from Dr Samir Bhatt on prevalence. They then held onto it until 22 June, the day before our defences were served. They then sent it to us on 22 June and said: please deal with this in your defences or at the same time as your defences within 24 hours, and if not, why not?

Now, I don't want to broaden this submission because I'm only dealing with this example of FCA unrealism, but that is really an absurd position to adopt.

The truth is that the FCA, as I said last time, has taken a misstep in relation to this part of its case. We will do everything we can to cooperate with the resolution of every other aspect of the case, which is

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what we expected to do and what we will do. But this,
both in its original iteration and in its current iteration, is simply a non-starter, and the pleading, therefore, should not be admitted, and if the FCA wants to consider some other way of dealing with the matter, that is entirely a matter for it.

Thank you, my Lords.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you, Mr Gaisman.

\section*{Mr Edelman.}

Submissions in reply by MR EDELMAN
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, Mr Justice Butcher's ruling at the last hearing you will find in bundle 1B, 702A, which, if you have the electronic version of bundle 1 B , it 's page 24 of that electronic section of the bundle.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: A702?
MR EDELMAN: 702A.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Yes.
MR EDELMAN: It's 24 , but the passage I wanted was on page 24, 702C --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: -- paragraph 9.
So after precluding any expert evidence, my Lord,
Mr Justice Butcher, continued:
"Let me make certain things clear, however. Firstly, that decision of itself will not preclude
arguments as to whether a type of proof could be sufficient to satisfy whatever onus of proof is on the insured. Secondly, it would clearly not preclude arguments on the basis of assumptions as to actual incidence. Thirdly, I expect insurers to plead proper and responsibly to the issue in their defences, in accordance with the mutual objective, and that may itself mean -- it may not, but it might -- that there is a narrowing of the issue (s) here. Fourthly, I intend to revisit this at the next CMC in the light not only of the defences, but also, I hope, of discussions between the parties in the meantime, with one of the possibilities being whether, if there remain issues which depend on finding actual prevalence, there should be directions for their resolution."

Now, one of our concerns about insurers pleadings when they came back is they weren't even admitting the relevance of, for example, hospital data for the purposes of proving relevance -- prevalence. So there was absolutely no engagement at all even with what I would call hard data. It's not the undercounting ratio; it's hospital data. No admissions, no admissions as to relevance, no admissions as to what can be proved from it. Absolutely, in cricketing terms, although I'm not a cricketer or cricketing fan, an absolute

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\section*{straight bat.}

So we have sought to see if we can take advantage of paragraph 9:
"The decision itself would not preclude arguments as to whether a type of proof could be sufficient to satisfy whatever onus (video link interrupted)."

What we are seeking to do (video link interrupted), which --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You keep breaking up, Mr Edelman.
I don't know if your connection is ...
MR EDELMAN: Sorry, I was promised by BT very fast internet.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I've got the same, but just occasionally.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Mr Gaisman, could you mute your mic? MR GAISMAN: Quite right, thank you.
MR EDELMAN: That may be why I was breaking up.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That might help.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, I think that was why I was breaking up, because I think Mr Gaisman was interrupting on the -did my Lord catch my submissions as to those paragraphs or did you want me to repeat them? Can everyone hear me? Did my Lord want me to repeat those submissions or do you have them?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I have them.
MR EDELMAN: I'm grateful.
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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Does my Lord have them?
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: So that contemplated that we could return to
this subject of methodology. What I was going to say
about the circumstances of this case is that ordinarily,
as in the Equitas v R\&Q case, what has to be proved is
a purely private matter; in that case how to construct
the balances or how to reconstruct the balances that
would have gone around the LMX spiral.
Here we are dealing with a public matter, and there
are public data and statistics, and I have to say when
the FCA entered into this litigation, it had hoped that
the insurers would be prepared to proceed on the premise
of the same data that the government have relied on, but
they have chosen not to even though they have no
evidence at all that there is anything to challenge
about it .
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, they don't know, do they? That's
the point my Lord decided against you on the last
occasion. It's all very well making submissions like
that, but the reality is that unless and until the
insurers have got their own expert, who may or may not
agree, then they just don't know, and that's why what
they've done is they've put in non-admissions, because
they can't put forward a positive case because they
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haven't got any expert evidence to support it.
MR EDELMAN: With respect, my Lord, their expert evidence
isn 't going to tell them how many people died at
a particular hospital or how many people tested positive
at a particular testing site --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, no, but --
MR EDELMAN: -- but they haven't admitted that either, or
its relevance.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, I am afraid I see this -- and
I wasn't at the last hearing, but I see this as
an attempt to either revisit a ruling that has already
gone against you or to find an ingenious way of getting
around a ruling that has gone against you.
MR EDELMAN: Well, my Lord, I've invited the court to allow
me to argue at trial that the government statistics
should be treated by the average small or medium-sized
policyholder who simply cannot afford to do anything
else -- should be treated as sufficient evidence so that
if that policyholder goes to his insurer and says: here
are the statistics, here's the information the
government relies on, is the insurer entitled to say:
no, that is not good enough, or is the insurer obliged,
then, to say: that's wrong for the following reasons?
Now, that's really where it's at, and that's the
hard question that we want the court to consider

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argument.

The arguments Mr Gaisman has advanced may be
correct. They may be wrong. It is certainly one of the issues which the Framework Agreement and the questions for determination which were associated with it contemplated would be determined at this trial .

I entirely recognise and accept, of course, that, as it were, if the final proof, in other words one that would bind insurers forever and in all cases, cannot be done in this trial, we seek an alternative route.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think the problem is the rebuttal presumption point, I think.
MR EDELMAN: Well, I'm merely -- that was putting in
ordinary language, because many people will be reading what's being said on this --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I mean, if what you're really saying,
which I think is what your reply seems to be saying, that you want to be able to argue at trial that this -the government data should be sufficient for policyholders to prove their cases as a matter of principle, and that doesn't depend upon calling any expert evidence about it, I can see the force of that argument. That can be addressed by the insurers in their response.
an answer at the trial. Is a policyholder entitled to have his claim submitted to the insurer with the government statistics and analysis as sufficient evidence for the insurer then to be required to say why (video link disrupted).

Now, that's not binding the insurers to have to accept it. They could say: we've now got our expert evidence and for you, it makes a difference.

One of the insurers has accepted -- Argenta I think it is -- that for most of their policyholders, the 25-mile limit will be satisfied. But some other insurers have just played a straight bat and said: you have to prove it. And it's this logjam that you are trying to overcome so that an insured knows what is prima facie sufficient proof, and that's the change from our last position, and last time we were trying to prove, on the balance of probabilities by scientific evidence, that this was correct. We hadn't anticipated it would be controversial. It turned out to be.

Now we are having to reconsider how to put our case, if that's correct, but this is the way in which we wished to put it and we wished to argue it on that basis. And unless my Lords are ruling that it is impermissible as a matter of law, then my submission is we ought to be allowed to argue it. It won't take up

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a huge amount of time because it is a matter of legal

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, is there anything else you want to say, Mr Edelman?
MR EDELMAN: I mean, if my Lord wishes us to clarify the pleading to express the point better, then we will, but it's (video link interrupted).
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay. What I think we will do, because I think Mr Justice Butcher and I would like to discuss this, we will suggest that you have a transcriber break now for 10 minutes, or at least until 3 o' clock, and we will communicate with each other by mobile phone.

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MR GAISMAN: May I be permitted to try and understand my learned friend's submission as encapsulated by your Lordship on the [draft] transcript at page 120, because if what your Lordship meant is there can be an argument about whether an undercounting ratio as a matter of principle is a permissible method of proving, by saying: look, there are so many reported cases, is it legitimate in principle to say: well, the reported cases understate the true nature of the problem and some sort of methodology which applies an undercounting ratio.

If that's the sort of thing your Lordship has in mind, well, I think I've indicated in my submissions that's not a debate we have any difficulty with at all. What I have more difficulty -- and I'm only intervening, really, to understand what your Lordship understood Mr Edelman's case in reply to be, reading from your Lordship:
"You want to be able to argue at trial that the government data should be sufficient for policyholders to prove their cases as a matter of principle."

Now, I know your Lordship is not doing anything more than summarising your Lordship's understanding of Mr Edelman, but my difficulty is I don't really understand what is now being suggested on behalf of the FCA.
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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that was -- I think Mr Edelman,
as I understood him, was accepting that he couldn't say:
well, I have proved this, because he hasn't got
permission to call expert evidence, which you would have
to do. But I think it 's, as it were, a sort of
hypothetical, that in the event that this is what could
be established, this would be sufficient in principle.
MR GAISMAN: Yes, that's fine. I said in my own submissions
one of the ways this could be approached is on assumed
facts. And if one assumes the facts, for example in
paragraph 28 of my learned friend 's particulars of
claim, we could still have an argument about whether
that was an acceptable method of proof.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that's the argument about
methodology, isn't it?
MR GAISMAN: Exactly, that's what I call methodology. The
trouble is, that builds into your statement of
Mr Edelman's argument in reply is: the government data
should be sufficient to prove their cases as a matter of
principle.
Now, does that mean that some qualitative judgment
is being expressed on the government data? Because that
we're not in a position to engage with. Or is it being
said, assuming that this turns out to be, to use the
expression Mr Edelman likes, the best data there is and
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nobody in due course can say anything against it, is that still a legitimate way for a policyholder to prove a claim?

The assumption is fine, but built into the way your Lordship has expressed that, that is, on one reading of it, a qualitative judgment.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I certainly had not intended the way I formulated it to be that. I had in mind your second way of putting it .
MR GAISMAN: Yes, exactly. All right. Then I'm sorry to have taken up your Lordship's time.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, in that case, what I suggest we do is let us break until -- well, everything else we've got to debate is really trial case management, and it shouldn't take more than about half an hour or so. Why don't we break until 3.10.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, can I make it clear that my primary case is that the government data and analyses should be treated and given equivalent status to the actuarial report in Equitas \(v R \& Q\), which is sufficient to discharge the burden of proof without being necessarily conclusive. That's my rebuttable presumption point, which means that the other party -- it 's open -recognising that it isn't the perfect evidence, it's not the actual best evidence that could be obtained, but that.
MR EDELMAN: I'm grateful.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You can have your permission to amend, but very much on the basis I've indicated.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, that's understood, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, okay. Does anybody want to say anything about the practicalities of having to have a further hearing, if we were to go down that road, and anything about the practicalities of producing an expert report by the end of July?
MR TURNER: My Lord, if I may, briefly. My Lord, as you know, the efforts to try to find a suitable expert continue, and they are not limited simply to Mr Wilkes who instructs Mr Kealey, but that is something being pursued across the board by those insurers who have an interest in the issue of prevalence.

The reason we had proposed directions leading to a trial possibly even early October, which is only a month later and possibly not even a month later than your Lordship has indicated, was to recognise the reality of the challenge of working with multiple workstreams over the course of the next month leading up to the trial of the construction issues at the end of

\section*{July.}

The reason, as you would doubtless have realised, why it is so difficult to find an expert is that there is an acute and pressing demand for the mathematical modellers at the moment. It is to be hoped that that demand will subside, perhaps over the next few weeks, as the current epidemic at least wanes, hopefully permanently, if only temporarily, and thus the chances of being able to find an expert who has time will increase over the next few weeks.

And it is therefore more probable that we will be in a position to have a trial at the beginning of October than at the beginning of September. But we recognise that it is an issue that does need to be resolved and it needs to be resolved very quickly.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Well, I think that's really a submission about practicality, Mr Edelman. I'm not sure there's anything you can say in response to that that's going to make much difference, really.
MR EDELMAN: No, my Lord, other than if you do allow seven days before any order is made, then perhaps the parties can liaise as to what would -- if there is to be a second trial, if the FCA decides to investigate that process, and as to whether there should be a September or October date.

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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, another possibility, because I'm acutely conscious that I'm being lent to the financial list for this trial, and that's as much as my superiors are prepared to lend me, if I can put it that way, which is why I had in mind September rather than any other time. So it may be that we would have to look, for example, at the very end of September, which is essentially the same sort of timescale.

I mean, I fully understand your point, Mr Turner. What I think we will say -- I mean, obviously we will -I think we will make some sort of order that it will be -- it will take account of the fact that there may be issues about timing, and if what's happening is that Mr Edelman is having a seven-day breathing space, then we would not make any order in relation to that aspect until the end of that breathing space, giving the parties an opportunity to put in any written submissions to us, short written submissions to us, that they wish to put in on this issue.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I hesitate to interrupt, but I thought my Lord had raised the prospect of Mr Justice Butcher alone doing this second-stage hearing, in which case my Lord's difficulties would --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, he and I hadn't discussed that at all . I think that would probably not be appropriate .
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    I mean, if we are effectively the trial court, then
    I think we are the trial court. The issues in this
    case, including that issue, are of sufficient
    significance that they have to be decided by the trial
    court as a two-man court.
    I mean, obviously if it transpires that the only
    time when it's practically possible to have this case is
    some time in the first half of October, I would be made
    available. I' II say no more than that.
    So we won't make an order about that, but if you
        could, within seven days, give us any submissions you
        want to give us about practicalities and finding
        an expert, and then, as necessary, we can revisit that
        in July
            Right, where do we go now?
    MR EDELMAN: Just to find a date for responding to agreed
facts 2, 3 and 4.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mm-hm.
MR EDELMAN: We've asked for a deadline of 4.00 pm on
29 June for responses to those. 2 and 4 have been
outstanding for some time, and 3 is a rework. I haven't
troubled you with the detail of it, but there are
aspects where the defendants have not responded. Maybe
they'll say if they're not going to, but at least we
want to know what the final position is on that
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document.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think Mr Gaisman says he will respond
by 29 June and it's not necessary to have an order.
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, so far as concerns agreed facts 4, the
last draft from the FCA was sent at }10.52\mathrm{ yesterday.
That was quite a busy day. They want a reply by Monday,
and we have said no need for an order, but we will
revert on Tuesday. So there really is no need for
an order.
So far as concerns agreed facts 3, Mr Edelman, were
he not pressed for time, as we all are, would have told
your Lordship that that is the very issue of prevalence
that we have just been on.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I thought so. I thought it was 2,
Mr Gaisman, agreed fact 2, isn't it ?
MR GAISMAN: No, no, he said 2, 3 and 4.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Oh, it's 2 and 4, according to the agenda.
MR EDELMAN: We're picking up the one from the previous agenda, my Lord.
MR GAISMAN: My learned friend, how shall I say, introduced agreed fact 3 as well, so I'm addressing all.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, it's 2 and 4. I mean, your point is simply you will respond by Tuesday and it's quite probable that we'll have arrived at Tuesday before

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there's a sealed order.
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, just to be quite plain, my submission about Tuesday is in relation to document number 4.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay.
MR GAISMAN: There shouldn't be an order in relation to document number 3 , which my learned friend mentioned orally, but is not in the agenda, because it is the prevalence issue that we've just discussed, and I don't think I'm responsible. I think it is Mr Orr for Zurich who is dealing with agreed fact 2.
MR ORR: My Lord, I am dealing with agreed fact 2 and our position is the same in the sense that we have said we will respond by 4.00 pm on 29 June and no order is necessary.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Well, you've got your answer, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I hope they do.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, if they don't, then you can come and ask for an order.
MR EDELMAN: So that we know that the document can be finalised, I note agreed fact document 3 is about prevalence, but it would be -- it would be helpful to know how far we can take the document. It may be that insurers will say, because we've said -- on that document we've said where defendants agree or don't

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agree, so we have recorded a lack of agreement.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: What the agenda records is that they had received a further mark-up from your instructing solicitors just after lunch yesterday to which they anticipate responding by 29 June, which is Tuesday. So if that's the position, then I don't think you can do any better than that, really.
MR EDELMAN: All right. My Lord, I'll accept that. I just wanted to make sure that --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: In the events that, for whatever reason, they don't respond and there is a degree of obduracy demonstrated, we will make an order.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: By my calculation, I don't want to make unnecessary difficulties, isn't 29 June Monday?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is it Monday?
MR EDELMAN: It is the Monday, yes.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You're quite right. Well, whether it's Monday or Tuesday...
MR EDELMAN: I think Mr Gaisman was saying the 30th for number 4 and Mr Orr the Monday for number 2.
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That was my understanding.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, that was my understanding.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay. Well, number 2 by close of business on Monday. Number 4 by close of business on Tuesday. Any further responses in relation to, as it
were, the recast on number 3 by close of business on 1
Tuesday as well. That gives them another 24 hours.
There has been quite a lot to do, Mr Edelman.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord, particularly for us.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: For everybody, I think.
MR EDELMAN: Got all of their applications through.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Now we're moving along now to
effectively case management to trial, are we not?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, we are, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Can I just say one thing at the outset of this exercise: that obviously I have not been in the Commercial Court since I went to the Court of Appeal, which is now four years, nearly, but when I was in the Commercial Court and specifically when I was judge in charge of the Commercial Court, I found that case management ran a lot smoother if the parties' legal advisors, their solicitors and counsel and their counsel's clerks, used my clerk, Tracey, as the point of contact for -- in effect for everything other than the actual listing of cases. I would urge you to adopt that approach in relation to this case; to use Tracey as the point of contact, or initial contact, obviously everything copied to Mr Justice Butcher's clerk. But you will find, those of you who have come across her in the past, she's incredibly efficient and things will run 133
a good deal more smoothly.
I had a distinct sense yesterday afternoon of what can only be described as déjà vu from four years or more before when skeleton arguments came dribbling in at various times, so far as I was concerned between, I think, about 1 o' clock and 4.55. No criticism in being levelled at anybody for that. I know people are under a lot of strain, but I suspect that that could have been dealt with more efficiently.

So could I just make that plea at the outset, please?

So timing, exchange and length of skeleton arguments. There are the two points here, aren't there, Mr Edelman? One is simultaneous or sequential. Three points, I suppose: simultaneous or sequential, should there be reply skeletons, and length.
MR EDELMAN: Yes. Yes, my Lord, and you have what we say about it.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We've got the written submissions.
We've discussed it. Although we do feel that the length of the skeleton so far as the interveners are concerned should be limited to 50 pages as we indicated, in relation to everybody else, we don't think it 's appropriate to put any sort of page limit.

We will trust to the good sense of all counsel
involved on the basis that there is not prolixity or repetition or overlap between defendants. It doesn't seem to us that this is the sort of case where we're going to be helped by imposing page limits which may turn out to be artificial and people will have to come back and ask permission to put in a longer skeleton. So we won't impose any page limits.

We also, subject to anything you want to say, think that the skeletons should be, as is normal, sequential. So you go first with your skeleton to be served,
I think, by close of business on 10 July -- I hope I've got my dates right -- and then the defendants' skeletons by close of business on the 14 th, which is the Tuesday of the reading week.

At the moment, subject to any submissions that anybody wants to make, we don't see the need for reply skeletons. Whatever is in the insurers' skeletons that you haven't anticipated, you can pick up in your oral submissions, and vice versa.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, it does, though, make it necessary for the insurers to ensure that they comply with the letter and spirit of the Framework Agreement by ensuring that there is one lead set of submissions on any particular issue. I quite appreciate they may divide up the issues between them, but where there are issues of general

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principle as opposed to individual policy construction, that it will be important for us to be able to look to one set of submissions to deal, for example, with the Orient Express point, and we don't want to be faced receiving submissions on the 14 th for a trial starting on the 20th with eight different ways of putting the Orient Express point.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, Mr Edelman, I think I speak for both of us that if we are faced on the 20th with eight different ways of putting the Orient Express point, somebody would be coming to the headmaster's study.
MR EDELMAN: I'm grateful for that indication. I have no problem -- that was our only concern, really, about page limit.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That's what I meant when I said about overlap and duplication ; that my understanding is that the insurers will -- there are common issues of principle which the insurers will divide up between themselves so that one insurer leads on the particular issue of principle and the others will only deal with that issue to the extent that, for example, their wordings give rise to some subtle difference that needs to be emphasised.
MR EDELMAN: Exactly, and I gave an example earlier as to
what prevention of access requires. It occurs in
a number of insurers ' wordings, and I appreciate
sometimes the context may differ. They may say it has
a different nuance, but in principle, one insurer should
be dealing with what that word means.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay. No, I agree with that.
You wanted to -- Mr Gaisman, are you making the running on this?
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, of course, we can spend a long time all agreeing in different ways, and we do agree, that unnecessary duplication is a bad thing.

My learned friend keeps invoking -- he did it in his skeleton -- paragraph 9.2 of the Framework Agreement, but, actually, it's not his best point, because paragraph 9.2, although it says quite rightly that insurers agreed so far as reasonably practical and efficient to coordinate and to minimise duplication, each insurer -- and the FCA recognises that each party has separate independent legal representation and each of the insurers has written different policies on relevant terms and, accordingly, each insurer remains entitled to communicate and make submissions separately.

Now, of course I understand what my learned friend is saying, but the idea that there are many, many issues on this case where leading insurers can be appointed, I
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wouldn't want your Lordships to hink that is so obviously, his submissions on the Orient Express fall into a particular type of category, and one can see that that is -- there are certain what you might call philosophical issues, especially on the causation side of the case --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR GAISMAN: -- where one quite understands the point my learned friend is making, and I hoped we might have worked it out for ourselves.

But the other aspects of causation and, of course, a fortiori insured perils, very much depend on the particular wordings.

Each insurer has put its case on causation with its own wordings in mind, and for good reason. I don't even begin to need to explain why, because obviously each insurer will say that the right question to look at in terms of causation is what would have happened but for the insured peril, and because each insurer defines its insured perils in different ways, then obviously there's -- what you might call the downstream submissions on causation have to be made separately.

We haven't got the time or, I would say, with respect, the inclination to try and merge submissions which can't be merged.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I don't think anybody was suggesting you should have to. I certainly wasn't. What I had in mind was exactly the point about something like Orient Express, Mr Gaisman, where there's an issue of principle which is effectively common to all insurers. One insurer will be selected to run that point and the others will only put in anything of their own to the extent there is some subtle distinction on their own wording. That's all I had in mind.
MR GAISMAN: I don't think I need to say any more, my Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Does any of the insurers' counsel want to say anything else on skeletons? (Pause)

Right, okay.
Bundles, where are we on bundles?
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I think that we are -- I don't think there's any issues between us. Again, it's Mr Gaisman. We've made some proposals and \(I\) apprehend that that is agreed.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We have got Opus 2 Magnum. Is it proposed that the bundles will be on Opus 2?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, so far as I'm aware.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, okay.
MR EDELMAN: We've said use reasonable endeavours to have the documents available by close of business on the 3rd, simply because we're in their hands.

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\section*{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I understand.}

Has there been any discussion about the extent to which the court might require hard-copy bundles not of everything but of certain things? I did a Magnum Opus 2 appeal in a competition case a little while ago where we had things like the core bundle, the pleadings, obviously witness statements here is unlikely to apply, but the core bundle, the pleadings and the authorities in hard copy, and speaking for myself, I find the combination of the two in this sort of case is much easier to work with.

Now, if that's not going to be too much of an imposition, I think we're -- people are going back into their -- solicitors are going back into their offices. I know that there is the ability to produce hard-copy bundles, and if that is possible, then I would certainly, for my part, and I don't know about my Lord, I would find that very helpful.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, we could certainly look into that. We wouldn't be able to do that by the time of the uploading to Magnum --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, what I mean is that by the time we come to our reading, assuming we have 15-17 July dates, by the time of the -- by that time, we would have the hard-copy bundles.
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MR EDELMAN: We may have discussions and we can certainly
discuss with insurers whether it would be possible to
have some sort of compressed core bundle.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You know, things like the policy
wording, there's nothing like having them in a bundle so
you can underline it in pen or whatever, and however
much one gets -- one familiarises oneself with using
electronic bundles, that sort of exercise is very
difficult to conduct on electronic bundles.
MR EDELMAN: Well, what we may have, I have managed to get
most of the policies, the full wordings into two lever
arches but they're very full and not all the full
wordings in all of them but what I wondered is whether
the court might find it helpful to have, for example,
the business interruption sections of the policies of
the lead 21 policies. And I'm not intending by any means
to exclude any of the other pages that insurers may
want. There may be definitions which are on definitions
pages, but if we could try and collect a hard-copy core
bundle with all the relevant pages. That would be the
business interruption section, any definitions pages
insofar as separately contained, and any other page that
insurers think they would refer to, so this is not
intended to be partisan.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, that would be very helpful,

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I think.
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, may I -- my learned friend Mr Edelman said that the position on bundles was agreed. May
I just address your Lordship on that?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Of course.
MR GAISMAN: The draft order that was originally proposed was a mixture of good news and bad news. Paragraph 12 of the original draft order said:
"The parties shall agree the trial bundle by 5.00 pm on 1 July."

That's good news, and unfortunately --
MR EDELMAN: I don't want to interrupt my learned friend Mr Gaisman, but if he looks at the agenda and our supplementary skeleton, he will see where we've got to.
MR GAISMAN: Yes, I have looked at them and that's why I'm making the submissions.
MR EDELMAN: All right.
MR GAISMAN: What has happened in relation to that good news is we have now taken a step backwards, and what is now said in paragraph 15 of its supplementary skeleton argument, which, as I say, I have looked at, is that it will "work to agree" a trial bundle by 1 July. Now, that's a step backwards.

The step forwards is that whereas the original draft order gave the FCA 13 days until 13 July to supply
electronic copies of the bundle, what is now said is that they will use reasonable endeavours because it's not entirely within the FCA's control to have the requested bundles available on Magnum by the 3rd.

Now, all I'm pointing out is that, as matters stand in the FCA's current formulation, working to agree something by the 1 st and reasonable endeavours by the 3rd, and I'm particularly concerned by the first of those, does allow for slippage in a timetable where slippage is not really possible.

Of course, documents can be uploaded to Magnum bit by bit, and we all had experience of the fact that different volumes of the trial bundle appear on Magnum at different stages, but I submit we should keep -first thoughts were better. We should keep the FCA's original proposal, which is that the trial bundle (video link interrupted) at this stage would agree the (video link interrupted).

In my submission, what should then happen is that there should be an order, with liberty to apply, that those bundles be available on Magnum by 3 July with liberty to apply, protecting the FCA and, indeed, anybody else, in case of mishap. But we do really need a timetable which is clear and which the parties can rely on and which everybody sticks to.

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MR EDELMAN: My Lord, our proposal was in the summary on the agenda. Parties to seek to agree -- seek agreement by 5pm 1 July, it should not be all that difficult to agree, claimant to use reasonable endeavours to have the documents available on Magnum by close of business on 3 July. To require us to have to apply if not everything is loaded by 3 July is to impose on us yet further obligations.

We will do our utmost to get the documents on by 3 July. If by some misfortune we can't, then we'll do it as soon as possible after that. But why we should have to apply to the court for an extension of time mystifies me and why Mr Gaisman cannot accept the assurance that we will do our best also mystifies me.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Turner has arrived on screen, presumably because he wants to say something.
MR TURNER: I do, my Lord, and I'm prompted to do so by reference to Mr Edelman's suggestion that there should be some filleting exercise in relation to policies in order to condense them down to something that can be fitted in as few pages as possible.

Your Lordship will have seen concern expressed in various defences as to the difficulties of taking terms in isolation from the rest of the wording. If all the policies are in the bundles in full, they would probably
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    run to about five bundles, at a guess, as an initial
    guess.
        The exercise of trying to strip out the wordings to
        achieve the core bundle proposed by Mr Edelman is one
    that may be contentious, but it would also be
    an unwelcome distraction, I suspect, to all parties over
    the next few weeks, and it is inevitable that as the
    parties prepare for trial, there would be other terms to
    which they wish to refer, and of course there will be
    nothing to stop them from doing so, and of course those
    terms will be available in your Lordship's bundle.
            But your Lordship will then have the unhappy
    situation of having a bundle with some but not all of
    the terms of the particular policy and a different
    bundle with different bits of the same policy
    potentially marked up to which to refer while writing
    a judgment.
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: By the time we get to reading in on the
last three days before the trial, you will have decided
which bits of your skeletons each of you wishes to refer
to. So I wouldn't have thought it was beyond the wit of
man to provide the court with the relevant sections of
the policies on which you intend to rely.
MR TURNER: Well, my Lord, we will take the encouragement.
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, can I just mention the question of

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reading in. It may well be that this is beyond your Lordship's control, but the insurers in general claim the view that three days is very tight, and if your Lordship were able to negotiate for a fourth, your Lordship could, of course, then start reading the claimants' skeleton, which your Lordship would have had since the 10th. To say this is a --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Gaisman, before you go any further, I don't know; my clerk may or may not be on the line, but if she is, she will be able to find out. Given that I've asked to be given the three days, the chances are I will not be given anything else to do for that week.

In fact, I think from recollection, I was due to be on compensatory leave that week anyway, before the pandemic started, and so I would have thought, other things being equal, that I would have been able to carve out four days.
MR GAISMAN: It's merely by way of giving your Lordship our view of how long your Lordship will need.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Understood. Understood. Okay. MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Certainly for my part the Commercial Court has said that I will have the week. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.

Now, I mean, so far as bundles are concerned -notwithstanding your points, Mr Edelman; we fully
understand that -- we think there has to be an element of certainty here. We think that they should be agreed by 5 pm on the 1 st , which is Wednesday, and uploaded onto Magnum by close of business on the 3rd, and that if there's a problem, you will have to come to the court and explain what the problem is.

I'm always very wary of things that say "reasonable endeavours", "best endeavours", "do our utmost", et cetera, et cetera. I think it's much easier you have an order to do something by a certain time and if you can't, you come and explain why you can't.

Magnum who are involved in that will have heard that as well and they will know that that's what they've got to do. All right?
MR EDELMAN: Right. List of issues is item 12. We have an agreement what the order was for list of issues; us to propose it on the 4th and the respondent to provide their responses by the 17th --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: By the 7th.
MR EDELMAN: By the 7th, sorry. Unless it's being said that the order should be varied, that should stand.
MR ORR: My Lords, I am dealing with this. In order to assist, we made an offer to produce the first draft of the list of issues to be provided to the FCA by 3 July and with them to respond by 6 July .

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My Lords, we did that for two reasons: first of all in the spirit of cooperation, which has underlain insurers ' approach to these proceedings from the outset, and, secondly, my Lords, because the court's order required, expressly required, the parties to cooperate with a view to agreeing the list of issues. That was the first provision of my Lord Mr Justice Butcher's order of 16 June.

The timing which my learned friend Mr Edelman has referred to is a default timing. So we did this simply as a constructive offer in a genuine attempt to assist. If the FCA wants to reject our offer, then so be it, and we will revert to the default timing and we look forward to receiving the FCA's list as soon as practicable.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, I think Mr Edelman wants to, as it were, have the first run at this, doesn't he?
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, yes, and it is the most sensible because we will have been in the midst of drafting our replies to the defences, and so we will be able to provide the list of issues at about the same time as we're providing the reply, and then the insurers will deal with it. But for insurers to start dealing with list of issues before they've seen or considered our reply seems to be rather nonsensical.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Anyway, this is not exactly the most
important point we've had to consider today. We will, I think, leave it with the claimants, Mr Orr.
MR ORR: Precisely so, my Lord, we are happy with that. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay.

Well, we've dealt with pre-reading and my clerk is already on to the case, so she tells me, so we'll try and get a fourth day for pre-reading for the 14th as well.

Trial timetable: I think on this one, Mr Edelman, what's really said by the insurers is they're not in a position to indicate how they're going to divide up the time and in any event, provided they don't use more than their four days between them, that's for them.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, I'm not pressing for them to do so now, but it would, perhaps, be of assistance to the court nearer the time for the court to know and for us to know who is speaking when.

That may also help, for example, if one particular -- because there may be, for example,
a division of labour between myself and Ms Mulcahy and it would be nice for us to know who is due to be speaking when.

We don't -- I'm not pressing for that now, but I thought the court would like to know.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I imagine that's something that will

\section*{come in due course.}

MR EDELMAN: As long as it does. But it may also be important as between the insurers that the tail-end Charlie doesn't find him or herself squeezed on time -LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No.
MR EDELMAN: -- and then that being taken out of our time. But that's a matter for them.
MR EDEY: My Lord, may I just interject on behalf of the interveners?
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDEY: From the interveners' point, it obviously would be helpful to know when the relevant insurers intend to be on their feet, metaphorically speaking. We may not wish to be there throughout the two weeks, and it would therefore assist to know when they are likely to be speaking.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, Mr Gaisman, do you want to say anything about this?
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, it's not a secret. It just hasn't been decided yet, and obviously I don't know how many cases your Lordship was involved in at the Bar with quite so many parties, all of whom have an equal interest and all of whom are represented by vigorous silks, but it all takes a bit of discussion, and one thing this case has been very short on -- I speak only
for myself, of course, except I suspect I don't -- is thinking time, and what we need now is some thinking time, because having discussions and having agreements before you have had some thinking time is a waste of time.

So when we've thought -- and of course I completely accept Mr Edey's point and of course the court will at some stage wish to know. It is not actually of great interest to the FCA, I can't see how it could be. But of course we will act responsibly and when we know, we will let the parties know, my Lord, and if we're taking too long over it, well, maybe it will be said we are. But your Lordship will have seen that the proposal is that we tell the FCA what our position is by next Wednesday.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that's a distraction, with respect. I would have thought that -- I mean, what's really required is that, given that this is a case where it's not as if somebody is going to have to bone up on their cross-examination, because there isn't going to be any cross-examination, I would have thought that if you were in a position to let the court and the FCA and the interveners know what the batting order of the insurers is likely to be at the same time as you serve your skeleton arguments on 14 July, that would be sufficient .

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MR GAISMAN: Your Lordship took the words out of my mouth.

\section*{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Of course I did.}

MR GAISMAN: The process of drafting the skeletons yields the answer to the question.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That was the point I had in mind.
Okay. Well, if nobody -- unless somebody else wants to say something about that.
MR EDELMAN: Item 14, my Lord, mode of trial, and we understood from the court that it had not fully committed yet to continuing with remote-only until the end of term and we keep open the option of hybrid.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Well, let's -- I think that the answer is that we feel, pleasant though it would be to see you all in the flesh and to return to normality in a court building, the practical reality is that even if the government social distancing is now 1 metre or 1 metre plus, whatever that means, rather than 2 metres, with 30 counsel involved, which is what we're told, it's just not feasible. There isn't a court big enough to conduct a trial, even a hybrid trial, with the number of people who would need to be in court.

There are issues about some counsel being in court and some counsel being on a screen. I don't, myself, approve of that, and I would not want to be thought to be encouraging it. So I think where we go is really
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. Okay.
MR EDELMAN: Yes, I make it clear that we only raised the option of hybrid because we were told it was --
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I understand. I'm not complaining, I'm just telling you that you may have got one thing from the listing officer, but we, as the judges, are telling you what we think the position is. All right. MR EDELMAN: No, my Lords, that's fair and I appreciate it .

I think the only matter is the publication of documents other than statement of case. Subject to the court's approval, the parties have reached an agreement on this, and you can find that agreement on volume 9 at page 121.
MR SALZEDO: It's not 121, it's 121 .
MR EDELMAN: I apologise. I've actually got it on the screen in front of me.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: 121. It's page 39 of the electronic
bundle.
MR EDELMAN: Sorry, 38 it starts.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.
MR EDELMAN: Oh, no, sorry, I'm on the wrong electronic page.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, you are on the right page, aren't you? It's the top email, I think.
MR EDELMAN: 25.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's the email from Allen \& Overy, isn't it?
MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. It starts electronic page 25. I had the wrong one up on my screen. It says:
"The insurers are content with your proposal in respect of transcripts. Seek judge's permission for Opus 2 to upload the synchronised audio and transcripts on its platform."

You'll see, if you move down the email chain and it 's the next page at the bottom, it's amendments to transcript, and then the subject carries on, transcripts for second CMC and trial.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: And that is the stipulation.
In our summary in the agenda, we refer to finalised transcript at 10.00 am on the second day after the relevant hearing day. That should be the second working

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day after the relevant hearing day. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: My Lord, subject to that -- my Lords have had an opportunity to review that email exchange -- I would invite my Lords to approve that, and if so, then that's what the parties will do.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, I think that's going to be all right.

Is there anything you want to say about that, Mr Justice Butcher?
MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: No, that seems fine.
MR SALZEDO: My Lord, I'm sure this isn't at all
controversial, but the extension to "working day"
instead of "day" should be for all of the references to
"day" in that paragraph, not just the publication day.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, very nice to see you, however briefly, Mr Salzedo. That was a very important contribution.
MR SALZEDO: My Lord.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay, can I just say this: that Mr Justice Butcher and I just discussed briefly again the issue in relation to -- or the prevalence issue.

I think, Mr Edelman, we've given you a seven-day breathing space. Could you please inform the court at the end of the seven days what your clients ' decision is
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    as to whether or not there needs to be a further trial,
    at which point we can investigate the possibility of
    dealing with any directions for that trial to be made on
    paper.
    MR EDELMAN: Absolutely, my Lord. We'll also hopefully --
if we do decide to proceed with a second trial, we can
then decide -- discuss with the insurers what timing to
go for.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
MR EDELMAN: Obviously the last thing we would want would be
to go for an early date and then for them to say that
they need an adjournment because they're on the verge of
finding an expert but he hasn't been able to work on it,
and so on.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, that would be helpful.
Is there anything else from anybody?
MR EDELMAN: That's the end of the agenda.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Good.
MR EDELMAN: I'm grateful for my Lords' attention.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much indeed for what's
been by and large an extremely constructive hearing. We
look forward to seeing you all on 20 July.
Have a good weekend, everybody.
(4.04 pm)
(The hearing concluded)

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[^0]:    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, we'll hear all the submissions and also from the sole applicant in relation to the further intervention and then we' ll rule on all of them in one go.
    MR EDEY: I'm grateful, my Lord.
    My Lords, by their application, all that my clients seek is the right to serve skeleton arguments at the same time as the FCA and to make oral submissions, opening submissions of no more than 30 minutes, if necessary, on the issues that arise in relation to their policies, and after the FCA has already made its oral opening submissions, and then we ask for 15 minutes in oral reply, again only if necessary and again only after the FCA has made its oral reply submissions.

    And to all of that, my Lord, the FCA has consented, subject to one point on costs which was previously live but which we are no longer pursuing, so there is no point between us and FCA in relation to our applications.

    It has also been agreed with the FCA that we will, if permitted to intervene, liaise closely with the FCA and its legal team to ensure that duplication is avoided where reasonably possible, and we anticipate that the basis, my Lords, on which the FCA has so consented includes the point made at paragraph 55 of its skeleton

[^1]:    MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: So what are the changes? MR LYNCH: My Lords, the changes are the old order appeared at E394. So that is volume 5 , which is, for letter $E$, draft order page 394. Your Lordships will see on page 395 that, if your Lordships are with me on the page reference --
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Just getting there, Mr Lynch.
    MR LYNCH: My Lord, thank you.
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: 394, yes.
    MR LYNCH: My Lord, thank you. The body of it is at 395 . LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
    MR LYNCH: That has been overtaken. So point 1 remains,
    that the applicants seek to be represented at the trial, but 2.1 has been overtaken to this extent: that what is requested is simply to file and serve a skeleton argument at the same time as the FCA, and subject to whatever page limit your Lordships indicate, and if your Lordships indicate 50 pages, well, then 50 pages it is .

    There should then be, either in 2.1 or within a new 2.2 , to file and serve a reply skeleton argument at the same time as the FCA.
    LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Well, that depends on whether we are prepared to order reply skeletons, and we' ll hear parties on that in due course.

