## OPUS<sub>2</sub>

The Financial Conduct Authority vs. MS Amlin Underwriting Limited and others

Day 3

July 22, 2020

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1 Wednesday, 22 July 2020 1 context in which the restrictions are being imposed, as (9.57 am) 2 contemplated by the clause, is the occurrence of the 3 Hearing via Skype for Business 3 4 Submissions by MR EDELMAN (continued) 4 So why one should subtract that? I quite understand 5 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, Mr Edelman, good morning. 5 their point that the disease on its own is not covered, 6 6  $\label{eq:main_model} \mbox{MR EDELMAN: Good morning, my Lords.}$ but neither are restrictions on their own, unless they 7 I was dealing with Hiscox and I was near the end of 7 are restrictions that follow one of the specified 8 8 criteria; and neither is interruption covered unless it. I've just got a few topics still left. 9 The counterfactual. Can I first deal with the 9 there is an inability to use, and inability isn't 10 public authority clause. Hiscox analyses this as 10 covered unless it's restrictions imposed by a public 11 a disease -- maybe we ought to have it up on screen; it 11 authority, and the restrictions imposed by a public 12 is  $\{B/6/42\}.$  They analyse it as A "disease", followed 12 authority don't qualify unless they follow the outbreak of a disease. But it is all part of a package. 13 by B  $^{"}$  restrictions  $^{"}$ , followed by C  $^{"}$  inability to use  $^{"}$ , 13 14 causing D "interruption ". 14 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. 15 Hiscox doesn't merely remove the interruption, the 15 MR EDELMAN: Once one gets beyond what is the cause, what is 16 immediate cause of the loss, if one might say that, in 16 the overall content of the clause, where does one stop? 17 terms of what the loss is all about, it is all about the 17 Why go as far as the government restrictions but no 18 18 interruption; instead, it removes B plus C plus D, but further? And if the government restrictions are to be 19 19 removed for the whole country, why not the disease for not A. the disease. 20 In other words, it removes government actions, 20 the whole country? 21 albeit as applied to the entire country, not merely 21 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: They may say, not in relation to this 22 22 insofar as they restrict the premises. And the wording, but one of their wordings in the trends clause 23 skeleton, just for my Lords' reference, their skeleton 23 actually refers to restrictions, doesn't it? Damage or 24 restrictions have not occurred. Doesn't that relate to 24 at paragraph 330,  $\{I/13/106\}$  says the proper 25 25 counterfactual is the same world as we are in, but the argument that you made yesterday about, well, 1 1 without the government actions as are found to be 1 leaving aside the point about this wording, Hiscox 12 qualifying restrictions . 2 wording only refers to "insured damage", which is 3 We submit that if you are taking out of account for 3 a defined term, and in turn "damage" is a defined term, 4 4 the purposes of the counterfactual everything down to C, "accidental physical loss or physical damage" and there 5 why aren't you taking D out as well? The only answer to 5 is no hint there of non-damage related extensions. So 6 that, and perhaps we should have a look at this as well, 6 your primary case is the trends clause just doesn't 7 7 is their paragraph 346. apply at all. But assuming that somehow we manipulate 8 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is the other way round, isn't it, 8 the wording, your point is that what you don't do is to 9 9 Mr Edelman? If you are taking out B, C and D, why take out that, as it were, say, well, the physical 10 10 aren't you taking out A? damage to the premises wouldn't have occurred, but 11 MR EDELMAN: Sorry, my Lord, yes. Why not A? Sorry, I got 11 everything else, including what caused it, is assumed to 12 the letters muddled up in my notes. Yes, why not A? 12 remain in place. 13 Their answer is, and this is at paragraph 346 of 13 MR EDELMAN: Yes. 14 their skeleton, it is  $\{I/13/110\}$ , is that this is at the 14 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Ergo, you don't get any business 15 core of the insured  $\mbox{ peril}$  . That is how they justify  $% \mbox{ it } L_{i}$ 15 interruption insurance. It's the Orient-Express point. 16 So what they are doing is trying to identify one  $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\} =\left$ 16 MR EDELMAN: Exactly, my Lord. 17 17 thing which they pick on as being the core of the But where the wording does refer to restrictions. 18 insured peril, and treating that as something which must 18 there are particular submissions I would make. 19 19 Firstly , that the use of the word " restriction " is 20 say, isn't the core of the insured peril and so it 20 merely a signpost to the relevant insuring provision. 21 remains for the purposes of the counterfactual  $\!.$ 21 Because it is rather more complex than damage, what the 22 We say that's  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left($ 22 draftsman is doing is signposting the relevant provision 23 rationale for it . One has, going back to  $\{B/6/42\}$ 23 and giving a shorthand for it, rather than plucking out

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core of the peril .

the restriction, as Mr Kealey would want to do, as the

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please, it is a composite peril. And the entire reason

that the restrictions were imposed in fact, and the

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MR EDELMAN: Mr Gaisman, sorry. Sorry, my mistake. My second submission would be just as a reference to damage must encompass what caused the damage, so a reference to the restriction must include a reference to what caused the restriction to be imposed, as required by the clause. So if you are treating the restriction as the q equivalent to damage, which is what the clauses that refer to restrictions seem to do, and if you are with me that when it refers to damage it is contemplating not just the damage but the cause of the damage, then the insured peril for the purposes of the restriction is the disease. Just as the hurricane is the insured peril for LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The insured peril; I thought your case was that the insured peril is as you put it the package. MR EDELMAN: My Lord, yes. But if you were to say that --LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If you are right in saying, well, it is a shorthand, " restrictions " is a shorthand for the relevant public authority provision, which is where the disease has led to the imposition of restrictions, which in turn cause an interruption to the business, on your case you take out everything.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is it Mr Kealey or Mr Gaisman?

MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: And assume a world where there isn't a disease and there isn't a restriction.

MR EDELMAN: Yes. But this is the alternative argument. If one doesn't do that and says no, it is not a shorthand, it just says " restriction ", and it is like using restriction like damage, it is identifying one particular thing, then if you are comparing like with like, if damage, the reference to damage encompasses what caused the damage, then you must do the same for restriction; and what caused the restriction, what was required to cause the restriction under the policy, was the occurrence of the disease. So even on that alternative base, even if it is not a shorthand for the full clause, we say the same result follows.

In the trends clause, my Lords will also have seen that it refers to "special circumstances".

In our submission, just as with the Orient-Express, that doesn't include the outbreak of the disease. And in relation to the clauses with a radius or a vicinity limit, it doesn't include the wider outbreak of which the qualifying outbreak formed a part because, as we have already explained earlier, that prospect is inherent in the nature of what Hiscox is covering and must be taken as having been contemplated as being associated with the insured peril.

But, necessarily by insuring a notifiable human disease, you are contemplating and appreciating that amongst the possibilities may not be just a local outbreak but also it is contemplating that it could be a wider outbreak that has spread to the 1 mile radius or vicinity of the premises.

That is within the contemplation of the parties and I will give you an example of that when we get to RSA,

So if you are insuring a notifiable disease, you are

stipulating that in order for cover that must have

occurred within a particular limit from the premises.

That is within the contemplation of the parties and I will give you an example of that when we get to RSA, the way in which they define the notifiable disease, the date on which it becomes notifiable is particularly significant as showing what insurers would have understood this risk to involve. In other words, the potential for a new epidemic disease to emerge.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We were looking at the Hiscox public authority wording, which we have got on the screen at the moment and, I mean, that wording, unlike others, doesn't include any sort of radius limit. So in

22 MR EDELMAN: That last point ...

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Leaving aside arguments about what is
 meant by " inability to use the premises ", what is meant
 by " restrictions ", et cetera, it all comes down, doesn't

it, to whether an occurrence of a human infectious or contagious disease, an outbreak of which must be notified, et cetera, is referring to a local occurrence or is capable of referring to a national outbreak of a disease. In other words, "occurrence", you know, as a global concept, if I can put it that way, as opposed to a local concept. That was the argument that you were running yesterday afternoon.

MR EDELMAN: Yes. My Lord, that is the primary argument.

But our alternative argument is that even if it is contemplating something local, that just puts it in the same argument basket --

13 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I understand.

14~ MR EDELMAN: -- as all the other policies with a 1 mile or 15~ a 25-mile limit .

16 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

 $\begin{array}{ll} 17 & \hbox{MR EDELMAN: It was that latter argument, that latter point} \\ 18 & \hbox{that my argument about what this is contemplating.} \\ 19 & \hbox{Sometimes one has to apply this discerning an intention} \\ \end{array}$ 

 $20\,$   $\,$  MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Mr Edelman, I understand completely,

and this is no doubt a very sort of simplistic question, but I understand completely the use of the concept of counterfactuals in the context of trends clause, of

course. For my own part, at the moment I don't really

find the concept of counterfactuals in application of

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the basic coverage provision very useful, because clearly we are interested for those purposes in seeing what the effect of various things is, and they may be distinct and they may have different effects at different stages.

I think your real position is that although there may be effects of, let's say, restrictions imposed by a government, a public authority, that you can imagine that there is an effect of that. If there is then an occurrence of a disease in the relevant vicinity, once you have got those two matters you have an insured event.

MR EDELMAN: Yes.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: And at that point it becomes really impossible to distinguish these matters. So that even if before you have got all the facets of the clause there, there may have been an effect, once you have got them all, then it is a sort of composite position.

MR EDELMAN: Yes, and might I make it quite clear that the reason we are focusing on counterfactuals so much is not -- I would emphasise "not" -- because we consider that is the correct approach; it is the insurers' entire causation case appears to be premised on counterfactuals. So they take these clauses with the vicinity limit, for example, and they say their

counterfactual is with the disease everywhere but not within the radius. So it is all about counterfactuals.

Hiscox's answer to this clause, which has no geographic restrictions so they can't argue that, apart from arguing that occurrence is local, so they try and get themselves into that category with that argument, but their alternative argument is the counterfactual is without the restrictions that applied to the business, but with everything else. Therefore, with the national disease. So that if occurrence does cover the national outbreak, they say, well, you assume that there were the restrictions but still the national outbreak.

That is the case the FCA is answering. That was the road block, the counterfactual road block that the FCA was aiming at.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: My Lord's point, I think, is that if you look at the public authority clause, if what you have got is the national outbreak of the disease followed by restrictions imposed by the government as a consequence, and that leads to an inability to use the insured premises, then, leaving the trends clause out of account, what the underwriters have agreed to pay is the difference between the actual income that you made during the relevant period, the indemnity period, and what you would have earned during the indemnity period,

what you would have earned during that period. And what you would have earned during that period must involve taking everything out, mustn't it?

MR EDELMAN: That is our case, my Lord. That is our case.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Because apart from the trends clause, all a loss of income provision is doing is saying it's the difference between what you have actually made and what you would have made if none of this had happened.

MR EDELMAN: Exactly, my Lord. Exactly.

That is entirely our case. I don't want to mislead the court with our focus on counterfactuals that we believe that there is anything in it at all . It is just simply the wrong approach. But we are referring to counterfactuals because this is the battleground, the real battleground that all the insurers have identified, and it is what they are all relying on.

They are saying how important "but for" is as a test of causation, importing it from other areas of the law where its application is an entirely different context, where it is talking about tortious conduct, for example. And you get the odd cases, the opposite extremes, the Baker v Willoughby, a man whose leg is injured negligently and then some time later he is shot in the leg and the leg is amputated, and the complex questions of how "but for" applies to the first tortfeasor. Then

the Jobling example of the person who is injured and then later develops a condition which means that they would have suffered the same symptoms anyway. These are complex "but for" questions that arise in other areas of the law.

But insurance is something different . It doesn't mean it has got its unique principles of law, but one is just asking a different question for a different purpose. It is a much simpler question and it comes down to my Buncefield example. A man whose warehouse is flattened by an explosion, and an explosion is something that is insured by the policy as a sort of peril that would cause it. He has got a business interruption policy. He simply should be getting the business interruption losses he has suffered by having his warehouse in ruins. You compare the income from what it was before the explosion to what it was in the period after. It is very simple, and that is what insurance is for.

It is rather like the classic example of the 1906 earthquake when I think CE Heath gave instructions to loss adjustors in San Francisco to pay all losses without question. People's houses and businesses had been destroyed in an earthquake, and you are just paying them to put them back into the position in which they

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were before it all happened. 2 That is why insurance, we submit, has its own 3 causation test and they are founded in some general 4 principles of causation but they have to be applied in 5 the context of an insurance policy. 6 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes of course I see that, Mr Edelman, 7 but you could have a position where the disease has 8 already caused a reduction in turnover before there have q been any restrictions imposed by a public authority . 10 MR EDELMAN: Quite. 11 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: And still more before there has been an 12 occurrence of an infectious disease in the vicinity . if 13 that is part of the clause. 14 Now, as I understand it you don't, at least in this 15 action, suggest that there can be recovery for that 16 downturn before those matters have happened. 17 MR EDELMAN: The answer to that is yes. But there is one 18 further question which arises. 19 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You can come back to that in a second. 20 You say it is only once there has been the 91 occurrence of all the features, then, you say, there is 22 then recovery for that part of the loss, part of the 23 interruption , which arises from that combination of 24 matters from that date. effectively. Is that right? 25 MR EDELMAN: Certainly you only recover your loss as from

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that date. So to that extent it is rather like the New

World Harbourview case where, although there were losses prior to the disease becoming notifiable, because notifiability was one of the ingredients, as it is in this clause, you can't recover for any losses before the disease becomes notifiable. That is just one of the ingredients and that is just tough, that is what the policy says, that is when it kicks in. So that is a dating issue. And on the dating issue, I entirely agree they are not insuring the disease separately, only when it operates in combination with all these factors. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Likewise, presumably to the extent loss is suffered before the restriction is imposed. MR EDELMAN: Well, now that raises the question that I was discussing with the point in New World Harbourview. Because ordinarily one might say yes to that; you have got to take the standard turnover, and if you are in the contractual machinery, the standard turnover would take you up to and including the depression of turnover. Then would you say: well, there was already a depression of turnover because of the disease? But then you get -this is why this is a rather curious and fairly unique element in business interruption insurance extensions, because if what you are accepting is that you are taking

satisfied, and that is on the basis that you are taking out the causes of the interruption, what do you do about one of the causes where the parties must have contemplated that it would be a developing cause?

This is the issue with diseases. Because by giving this cover for disease, the parties must be contemplating, amongst the spectrum of possibilities, not the only one, because you can have just some, as I said, local outbreak of measles or mumps, but in the spectrum they will be contemplating that a disease could emerge which could become notifiable and which could --

11 12 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Then, Mr Edelmen, you are doing better, 13 aren't you, by reference to the trends clause, than you 14 are by reference to the primary insurance clause? 15 Because if the disease has caused interference or 16 interruption with the business before the restriction. 17 for the purposes of the basic insuring clause, why do 18 you do better under the trends clause by taking out that 19 part of the deterioration in the business for that 20

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is the same point, isn't it, as in relation -- you said it is a timing point, but I mean if we say, let's just fix for the moment and let's just say that under this wording which we are looking at, the Hiscox wording, that the restrictions imposed by

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a public authority, the first relevant restrictions are on 20 March. By 20 March there is already a downturn in the insured's business, but the various conditions for cover are not satisfied until 20 March. On orthodox principles I would have thought that you cannot recover under the policy for the downturn in the business before all the various components of the insurance were satisfied.

MR EDELMAN: That is right. I'm not saying that you can recover from it. But when you are assessing what the loss is from 20 March -- this is the point -- when you are assessing the loss from 20 March, do you take into account as your starting point that there had been a reduction in turnover because of what I would call the lead up to that all being triggered?

I fully accept --

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It wasn't insured. Until 20 March it wasn't insured. It is a different factual scenario, but why is it different from your example of the Michelin star chef who hands in his notice three days before the relevant restriction is imposed? None of it is insured until 20 March, on this hypothesis. So don't you have to compare the position as it was immediately before, with what has happened?

MR EDELMAN: That depends on what one infers as to the

everything out from the date that everything was 14

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contractual intent when within the peril that you are insuring is something like a notifiable disease .

I accept entirely my Lord's point about the chef, and for most situations things that happen that affect your turnover before the peril as a whole bites have to be taken into account.

The question is: what would the parties be contemplating when they are insuring this sort of peril? What they would be contemplating is that diseases, unlike the chef leaving, diseases are not just not there one day and there the next. This is necessarily, if it is contemplating potentially an epidemic, not only, but potentially, that's within its purview, it is necessarily contemplating that the disease itself will be an emerging thing.

The loss isn't payable until the emerging thing causes the various stipulated effects. Then it is a matter really of inferred intention when one comes to the settlement adjustment. Is it then intended -- because you have obviously got something that has become so serious, either locally or nationally, so serious that restrictions are being imposed which make you unable to use your premises to the extent my Lords decide that phrase applies.

So it is necessarily contemplating an emerging

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situation . Very unlike all the other perils , which will be suddenly occurring, and you can say: well, before it it was like this, and after it it is like that. That is why I said this is a very different and unique sort of peril . And if one says all these disease-type emergency, danger, are potentially contemplating something which could be an emerging problem which grows and grows until it reaches a stage where it is so serious that the authorities have to intervene, and intervene in a way which affects your use of the premises or access to your premises, then what are they contemplating about the insurance cover? Because if they say: ah well, yes, we appreciate that for it to have got to the stage where the authorities are intervening it must have got really serious, either locally or nationally, but actually for your business interruption, although it doesn't start until the ingredients are there, we are going to take into account all of the effects of this emerging problem, so you get virtually nothing for your indemnity, or you get 50% of your loss going forward.

We would say, and you know, it's a matter of expressly, there is no law that one can use for it, but it is really what the policy is contemplating, the sort of problem, and how the business interruption

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 $1 \qquad \quad \mathsf{calculation} \ \ \mathsf{is} \ \ \mathsf{supposed} \ \mathsf{to} \ \mathsf{apply} \,.$ 

Once you have identified that you are taking out the disease, isn't the logical thing to be taking out of account the effects of the disease of the same epidemic prior to the date of notifiability as well? Because that is something that everyone would have contemplated, an emerging of --

 $8 \qquad \text{MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I see that, Mr Edelman, but this is} \\ 9 \qquad \qquad \text{a stage further} \; .$ 

10 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I don't --

 $\begin{array}{lll} 11 & \text{MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Supposing I am prepared to go along} \\ 12 & \text{with you that we take everything out, which is the} \\ 13 & \text{insured peril, and we take it all out, this is} \\ 14 & \text{nevertheless a further argument, it's a step further}. \end{array}$ 

15 MR EDELMAN: Yes, it is. Absolutely, 100% a step further.

 $\begin{array}{lll} 16 & \hbox{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Therefore, two things about it. We} \\ 17 & \hbox{will be assisted by the Hong Kong case you referred us} \\ 18 & \hbox{to, will we?} \end{array}$ 

MR EDELMAN: The point wasn't argued there. They just argued about the application of the trends clause -- sorry, of the standard revenue. They had the standard revenue and they were arguing about the date of it. So they didn't get on to, the parties in that case didn't actually argue: even if that is the date, you shouldn't be depressing the turnover. So you won't be helped by

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1 it because the point didn't arise.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So this is an Edelman point, as it were. There is no authority to support it.

4 MR EDELMAN: No.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The other thing, can I just say this about it, obviously we will have to think about it, although at the moment it seems to me to be quite ambitious, if you don't mind my saying so, some of the wording -- I forget whose wording it is -- in RSA one of the wordings actually talks about, actually backdates the notifiability point to an earlier date.

the notifiability point to an earlier date.

MR EDELMAN: Yes, it is, it is RSA3, my Lord. And the important point is that is the strongest possible evidence of insurers' understanding of what sort of peril they are dealing with.

 $\begin{array}{lll} 16 & \mbox{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It might also be said that if you are} \\ 17 & \mbox{right} \ , \ \mbox{then you are only right in a situation where the} \\ 18 & \mbox{parties have expressly contemplated that, as they have} \\ 19 & \mbox{in that wording.} \end{array}$ 

20 MR EDELMAN: My Lord, what that is doing is it is backdating the inception of cover.

22 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

23 MR EDELMAN: That is the first point.

24 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

 $25\,$   $\,$  MR EDELMAN: What that is doing is saying: although we only

There are three wordings on materially the same, or

The lead policy is the commercial combined policy,

similar , cover terms. There are some differences on

quantum machinery and trends, but they are essentially

and that is at  $\{B/2/1\}$  in the bundle, and the relevant

"Revenue Protection Insurance" is on page  $\{B/2/33\}$  of

section on business interruption, which is entitled

On the issues that are being tested, there is in

cover for notifiable disease having this effect, we will

respond because there is no relevant damage to property

Et cetera. As Mr Edelman pointed out on Monday,

that is not common ground. These are simply points that

are not being tested or advanced in this case, and it

doesn't represent any concession that such clauses do

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not respond to COVID losses. It will be open to

and that the extension for disease does not respond

because it applies to a closed list ..."

policyholders to test those elsewhere.

| 2  | reverse New World Harbourview and treat the disease as      | 2  | fact quite a lot of common ground between Arch and the   |
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| 3  | being notifiable from an earlier date. So it's the          | 3  | FCA.   |
| 4  | trigger, it is the trigger date.                            | 4  | It is agreed that all of the actions relied on by        |
| 5  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So if all other matters were            | 5  | the FCA were actions or advice of government due to an   |
| 6  | satisfied   | 6  | emergency which is likely to endanger life .             |
| 7  | MR EDELMAN: RSA4, I think it is, not 3.                     | 7  | There is no vicinity requirement in the Arch policy;     |
| 8  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: your point would work on the express    | 8  | it covers emergencies anywhere.                          |
| 9  | wording of that clause.                                     | 9  | There is no interruption or interference                 |
| 10 | MR EDELMAN: You wouldn't need to because I think that is    | 10 | requirement, and Arch doesn't seek to imply one, unlike  |
| 11 | just a notifiable disease.                                  | 11 | the property damage BI clause that we will look at in a  |
| 12 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I follow the point. I follow the        | 12 | moment.  |
| 13 | point.  | 13 | So it is insuring loss resulting from prevention of      |
| 14 | MR EDELMAN: It wouldn't matter.                             | 14 | access, and there is no dispute that COVID-19 was an     |
| 15 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Anyway, we have probably taken up       | 15 | emergency; or as to the date from which the FCA alleges  |
| 16 | enough time on that.  | 16 | that there was an emergency, 3 March of this year, that  |
| 17 | MR EDELMAN: Can I just briefly finish Hiscox, because we    | 17 | is admitted.   |
| 18 | have a lot of policies to get through today.                | 18 | There is no suggestion that if a disease is not on       |
| 19 | Perhaps if I briefly say something about the NDDA           | 19 | a list in the disease clause that it is excluded from    |
| 20 | clause, the counterfactual on that. The question arises     | 20 | cover under that clause and under the clause relating to |
| 21 | again as to whether the denial or hindrance in access       | 21 | government action; and we will compare the arguments     |
| 22 | resulted from an incident within 1 mile of the vicinity .   | 22 | made by Zurich later in that regard.                     |
| 23 | So the difference here is that where the occurrence of      | 23 | So there is a lot of common ground. There is             |
| 24 | a disease refers to the disease incidence, here we have     | 24 | a limited dispute and it relates to two matters.         |
| 25 | not got we have got an incident, and we say that            | 25 | The first is what amounts to a prevention of access.     |
|    | 21  |    | 23   |
| 1  | either the incident is a national one, or if it is          | 1  | Arch says you can only have a prevention of access where |
| 2  | a local one the same issues apply. And we say the           | 2  | there is full closure, and the FCA says part closure     |
| 3  | government orders plainly did result from the broader       | 3  | will suffice .   |
| 4  | incident .  | 4  | The second issue is causation. Arch's                    |
| 5  | But I think we ought to move on and I will let              | 5  | counterfactual seems to be that it involves removing the |
| 6  | Ms Mulcahy take over with Arch. I think I have probably     | 6  | government action causing prevention of access to all    |
| 7  | said as much as I should say about Hiscox and I will let    | 7  | premises nationwide. So they accept there is an          |
| 8  | her take over.  | 8  | inextricably linked point that the national action is    |
| 9  | (10.35 am)  | 9  | what should be removed, not just action as applicable to |
| 10 | Submissions by MS MULCAHY                                   | 10 | the insured premises. The FCA says the same should also  |
| 11 | MS MULCAHY: My Lords, I am dealing with Arch and I am going | 11 | apply to the emergency, that you should assume there is  |
| 12 | to start with a very brief preliminary matter.              | 12 | no emergency nationwide.                                 |
| 13 | Paragraph 23 of Arch's skeleton, which is at                | 13 | With that introduction , let's look at the policies .    |
| 14 | $\{1/7/11\}$ , if we can bring that up on the screen, says  | 14 | Arch's policies relate to all categories other than      |
| 15 | that:   | 15 | category 6, so there is no holiday accommodation, but    |
| 16 | "It is common ground that the main BI cover does not        | 16 | other than that it applies to all the other businesses.  |

that tab. 24

materially the same.

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the premises are not literally closed . We can see that

from paragraph 67 on page  $\{1/7/22\}$  of this document. So

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and then we have:

"Prevention of access to the premises due to the

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for example, they accept that with category 2 cinemas, theatres, et cetera, the 20 March instructions, the 21 and 26 March regulations amounted to a prevention of access because it is ordered to cease carrying on business.

It is also accepted that category 4 shops, those are non-essential shops offering goods for sale or hire, and category 7, places of worship, have access prevented by the 23 March instructions. That is their skeleton at paragraph 66, and it is also set out in annex A in relations to categories 4 and 7.

They also accept that there is prevention of access for category 1 businesses, these are the restaurants, pubs, et cetera, where they did not previously carry out a take-away business and when they were ordered to close on 20 March or in the two sets of regulations, it is accepted that that is prevention of access.

Where the parties differ , and Arch says there is no prevention , is where a business continued a pre-existing take-away or it had a pre-existing take-away business . We see that from Arch's skeleton at paragraph 68, which is on the screen  $\{1/7/22\}$ , or where a category 4 business continued a mail order business , even if it was only part of their business .

It is also said if a business was permitted to stay

open despite the stay at home orders prohibiting customers from attending, and the other social distancing requirements, for categories 3 and 5 it says there was no prevention of access.

Again, in relation to school, it says if they were teaching critical workers' children or vulnerable children there was no prevention of access, and it says that in relation to annex A, category 7.

Mr Edelman has addressed this already in relation to Hiscox, and we say that position is entirely unrealistic . For example with category 1, Arch is saying no prevention if a restaurant continued an existing take-away business, because what is said is that the policyholder, this is paragraph 64  $\{I/7/21\}$ because the policyholder could continue part of the insured business from the premises, and access to the premises was not prevented. But if you had a bar which would sell the occasional sandwich to customers, and they decided not to stay open in order to sell those occasional sandwiches to customers, then there is a prevention of access to the premises. So we say that there is still a prevention of access, notwithstanding that there may have been a part of the business which does take-away.

In relation to category 2, Arch accepts there is

a prevention of access by the 20 March instruction and by the regulations. What the 26 March regulations did, and they did it for the first time and following the instruction and following 21 March regulations, was they introduced an exception. They introduced an exception for broadcasting to viewers outside the premises and for hosting blood donations.

So if we assume that a small part of the pre- existing business included broadcasting outside the premises, what is Arch saying, that there was only recovery for five or six days from 20 March until 26 March, when that part of the business is allowed to be resurrected? We would say, why should a small sideline of that kind lose the insured all cover? Its core business of being a theatre, having customers come and watch events, is over.

So far as category 4, non-essential shops, is concerned, it is the same principle. The 23 March announcement said that they must close and that was unqualified. The qualification permitting mail order was then introduced in the 26 March regulations, and Arch says that the shops which already had a mail order business have suffered no prevention. That is in annex A, category 4.

So if we posit an independent bookshop in a village,

which may have no website but has a telephone and receives a couple of telephone orders a year from an elderly man who cannot easily leave his home, then it is being said, in effect, that the 26 March regulations allow access to the shop, because of those two telephone orders a year, whereas if there had been no orders, access would have been prevented. And query whether a willingness to take telephone orders means there is a continuing part of the business even if it had no orders in fact.

It may be said this is de minimis, and try to apply some sort of line of that kind, but we say it is the same principle; whether the telephone orders were 20% or 50% or 70% of the business, there was still a prevention of access to the premises for a part of its business. The percentage merely affects the degree of loss.

Similarly in relation to places of worship, there was an exclusion and exemption for funerals. Arch isn't taking that point, but its logic would say that there is no prevention of access because you could still access for the purposes of conducting funerals.

Schools. Mr Edelman has covered this point already. It was announced that schools would close other than for teachers, key workers' children and vulnerable children for the purposes of teaching those pupils. But the

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schools closed to the vast majority of pupils . If a school is, in this context, unlucky enough to have to teach a key worker's child or vulnerable child, then they have no prevention of access. If they don't have to do so, there is prevention of access.

Arch says full versus partial closure is a clear line in the sand. They say this in annex C, page 3 in the bottom line. But we would say that is absurdly formalistic, especially when Arch sensibly accepts that prevention of access doesn't mean physical impossibility for all purposes.

Another difficult aspect to understand is why it is being said that it is only if category 1 or category 4 businesses previously provided take-away or mail order services that its business is prevented. That is said in paragraph 63 of Arch's skeleton.

If a business, and it has a duty to mitigate its loss, we can see that from condition 1(a) on page  $\{B/2/38\}$ , it is obliged to take any action reasonably practicable to minimise any interruption of or interference with the business or to avoid or diminish its loss, so if it introduces a take-away or a mail order business to mitigate its loss in order to try and maintain some revenue, on the logic of the rest of Arch's case that has ended its prevention of access.

It should be noted, if we go back to the insuring clause on page 36, exclusion 2 excludes indemnity for any period other than the actual period when the access to the premises was prevented.

So we say it is illogical . This is not a clear dividing line , it is illogical . Why, on Arch's case, is a business starting take-away or mail order to mitigate its loss not also losing its prevention of access by virtue of doing that? It doesn't make sense.

Categories 3 and 5 Mr Edelman has dealt with, and the same point arises. Customers could only make essential trips to hardware stores, et cetera. So you might be able to go in and buy a light bulb or a battery, but you couldn't go and just buy DIY products unless they were essential. So there would have been a reduction in trade.

Similarly , for the service industries , you couldn't travel or have contact unless it was essential . And query how often a visit to a financial adviser or an accountant at that point in time was likely to be essential

So we say that the prevention of access was caused by the advice of the 16 March, repeated subsequently and leading to regulation 6 on 26 March in the regulations to avoid non-essential travel and contact. We say there

just is no line in the sand. Partial prevention of access is prevention of access to the premises for the purposes of carrying on the business at the premises; and, as Arch accepts, it doesn't have to be the case that access is physically impossible, it is about whether the premises could not carry on the business, and we say that is the normal business of the premises. If it is able to carry on in part, that goes to reduce loss as a matter of quantification, but there is still cover.

The only other issue on prevention of access is the date, where we say 16 March was when everybody was told to stop non-essential contact and stop all unnecessary travel and to avoid going to pubs, clubs and theatres; and the purpose of that was to prevent people from going to pubs, clubs and theatres and not to travel.

So we say the government took action, or at least it was advice, by instructing them not to do so, and the public followed that advice and that prevented access. This is not wordplay, it is the ordinary meaning of the words. Prevention wasn't a mere by-product of the government action, it was the whole point. And if a pub was empty by 17 March, that was because its customers had been prevented from accessing it. And since Arch accepts that even a recommendation counts as

a prevention, we say there was a prevention of access from 16 March.

I turn now to the final issue, which is causation. Arch accepts that where premises were required to be closed, which, as I have said, it accepts occurred for at least category 2, the cover is engaged save for causation of loss.

So it accepts that for some businesses there was prevention of access to the premises due to actions or advice of a government due to an emergency anywhere or everywhere which is likely to endanger life. So no vicinity requirement in relation to where the emergency must occur. So it is effectively accepting that the policy responds to the national emergency, to the national pandemic.

It doesn't dispute that the prevention was due to actions or advice, or that actions or advice were due to the emergency. But what they say you do is you remove the insured peril of the government action preventing access, but not the emergency or its other consequences.

We can see that most closely in its defence at paragraph 7.12 to 7.13, it is at  $\{A/7/5\}$ . They make it clear there:

"The burden of proving a right to an indemnity is on the policyholder . On the proper construction of Arch  ${\bf 1}$ 

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and on established principles of causation, where a policyholder has shown the government ... action clause has been triggered by reason of a qualifying prevention of access, the policyholder must then establish on the balance of probabilities that the prevention of access (the insured peril) [it says] has caused business interruption loss ... At a minimum, the policyholder must show the prevention of access to the premises is a 'but for' cause of loss.

"For these purposes, the appropriate counterfactual scenario is where there was no insured peril ..."

Then it says:

"... ie no government or local authority action or advice preventing access to the premises, but where all other factors remain unchanged."

Then it sets out a list , including that COVID-19 existed in all parts or most parts of the UK; various other control measures remained in force , including advice on social distancing , the lockdown, self - isolation requirements; and then the control measures affecting employment, consumer behaviour, economic activity , confidence , et cetera .

So they are saying all of that public authority action falling short of prevention means, for the purposes of the counterfactual, it is all still there.

Then it is alleged that the loss would have been suffered anyway. We see that in Arch's skeleton at paragraphs 127 to 131, which is at  $\{1/7/36\}$ . We have addressed this before, so I am going to take this very briefly .

 $\begin{array}{ll} 6 & \mbox{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: This is essentially the same argument} \\ 7 & \mbox{as is being run by all the insurers , isn't it?} \end{array}$ 

MS MULCAHY: It is exactly the same. A different clause, but the same argument.

 $\begin{array}{ll} 10 & \hbox{LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: There is a trends clause, is there?} \\ 11 & \hbox{MS MULCAHY: There is a basis of settlement clause which we} \\ 12 & \hbox{accept applies, despite referring to damage.} \\ \end{array}$ 

13 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Where is that?

14~ MS MULCAHY: That is --

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Page 34, I think.

16 MS MULCAHY: Yes, that is right. That is right. And we
17 have the insurance on gross profits is limited to loss
18 due to reduction in turnover and increase in cost of
19 working. Then it explains what it will pay. And it has
20 the words "which but for such additional expense would
21 have taken place due to the damage". So ...

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Your basic point here is that once you have got the restriction of access it becomes really impossible to distinguish between these things, and indeed it is not really the fault of the insured that

they can't distinguish between these things because it is a government regulation in the first place.

3 MS MULCAHY: Yes, what we say is there are three elements
4 here. We have the prevention of access, element 1; due
5 to actions of advice or government, element 2; due to an
6 emergency likely to endanger life, element 3. They have
7 said if you want to be formalistic about it, the peril
8 is the prevention of access. So they say, fine, you
9 have stripped that out.

They then go on and remove element 2 as well, they take out the government action or advice; but not just the government action and advice affecting the insured premises, they also take out all government action nationwide as it applies to all premises.

We say you must also remove element 3, the emergency likely to endanger life; it is a further requirement for cover, it is the underlying cause which forms part of the trigger chain, and it results in the government action which then results in the prevention of access.

So we say it is not the case that you leave that in, you remove that too; you don't set it up as a rival competing cause for what is being said to be the insured peril.

Just going back to Mr Edelman's lorry spill example, we say a clause like this should be read as providing

cover where the emergency is of sufficient seriousness as to cause there to be action by the authorities, and if that then has the specified effect on the insured it is covered; and any counterfactual that then seeks to treat only the action by the authorities as insured is wholly artificial, and it would render cover illusory for the sorts of serious emergencies that the cover is clearly contemplating. So we say the emergency is an integral part of the cover. It is contemplated. It may not be sufficient in itself to trigger indemnity, because you need all three elements. But just as action by the police or authorities having the specified effect wouldn't be sufficient in itself, without something that could be properly classified as an emergency. So you take them altogether.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The prevention of access in the abstract is meaningless, isn't it?

MS MULCAHY: No doubt that is why they have married elements 1 and 2 and then subtracted those. But as I said, in relation to element 2 they haven't just said it is action or advice affecting the premises, they have said it is nationwide action or advice. And we apply the same logic to element 3 and say it must be the nationwide emergency.

One other factor, it is said by Arch to be

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irrelevant , but we say, you know, this cover has a  $\check{c}25,000$  limit and you have to bear that in mind as well when you get into looking at what their case entails . Effectively , you are having to model a world with the emergency still in it but without the government action affecting access to the premises, and how that would or would not have economically affected the insured .

Arch shy away from addressing that by saying it can't be resolved in the test case. If you look at paragraph 135, I think it starts at page 38 and goes across to page 39 of the skeleton in the document that we are in  $\{1/7/38\}$ , it makes it clear that our case on burden of proof is also incorrect , the policyholder bears the legal burden:

"There is nothing in the Arch policies to suggest the burden of proof is reversed."

I hope I have explained our case on that:

"How, in a particular case [if we could go over to the next page] the policyholder may discharge its burden, and how (as a matter of practice) Arch may seek to show how the economic effects of the pandemic, the economic downturn, et cetera, would have affected the policyholder's business even if it had not been required to close the premises, are not matters that can sensibly

be resolved in the test case ..."

But that is where the analysis of the insurers leads, the necessity for that type of economic modelling.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If they are right as a matter of principle, then that would follow, wouldn't it? But you say it's for us to decide in the test case whether they are right or wrong as a matter of principle. If you are right that the three elements you have identified all have to be excised in order to do the counterfactual exercise, then that is the conclusion that we will reach, and what the effects of that conclusion are in any individual case is, of course, not for this test case.

MS MULCAHY: My Lord, exactly. The point I am making is that for cover of č25,000 is it really contemplated that one would have the sort of economic modelling evidence that appears to be being suggested here.

 $19 \quad \mathsf{LORD} \; \mathsf{JUSTICE} \; \mathsf{FLAUX} ; \; \; \mathsf{Yes}, \; \mathsf{I} \; \mathsf{understand}.$ 

MS MULCAHY: We would say deploy the low limit in aid of that construction, is that really what is being contemplated by the clause?

In practice, Arch says it is offering 35% to reflect a guess, it seems, that 65% of the loss is caused by what it says are uninsured concurrent causes. We see

that at paragraph 14 of its skeleton on page 8, and it says that is a fair and reasonable gesture, in annex C at row 463. But we can see it says it is paying 35%. No basis is given for that figure, nor can insureds dispute it.

Our response to that is that it is wrong as a matter of principle. The emergency should be treated as part of the insured peril for this purpose; alternatively, not excised from the counterfactual because it is contemplated by the insuring clause, and loss adjustment is not supposed to be merely a discretion for an insurer.

My Lords, those are my submissions in relation to Arch, and I will hand back now to Mr Edelman, who I think is dealing with QBE.

16 (11.06 am)

Submissions by MR EDELMAN

MR EDELMAN: My Lords, that is correct, if I can now start dealing with QBE.

We have got three versions of policies for QBE. The first is QBE1, at  $\{B/13/31\}$  for the relevant clause, is 7.3.9:

"Interruption of or interference with the business arising from any human infectious or human contagious disease [excluding certain diseases], an outbreak of

which local authority stipulated shall be notified to them manifested by any person whilst in the premises or within a 25-mile radius of it."

QBE2 is at  $\{B/14/29\}$ , and it is similar language:

"Loss resulting from interruption of or interference with the business in consequence of any of the following events ... any occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 25 miles."

Then QBE3 at page 22, that is  $\{B/15/22\}$ , and that lower part of the page:

"Loss resulting from interruption or interference to the business as covered by this section  $\dots$ "

Then (c):

"An occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 1 mile of the premises."

You may recollect my referring to that distinction and the fact that QBE's written submissions focus on  $1\ \text{mile}$ , without focusing on the  $25\ \text{-mile}$  clauses .

The QBE defence is in fact principally one of causation and there is only a little bit more that I want to say about that.

There are no coverage points of substance aside from a proof of occurrence, and I have dealt with that under prevalence. There is a pollution and micro-organism exclusion in the policy, but QBE doesn't rely on that.

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They accept that there is an occurrence of COVID-19 when a person contracts the disease and it was diagnosable; they accept that point. If you want it, that is paragraphs 201 and 202 of their skeleton.

We understand them to accept that there is no difference in principle between "occurrence" and "manifestation" -- slightly different wordings, as you saw -- provided that an inference can be drawn from the available evidence that there were COVID-19 cases, whether diagnosed or otherwise, within the relevant area.

But their particular point on causation is they say it's difficult to see how there could be a business interruption loss to an insured caused by an occurrence, in circumstances where the insured and its customers have no knowledge of the fact that, for example, someone with COVID had been at the premises or within the policy area.

We say knowledge isn't required. If, as a matter of fact, the government has acted in part in response to the presence of cases within the requisite area, whether inferred or actually identified, then the resulting disruption is caused by the presence of the disease whether the policyholder or its customers know about it or not. This is the causation issue.

Can I move on then to the particular terms of the clauses . If we go back to QBE1, which is  $\{B/13/31\}$ . It is important, we say, to analyse what this clause is about. It is setting a requirement for the disease to occur within the requisite area, and it is identifying that, we submit, as a qualifying condition for cover . So it is arising from any disease as long as it is manifested by a person within 25 miles .

We are not arguing, as QBE suggests we are, that the effect of this is to provide cover for an occurrence of disease beyond the 25-mile radius zone. We recognise and accept that there is a qualifying condition that the disease must have manifested itself within the 25-mile radius. Where the disease outside that radius comes in is the circumstances in which the occurrence of what has occurred within the 25 miles can be regarded as being properly regarded as causative of the government's response to the outbreak and the ensuing loss to the insured's business within that zone.

Before I turn to that, though, can I just deal with interruption or interference, which appears at the beginning of these clauses.

QBE accepts that social distancing measures, closure measures and other human action could in principle cause interference with the business. So that appears to be

common ground.

QBE accepts that an insured premises does not have to be forced to cease all of its operations in order to satisfy the interference test. What they say, the reference is at  $\{1/17/68\}$ , what is required is an intermeddling with the business such that it cannot be operated by the insured as they had originally intended. We agree with that. So we don't have to get into a debate about what "interruption" means, because they have accepted, realistically and sensibly, what "interference" means. They don't advance any positive case on that aspect, therefore, to contradict our argument, but obviously that is all subject to their causation case.

So can I now turn to the causation issue on QBE, much of which has been covered, there is only a little amount that I want to add.

The starting point, and perhaps we can look at their skeleton for this, it is  $\{1/17/13\}$  -- no, it should be the next page then  $\{1/17/14\}$ , another page change with the references being added. It's paragraph 24. Sorry, the previous page. That was right. Paragraph 24, page 14, please. It says:

"In terms of the sort of circumstances that might be covered by the 'relevant policy area' aspect of the QBE

disease clauses, the range of potential cases (generally but also in the particular context of COVID-19 crisis) are myriad. A localised outbreak of a notifiable disease, including COVID-19, might lead to a particular street or square mile (et cetera) being locked down, even though the rest of the country remains 'open for business'."

That is what they say is the scope of operation of their policy. Their causation case appears to be built on this edifice, that that is what this policy is insuring.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That can't be right in relation to the 25 miles though, can it?

MR EDELMAN: No. That is "localised" is a bit of an odd word to use for an area which covers nearly 2,000 square miles. But let's deal with this even in relation to the 1 mile policy, where it might make a little bit more sense.

It has at the heart of it an important premise which needs to be analysed, because what it appears to be accepting, and is necessarily assuming, is that the disease will not be the direct cause, in the sense of the immediate cause, of any interruption or interference with the insured's business and that, with respect, is obvious.

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What these clauses are all contemplating, as Mr Howard seems to accept in paragraph 24, is that the authorities will be doing something about it. That is the critical point, because any interruption or interference will be caused by virtue of the response of the authorities to the outbreak, not by the outbreak

One can analyse this, and then one then asks oneself: if one is talking about these clauses contemplating that actually what will cause the interruption or interference is the reaction of the authorities to the disease, what is the function of the 25-mile or 1 mile restriction? Is it imposing a locality limit or is it merely imposing a qualifying condition, saying that if there is authority reaction to an outbreak of a disease, and that authority action impacts on you, you only have cover if that disease, whether it is elsewhere or not, is present within the defined radius from your premises?

That means, let's take Salisbury, I think I may have given this example before, someone who is on the outskirts, who is more than 1 mile from the centre of Salisbury and let's say, you know, I know it is not really a disease case but let's treat it as an outbreak of a disease: there is an outbreak of a disease in the

centre of Salisbury, and the authorities think they've caught it quickly and there is only a handful of cases in the centre of Salisbury, but to be on the safe side they shut down Salisbury and its environs, and a business is caught up which is more than  $1\ \text{mile}$  from the centre of Salisbury, it is affected by the government action, but the qualifying condition, that the disease has occurred within 1 mile of the premises, is not satisfied

One can look at this in another way with the notifiability requirement.

The notifiability requirement is another qualifying condition. One doesn't construct a counterfactual for the purposes of this clause, even if one was assuming Mr Howard's approach of local outbreak, one doesn't say: ah well, what if a government had not classified the disease as being notifiable until 21 days after the local authority acted? The local authority was quicker off the mark in acting than the government. Or assume that they would have been, as a counterfactual; assume the local authority had acted before the government made it notifiable. One doesn't use that as a counterfactual, it would be nonsense, because notifiability is just a qualifying condition. So ...

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is that a convenient moment?

1 MR EDELMAN: Yes. My Lord, I have got very little to say 2 about QBE, so if I could possibly, my Lord, just finish 3 this topic LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

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5 MR EDELMAN: Actually that would be more even in the halves. 6 we would have an hour and 25 minutes for the shorthand 7 writers on both sessions.

8 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That is fine.

> MR EDELMAN: When QBE in the policy -- let's go back to  $\{B/13/31\}$  -- when they use "arising from", let's put to one side causal rules and so on, we know that what it is actually contemplating is the disease outbreak being causally associated with some response from the authorities, and that response being actually what causes the interruption or interference .

What we then have as the analysis is that the public authority response, which causes the interruption or interference in fact, is covered by the policy as long as the disease to which the government is reacting is one that is notifiable and it has manifested itself within the 25-mile radius.

Now, QBE's entire causation case is in essence premised on the edifice that the entirety of the government action can be put into the counterfactual, despite the prompting role for that action that

outbreaks all over the country, including in QBE's relevant policy areas, actually had.

We say, as we have said before and I say this in a sentence, the government was responding to one indivisible occurrence or multiple occurrences which are aggregated as part of a national occurrence to become one combined cause. In reality, if all areas had not been affected to a greater or lesser extent, one can imagine that there wouldn't have been a national lockdown. It was the national picture of all these local outbreaks which caused the lockdown. And when the court considers what caused the application of the government's lockdown measures in any particular locality, the causal effect of local prevalence of the disease is part of that overall indivisible cause or viewed individually by virtue of its contribution to the overall picture, and is an effective cause of the government action.

My Lords, I am looking through my notes, and if you could bear with me for another two or three minutes I will be finished QBE entirely.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.

MR EDELMAN: Because I just wanted to say a little bit about the quantification machinery and trends clauses. We have made our submissions as to the application of the

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adjustment machinery in writing, you have our 1 2 submissions on Orient-Express. I don't intend to add 2 3 anything to that. So although we have made submissions 4 about whether they apply, even if they do apply we 5 submit that they are not relevant to this case at all. 6 My Lord, those are my submissions on QBE. 7 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay, we will have a break for ten 8 minutes, until 11:35am. g (11.25 pm) 10 (Short break) 11 (11.35 am) 12 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Are you ready? 13 MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. I usually try to avoid coming back to points that 14 15 I have argued earlier, but can I just add one further 16 illustration to try and persuade my Lord of the Edelman 17 point on prior downturn by giving you an example. And 18 I hope the fact that it is a Mr Edelman point doesn't 19 make it all the worse in your eyes. 20 Let's assume for the poor owner and, if my Lords 21 decide, the hard done by owner of the hotel in the 22 Orient-Express case, that prior to the arrival of the 23 hurricane there had been hurricane warnings, and guests 24 who were due to stay at the hotel prior to the arrival

of the hurricane cancelled their bookings, and let's say

that, contrary to the result in the case, there was actually to be a calculation of the loss of turnover of that hotel, and for that purpose you needed to work out what its turnover had been prior to the occurrence of the damage

Of course, although hurricane would, under that policy, have been an insured peril in the sense that it wasn't excluded, the policy is not triggered until it causes damage to the hotel. But the hurricane is trundling along through the Gulf of Mexico on its way towards the hotel and that causes people to either leave the hotel or not pursue their bookings for periods prior to the damage.

When the loss assessor is calculating his starting turnover to use as a comparison to the turnover following the damage, does he take into account when he does the 12-month period, it may only be a modest difference but does he take into account the fall in turnover that was in those last few days, or does he say: well, it would be a nonsense to take into account those few days, so I am going to treat those few days as if they were standard turnover, because obviously that was affected by the imminence of the arrival of the hurricane

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If we --

25 indemnity.

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highlights the question. I'm not sure it answers it, 3 but it does --LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I agree. 4 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Does Riley deal with this at all or 5 6 7 MR EDELMAN: My Lords, I don't think so, because most things 8 that happen to buildings are pretty instantaneous; they q are fires, floods, they are things like that, that is 10 the everyday occurrence, certainly in this country. 11 Even when we have a storm, a terrible storm, I think we 12 were told there's nothing to worry about and everything 13 is going to be all right; the 1987 storm. 14 So it is a very unusual situation. But I drew that 15 analogy because, really, if that is the right answer for 16 the hurricane case, then that is my analogy to this 17 18 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I understand your point. I'm not sure 19 I accept it. Speaking for myself, my reaction is it 20 wasn't insured. But I follow the point. I follow the 21 point. 22 MR EDELMAN: No, don't get me wrong, I am not saying that 23 the loss of turnover in those two or three days before 24 the hurricane causes damage is insured. 25 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, but --

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I agree with you, Mr Edelman, that

MR EDELMAN: That loss and turnover has to be borne by the insured uninsured. It is the question of when you are 3 calculating the standard turnover or adjusting the standard turnover under these clauses, what would be the parties' intention? That is the question. How is this intended to operate?

7 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: But the effect of calculating it in the 8 way in which you suggested it should be calculated is 9 that the insured does recover for something he wouldn't 10 otherwise have recovered for, does he?

11 MR EDELMAN: No, no, he never recovers for the lost turnover 12 in that --

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Because you say you ignore the fact that there has been a reduction in bookings as a consequence of the imminence of the hurricane in assessing what the turnover was. So let's say for the sake of argument up to that point it is \$1,000,000, and after the hurricane comes it is zero, so he gets a million dollars .

But if in fact, as a result of the cancellations of bookings in the two weeks before the hurricane hit. it is only \$900,000, and that has to be taken into account and at the end of the day it is zero, then he gets \$900,000. So it does affect the amount of the

MR EDELMAN: Of course it affects the amount of the 1 the premises." 2 indemnity but he is not getting the 100,000 loss. 2 There are some elements to the clause my Lords can 3 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That is debatable, I think, on your 3 see: closure or restrictions placed on the premises, as 4 argument. 4 a result of a notifiable disease manifesting itself MR EDELMAN: What he is getting, my Lord, is he is getting 5 5 within 25 miles, and it has to result in loss. 6 the indemnity for, let's say the ordinary day-to-day 6 This one doesn't actually specify, probably because 7 7 turnover would have been a million, and from day one of of the nature of the business, that there has to be an the damage he is getting loss based on that  $1\ \mbox{million}$ interruption or interference; it is just talking about 8 8 q not loss based on the 900,000 which was only q 10 10 artificially reduced immediately prior to the damage by Most of this we have already debated, but just some 11 the impact of the very thing that caused the loss . Or 11 points that particularly arise on this. My Lords will 12 12 in our case combined to cause the loss. note that there is a maximum amount of č250,000 on this 13 13 In a sense, the emergence of this disease is like an cover, you will see immediately to the right of the 14 14 approaching hurricane, because it is something that was clause. The only words that are really new are "closure 15 building up to a crescendo until it reached such a level 15 or restrictions placed on", but otherwise, as I say, it 16 16 is very similar. So can I have a look at those words. that the government had to act, and what the insurers 17 17 It is common ground that "closure or restrictions are saying is: well, you assume all of the impact of the 18 impending hurricane, and you take that into account when 18 placed on the premises" were satisfied with effect from 19 19 you are assessing what the combined effect of the 1.00 pm on 26 March by regulation 5(3) of the 26 March 20 20 hurricane and everything else caused; and we say that is regulations. The references for that is the 21 21 regulations, we don't need to look at them so please 22 22 I had better move on. All I can do is leave the don't turn them up,  $\{J/16/3\}$  and the RSA skeleton, 23 23 appendix 1, page 5, paragraph 16. points with my Lords and ask you to reflect on it. 24 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We will think about it, don't you 24 So the only issue between the parties is whether 25 25 this was satisfied before then. RSA is effectively worry. 57 1 MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. I hope you accept that even if 1 taking the same line on this as Hiscox, albeit not the 2 2 same line as Arch or Ecclesiastical , arguing that it is an Edelman point, it is quite a serious one. 3 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I agree with you, Mr Edelman, it is 3 closure or restrictions needed to have legal force to 4 a serious point, and I see entirely the force of the 4 apply. 5 5 point, I really do. But I am not convinced that it is So the first question is whether the word "placed" 6 necessarily right. But we will think about it. 6 applies to the word "closure". We say, you won't be 7 7 MR EDELMAN: Yes. surprised to hear, that it doesn't. The word "placed" 8 8 My Lords, RSA. This is going to be a bit longer is looking at closure. But in any event -- sorry, is 9 9 looking at -than the other policies because there is quite a few 10 variants, not, I would emphasise, because we see there 10 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Sorry? 11 as being any complexity. 11 MR EDELMAN: The word "placed" is looking at restrictions. 12 RSA1 and RSA3 both contain only disease clauses, so 12 I misspoke. But in any event, we say that doesn't 13 13 I will deal with those policies in full and address really matter. 14 those issues before I turn to RSA2.1, 2.2 and then RSA4. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Grammatically it doesn't make sense, 14 15 So can I start with RSA1, and you will see it at 15 because it would be "closure of or restrictions placed 16  $\{B/16/1\}$ , which is Cottagesure. It is aimed and 16 17 17 MR EDELMAN: Yes, maybe the word "of" is missing. But directed at holiday cottage owners who rent out their 18 18 "closure on" also doesn't make sense. property. 19 The disease clause we are interested in is on page 19 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: "Closure is placed on the premises" I 20 20 16 on this tab  $\{B/16/16\}$ , and extensions to cover, it is suppose is a rather clunky way of saying it, but it 21 21 probably doesn't matter, does it?

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MR EDELMAN: No, it doesn't. Because what I am saying is

"placed on", whether it applies to them or not, is even weaker than "imposed". Do you remember we discussed

"imposed" in the context of Hiscox? And we submit that

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"Loss as a result of:

"closure or restrictions placed on the premises as

itself at the premises or within a radius of 25 miles of

a result of a notifiable human disease manifesting

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what the government did, and you have heard all about way, because it covers notifiable disease manifesting 2 that, is sufficient to satisfy the words "placed on". 2 itself at the premises: so if there is a particular 3 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: From when? 3 complex of holiday cottages, if you like, where there is an outbreak of Legionnaires' disease, and the government 4 MR FDFI MAN: From 16 March is our date 4 5 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That is the Prime Minister's 5 asks the owner to identify who is going to be going 6 6 there in the next 3 weeks, and the government says to announcement or statement: stay at home, don't go away 7 7 on holiday. each of the people who is going there, "Don't go there 8 MR EDELMAN: Exactly. 8 because there is an outbreak of Legionnaires' disease", q q MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: But the issue here is whether it is you would say that is a restriction placed on the 10 10 placed on the premises, isn't it? premises. 11 MR EDELMAN: Yes, and my Lord, effectively we say that one 11 MR EDELMAN: Absolutely. They are telling them -- they don't list every single holiday cottage you can't go to, 12 12 is looking at the practical impact of this. Is there 13 13 a restriction or closure placed on the premises when you they are telling them: don't go to any. In my Lord's 14 14 tell people not to go there? You are restricting the example they were, but in case they were saying: don't go to any of them. 15 15 free travel. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, I follow. Yes. 16 What RSA says is that the 16 March announcement did 16 17 not restrict free travel in the UK. But what the 17 MR EDELMAN: Anyway, that's a short point but that is our 18 Prime Minister in fact said, as my Lord has just said, 18 point on that. 19 "Now is the time for everyone to stop essential contact 19 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: In the context of holiday cottages it 20 20 might be said either you close them or the restrictions with others, avoid unnecessary contact of all kinds". 91 And we submit that you do place restrictions on the 21 that are being referred to have to be something else, 22 22 premises if you place restrictions on the customers other than physical closure or physical prevention, as 23 23 going to the premises. That's what they were doing. it were, from getting into the premises, because 24 24 They were telling people, as my Lord just said, "Do not otherwise why have you got restrictions there at all? 25 travel to holiday accommodation". That, we say, is 25 And you would say the obvious restriction placed on the 63

placing a restriction on the premises, even if it is not directly identifying the premises as such. That is essentially our submission.

Then RSA also say that the social distancing measures in regulation 6 are not relevant restrictions . Therefore, and this is its causation case, even though they accept regulation 5(3) on 26 March is a closure, they say, well, it didn't cause any loss, because regulation 6 prohibited all customers from travelling, and that is not a restriction placed on the premises.

That demonstrates, even if we put to one side the 16 March government statement and announcement, it shows you now how artificially they are approaching this clause, that you are not placing a restriction on the premises if you tell people not to go there.

That then becomes their counterfactual, that even if the government hadn't closed you, hadn't included you in the regulations on the businesses that were required to close, you've still got the regulations preventing people from going to you, so you would have suffered your loss anyway.

The answer to that is, looked at  $\$  realistically , the restrictions were imposed on the premises, were placed on the premises.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I suppose you might test it in this

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premises is telling people: you can't go there.

MR EDELMAN: Exactly, or how many people can go there.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, okay.

MR EDELMAN: Then the clause requires it to be as a resu

MR EDELMAN: Then the clause requires it to be as a result, loss as a result of the closure and -- sorry, the closure or restrictions to be as a result of notifiable human disease, which we have dealt with, that's the prevalence point, within the 25 miles.

But there is one point on the "as a result of" notifiable human disease within a radius of 25 miles. This has been debated in the skeleton, and it is Mr Harrison's idea, example, the Chesil Beach example which we give in our skeleton, which quite nicely illustrates the point that RSA and other insurers are taking.

My Lords, it arises in particular on this one, because if you go to the next page, we don't have to worry about the precise terms, but on page  $\{B/16/17\}$  there is in fact a pollution of beach cover, and it is pollution of the beach within a 10 mile radius. I am not going to get into the solely attributable , sudden or accidental stuff , but just so you know this is not an outlandish example, this is actually based on a provision in the policy referring to a 10-mile radius of pollution .

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So let's forget about the particular language of it and just imagine that there is a clause which is like this, which is loss as a result of pollution of a beach within 10 miles, and there is an oil spill on Chesil Beach which pollutes the entire beach. Three miles of Chesil Beach is within a 10-mile radius of the holiday cottage.

On insurers' counterfactual, there would be no indemnity payable for any loss of business, because if somehow, miraculously, that 3-mile stretch of Chesil Beach escaped any pollution -- this is their counterfactual -- the beach would still have been closed because of the pollution elsewhere; and the customers still wouldn't have come, because the whole of the rest of the beach was polluted.

It rather shows how artificial the counterfactual is. We submit that they really don't have an answer to this. The event is you have suffered a loss, and in that case because a beach within a beach within a certain radius was polluted. It was. And talking about, "Well, if that bit hadn't been polluted and only another bit had", it is just as unrealistic, in our submission, as the toxic lorry spill case. You are contemplating a combination of events and that is sufficient.

One other point on this . RSA say that the lockdown measures, on the "as a result of", they say the lockdown measures weren't as a result of an incidence of COVID-19 but were preventative or pre-emptive. But that doesn't accord with the facts on incidence and on the government action , as we express them.

What we know is that the government was responding to not just the known but also the known unknowns, and I have dealt with that before. But I just thought I would mention that that is a particular point that RSA are taking.

Can I then move on to causation. In a sense we come back to the Chesil Beach example again and think about that, because the peril there, the pollution, is of itself of a nature which is capable of affecting a wide area, just as a notifiable disease is.

Just as there the section within the 10 miles would clearly be part of the overall picture in the mind of a holiday-maker deciding whether or not to book or cancel a holiday at the guest house, so the outbreak within the 25 miles is part of the overall picture that the government has when it is deciding to make the decision to impose restrictions on businesses and the public.

But let's have a look at some of the particular ways

in which RSA operates the counterfactual, because what they do is they subtract the whole of the clause; they subtract the closure, the restrictions and the disease manifesting within 25 miles. So they don't make the mistake we say that other insurers make, of arbitrarily declaring that only the closure or restrictions are the peril and not the disease, and they also don't seek to remove only the restrictions placed on the premises, they accept one must remove the nationwide restriction; but their case is, and as I think I have already foreshadowed, that the government restriction on travel was a separate "but for" cause and is not excised.

We say there are a number of flaws. I have already referred to the first flaw, but that is not treating that restriction as a relevant restriction and that is wrong. But secondly, it is an unrealistic and, we would say, atomistic view of the regulations, where some of the regulations are removed for the purposes of the counterfactual and some are left in. We say they are a package, and they either all stay in or they all need to be excised.

22 Let's see what --

23 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That really ties in very much with your 24 first way of putting it, doesn't it?

25 MR EDELMAN: Yes.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: If you are wrong about that, then the second argument has more force.

MR EDELMAN: Although where one gets to is that if all the other regulations are said to still be in force, one still has everything else open that was permitted, everything else, everything open within the same category as the premises, as the holiday accommodation, everything else closed, and then you have this disease-free halo of 2,000 square miles in which you then have a guest house with a total monopoly of business. It's just fanciful and unrealistic.

And so we would say this is, I'm afraid, lawyers' counterfactual and it is not the real world; it's not the real world of this policy and what this policy is aimed to achieve.

Now there is one point on the machinery. We have made our submissions as to whether the machinery applies or not, but at  $\{B/16/73\}$  under "Loss of Gross Revenue" there is a point about what "solely" means and the effect of it:

"Loss of Gross Revenue.

"The actual amount of the reduction in the gross revenue received by you  $\dots$  solely as a result of damage to buildings ."

And assume that we are manipulating that. But then

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if my Lords can remember that, it's the problem of looking at electronic copies, and if we look back to the clause itself now, on page 16  $\{B/16/16\}$ , which is on the screen, we would then be reading into that clause, "Solely as a result of closure or restrictions placed on the premises as a result of human notifiable disease" et cetera, et cetera et cetera. It is the entire package. q LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. MR EDELMAN: And it would not be operating, you can't say it's solely within a radius of 25 miles. That would be to insert "solely" at each stage of the causal link. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Your primary case is that the "loss of gross revenue" definition doesn't apply because there wasn't damage to buildings. MR EDELMAN: Exactly, my Lord, yes. We have put that in writing and there is limited time, and it is one of those arguments that there's not much orally that one can add to it, it is what it is. We say it is a good argument. But we would be putting the "solely" at the beginning -- if it was to be manipulated, what I think Mr Turner is trying to do is then put "solely" so that it operates "solely within a radius of 25 miles", so he is inserting it at each bit of the clause. Whereas all it means is that the loss must solely be as a result of

the combination of these ingredients. And that still leaves open the question, the more general causation question, and doesn't affect that.

My Lords, that is RSA1. Can I move on to RSA3. I will come back to RSA2.

RSA3 is  $\{B/19/38\}$ . This is a commercial combined policy, you can see from the top of the page. Again, this one is, as we saw with QBE, a very simple disease clause, just two elements to cover, interruption or interference, and then following an occurrence.

The key issues here are firstly what is meant by "following ", and then there is also, on page  $\{B/19/93\}$  a rather convoluted exclusion . It is a contamination or pollution clause, at L, and:

"The insurance by this policy does not cover any loss or damage due to [amongst other things, second line in the middle] epidemic and disease  $\dots$ "

Then it says in the second (a), it has two lots of (a) and (b):

"If a peril not excluded from this policy arises directly from pollution and/or contamination any loss or damage arising directly from that peril shall be covered.

"(b) All other terms and conditions of this policy shall be unaltered and especially the exclusions shall

not be superseded by this clause."

Bear in mind I will come back to that exclusion, but I just wanted to show you what we are going to have to be addressing. Go back to the clause now at page  $\{B/19/38\}$ , "interruption or interference", nothing much to be added to that. Then we have got the word "following" at the end of the first line. We have made our submissions in Hiscox on the meaning of the word "following" as a causal connector, and we say only a loose causal connection is envisaged. No need to establish "but for" causation; it is enough that the disease is part of the causal background, which a disease within the relevant 25-mile radius plainly is. Ms Mulcahy will also be addressing this further in relation to the Zurich policy.

RSA suggest that other terms in the extension indicate that a proximate cause test is intended by the word "following", relying on references to "affected in consequence of", "directly affected", words like that in the policy. But in our submission, if the draftsman had meant "directly affected" and he has used it elsewhere in the policy, that is what he would have said.

It may be the point is academic because our case is fine whether "following" is proximate cause or not, something stronger or not, but it may have been

selected , and we say probably was selected , by the draftsman as a more appropriate term in recognition of a point I have made before, that the interruption or interference was likely to be caused by health protection measures following an outbreak of a disease . So it is an implicit recognition that there will be something intermediate happening to cause the interruption or the disease .

One sees the word "following" in the context of these disease clauses used quite frequently. And just putting to one side its causal connotations, it does have that important recognition that it is recognising that unlike other sorts of perils, this one will not be having a direct effect of its own on the business, it will be causing something else to happen which will have an effect on the business. And that rather explains the looser use of the word "following".

It also, we submit, undermines the insurers' approach to this counterfactual.

There is one other provision that I should have highlighted for you but I forgot, and I should have done so. There is on page  $\{B/19/39\}$  at item 4, there is this exclusion, right at the end of the clause above " Professional Accountants":

"We shall only be liable for the loss arising at

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those premises which are directly affected by the occurrence discovery or accident [and it says] maximum indemnity period shall mean three months."

So it is premises directly affected. There is a similar clause in Arch and in Amlin 1 and 2.

In a rare moment of accord, Amlin actually agree with our analysis of this clause, which is that it is actually there to prevent the loss, including what I would call the knock-on effect loss at another set of premises owned by the insured which are not impacted.

So, for example, if there's an outbreak of disease, let's say there is in a locality, and the local authority says that anyone who has worked at that locality cannot work, cannot go and work anywhere else, they have got to be quarantined, and the people who work at that may be, for example, some cleaning staff who clean all that insured's holiday cottages, and another holiday cottage is outside the 25-mile radius and cannot be cleaned. The loss from that holiday cottage can't be included; it is not the premises directly affected. That is what this is aimed at.

But RSA take a rather more dramatic view of this, because they say that this actually prevents people -- this applies so that it has to be something directly on the premises. They say that this clause requires the

staff at the premises to be infected or the premises to require a deep clean because of the disease or its effect .

So it is looking at making sure the premises are directly affected, as opposed to the, those premises which are directly affected, which we say is far too restrictive. It is effectively removing the 25-mile cover and supplanting this with a cover that only operates when there is a disease on the premises. So we say that is just simply a misreading of the exclusion.

Now if I can move on to the pollution and contamination exclusion , which is this tab, page 93.  $\{B/19/93\}$ . Just putting "epidemic" to one side for a moment, and we say "epidemic" and "disease" is obviously within the ambit of the disease clause , because that is what some notifiable diseases are capable of being and that is what notifiable disease encompasses. But even putting to one side the epidemic point it is obvious, we submit, that the word "disease" in that clause cannot have been intended to take away the cover given by the infectious diseases extension . And one then asks oneself: if that is the answer, how does one get there?

"If the peril not excluded from this policy arises directly from pollution and/or contamination any loss or damage arising directly from that peril shall be covered."

Then one has to treat pollution and/or contamination, although they are in bold they are undefined, as having been intended to be a reflection of the title to this clause, "Contamination or Pollution". It would have been easier if there had been a definition which defined it in accordance with subparagraph (a), but there isn't, so one has to make sense of it and that would make perfect sense.

The other way is to say at (b):

14 "All other terms ..."

 $\begin{array}{ll} 15 & \mbox{MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Sorry, I don't understand quite how} \\ 16 & \mbox{that works, Mr Edelman. Could you just explain it} \, . \end{array}$ 

MR EDELMAN: Yes.

18 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: The second (a):

 $$\rm ^{"}\,If\ a\ peril\ not\ excluded\ from\ this\ policy\ arises}$  20  $$\rm directly\ ..."$ 

MR EDELMAN: From epidemic or disease.

22 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: So you then look to see whether the 23 infectious disease cover arises directly from epidemic 24 or disease.

25 MR EDELMAN: Yes.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes.

MR EDELMAN: There is an obvious intent here. I mean, they are obviously not intending by this exclusion at the end to override an express grant of cover, so one has to read this sensibly.

The other way through to it is:

"All other terms and conditions of this policy shall be unaltered and [in brackets] (especially the exclusions) shall not be superseded by this clause."

The words "shall not be superseded by this clause" must be intended to indicate the terms and conditions shall be unaltered, to indicate that if there is an express grant of cover in relation to any of these topics, this exclusion is not negating an express grant of cover.

What it is doing, essentially , is making sure that perils that don't specifically state what they are going to be caused by aren't caught up with this .

19 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I mean, you could look at it, if you go 20 back to the insuring extension at page  $\{B/19/38\}$ :

"We shall indemnify you in respect of interruption or interference with the business following any occurrence ..."

And then "attributable to food or drink supplied from the premises". So that would seem to be covering

| 1  | food poisoning.   | 1  | MR EDELMAN: Yes, this is 2.1, there is RSA2.1, which is     |
|----|---|----|---|
| 2  | MR EDELMAN: Yes.  | 2  | this one, the restaurants, wine bars and public houses;     |
| 3  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If you go to the exclusion, it talks  | 3  | and RSA2.2, which is the shops policy, that is the one      |
| 4  | about it doesn't cover any loss or damage due to          | 4  | at tab 18.  |
| 5  | poisoning.  | 5  | MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: They have the same prevention of access |
| 6  | MR EDELMAN: Yes.  | 6  | cover.  |
| 7  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's a circular point, isn't it?      | 7  | MR EDELMAN: Yes. That is why they have been grouped         |
| 8  | MR EDELMAN: Yes.  | 8  | together.   |
| 9  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Your point about (b) is probably the  | 9  | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So we only need to look at one, do we?  |
| 10 | answer really . (a) is a bit impenetrable .               | 10 | Page {B/17/36}.   |
| 11 | MR EDELMAN: Yes, it is. It is all a bit impenetrable. But | 11 | MR EDELMAN: Yes. It's "Prevention of Access Public          |
| 12 | I think when one looks at this as a whole, and one gets   | 12 | Emergency":   |
| 13 | this with insurance policies, sometimes one has to        | 13 | "The actions or advice of a competent Public                |
| 14 | actually work out what the draftsman is getting at.       | 14 | Authority due to an emergency likely to endanger life or    |
| 15 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.                                  | 15 | property in the vicinity of the Premises which prevents     |
| 16 | MR EDELMAN: And what he must be getting at is: there is   | 16 | or hinders the use or access to the premises."              |
| 17 | this general exclusion but I am not intending to          | 17 | Again, similar to clauses you have seen before.             |
| 18 | override any express grant of cover, it's just if there   | 18 | There is an issue in relation to 2.2, where there is        |
| 19 | isn't something express for these topics.                 | 19 | a different exclusion, so there is one difference.          |
| 20 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: They are extensions, aren't they?     | 20 | There is no difference in the cover clause, but there is    |
| 21 | MR EDELMAN: Yes. And it is fine, it works as it stands.   | 21 | a difference in the exclusion.                              |
| 22 | But then "epidemic" and "disease" go together, because    | 22 | The exclusion to 2.1 is as a result of diseases             |
| 23 | a notifiable disease is something which has the capacity  | 23 | specified in extension A(a) "Diseases". We needn't turn     |
| 24 | to be an epidemic.  | 24 | it up, but it is a list of diseases and obviously this      |
| 25 | I think what Mr Turner wants to do is to carve out        | 25 | one isn't there. Then there is below it "Any amount in      |
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| 1  | "epidemic" and say: ah, this is an epidemic exclusion.    | 1  | excess of č10,000".   |
| 2  | But that is inconsistent with the nature of the peril,    | 2  | Then if we go to the clause in 2.2 at $\{B/18/51\}$ one     |
| 3  | and, you know, it says "all other terms and conditions    | 3  | can see that there is a different exclusion and it          |
| 4  | shall be unaltered". So it goes back to the policy.       | 4  | reads, and it reads perfectly naturally:                    |
| 5  | And if, as a matter of construction, by covering          | 5  | "As a result of infectious or contagious diseases           |
| 6  | a notifiable disease it covers something which is         | 6  | any amount in excess of 10,000."                            |
| 7  | capable of being an epidemic and develops into one, then  | 7  | So this has got a different disease exclusion.              |
| 8  | the exclusion doesn't apply. Just as with my Lord's       | 8  | Instead of excluding only specified diseases, it            |
| 9  | example of food poisoning. You have the exclusion, but    | 9  | excludes all of them, and the words "any amount in          |
| 10 | if you look at the clause and on true construction of     | 10 | excess of 10,000" are printed as part of that exclusion.    |
| 11 | the clause that falls within the ambit, it's not          | 11 | In other words, capping any indemnity under this public     |
| 12 | excluded.   | 12 | emergency clause to č10,000. We don't dispute that that     |
| 13 | My Lord, RSA3, there is nothing more for me to add        | 13 | is so capped.   |
| 14 | on causation and counterfactual or on the trends clause,  | 14 | But, as you have seen, RSA's submission is that             |
| 15 | so unless there is anything more on that policy I was     | 15 | there is an obvious error on page $\{B/18/51\}$ , and the   |
| 16 | going to move on to RSA2, and there are two forms of      | 16 | obvious error and the obvious correction to it is to        |
| 17 | that.   | 17 | remove the words "any amount in excess of 10,000" and       |
| 18 | The first one is $\{B/17/1\}$ . I will just show you      | 18 | place them as though they apply to all the cover under      |
| 19 | what that is, it is a restaurant, wine bars and pubs      | 19 | this clause.  |
| 20 | policy. Then $\{B/18/1\}$ , a shops policy. These are the | 20 | One can see that is what the draftsman did on 2.1,          |
| 21 | lead policies , but they just show you essentially what   | 21 | but that would not be obvious to the reasonable reader      |
| 22 | these are about.  | 22 | as a mistake on this clause. There is nothing wrong         |
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Let's go to the key element of cover. Let's take

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with it at all . Perhaps I will deal with this point

One can see that the clause above has no sub-limit

while we have got the page open.

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that at  $\{B/17/36\}$ .

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: This is RSA2, is it?

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at all . The one below does have an overall sub-limit . And as one goes through the clauses one sees a mixed bag on it . If one goes to the previous page  $\{B/18/50\}$  the first one has no sub-limit , the second one does have a sub-limit , and the third one (c) does have a sub-limit . But as I have shown you, and it goes over the page, the fourth one, "failure to supply" doesn't . It is a mixed bag. It is not an obvious error .

One can well imagine why diseases might be singled out for a sub-limit of 10,000. That makes perfect sense. Whereas what Mr Turner wants you to do is to read this as though there is an absolute exclusion of all infectious diseases from the clause, and we submit that simply is not tenable. It's not obvious that there is an error, and the moving of the words "any amount" to give them a false, to give them a capital A, and the new line is not an obvious correction.

I think Mr Turner, he will forgive me if I have made a mistake about this, I am trying to recollect submissions, I think he made some point about there being no comma after the word "diseases". If you look carefully through the policy, the use of a comma does not seem to have occurred to the draftsman in any clauses at all. It's not a form of punctuation that --LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No.

MR TURNER: I'm not sure that's a point we have taken.

MR EDELMAN: Then I apologise for that. But if a point was to be taken, that one would expect a comma if I was right, there aren't any commas anywhere.

While we are on the subject of exclusions, there is one other exclusion that I should deal with. Let's go back to page  $\{B/17/36\}$ , and there is an exclusion (b):

"During any period other than the actual period when access to the premises was prevented."

This seems to be relied on to argue that only prevention of access is covered. So one ignores the words "prevents or hinders the use or access to the premises" in the insuring clause. So you give with one hand and you take away with the other.

Of course exclusions can cut down the scope of cover, but it would be remarkable if the intention of the draftsman when this exclusion was inserted, having conferred cover for prevention or hindrance of use or access, was, by an exclusion, then to cut it down to prevention of access only.

If that is what was intended, he would have simply said "which prevents access to the premises" in the insuring clause. What this is obviously intended to do by a shorthand is to say that you cannot have indemnity for the after-effects of a prevention or hindrance of

What you get is when there was prevention or hindrance of use or access, when that was actually operating you can get your loss; but the minute that stops, that is when your indemnity period stops, and you can't say: well, because of that it took me a while to recover my business. That is the simple explanation for that, and the draftsman has simply used a shorthand, "prevention of access", to encompass all the concepts that he has put in the insuring clause.

If one goes back now, having dealt with the exclusions , to the clause itself , their preamble I should have shown you at page 35  $\{B/17/35\}$ :

"Cover provided by this subsection is extended to include interruption or interference with the business."

Then page  $\{B/17/36\}$ , interruption and interference has been addressed, it doesn't seem to be disputed this will be satisfied.

We have "actions or advice of a competent public authority"; there is little debate, little if any debate here. It is important to recognise, though, that RSA acknowledges that advice from the government can be coercive in its effect.

That is an important contextual point, if people say, "Well, none of this could have been anticipated,

and it is hard luck on the insured if the government didn't impose things in a legally binding way, instead of just imposing them by guidance", but this policy actually contemplates that there will be, amongst other things, a prevention of use or access resulting from advice of government.

Obviously whether that has happened and is causally linked will be a question of fact in different types of case, but it shows a recognition that governments and authorities sometimes act in an advisory way which really is coercive, even if not legally coercive.

Directly legally coercive, I should say.

On the "emergency likely to endanger life ", we have covered that before, but RSA, unsurprisingly, accepts that the COVID-19 epidemic was a general public health emergency. Ms Mulcahy has addressed that on Arch 1.

Then "in the vicinity ", we have addressed that as well under Arch. Arch have a vicinity limit, I correct myself. The emergency occurred in all areas, and therefore will have occurred, we submit, in the vicinity of the premises. The epidemic, and in this case in the context of an emergency it's not just the actual cases, but the emergency is the serious risk of its further spread and development throughout the population, is of itself an emergency, and that was a nationwide emergency

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and therefore necessarily occurred in the vicinity . And Then you have got our case on the trends clause, our the clause doesn't say that the emergency has to be only 2 case on the trends clause is in writing. in the vicinity of the premises. All it needs to do is 3 I need to press on, so if my Lords are content to be an emergency which is likely to endanger life in 4 I will move to RSA4, which is at  $\{B/20/1\}$ . 5 the vicinity of the premises, and it was. The COVID You can see it is a Marsh form, but there is emergency was likely to endanger life in the vicinity of 6 a clause in it which says it to be treated as RSA's everywhere in the country. So we say that's satisfied . 7 form. Three clauses to consider: a notifiable disease 8 But even if the emergency has to be in the vicinity , clause, an enforced closure cause and a prevention of for the reasons I have given that is also satisfied . q access clause. 10 We understand that RSA's case is that the emergency Page  $\{B/20/6\}$  is the material damage insuring wasn't in the vicinity, but that, for reasons I have 11 clause . That is just to show you where that is . Then 12 given, ought to be rejected. It presupposes that the clause 2.3 on  $\{B/20/7\}$  is the business interruption 13 emergency contemplated can only be local. That is not what the policy says. Really what RSA is doing is 14 "In the event of interruption or interference to the inserting the word "only" in the clause to: an emergency 15 insured's business as a result of ... 16 "( viii ) Notifiable diseases and other incidents : likely to endanger life only in the vicinity of the 17 "(a) discovered at an insured location." premises. And that is not a permissible approach to construction 18 Not relevant for us. obviously. But: The authority action was due to the emergency. 19 "(d) occurring within the vicinity of an insured We have dealt with the causal relationship between the 20 actions or advice of the competent authority and the 21 "during the period of insurance." 22 emergency. We also have prevention of access at (xii): 23 We then have prevention and hindrance of use. We "Prevention of access - Non-damage" have RSA again on this policy drawing a distinction 24 At the end: between what they term "closure measures" and "social 25 "Within the territorial limits, the insurer agrees 87 distancing measures". So the distinction is based on 1 to pay the insured the resulting business interruption the content of the measures, rather than their legal 2 loss ." force. They accept that the closure measures did 3 You will find those definitions firstly at page 23, prevent use of all premises to which they apply, but 4 for business interruption loss, which is, the top 5 they deny that the social distancing measures caused any left - hand corner, reduction in turnover. kind of prevention or hindrances of access. 6 7 You have our case on this . Preventing customers 8 the backdating one. (ii): from accessing premises is, we submit, prevention of 9 "Any additional diseases notifiable under the Health access; and, similarly, the social distancing measures also amounted to hindrance of access. 10

We then have the counterfactual, and I think we have really dealt with this but just so you are aware of it, RSA's primary case is that you only subtract the endangerment in the vicinity . Here the Scilly Isles is used as the knight in shining armour by the RSA, an island of disease-free safety, still subject to the restrictions , and they say that the counterfactual  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left$ requires you to imagine that each holiday cottage enjoyed that same immunity. You have our submissions. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: This is restaurants or pubs, isn't it? MR EDELMAN: Yes. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Hotels, restaurants, pubs.

22 23 MR EDELMAN: Yes. It is just utterly fanciful, in our

submission. It doesn't tie in with the clause, but

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it is utterly fanciful .

Then you have notifiable disease on page  $\{B/20/29\}$ . This is quite an important one. This is RSA4, which had

Protection Regulations (2010), where a disease occurs and is subsequently classified under the ... regulations such disease will be deemed to be notifiable from its initial outbreak "

As I mentioned before, there are two points about this clause. Firstly , it overrides the New World Harbourview point about when you get indemnity if there is a delay in it being made notifiable. But secondly, and we say more significantly and of general significance to all these policies, is it is expressly contemplating, it must be, it is said by RSA to have been intended to override the New World Harbourview decision, which was a case about a newly emerging disease, SARS in the Far East, and this, if nothing else, demonstrates that within the ambit of these notifiable disease risks, insurers must be taken to know

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that they are at risk of providing indemnity in respect of losses arising from newly emerging diseases which become notifiable .

Those newly emerging diseases could be anything, but we all know which are the ones in recent times have caused a degree of panic, things like SARS and Ebola. Whether they go anywhere or not, or how far they go, depends on the nature of the disease.

But anyway, you will see that part of the definition of "notifiable diseases" is any additional diseases notifiable under ... and it has a list of any additional diseases, so that is not an exclusive list. Then (v):

"... any other enforced closure of an insured location ..."

So under the "Notifiable Diseases and Other Incidents" cover, going back to page 7, one has those two ingredients ,  $\{B/20/7\}$ , an additional disease occurring within the vicinity , or any other enforced closure of an insured location by any government authority .

Then we have, going on to the definitions at page  $\{B/20/30\}$ , the "Prevention of Access - Non-Damage" clause. Actions or advice, governmental authority or agency in the vicinity of the insured locations -- this is 87 on the right-hand side, just below the middle --

which prevents or hinders use or access of the insured locations

For reasons which we explain in our skeleton, we accept that the claim, the trends mechanism and all that applies to this policy, so I needn't go into that.

There is also one other definition I need to take you to, because it is significant .  $\{B/20/35\}$  " Vicinity ". We say this is a good working definition of what " vicinity " should mean.

"... an area surrounding or adjacent to an insured location in which events that occur within such area would be reasonably expected to have an impact on an insured or the insured's business."

Then one has to consider the nature of the event, and whether or not it is in the vicinity.

Our submissions on that is "vicinity" is a flexible concept and, if necessary, the country could be in the vicinity of the premises for the purposes of an epidemic. But we don't need to go that far, because we have got our causation arguments about outbreaks of disease in a vicinity. And in the particular context of COVID, the causal role that occurrences of the disease in any relevant policy area, whether it is a vicinity or a mileage limit, has. But you have our submissions on that.

No further points additional to other insurers arise on the first head of cover, going back to page  $\{B/20/29\}$ , that is diseases in the vicinity, that is the same arguments as before.

We then have, under 5, enforced closure. There is just a couple of points here. RSA admits in its defence that if and to the extent that premises insured under this policy were ordered to close in full or in part, that amounted to enforced closure. The reference for that is their amended defence at paragraph 50, subparagraph (d). That includes orders, and not only legislation. But also the government announcements on 20, 23 and 24 March. So it accepts that a partial enforced closure applies and is covered by the clause.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Presumably that is because the actual insuring clause begins with the words:

"In the event of interruption or interference to the insured's business ..."

19 MR EDELMAN: Yes, but they are not seeking to argue that
20 enforced closure requires closure of the whole lot .
21 LORD HISTICE FLAUX: Enforced closure of the whole lot is

21 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Enforced closure of the whole lot is 22 inconsistent with interference . That's the point .

MR EDELMAN: Exactly, yes.

Having said that, if we can now go to  $\{1/18/77\}$ . I think I have got the right reference . It is 24(a) of

their skeleton argument. Because they have then got a rather convoluted example that they give. A restaurant has space for 10 diners, predominantly used as a take-away. Other than at weekends, the seats are solely used by take-away/collection customers to wait for their food. The 21 and 26 March regulations required the dining/waiting area to be shut. The customers could enter the premises one-by-one to collect their take-aways. The 21 and 26 March regulations permitted chefs to continue cooking food in the kitchen as before.

The next page  $\{1/18/78\}$ , (iii ):

"Even if the FCA were to maintain that there is some form of 'enforced closure' in relation to premises which were palpably not closed, the fact that chefs can work in the kitchen and the public can come into the same (closed) dining area to pick up their food, contradicts the possibility that it could be for 'health reasons or concerns'."

Let's go back to the clause again,  $\{B/20/29\}$ . This is the for "health reasons or concerns". I have to confess that we really do not understand that submission. Everything that happened to that restaurant was due to the COVID outbreak, everything that he is describing, and that is --

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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: But if one of the health concerns of 1 (12.52 pm) 2 the government is if people get within less than 2 Submissions by MS MULCAHY MS MULCAHY: I will take it as far as I can, my Lord. 3 2 metres of each other they might contract COVID, and if 3 4 that is what has led to the partial enforced closure and 4 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes 5 5 it is accepted, then, as you say, the example would seem MS MULCAHY: As we will see, Zurich is something of an 6 to be fairly and squarely within the terms of the 6 extremist compared to the other insurers, and has taken 7 7 policy, wouldn't it? a number of points that have not been taken by other 8 MR EDELMAN: My Lord, yes. And there is a partial closure, 8 insurers . So I am going to try and focus on those q q because the dining area is closed for dining. The fact points and avoid repetition, where possible, of matters 10 10 that people may be allowed to enter one-by-one to we have covered already. 11 collect their take-aways does not cause the restaurant 11 Just to introduce the policies , Zurich has two 12 12 area to cease to be closed as a restaurant area. types, we have labelled them type 1 and type 2. We 13 13 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No. don't need to look at it, but the representative sample 14 14 MR EDELMAN: The other points that are made in relation to document shows that the two types have materially the 15 this policy, I think I have already dealt with. 15 same wording. Zurich 2 has five non-lead wordings. We We then come to the final clause, which is the 16 16 now know that between the wordings all seven categories 17 non-damage denial of -- the "Prevention of Access --17 were covered, but there is a heavy leaning towards 18 Non-Damage", and that is at page 30. If we can move 18 category 5, so those are the service businesses but also 19 19 forward to page 30  $\{B/20/30\}$ . would encompass manufacturing. 20 The only apparent dispute is whether the coming into 20 I think I have lost my Lord, Lord Justice Flaux at 21 21 force of the Act and the designations made on 4 April the moment. 22 22 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Only because I'm getting the Zurich were "actions" or "advice", perhaps we will wait to see 23 23 what Mr Turner says about that in his submissions, but policy file. 24 24 MS MULCAHY: The Zurich 1, if we go to it, the Zurich 1 the fact that advice is there recognises that advice can

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be coercive, even if not carrying a legal obligation.  $93 \label{eq:partial}$ 

Then we have again got in this clause "in the vicinity of the insured locations". But we have dealt with that. There is an issue again as to whether the government's social distancing measures prevents or hinders use or access to premises, but I have dealt with that in relation to Hiscox and you have our submissions on that

Then finally, counterfactuals. Our case is the same as it is in other cases. What RSA say is that you only remove the regulations as are applicable to the premises but keep the same regulations nationally. So it is as if the regulations apply to these premises and no one else. They also say, so you have got all the other closure measures and the social distancing measures remaining in place. That is their counterfactual.

We say that is ridiculous. You can't cherry-pick like that. It is either government action or advice or not. You can't start salami slicing it into these ingredients, and they are not relevant salami slicings for the purpose of the clause.

That is all I want to say about RSA. Unless my Lords want to break for lunch now, I think Ms Mulcahy was going to make a start on Zurich.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We have eight minutes, so perhaps it would be sensible if she made a start on Zurich.

If we go to just look briefly at the property damage BI, that is at page 14 of that document  $\{B/21/14\}$  and we have "Business Interruption 'All Risks', section B1, and cost in B2

policy, it is in the main bundle at  $\{B/21/1\}$ .

There is then a schedule, which appears at page 41  $\{B/21/41\}$  of the same document, "Combined All Risks Policy Schedule". If we go forward to  $\{B/21/43\}$ , we can see there, it is redacted but there is a summary of cover, and we can see that it shows BI is included for this insured at B1 and B2, and the business is blacked out but you can see that the business would be identified by name towards the top.

The "Extensions" cover clause starts on page  $\{B/21/50\}$ , if we go forward to that, and explains:

"Section B1.

"The business interruption cover is subject to the extensions shown below:

"Any loss as insured by this section resulting from interruption of or interference with the business in consequence of accidental loss destruction or damage at the undernoted situations or to property as undernoted shall be deemed to be an incident, provided that, after the application of all other terms and conditions of the policy the liability under the extension(s) in respect of any one occurrence shall not exceed ..."

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Then we have a percentage limit. MS MULCAHY: So that is civil authority. 2 So that wording is drafted with property damage in 2 As to "action", Zurich pleads that action does not 3 mind. But if we go forward to the next page, we see the 3 include advice or guidance. We can see that from its 4 relevant extension at the top of {B/21/51} which is 4 defence at paragraph 39.2(b) but also its skeleton at 5 entitled "Action of Competent Authorities". It has been 5 paragraph 80. Perhaps if we can go to the latter, it is 6 referred to as the AOCA clause by Zurich. That covers: 6  $\{1/19/37\}$ . It sets out there a case that action must be 7 7 "Action by the police or other competent local, more affirmative than advice, referring to mandatory 8 civil or military authority following a danger or 8 actions taken or orders issued, which will invariably q q disturbance in the vicinity of the premises whereby have the force of law. 10 10 Indeed, at paragraph 85, which is on page  $\{I/19/38\}$ access thereto shall be prevented provided there shall 11 be no liability under this section of this extension for 11 over the page, it says: 12 12 loss resulting from interruption of the business during "Only the 21 and 26 March regulations were action." 13 the first six hours of the indemnity period." 13 So that is its position. 14 In Zurich 2 that is provided for three hours, so 14 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That is also quite difficult, isn't it? 15 it is slightly different: 15 Action by the police; if the police officers, after the 16 "For the purposes of this extension: 16 disturbance in the locality, were saying, "I advise you 17 "a) the limit is 4.8%. 17 not to go down that street ", that is not action 18 "b) the maximum indemnity period is 3 months." 18 apparently, on this. 19 In Zurich 2 it is 12 months, so there is again 19 MS MULCAHY: Apparently so. 20 20 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Or if there is a danger or disturbance, a slight difference there. 91 The wording here is very similar to the MSAmlin1 21 as a result of which the police put one of their blue 22 22 denial of access clause, which we will be coming on to lines across, that is not actually -- as I understand 23 23 after Zurich, just to note the similarity it, it is not legally enforceable, but to say that 24 The first issue I need to deal with relates to 24 wasn't action by police would be rather surprising . 25 action by a civil authority. As I mentioned on Monday, 25 MS MULCAHY: Yes. I can only endorse that, my Lord. We unlike Amlin, Zurich denies that "competent local, civil 1 1 would take the same position and say that "action" is 2 or military authority" includes the government. It is 2 much broader than that, and includes, particularly in 3 the only insurer to deny that the government falls 3 the context of a public authority, pronouncements and 4 within its wording. What it argues is it is not 4 guidance where they -- much public authority action is 5 5 national government, it is the done through announcements and pronouncements. 6 Health & Safety Executive, it is the CAA, the Fire 6 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You say that the Prime Minister's 7 7 Service, but it is bodies that fall below the level of statement on 16 March was clearly action by a civil 8 8 national government. They say that that is supported by authority. 9 the local nature of danger or disturbance in the 9 MS MULCAHY: Indeed. 10 vicinity and the exclusion for the first few hours of 10 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is that a convenient moment to break? 11 the interruption 11 MS MULCAHY: It is, exactly. I was just going to say it is 12 Now, given my Lord Lord Justice Flaux's indication 12 13 13 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: 2 o'clock. on Monday I am going to leave this point for a reply if 14 it is pursued. I think you have the gist of our point MS MULCAHY: Thank you, my Lord. 14 on this. We say "civil" is broad generally, it is 15 15 (1.00 pm) 16 contrasted with the military authority. 16 (The short adjournment) 17 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It would mean that, for example, if the 17 18 relevant action was an action by Public Health England 18 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It's just before 2 o'clock, Ms Mulcahy, 19 it was covered, if it was an action by the Minister of 19 but if you are ready to go, why don't we? 20 20 Health it wasn't, or the Secretary of State for Health MS MULCAHY: I am ready to go. 21 21 it wasn't, which is surprising. I just want to finish this point on action, briefly, 22 MS MULCAHY: Yes. We say "civil" is broad generally, 22 If I go to the Oxford English Dictionary definition put 23 23 government naturally falls within it, as well as in by the defendants, it is at  $\{K/222.1/2\}$ . 24 24 government executive organs like the HSE. It may be that we haven't got the person operating 25 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. 25

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the RingCentral system yet.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, here we are. 1 including 20 March, the first regulations happen the 2 MS MULCAHY: Here we are. The definition of "action" which 2 next day, we say this was all action. 3 is set out there is: 3 Moving on to the second topic, "prevention of 4 "The process or condition of acting or doing in its 4 access", Zurich's case on prevention of access to the 5 5 wider sense; the exertion of energy or influence." premises is that one needs physical obstruction or 6 6 physical impossibility or, alternatively, a complete And we would say that acting or doing, in its wider 7 sense, and the exertion of influence would encompass 7 cessation of the business. We can see that from 8 8 government advice, government pronouncements of the kind paragraph 95 of its skeleton, at {1/19/44}, where it q q sets out that case. 10 10 There is a policy point I would like to make as It takes the extreme position that there is no 11 well, which is to have a look and contrast the way in 11 prevention of access even by the 21 March and 26 March 12 which this is dealt with in the disease clause, which is 12 regulations. We can see that from paragraph 116 of its 13 13 a page  $\{B/21/52\}$ , with the extension we are looking at. skeleton , on  $\{1/19/51\}$  of the same document, where it 14 14 If you look at the disease clause, which insures 15 loss resulting from interruption of or interference with 15 "As to [both sets of] regulations: 16 16 "(1) They do not on their face prevent access to the business carried on by the insured at the premises 17 in consequence of any occurrence of notifiable disease 17 premises: and 18 at the premises, and then if we go down to under 3: 18 "(2) They do not have the effect of preventing 19 19 "which causes restrictions on the use of the access to premises 20 premises on the order or advice of the competent local 20 "Both of these points are unsurprising because the 21 authority." 21 regulation were not aimed at preventing access; rather 22 22 Now, "action" which we have in the relevant they were designed to reduce the degree to which people 23 23 extension on page  $\{B/21/51\}$  is naturally broader and can gathered and mixed, particularly indoors." 24 24 include, as we say, speech acts such as instructions and Now, we say that that is a complete misreading of 25 orders being given, even if they are not legally backed, 25 the regulations. Even for category 2 businesses, and 101 103 1 and rules, and it is deliberately, we would say, 1 even where they have been ordered to cease operations 2 intended to be broader than "order". 2 entirely in the 26 March regulations, which we can see 3 But this is important, because Zurich's proposed 3 if we go to them, it is  $\{J/16/3\}$ , and it is regulation 4 meaning, "mandatory action with the force of law" is 4 4(4) towards the top, that: 5 5 almost synonymous with "order", but that word wasn't "A person responsible for carrying on a business ... 6 chosen for the extension that we are looking at. We 6 in part 2 of schedule 2 must cease to carry on that 7 7 would say that therefore it is broader and it business or to provide that service during the emergency 8 encompasses all acts of government, including those done 8 period." 9 9 by announcement. They say that that was not ordered to cease 10 We saw on Monday that the government language mixed 10 operations entirely, and they rely on regulation 4(5) 11 "requests" with "orders", but they were all to be taken 11 and the fact that paragraph 4 doesn't prevent the use of 12 as authoritative and as amounting to government action. 12 premises used for the purpose of broadcasting 13 13 a performance to people outside the premises. They say So we say the short of it is the government was 14 acting; it had an action plan on 3 March. And on 14 that is sufficient , there is no prevention of access, 15 15 16 March, when it told people to stop inessential there is no complete closure. 16 contact of all kinds, and to stop all unnecessary 16 Now, as I have already made clear with Arch, that is 17 17 travel, and to work from home wherever possible, the not a point that Arch is taking, but Zurich takes that 18 Prime Minister said that it was necessary to take 18 case; that is its primary case, that there was no 19 drastic action. And on 20 March the Chancellor 19 closure even for category 2. And it is said in relation 20 20 explained its actions, saying it had taken steps to to, for example, a retail business, a non-essential 21 21 retail business, category 4, that regulation 5(1), which close schools. Now, that wasn't backed by legislation

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as you can see provides that:

"A person responsible for carrying on a business

[must] cease to carry on that business [and] close

any premises [and] cease to admit any person to its

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other than to give a power to close schools, but they

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necessary to save lives ".

were saying "We have closed schools and these steps are

So by all these things, by its statements up to and

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premises ..."

But even there they say that that is not prevention of access, because an employee can attend the business for the purposes of meeting any mail order business.

Its case in that regard is set out in paragraph 120(2) and (3) of its skeleton, that is  $\{1/19/53\}$ 

It says at paragraph 83, which is on page  $\{I/19/38\}$  that this is the true battleground between the parties, and it spends 12 pages of its skeleton on this point.

Now, I have already discussed these issues in relation to Arch and we would say the same points apply, and they are a response to Zurich's  $12\ pages$  in relation to this .

Zurich are seeking to rely on what US courts have held in some six US decisions, applying US policies with different language, for example "prohibition", and the they are applied to a particular US situation, different from here, in relation to restricted vehicular access and closed bridges and so on.

Now, we will deal with those in reply, having heard what Zurich say about it, but we say they don't change the position here. And, as with Arch, our case is that all the actions relied upon in substance prevented access to the premises.

The third issue I am going to come to now is "danger or disturbance in the vicinity of the premises", and these are issues specific to Zurich, so I will address

Zurich has three main points here. The first point is that "danger" cannot be disease, because there is a separate clause relating to disease. Its second point is that "vicinity" does not mean locality, it means "immediate locality". And its third point is that to be a danger in the vicinity the danger has to be only in the vicinity.

To take the first point first, we would say that what they are saying is that danger from disease cannot have been intended to fall within the government action clause.

We would say there is no presumption against overlap. The starting point, as Zurich itself accepts is its natural meaning if one looks at its skeleton at paragraph 129, on page 57 of  $\{1/19/57\}$ , is that disease is plainly a danger. That is accepted as part of its natural meaning. It is also accepted, if we go to paragraph 73 of the skeleton on  $\{1/19/35\}$ , it is accepted that the extensions are not mutually exclusive they can potentially overlap. That is accepted by Zurich.

in different circumstances. So apart from the fact that this is responding to a notifiable disease at the premises, we can see it is about causing restrictions on the use of the premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority. So it is restrictions on use, but in the AOCA clause it is prevention of access.

The clauses may have greater or smaller lengths of indemnity, of sub-limits and different premia, according

We can see if we look at the clauses, if we go back

to the disease clause at  $\{B/21/52\}$ , they are triggered

The clauses may have greater or smaller lengths of indemnity, of sub-limits and different premia, according to the schedule in any particular case and according to how those risks are perceived.

Zurich relies in its skeleton, it is paragraph 132, on an Irish case called Welch v Bowmaker. It is an Irish case about a debenture -- sorry, I should have given the reference, but I think it has been brought up on the screen anyway. Yes. It is paragraph 132 at the top  $\{I/19/58\}$ , and they say:

"... it is unlikely, as a matter of common sense [in circumstances where the policies contain a notifiable diseases extension] that the reference to 'danger' in the AOCA extensions is intended to encompass an outbreak of disease, let alone an outbreak of a notifiable disease."

Then we have a quote from Welch v Bowmaker:

"When you find a particular situation dealt with in special terms, and later in the same document you find general words used which can be said to encompass and deal differently with that particular situation, the general words will not, in the absence of an indication of a definitive intention to do so, be held to undermine or abrogate the effect of the special words which were used to deal with the particular situation."

The quotation relied on continues, and I will give you the reference but I won't go to it, I will just read you the one sentence that follows on, it is at  $\{K/66/5\}$  it says:

"This is but a common sense way of giving effect to the true or primary intention of the draftsman, for the general words will usually have been used in inadvertence of the fact that the particular situation has already been specifically dealt with."

We would say that colours the context in which the part quoted at paragraph 132 is to be read. Plainly it cannot be suggested that Zurich had forgotten about one extension, when drafting another one page later.

So we say the fact that there is a disease clause does not mean that there is no cover for disease, if it is a danger under the AOCA clause.

I turn now to the second point, which is that it is

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said that "vicinity " does not mean locality but
"immediate locality ". We would say that the implication
of the word "immediate", which is what Zurich is seeking
to imply here, is impermissible.

Elsewhere in the wordings the exact phrase
"immediate vicinity" is used, but it is not used in the

AOCA clause. We can see that at  $\{B/21/31\}$ . It is

condition 1(1) and we see the words:

"The area in the immediate vicinity of the work ..."

Zurich say that is a different context, but
nonetheless one would expect that if it was intended
that "vicinity" mean "immediate vicinity", that those
words would have been used in the AOCA clause as well.

Our case is that "vicinity" is such area as would reasonably be expected to affect the insured's business in relation to a particular danger or disturbance. That could be a whole city or a whole country, if the danger is an infectious disease.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: There, Ms Mulcahy, you are getting a long way away from the ordinary meaning of the word "vicinity", aren't you? "Vicinity" means a close area.

MS MULCAHY: We say it is a flexible concept. As Mr Edelman showed you with RSA4 and the definition of "vicinity" there, we say that is a sensible, workable definition; it is one that takes account of whether a danger

somewhere could be reasonably expected to impact on the premises in question.

In some ways Zurich accepts that it may not be just at the premises, because they note, if one looks at footnote 128 on  $\{I/19/61\}$ , they accept that for some premises "vicinity" might be 10 miles away, because a rural business can be affected by danger at that distance.

But in any event, COVID-19 was a nationwide danger, as Arch accepts, in terms of it being a nationwide emergency from 3 March. And as I told you on Monday, by for example -- I mean, danger is all about risk, but by 16 March almost every local authority had actual cases. 317 local authorities, all but 19 of them had reported cases, and you have seen the SAGE minutes leading up to the announcement on 16 March about the concern as to the true number.

So even if "vicinity" is more local, it is more of a fixed distance, query what that is, but even if it is more local to the premises we would say here it is satisfied, there is a danger within the vicinity.

Then the third point that Zurich make, which is that to be a danger in the vicinity the danger has to be only in the vicinity; they say even if there was COVID at the premises and all the neighbouring premises, there was no

danger in the vicinity because there must be a specific local danger. It is in their skeleton at paragraphs 135 to 136, at  $\{I/19/58\}$  to page 59.

This is similar but slightly different to Hiscox's implication that a case would have to be preponderantly within the vicinity, and we would say, for similar reasons, that's not so.

Zurich acknowledges as a matter of ordinary natural meaning and logic "within the vicinity" does not prevent the danger from also being outside it . If we go forward to paragraph 138 of its skeleton, we can see that there  $\{1/19/59\}$  that it can arise in relation to inside and outside such vicinity as is specified .

We would say the required nexus is supplied by the wording; it must prevent access, it must follow the danger and it must be present in the vicinity. And there is no room, therefore, for the further implication of a specific local danger only, ie effectively of an epidemic exclusion, if one is talking in relation to disease.

That was what I wanted to say about the issue of danger or disturbance in the vicinity of the premises.

The last issue is causation. This is the first case I think we have had where the word "following" is disputed in terms of its meaning. As you have seen, the

civil authority action has to be following the danger in the vicinity .

Zurich's argument in relation to that is in its skeleton at paragraph 9 on page  $\{1/19/5\}$  of this document, but also at 75 to 76 at page  $\{1/19/36\}$ .

Obviously for this issue to arise, it must have been found that COVID-19 was a danger in the vicinity. And Mr Edelman has addressed Hiscox 4, where the question of restrictions following occurrence of a disease within 1 mile arose

Now Hiscox, and we would say rightly, accepts that "following" is a looser causal connection, although it requires more than simply a temporal successiveness or a temporal connection.

Zurich disagrees . Zurich argues "following " means proximate cause, in the same manner as "resulting from". We see that in its skeleton at paragraph 147 on  $\{1/19/62\}$ .

In any case, they say that the government response did not follow any danger in the vicinity because it was a nationwide response. They say that at paragraph 148  $\{1/19/63\}$ . We have already addressed the latter argument in relation to Hiscox and the jigsaw argument and I am not going to repeat that, and we have dealt with it in our skeleton in relation to Zurich. But as

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to the former point, the point about whether "following" is a strong causal connection, ie a proximate causal connection, we would say that it isn't. It is a looser connection, that is obvious given its primary natural meaning. We don't need to turn it up but the dictionary definition at  $\{K/222/1\}$  is "to come after, or to succeed". And yes, in this context it imports a causal connection, but not one that requires a direct and "but for" link, rather it is more of a causal contribution .

The fact that, I mean, Zurich clearly doesn't like this word "following ", instead 14 times in its skeleton it replaces it with its own, and we would say not synonymous, term "in response to", which it prefers, because it suggests more of a nexus with the part of the danger that is in the vicinity. But we say that is rewriting the clause. It refers to "following" and that is looser in its natural language and its effect.

The other thing that we rely upon is the fact that the clause anticipates military or government action, which may well be reacting to wide area events. So it is contemplating exactly the situation arising here. If, contrary to our case, "vicinity " means in this context a small area, we are still talking about authorities where there is potential for the area to be much broader.

The other main argument is on the "but for" link between prevention and loss . Zurich adopts the points in the joint causation skeleton, but then itself , it's page 34 to 35 of this document  $\{I/19/34\},$  in three pages it goes on and deals with these points .

These have already been addressed by Mr Edelman and they have been addressed in relation to Hiscox, where although there was "solely and directly" wording, including in relation to a vicinity clause, and I have addressed them in relation to Arch where there wasn't a vicinity requirement.

What Zurich is saying is that most or all of the loss is irrecoverable because it is caused by wider disease-related effects, including other government measures.

We see this in Zurich's skeleton at paragraph 165 on page {I/19/67}. If we can go over the page {I/19/68}, these are the list of other factors, the wider circumstances. I took you to this when I was dealing with concurrent causes yesterday, and you can see the list there: nationwide pandemic, which resulted in individuals contracting COVID self-isolating, shielding; and/or the response of the public to COVID; and the adverse impact of the above matters on economic activity; and then government measures responding to

COVID other than those that the court might find prevented access to the premises.

Then if we go to 166, it is said:

"Each of the above matters was and is an independent cause of policyholders' losses ..."

A cursory glance at the list of causes there identifies that effectively they are all simply COVID-19, or intermediate direct effects of COVID-19, the public and government behaviour in response to it. They are not independent of each other or the insured peril, in the ordinary sense of the words; they are all interlinked. Indeed, if one looks at (3), it is "The adverse impact of the above matters", so they are clearly interlinked with each other.

What Zurich is saying must be removed for the purposes of the counterfactual is the national government action which prevented the access, so they are saying the regulations which are found to prevent access. And it is said, for example, footnote 149 probably makes this clearest on page  $\{1/19/74\}$ , where it is said we had misunderstood Zurich's case, and it says:

"On Zurich's case, it is the nationwide application of the regulations which prevent access which falls to be removed. However, it is only the danger in the vicinity which, on Zurich's alternative case, falls to

be removed from the counterfactual, not danger outside the vicinity."

So it is essentially seeking, and similarly in its skeleton at paragraph 200, to reverse such regulations as might be found to prevent access to the premises, and it says that that is the insured peril, paragraph 197. On its alternative case it would also remove danger in the vicinity  $\{1/19/86\}$ .

We have addressed this already, so I am going to take this very briefly, but essentially by accepting that the national action is to be removed, Zurich is accepting that one does not just look to the narrow insured peril approach, and that some things, national government action, are inextricably linked or indivisible. And once you accept that, you move past interruption. Once you accept, you move past interruption to action of the civil authority, why do you not also include the danger that is part of the chain in the clause?

The reason Zurich doesn't remove the danger is because you would then have to accept to remove the national danger, not merely the part within the vicinity. Because like the national civil action, the thing as a whole would need to be removed, not merely the part that causes interruption.

And Zurich accepts the absurd windfall result of its Submissions by MR EDELMAN 2 construction, that there is no danger in the vicinity 2 MR EDELMAN: My Lords, Amlin policies come in three types. 3 but there is a danger everywhere else. If we look at 3 Firstly we have Amlin 1  $\{B/10/1\}$ , called the policy, 4 paragraph 214 on page  $\{I/19/91\}$  it says that that is 4 commercial combined policy. There are two clauses of 5 5 apparently fine. It says: interest . Page  $\{B/10/65\}$  which is a competent authority 6 "In principle, there may be scope for recovery of 6 clause: 7 such 'windfall' profits ..." 7 "Loss resulting from interruption or interference It goes on to say they are "unlikely to arise". 8 8 with the business following action by the police or q q We would say that is not the result, that's not the other competent local, civil or military authority 10 10 answer. It shows the construction is not what is in following a danger or disturbance in the vicinity of the 11 fact intended. And on the facts Zurich suggests, well, 11 premises." 12 12 nobody would have flocked to a danger-free or Familiar territory again, and I am not going to 13 13 restriction - free area. But we would say that is simply repeat all the submissions that have been made about 14 14 contrary to common sense, and such profits are likely to that form of clause 15 arise in relation to that scenario. 15 You will see it is a č50,000 limit of cover. 16 16 The other thing they seek to do is whilst it is Then the next page,  $\{B/10/67\}$ , again a fairly 17 accepted that the national actions that prevented access 17 familiar type of clause: 18 should be removed from the counterfactual, they don't 18 "Consequential loss as a result of interruption of 19 19 accept the full scope. or interference with the business carried on by you at 20 So the 26 March regulations, we would say were an 20 the premises following ..." 21 indivisible action that must be assumed not to have 21 Then (iii): 22 22 occurred. But what Zurich seeks to do is to redraft "Any notifiable disease within a radius of 25 miles 23 23 them or to redact part of them and leave the rest in for of the premises." 24 the purposes of the counterfactual, redacting only the 24 There is a limit of indemnity here of č100,000. 25 parts that are found to have prevented access, on its 25 The consequential loss, you will see that is at 117 1 case. We say that that is just inappropriate. 1 page  $\{B/10/11\}$  the top of the page. 2 2 Then I am not going to address it substantively but "Loss resulting from interruption of or interference 3 just to tell you where it is, the trends clause is on 3 with the business carried on by you at the premises in 4  $\{B/21/55\}$ , it is next to "Rate of gross profit" and 4 consequence of damage to property ..." 5 5 "Standard turnover" on the right-hand side, and you will My Lord --6 6 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That is effectively exactly the same as 7 7 "To which such adjustments shall be made as may be QBE2, isn't it? 8 8 MR EDELMAN: Yes. necessary to provide for the trend of the business and 9 for variations in or other circumstances affecting the 9 Then Amlin 2,  $\{B/11/1\}$ , it is a retail policy. Then 10 business either before or after the incident or which 10 you will see the clauses: at page 47, consequential 11 would have affected the business had the incident not 11 loss, notifiable disease; and at 48, the prevention, occurred ..." 12 12 1 mile radius. Again, you have seen clauses like that. 13 13 Then there is the adjustment which but for the Denial or hindrance of access. 14 incident would have been obtained. 14 Finally , Amlin 3, tab 12, page 1,  $\{B/12/1\}$  it is for 15 We accept the machinery applies. There is a debate 15 forges. There are apparently no claims under this one. 16 about what "had the incident not occurred" means, and 16 but there may be policies like it in these words, so it 17 17 is worthwhile looking at it. Page 50 I think it is now. that is dealt with in our skeleton at paragraphs 694 to 18 709, and we say that it wasn't intended to modify the 18  $\{B/12/50\}$ . There you have it, it just has the 19 result absent the clause. But insofar as "incident" is 19 prevention of access clause. Threat or risk in slightly 20 20 different language: concerned, we say it means "but for the interruption" 21 and that is the incident that is being referred to here. 21 "Following threat or risk of damage or injury in the

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page.

vicinity of the premises."

But you will see that that they contemplate disease

by a limited disease exclusion at the bottom of the

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Amlin.

(2.26 pm)

My Lords, those are my submissions on Zurich and

I am going to hand back now to Mr Edelman to turn to

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So, as you have seen, the prevention of access clause, particularly in Amlin 2, is materially the same as Hiscox's clause, and Amlin have adopted Hiscox's submissions on that, so I  $\mbox{ will }\mbox{ say no more about that at }$ 

Amlin 1, we have got the definition of "notifiable disease" on page 58 of tab 10.  $\{B/10/58\}$ . It is.

" Illness sustained by any person resulting from any infectious or contagious disease, an outbreak of which the competent local authority stipulate shall be notified to them."

Now let's go back to the clause itself, which is at page  $\{B/10/66\}$ . In fact I should say there is a pollution and contamination exclusion, which is not relied on by Amlin. So we have got the elements of the clause, which you will be familiar with, and we have got the concessions -- sorry, I should take the prevention of access clause first .  $\{B/10/65\}$ .

Amlin concedes that the UK Government and Parliament is an authority for this clause. There was a previous caveat, but that has now been jettisoned. Full concession that government is covered by the reference to "public authority". They also concede that "action" covers any acts or things done by the government, thus including advice and guidance, as well as regulations,

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the whole gamut. That is their skeleton at 135.1 and 2 for those two concessions I have referred to. Four issues: what government action led to prevention of access; the meaning of danger in the vicinity; whether the government action was following a danger or disturbance in the vicinity; and potentially interruption or interference .

Firstly, prevention of access. You have had argument on this before, but just so you know what Amlin's position is, as I understand it they say it depends on the premise that "prevent" requires a technical legal prohibition.

We say that simply is not right . It is wrong to suggest that we only have a prevention of access where, as Amlin contends, see paragraph 154.3, it is physically or legally impossible.

Then if we can go to what they say about this, in  $\{1/12/94\}$ , paragraph 160, or it must be the next page I think.  $\{1/12/97\}$ , they say:

"The FCA's fallacy is to equate access with use and to equate prevention with hindrance. If you can gain access to premises, even if not all parts of the premises are accessible, that is not a prevention of access but it may be a prevention (or hindrance) of use."

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This is the example of a professional I gave earlier; as long as you can gain access to the premises, it is not prevented. That is a lawyer's answer to a question which is a practical one which is posed by this policy.

I will come back to one point. I have just had a message to correct something.

We say this puts the test far too high. It will almost never be physically or legally impossible to access any part of a premises for any purpose at all.

What Amlin are saying is the fact that theoretically someone could have had a reasonable excuse for entering premises, a barrister to go and collect some papers, means that they are not prevented access for the purposes of this clause.

That is obviously not what this is about. If what they are saying is yes, you might be able to go in and get some papers you can't work without, but you can't actually sit at your desk and work if you can take those papers home and work on them, which these days we all can, either with the assistance of a vehicle or we can use the documents electronically .

Their own case is somewhat incoherent about this. If we look at 162 on that page  $\{1/12/97\}$  they say: "Any kind of local emergency involving a cordon or

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blocked access roads or similar would trigger the cover and those are precisely the types of situation that the clause was designed to meet."

My Lord Lord Justice Flaux referred earlier to the status of a cordon anyway, but cordons are -- there is no policeman there to turn you back, you can go under or over if you choose.

Is Mr Kealey saying: well, unless it is an actual physical barrier that you physically can't get past, there is no prevention of access? This is entirely

12 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I mean, this is probably not very -- he 13 says a legal prevention would be sufficient, doesn't he?

MR EDELMAN: Yes. So if you can physically get there but 14 15 vou are breaking some rule by going there. Well --

16 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: It may in fact be the case, I don't 17 know, but it may be the fact that it is actually illegal 18 to cross a police cordon, for want of a way to put it. 19 But it probably doesn't matter.

20 MR EDELMAN: No, it doesn't, because we say this is just 21 wholly unreal. He gets this idea from some authorities 22 that he cites at 155.5, which I think is probably two 23 pages back, on 95, I hope. One more page back, 24  $\{1/12/94\}$ , he says: 25

"The ordinary, natural meaning ... not matters of

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legal authority. However, it is notable that a range of authorities also refer to access in its ordinary way and natural sense ..."

Let's look at the cases he cites on the next page. The next page, please . There we are, got it  $\{1/12/95\}$ .

There's a crowd assembling outside the defendant's theatre; that's an example of physical access. A case relating to a house owner's right of physical access from the house to the adjoining highway. And public nuisance, where the access is obstructed.

Now, yes, of course those are all cases in tort, on what constitutes a tort or a breach of a right of access. We are dealing with an insurance policy which is covering something which relates to a business and business activities . It is an entirely different context and these cases simply don't assist. If he is trying to draw an analogy with these cases, it is a false starting point.

They have an alternative case on access, which is buried away at page 192, I hope this is the correct reference, in an appendix.  $\{I/12/192\}$ . It is paragraph A2.17:

"Without prejudice to [their] primary case [at the bottom], this section ... addresses the extent (if any) to which there was ever any legal prevention of access

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in respect of different types of business."

The next page, this is on the premise that it could be prevented by legal impediment; then they go on to say that they admit that only category 2 businesses forced to close by the 21 and 26 March regulations suffered a prevention of access.

They deny that pubs, cafes, bars and restaurants suffered a denial of access -- I think that is probably on the next page -- because they could theoretically have turned themselves into take-aways. It is (iii)  $\{1/12/194\}$ . So because you could go to the property and run a take-away, then you have not prevented access.

We have dealt with it in other contexts, but these submissions, we submit, are unreal as when one is looking at the business that is insured. And being prevented customers, we would submit, included being prevented from accessing the premises for the purposes of the business.

Can I move on to the next ingredient , danger or disturbance in the vicinity . Amlin accept that there was --

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Just before you do, Mr Edelman, do you say there is any significance at all in the use of the future tense in "will be prevented", rather than "is prevented"?

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MR EDELMAN: Well, my Lord, I have to confess that it's one of the difficulties . There are so many points, you miss points sometimes.

4 That is obviously of significance , because my Lord 5 is right, I think, that that is looking to the 6 prospective effect 7

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is looking at the prospective effect of the ...

q MR EDELMAN: Of the prohibition of the --

10 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Of the action.

11 MR EDELMAN: Yes, so there doesn't actually have to be, and 12 it is just when your business is interrupted or 13 interfered with. And it again comes back to the point 14 my Lord was making about the fact that you have got 15 "interference " encompassed here. Because if you can't 16 get to your premises at all, for any purpose at all, how 17 is your business going to be interfered with? It is 18 impossible

19 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Yes.

20 MR EDELMAN: It is giving with one hand and taking away with 21

22 Danger or disturbance. Amlin accept that there was 23 a danger from 12 March, but they say that it is 24 a question of fact as to whether that existed anywhere 25 in particular.

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We say that the danger is everywhere in the country and therefore, necessarily, in the vicinity of the premises. That is not taking the point that the country is the vicinity, although we argue that; it is saying that if it is everywhere, it is necessarily in the vicinity of each set of premises.

Amlin, they characterise our case as saying that if one person with COVID is in Trafalgar Square that means there is a danger in the vicinity of most of London, which is an unreal comment, because one proved case in the vicinity, as we all learned to our cost, will rapidly spread to others, and did rapidly spread. There is certainly a danger of it spreading to others. And given the evidence of prevalence and the rate of transmission, the chance of being one isolated case in a vicinity becomes vanishingly small.

Interestingly , one can say that the whole global pandemic started probably from one infected person. Or may have started from one infected person. But anyway, it doesn't detract from the danger.

21 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes, because you say "danger" doesn't 22 here necessarily mean an occurrence of someone with 23 COVID --

24 MR EDELMAN: Exactly.

25 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER:  $\ \ --$  but the potential for someone. And 128

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you say for this purpose. MR EDELMAN: Yes, absolutely. So there is not a prevalence occurrence issue here, unless they can show that you are in -- maybe the Scilly Isles, I don't know, but I am not going to make any concession in relation to the Scilly Isles because I am sure people would have said "It might not have any at the moment but there is a real danger q that it will spread to the Scilly Isles unless we do something". But you would have to have maybe some remote Scottish island which has only a monthly ferry service and nobody can get to or from the island. I don't know whether such an island exists any more, then one might say there wasn't a danger on that island. But otherwise there is a danger everywhere. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Ironically, the more remote Scottish islands did in fact have occurrences of COVID. The Scilly Isles must have been lucky, given that there is a regular ferry, at least I hope there is, there certainly used to be a regular ferry from the mainland. And if you are looking at it in terms of danger, you would say there was clearly a danger in the Scilly Isles because it would only take one infected person to go across on the ferry, certainly in March, for there to be more people infected.

if that exists, then that is the danger. That is what

MR EDELMAN: Yes, exactly, my Lord. Exactly.

So all these danger clauses, and it is accepted that this is a danger, or an emergency for the other clauses, it is all over the place. It is everywhere.

So, you know, you find someone in Trafalgar Square and you think to yourself: where did they get it from, who did they catch it from, where have they been? And actually, in March, that probably was a bit of a panic. But in fact there would have been probably quite a few people in Trafalgar Square with COVID in March, unfortunately.

The other element of this clause is we have got "following ", following a danger, and the attempt was made by Amlin to substitute "following with the words "results from". The high point of their case is that "following and resulting from are used interchangeably on one occasion in a 97-page policy.

The example that Mr Kealey or one of his juniors or solicitors has come up with is that we have it here on  $\{1/12/186\}$ , paragraph A2.6. On the "welcome" page, that is page 4, the coverage was summarised as follows:

"In return for the payment of premium shown in the schedule, we agree to insure you against  $\dots$ "

If we could have the next page,  $\{1/12/187\}$ :

"loss resulting from interruption or interference

with the business following damage."

By contrast, the business interruption clause at the start of section 6 promised to pay 'any interruption or interference with the business resulting from damage to property ..."

That, in a 97-page policy, is the edifice on which the argument is built that "following" has some stronger meaning.

Of course, one bears in mind, going back one page to  $\{1/12/186\}$ , that the passage they refer to is a general "welcome" page and actually the more detailed provisions are set out in the policy. We have counted up "following" is used 76 times in the policy, "resulting from" is used 14 times, they are often used in the same clause, like the cover clause we are concerned with, and they have identified one occasion, and we say what about the other 75 times that "following" is used? There is no basis for saying that they are interchangeable based on one instance alone.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: This isn't going to matter very much.
 If you are right about everything up to this point, that
 it is a danger in the vicinity --

23 MR EDELMAN: Yes.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: -- then the action will have been taken as a result of the danger in the vicinity .

1 MR EDELMAN: Yes. But obviously Mr Kealey thinks it is an important point, because he spends quite a chunk of his skeleton discussing the meaning of the word "following".

4 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: A fortiori, if danger, as my Lord said 5 a little while ago, imports the potential for

MR EDELMAN: Even less significant.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX:  $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$  it is even less significant .

MR EDELMAN: Yes. I think I said that at the beginning, not of this section but I think I have said it, whether it was Monday or Tuesday, that actually there is a debate, a hot debate that some of the insurers have raised about the meaning of "following", but it doesn't really matter.

Interruption or interference, there is no issue about that.

So that is the prevention of access clause, but I will move forward to the disease clause. That is page 59, if we are still in the same tab. No, that is the definition . Sorry, it is page  $\{B/10/66\}$ .

Most of this we have already dealt with before. I have shown you, we have been through various of the requirements and I have shown you the meaning of "consequential loss". On proof of the disease Amlin are adopting Hiscox's case, and I don't need to say anything

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more about that. As to proof of restrictions , the government restrictions followed the notifiable disease; again, we have addressed that already. As far as I know, there is no other issue in relation to a direct effect .

There is a point on Amlin which they dealt with at  $\{1/12/114\}$ , which is at paragraph 219. This is dealing with a provision that requires the disease to be excluding indirect loss of other premises. They essentially agree with our analysis of that clause, as I gave it to you, but what they say is it is all a question of fact. Well, we agree it is unnecessary to debate about factual scenarios, but it is important -- the point arises on RSA3 -- for the court to rule as to the impact of provisions like that.

If I can now move on, my Lord, to paragraph 219  $\{1/12/114\}.$  I have already got that on the screen. At 223, where they give their summary -- perhaps on the next page  $\{1/12/115\}$  -- and they have the five country house hotels example, a policy for each of the hotels:

"Does the loss of income in respect of each hotel flow from proved cases of COVID-19 within a 25-mile radius ... The answer is no. All the loss was caused by the government legislation applicable nationwide, which is a different cause altogether from locally proved

cases of COVID-19 ...

"When the loss in respect of each hotel is tested separately under a counterfactual [this is the important point] assuming that the proved cases of illness sustained within a 25-mile radius of the hotel in, say, Herefordshire did not occur (but everything else remains the same):

"(a) ... FCA cannot prove that, but for the proved cases of illness within a 25-mile radius of the Herefordshire premises, the government action would not have applied to that location . Plainly it would."

Consequently, the insured have suffered no loss. So this is a graphic illustration of insurers' argument that you can have all the 25-mile radius areas in the country, outbreaks of disease in all of them, and insurers' positive case is that none of the policies pay because they can always point to the other areas in which the disease manifested itself.

It is rather like two insurance policies with matching other insurance clauses, and insurers saying neither of them pay because they both say: we don't pay if there is other insurance in place. It is an analogous point, but here you see it in black and white what insurers' case actually is. Nobody pays, even though the disease is everywhere, because they can

always point to it being somewhere else as well.

Amlin 2 I don't think, in the time available, really adds anything more. As I said, it is at  $\{B/11/47\}.$  It is slightly differently worded but to the same effect. But it doesn't have any reference at all to interruption or interference here, it just says "pay you consequential loss following" for that clause. And on page  $\{B/11/48\}$  that one is only interruption , it doesn't refer to interference , but interruption , it is your financial losses . But it is the same point. But that does have denial of access or hindrance.

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: That one has "caused by an incident within 1 mile"

MR EDELMAN: Yes. But that you have had submissions on, and I am not going to -- so there are differences there, but it has all been covered by previous submissions.

Finally , the counterfactual . Again, it is similar to some of the stuff you have heard before . If we go to Amlin's skeleton  $\{1/12/159\}$  at paragraph 302, the only matter to be reversed on the counterfactual is the action and the identified authorities of the qualifying type, which results from a specified situation which has the specified effect , viz access will be prevented . So that is what you strip out .

They spend a lot of time arguing that the insured

peril under the prevention of access clause is only the government action. The remainder of the clause serves to, as they put it, "define, refine, qualify and restrict the type of action which qualifies". That is in this section of their skeleton.

But Mr Kealey's usual outpouring of verbs and reasoning, I won't apply an epithet to it, is required, because MSA needs to go to extreme lengths to narrow the scope of the insured peril for its own counterfactual purposes. That is a misapplication of the policy and of the correct approach to causation in the context of a clause like this.

My Lords, on the trends clause there is nothing we needed to add to what we have said in writing, so unless there is anything more on Amlin I am going to move forward to Ecclesiastical.

It has two wordings. They have been referred to as 1.1 and 1.2., and they start at  $\{B/4/1\}$ , please. As you might guess from the title "Parish Plus", it is for churches, it is "Put your faith in us" unless you make a claim under your insurance in current circumstances, in which case your faith will be misplaced.

 $\{B/5/1\} \text{ is the other main policy}. \quad \text{Two lead}$  policies . That is, as you can guess from the picture, for nurseries . So in this category there are nurseries,

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churches and other businesses . Ecclesiastical 's skeleton says that as far as they are concerned it is categories 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, but in a table prepared by insurers it says 3 and 5 as well . So other policies issued by Ecclesiastical appear to cover all categories , but anyway we are looking at these ones.

The relevant form of clause is a prevention of access clause. Let's take the Parish Plus policy at page 45  $\{B/4/45\}$ . Thank you. The main dispute relates to prevention or hindrance, its access to use the premises being prevented or hindered by any action of government, police or local authority due to an emergency which could endanger human life. You will see it is covering for loss resulting from interruption or interference with your usual activities .

There is a relevant exclusion which there is an issue about, "closure or restriction in the use of premises" on the right-hand side, number 3, "due to the order or advice of the competent local authority as a result of the occurrence of an infectious disease or other issues such as food poisoning, defective drains or other sanitary arrangements". There is also, needless to say, the same causation arguments.

Since the FCA served its skeleton, we have had Ecclesiastical 's skeleton which, as we understand it,

accepts that there was an emergency from 12 March but not before.

Hindrance of use of churches is accepted but not before 23 March. So they don't accept that anything prior, including the 16 March announcement, amounted to a hindrance. And hindrance of schools is now accepted but again not before the 23 March, and they don't accept prevention of access, but that doesn't really matter because of the hindrance.

They do now accept that actions include the whole government, the whole gamut of government action. Let me rephrase that. They don't accept that actions include the whole gamut, but they appear to accept that there is hindrance at least from those actions which they accept do qualify. The limits you will see here in this one, it is č10,000, and in Ecclesiastical 1.2, it is as scheduled.

What I need also to show you in the Parish Plus policy is the definition of "income", which is at page 43. Sorry, page  $\{B/4/42\}$ . That gives you the provision for loss of income. And "income", 42, means:

"The money paid or payable to you including donations, collections, rent and hire charges."

So that is what this policy for churches covers.

Of significance to the construction exercise is also

extension 6 on page 46  $\{B/4/46\}$ , and that has a list of diseases , and over the page  $\{B/4/47\}$  what is covered:

"Any occurrence of a specified disease ..."

Needless to say, COVID nor is SARS on that list, although it was a notifiable disease, it was made notifiable many years ago:

"Any occurrence of a specified disease being contracted by any person at the premises or within a radius of 25 miles."

Below (d):

"Which causes restrictions in the use of the premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority."

I will come back to that extension in a minute. If we come back to the clause itself , there is the broadest terms here.

Firstly , we start off with "interruption or interference with your usual activities ", at the top of the page  $\{B/4/45\}$ .

Then we have "prevention or hindrance of access or use", so that is very broad.

We address schools at length in our written submissions, and I am not going to repeat it now. In its defence Ecclesiastical has denied that the announcement on 18 March that schools would close on

20 March was a prevention or hindrance because it had no legal force. It seems now to accept that educational premises, including schools and nurseries, did suffer a hindrance of access from 23 March, even though the legislation wasn't enacted to make that a legislative requirement.

So really the only question is whether the earlier date of Friday the 20th or Saturday the 21st perhaps should apply, because it was announced on 18 March that schools would close from the 20th.

So we say it should apply from the earlier date, it may make a marginal difference, but our position should be accepted; and Ecclesiastical doesn't explain why the instruction on the 23rd was a hindrance but the announcement of closure with effect from the 20th was not

Now on to churches. I think we have referred already to the constitutional essays we have had from Mr Kealey on the status of what the government has done. It is rather puzzling why he thought it necessary to do so, because Ecclesiastical now accept that the use of churches, and now schools, was hindered at least from 23 March 2020 by the lockdown announcement.

But we say, in fact, for churches the prevention or hindrance of action goes back to 16 March. I should

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record also that Ecclesiastical , and this is in their defence, have accepted that the clauses are focused not just on those employed within the church, the clergy , et cetera , but also the congregation .

So this is a case where there is an insurer, perhaps more realistically than others, accepting that access by the customers is relevant, although they may say they are only admitting it because of use. So you can't use it if the customers can't get there. I use "the customers" perhaps as a general term, but obviously I would say the congregants, for the purposes of the church, although they may not be congregants, they may just be visitors. All of the public were given clear instructions to stay at home on from the 16th and to avoid all unnecessary social contact, stop unnecessary travel and that, we submit, is sufficient.

But what Ecclesiastical say, if we go to  $\{I/12/78\}$ , please at 120.4(b):

"The FCA says that clear instructions were given on 16 March 2020, well before the mandated closure. But it is quite apparent that what the FCA describes as 'clear instructions' were, in relation to churches, neither clear nor instructions. Churches were noticeable by their absence from what the Prime Minister said and it is entirely reasonable to suppose that reasonable

churchgoers would not have interpreted what the Prime Minister said as requiring them not to go or discouraging them from going to their places of worship."

People were told to stay at home and avoid social contact. I don't know how much clearer Ecclesiastical would want the government to express their wishes, but even if some people misinterpreted what the government said, it would be sufficient for our purposes that this caused a significant number of congregants not to go to church, because that would, at the very least, be a hindrance of access or use.

There is also a reference in their skeleton to "mass gatherings", mass gatherings being addressed on 16 March, but what was said on 16 March went well beyond mass gatherings and it was, as I have said, avoiding all unnecessary contact and travel.

In other cases for other categories Ecclesiastical has not been drawn, but they have given some an example. If we can go to  $\mbox{I}$  --

21 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Sorry, what have they not been drawn on, Mr Edelman?

MR EDELMAN: Sorry. On how their policy applies to different categories. What they say about denial or hindrance of access to --

MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You mean other than churches or nurseries? MR EDELMAN: Yes. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Which policy wording do they insure other categories under? Because this policy we are looking at, Parish Plus, is clearly a churches-only policy. MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. q LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: And the other one looks to be a nurseries - only policy. MR EDELMAN: But there are some other non-lead policies. I am afraid I haven't had the time to go through them all, but they do accept that they do issue policies to other businesses. They haven't asked us to put any others as lead policies frankly, so these are the terms that we are testing. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I would have thought that we have got more than enough to be getting on with lead policies. frankly. If Mr Kealey wants to tell us there is something else that he wants us to deal with, let him do so. But don't take up time dealing with it now, we still have Argenta to go.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Also we need to have a break for the

shorthand writers in about eight minutes' time.

MR EDELMAN: I have an eye on the clock.

MR EDELMAN: I will desperately try to finish . Ms Mulcahy needs about 20 minutes to half an hour on Argenta. Maybe 20 minutes. We have a little bit more time, LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Okay. MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You have got the moot question to deal with yet, Mr Edelman. MR EDELMAN: I will --LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Competent local authority. 

MR EDELMAN: Yes, that is the one I am coming to now. I was about to say, you took the words, but I now come to the main event on this policy, because this is the unique and individual event, which is the exclusion to the policy.

There is obviously a tension here between the

insuring clause and the exclusion, and what Mr Kealey has done to rationalise the fact that the insuring clause refers to "government, police or local authority", whereas the exclusion only refers to "competent local authority", is to delve into the public health legislation, remembering these are policies designed for churches and nurseries, delve into public health legislation to suggest that anyone with a detailed knowledge of public health legislation would know that an order could be made for a local event by

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2 national agency. 3 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Or a Crown Court judge. MR EDELMAN: Or a Crown Court judge. 4 5 We don't dispute that that is the correct analysis 6 of the legislation . LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: But that is not what the policy says. 7 8 MR EDELMAN: No, it isn't. q In some other context, and I want to be clear about 10 this, in some other context his argument may stand up. 11 But it is all about context. And you are looking at 12 this clause from a reasonable reader's perspective. 13 I appreciate that people are supposed to know the 14 general law and they can't be said not to know their 15 general law, but this is going way beyond the general 16 law: this is intricacies . 17 An ordinary reader would look at the words 18 "government, police, local authority", see an exclusion 19 which refers to a "competent local authority" and conclude that it wasn't excluding government. At the 20 21 very least it is ambiguous, and it's an exclusion. But 22 we say that's what it means. 23 Yes, you have got a list of diseases there, and I am 24 not going to trespass upon any evidential grounds. 25 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is also of some significance, isn't

somebody that was either a local authority or some

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1 it, that you have got to look at the entirety of the 2 exclusion? The exclusion is --3 MR EDELMAN: Yes. 4 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: -- not only of infectious disease but 5 food poisoning, defective drains and other sanitary 6 arrangements. Those matters are clearly ones which 7 would be dealt with by the local borough council. MR EDELMAN: Yes. Exactly, my Lord. There is nothing to 8 9 alert you -- and then the next one, the next exclusion 10 is the vermin one. 11

So all of the subject matter, all of the other subject matter is purely local and parochial. There is not a lot to say about it  $\ \ really$  , because one looks at it and just gets an impression that one knows that in fact lots of people who might not be classified -- we know now; I didn't have a clue about this before -- but we know that other people have the capability of doing things. If you had a clause which had "competent local authority" and a 25-mile radius in the insuring clause, then you might say: oh well, does that really mean " local "?

So I am making it clear that this is purely contextual for this exclusion in this particular policy. Other policies, where it is in the insuring clause, a different context may have a different meaning,

because Mr Kealey is right about the authorities that can deal with disease.

There is really no clue to it being different . I know he relies heavily on extension 6, but one has to look to see whether a reasonable reader of 3 would think that it meant something fundamentally different from what it appears to say. And 6, it has got diseases, but if you are now assuming a reader with intimate knowledge of all the public health legislation , you would think: yes, well these correspond to the notifiable diseases list, but hang on a minute, what is the most recent epidemic disease of a type that could, if it resurrected itself, spread across the country, it's SARS. And it's not there.

I'm not saying it would be conclusive, but there is nothing here that drags you into saying that it's not local. If the list was unspecified in 6 and it was an insuring clause, one might say -- and that was a unitary clause, only dealing with disease, then you might say: if it is only purporting to cover notifiable disease and it's not limiting it, well maybe it could extend to something else. But that is not what we have here. We don't even have in the exclusion to the extension 3, we don't even have a reference to "notifiable disease", it doesn't invoke the "notifiable disease" concept.

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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No. 1 2 MR EDELMAN: So --3 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Even though clause 6(a) contemplates an 4 occurrence of a specified disease being contracted 5 within a radius of 25 miles, it has to cause 6 restrictions in the use of the premises on the order or 7 advice of the competent local authority. So it is the 8 local council or the local authority that restrict it. 9 MR EDELMAN: Exactly. What I was saying was if you have 10 a notifiable disease, an unspecified notifiable disease 11 list, and 25 miles and this, it might be open to it. 12 But we have got to look at the context in which this is 13 all used

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

MR EDELMAN: My Lord, that is all I really wanted to say about the exclusion. It is what it is, and it is a very short point on which the fate of churches and nurseries may turn, because they really are the sort of institutions that, you know, however low the limits of 20 indemnity may be on this,  $\check{c}10,000$  is actually quite a lot of money. It is covering things like, you know,

23 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.

24 MR EDELMAN: Causation and counterfactuals, my last topic on 25 this.

you have lost your income from collections .

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1 Ecclesiastical say in their skeleton, paragraph 298, 1 reversed is "access to or use of the premises being 2 {1/12/158}: 2 prevented or hindered, where such prevention has 3 "The only matter to be reversed on the 3 occurred for the specified reason, by reason of action 4 counterfactual is access to or use of the premises being 4 of the government, in specified circumstances, viz due prevented or hindered where such prevention et cetera 5 5 to an emergency endangering human life", which seems to 6 has occurred: 6 recognise that these are interconnected. 7 7 "for the specified reason ... MR EDELMAN: Yes. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: And then says in 299: actually you 8 8 "in specified circumstances ..." q q Then they say: don't reverse out the emergency, even though it is 10 10 "None of the other matters, including those set out a specified circumstances. There is a tension there. 11 in paragraph 296 above is to be reversed. Specifically, 11 MR EDELMAN: Exactly. What it comes down to is trying to 12 12 and importantly, the 'emergency endangering human life' identify -- and it is a fundamental error in approach to 13 13 to which the government action which caused prevention the operation of these insurances. It is trying to 14 14 identify, in a clause which has a number of ingredients et cetera was a response is not to be reversed. That is 15 not an insured peril in its own right." 15 which are required for cover to be triggered, a single 16 16 insured peril . And it is an over-rigorous approach, So you imagine that there was an emergency 17 17 because it is like saying, well there has to be one sufficient to generate the government action. Because 18 it is only if there is an emergency of sufficient 18 single, unitary insured peril in here somewhere. 19 19 seriousness to provoke the government into action that Something has got to be the insured peril . And these 20 it will act. But for your counterfactual you take out 20 clauses are quite unusual because, unlike in marine 21 21 the government action and assume that it didn't react to insurance or non-marine insurance for property where you 22 22 the emergency which is contemplated by the clause. would have it's either a storm, a peril of the seas, you 23 23 With respect, you know, if that is the expect one single peril to cause a loss, occasionally 24 counterfactual, it is cloud cuckoo land. From the 24 you might have two separate perils, which combine to 25 contemplation of this clause, it is just undermining the 25 cause a loss like in the Miss Jay Jay. But these are 149 151 1 clause completely, because you say: yes, the government 1 composite perils, and it is a conceptual problem which 2 2 underlies all of insurers' approach to these sorts of may have acted but you assume that there was the 3 emergency still . It is back to the salami slicing . 3 clauses, that they are trying to find in there somewhere 4 You have got the arguments on this, we have 4 something they can single out as the insured peril. 5 5 reiterated them in relation to the policies, and the It's why they all come up with a different answer, 6 6 fundamental flaw in Mr Kealey's analysis is that he is because it is an artificial exercise. It is just simply 7 7 suggesting that we are saying that this is cover for an the wrong exercise for something which is a composite 8 8 emergency and unless you reverse, unless you treat the package. 9 9 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes, and because it is a composite emergency as part of the counterfactual, you are 10 treating the policy as if it is covering an emergency. 10 package, it is quite impossible to know which bit of it 11 But that is not right. We are looking for cover for 11 had what effect, and that is just something which never 12 the policyholders for the combination of events which 12 happened. In a sense, that's what the insurance 13 13 has occurred, and that combination includes the contemplates. 14 emergency. If the government, like the insurers' 14 MR EDELMAN: Yes, it is a package of things. They all 15 15 favourite government, the Government of Sweden, had combine together. A causes B causes C causes D, and you 16 chosen not to act, although it did act in many respects 16 have got your interruption or interference . 17 17 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: But that is subject to any amount or but it didn't impose a lockdown, if it had chosen not to 18 act, the clause would not be triggered. But it did 18 any aspect where you can separate it out, for example 19 choose to act. But the fact that it did choose to act 19 temporally 20 MR EDELMAN: Yes, my Lord. 20 doesn't mean that you assume it didn't act but there was 21 still the emergency, and it behaved like Sweden for the 21 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: We have been through that, Mr Edelman, 22 purposes of a counterfactual. 22 and you don't need to repeat what you say about it.

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MR EDELMAN: No. That is the classic point.

Mr Edelman?

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Is that a convenient moment,

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LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: There is a tension as well, it seems to

look at 298 of his skeleton, the only matter to be

me, Mr Kealey will no doubt deal with this, but if you

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| 1  | MR EDELMAN: I have just got three or four more sentences on | 1  | right-hand side "Section exclusions", which apply in     |
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| 2  | trends clauses and then we can finish, and there is         | 2  | addition to other exclusions :                           |
| 3  | enough time for Ms Mulcahy, she asked 20 minutes for        | 3  | "The company will not be liable for"                     |
| 4  | Argenta and I think we will be bang on time.                | 4  | If we go forward a page we come to the relevant          |
| 5  | Just on the trends clauses very quickly, we deal            | 5  | clause, which is "defective sanitation, notifiable human |
| 6  | with those in our skeleton argument. There is a dispute     | 6  | disease, murder or suicide ". It is subparagraph 4(d)    |
| 7  | about trends clauses at 1.2, but there is no specific       | 7  | that is relevant for this purpose:                       |
| 8  | trends clause in 1.1. But under the damage basis of         | 8  | "Any occurrence of a notifiable human disease within     |
| 9  | settlement clause, you will see that, there is a "had no    | 9  | a radius of 25 miles of the premises."                   |
| 10 | damage occurred" point. But you will see that in our        | 10 | We can see the exclusion on the right-hand side:         |
| 11 | skeleton . I don't have anything to add to what we have     | 11 | "For any amount in excess of č25,000."                   |
| 12 | said in our skeleton.                                       | 12 | That is a č25,000 limit:                                 |
| 13 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.                                  | 13 | "For any costs incurred in the cleaning repair           |
| 14 | MR EDELMAN: My Lord, that is all I wanted to say about      | 14 | [et cetera]  |
| 15 | Ecclesiastical .  | 15 | "For any loss arising from those premises that are       |
| 16 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Very well. We will have a break for     | 16 | not directly affected by the occurrence"                 |
| 17 | ten minutes, until 3:40pm.                                  | 17 | So this is a very simple clause; it is interruption      |
| 18 | (3.30 pm)   | 18 | as a result of occurrence of notifiable disease within   |
| 19 | (Short break)   | 19 | 25 miles. So it is similar to QBE, which has already     |
| 20 | (3.40 pm)   | 20 | been discussed.  |
| 21 | Submissions by MS MULCAHY                                   | 21 | What I would like to do, rather than repeating           |
| 22 | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Are you ready, Ms Mulcahy?              | 22 | points that have been made already, is just pick up some |
| 23 | MS MULCAHY: Yes, I am, my Lord.                             | 23 | issues specific to Argenta.                              |
| 24 | The last insurer is Argenta and I will seek to deal         | 24 | We have an admission by Argenta in relation to proof     |
| 25 | with that briefly .   | 25 | of disease, which is at paragraph 35 of its skeleton,    |
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|    | 153   |    | 155  |

There are two wordings for Argenta. We don't need to go to them, but they are shown in the representative sample at  $\{B/1/4\}$ . They are on materially the same terms. The lead is the guest house and B&B policy. Both of them relate to category 6 businesses only, so catered and uncatered accommodation; although it is accepted that there may have been an impact from some category 1 measures, for example if there was a bar or a restaurant in the accommodation.

Just to introduce the clause, the policy starts at  $\{B/3/1\}$  and then the business interruption clause is on  $\{B/3/57\}.$  It is page 56 of the policy % A=A/2 itself . That is the main property damage business interruption clause --

That covers interruption to the business at the premises, and "business" is defined on the previous page at  $\{B/3/56\}$  as "the provision of guest house accommodation, catering services and leisure facilities at the premises".

Then if we go forward to page 57 of the policy and page  $\{B/3/58\}$  of the bundle, it sets out the extensions and the cover wording. So we can see from the top left:

"The company will also indemnify the insured as provided in the insurance in this section for such interruption as a result of ..."

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We will come back to that in a moment. Then on the

that is  $\{I/11/16\}$ . They admit the FCA case that there is an occurrence within 25 miles whenever a person within that area has contracted COVID-19, whether or not it is medically verified or they are symptomatic. So there is an agreement by Argenta for that purpose as to what is required to satisfy the requirement for disease within the 25-mile limit.

There is very little disagreement between the parties about interruption. As we understand Argenta's case, I'm sure they will correct us if we have misunderstood it, but it is worth just noting the approach of Argenta in comparison to other insurers .

Argenta in its skeleton, it is paragraph 41.2(a) and footnote 70, so it is  $\{I/11/19\}$ , it accepts that the 21 March regulations resulted in interruption if there was a bar or a restaurant in the accommodation, other than solely for room service, which is permitted by the regulations . They would accept that if the bar or restaurant was closed, then effectively part of the business was interrupted.

At paragraph 12, which is on page  $\{1/11/8\}$  they seem to accept that the 24 March instruction to holiday accommodation providers to close interrupted holiday accommodation.

Then at paragraph -- I will give you the reference

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to the defence, it is 59.3 and footnote 7 in the defence, but it is expanded on in the skeleton at paragraph 41.2(b) to (c). It is accepted by Argenta that the 26 March regulations did cause interruption, subject to limited exceptions.

So they say there is interruption insofar as the bookings did not fall within any of the exceptions, such as travelling to a funeral or housing the homeless, et cetera.

So that appears to be an acceptance that in a guest house with, say, 30 rooms, where 20 or 25 of them were closed but the rest stayed open for these exceptional guests, there was still interruption; or if you had an occasional guest in a cottage, but huge voids in the bookings diary, it would appear to be accepted that there is interruption when it is not occupied.

So Argenta appears to accept, on our understanding, that interruption to part of the business is enough. We say that must be right, and agree.

So the real issue between the parties is yet again causation, and the main argument that is advanced by Argenta is this:

Although it accepts that the cover does respond where a disease is not simply only within 25 miles, but also goes beyond it, and we can see that from its

skeleton at paragraph 48.1, which is on pages  $\{I/11/21\}$  to 22 of this bundle, it is also at paragraphs 64 to 65  $\{I/11/28\}$ . So they accept the disease can go beyond the 25 miles, but they then go on and say, and it is in a number of places in their skeleton, paragraph 50 and paragraph 58, they say that the interruption was not the result of the disease within 25 miles but instead was the result of the broader pandemic and the government and public response to it, which is not sufficient to bring the loss within the extension.

Argenta's case, and it seems to be unique in this respect, at paragraph 79.4, so it is page  $\{I/11/34\}$  of this document, they say they will be paying no claims for interruption after 16 March.

Just pausing there, that seems to implicitly accept that from 16 March there was an interruption , that that announcement led to an interruption of holiday accommodation.

But just returning to causation, its argument is that even if there were no disease in this counterfactual, there was no disease within the 25 miles of a holiday location, and that obviously, if it is inland, a huge area, 2,000 square miles, we say that that would be a safe haven holidaymakers would flock to, what Argenta says is that there is no recovery because

of what the Prime Minister and the government did, what they said, on 16 March, because they said you shouldn't travel for inessential purposes, and that, they say, resulted in the cessation of holidaying, so you don't have a cause by the occurrence within 25 miles; it is caused by the Prime Minister's speech instead.

Now, absent the government intervention the disease clause would have been triggered, but they say the government intervention prevents cover.

So the approach is therefore to say that the cover does respond where you have a notifiable disease going beyond 25 miles, but not where there is a public authority response which goes beyond 25 miles, despite the fact that they go hand-in-hand.

You will recall on Monday, and it might be worth just looking at it again, it is  $\{J/10/1\}$ , the explanatory note to the notifiable disease regulations makes it clear that a disease is being made notifiable, the regulations are placing obligations on various persons for the purpose of preventing, protecting against, controlling or providing a public health response to the incidence or spread of infection .

So we say the very essence of a notifiable disease is that it contemplates public authority response, a public health response in order to control the spread of

infection and reduce the spread of infection . So we say they go hand-in-hand, but Argenta seeks to separate them out.

I'm not going to deal with the jigsaw argument again, we say there is a single disease or each part of the jigsaw was a concurrent cause and made its own contribution to the disease.

There's a specific point here with Argenta. They accept that the Leicester restrictions would trigger cover, because they say that that they are a local response. We can see that, it is footnote 20 on page 7 of their skeleton, it is  $\{1/11/7\}$ . But they also say it at paragraph 56.3, which is on page  $\{1/11/25\}$ , and at that paragraph they talk about how a local lockdown would respond but a broader lockdown cannot.

If we could go to  $\{I/11/25\}$  please, it is 56.3. They accept that targeted local restrictions such as those recently imposed in Leicester are capable of giving rise to loss caused by occurrence of COVID within 25 miles of some policyholders, and consideration of this type of local lockdown confirms the loss caused by national restrictions is not covered by extension 4(d).

That seems to acknowledge that the most obvious way for a disease to result in interruption is through a public authority response. But they are making

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a distinction between Leicester and the national But what if one had a regional shutdown? What if the whole region from Birmingham to Nottingham, through Leicester to Peterborough, was shutdown; would it be said that the shutdown was not the result of the many cases in Leicester but the cases elsewhere in the region? We say that is simply not reality . England is q made up of regions that for the purposes of the national lockdown were all shut down. And if the Prime Minister had said now is the time for everyone, including in Bedford and Brighton and Leicester and Birmingham, to avoid essential contact, and you should avoid pubs in Bedford and Brighton and Leicester and Birmingham, then presumably Argenta would accept that that was sufficient But that is effectively what the Prime Minister did in imposing the national lockdown. It was imposed in

But that is effectively what the Prime Minister did in imposing the national lockdown. It was imposed in every locale. They considered doing it in certain areas, but they did it nationally because the shape of the curve was very similar across the country.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: They were considering London and the

Midlands, weren't they?

MS MULCAHY: Yes, but they decided it --

25 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: But in the end they imposed it

everywhere.

MS MULCAHY: -- was everywhere. The shape of the curve was everywhere. The height of the curve was different, but the shape of the curve was everywhere so they decided that it needed national action.

Argenta would seem to accept this in principle . They accept at paragraph 52, if we go back to page  $\{I/11/23\}$ , they make reference there to the pandemic being the "widespread occurrences of COVID-19 across the country". And then they say that those occurrences caused government action, which they define as events B and C., you can see at 2(a) and (b). Then they try to separate out the local occurrence, event E, as also caused by the pandemic.

Perhaps we can go over the page with that, so you can see the rest of that  $\{1/11/24\}$ . They talk about the concern at event E, but that is dealt with at (4):

"In addition, the pandemic (event A) also caused, at least in most cases, local occurrences of COVID-19 within 25 miles of the insured property (event E)."

So they are accepting the government response is a response to occurrences of COVID-19 around the country; we see that from the skeleton at 46, the last sentence, page  $\{I/11/21\}$ . But plainly the many occurrences within 25 miles, the 2,000 square mile area,

were part of that.

So what we don't understand is when you come to paragraphs 54, for example, on page  $\{I/11/24\}$ , but it is also at 58 and 78, it is said by Argenta, repeatedly, that the local occurrence is simply not in the causal chain at all . We just do not understand that . Of course it is . The response was a response to all of the local occurrences, including the local occurrence that would have been within 25 miles of any specific policyholder .

Just briefly, there is a point being raised about the exclusion to extension 4(d) for any loss arising from the premises that are not directly affected by the occurrence, discovery or accident.

Mr Edelman made reference to this already in the context of Amlin. We say that that is a common clause that is dealing with multi-premise businesses to avoid recovery for lost revenue across the whole business once there has been an interruption only to the business at a particular premises. That is how Amlin also explain it at paragraph 219 of their skeleton. It means that the premises must be directly affected by the occurrence of the COVID-19 within 25 miles.

The FCA accepts that the interruption must be directly caused by the occurrence within 25 miles,

because the term "resulting from" imports a proximate cause test, as Argenta also says in its skeleton, so we say this clause adds nothing. It can't be said that "directly" adds anything to proximate cause.

Indeed, Argenta itself doesn't really seem to rely on this as excluding anything, because in its skeleton, for example paragraph 18 on page  $\{I/11/10\}$ , but it is also at 62 on page  $\{I/11/27\}$ , it merely says it confirms the case, absent the exclusion; and we don't really understand what sort of exclusion merely confirms the existing position . So we think this is a non-issue .

If it was the case that there had been a shutdown across a number of holiday cottages because of vermin at one, because of an interconnection, as Mr Edelman suggested, because it affected those who went in and cleaned the others, then that would be different, because it couldn't be said that all of the cottages had been closed as a result of the vermin. But it is a different situation where you have cottages all over the country, being closed because of disease all over the country, and we say that that really is not addressed.

Then just to note that there is a trends clause. We say that this is a case where the machinery and the trends apply, and we accept that the word "damage" has to be made to work.

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The basis of settlement clause is at  $\{B/3/60\}$ . If we can just bring that up on the screen, it's just to draw your attention to where it is. That deals with what the basis of indemnity is, and you will see the reference there to the amount by which gross income during the indemnity period falls short of the standard gross income due to the damage.

If we go back to page  $\{B/3/56\}$  we can see there the reference to the definitions of "gross income" and "standard gross income"; and you will note the adjustments language that you will see in the definition of "standard gross income" along with the words "but for the damage". So it is the same points as before and I won't repeat them. We say that doesn't make a difference to the principles of causation, but that is covered in our skeleton at paragraphs 946 to 950.

My Lords, those are our submissions on Argenta, and those are in fact the FCA's submissions, having taken you through the headline points from the policies generally, and on that note I will hand over to Mr Edey, who I think is up next for the Hospitality Industries Action Group.

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Thank you very much, Ms Mulcahy. (4.00 pm)

Submissions by MR EDEY

MR EDEY: My Lords, as you know, the interveners I represent are interested in QBE1-3, which your Lordships will find in bundle B at tabs 13 to 15, and also in RSA4, which is in bundle B at tab 20.

We adopt what the FCA says about those policies, and similar issues that arise on other policies in this test action, but there are a few points, my Lords, which we would like to make or emphasise, starting, if I may, with a couple of points about the nature of the notifiable disease clauses in both the relevant QBE and RSA4 policy. I then want to say something about the insured peril relevant to both cases, before dealing with the causation issue, which is the only real point on QBE, and then finishing with a few discrete RSA4 points.

My Lords, all of that will have to be at a serious gallop, I'm afraid, and as a result for the main part I am not going to take you to documents, I am just going to give you references to them, though no doubt when I do they will pop up on the screen.

My Lords, starting then with the general nature of the specific disease cover in the two cases. There are two points.

First, focusing, as insurers are inclined to do, on

the word "pandemic", as if it is some magical thing, wholly distinct from a notifiable disease, is obviously a diversionary tactic. A pandemic is or may be simply a very widespread notifiable disease. It is nothing more. Put the other way, it is common ground that a notifiable disease could be or become a pandemic.

So we say, in response to a point QBE make at paragraph 51 of their skeleton argument  $\{I/17/23\}$ , and a similar point that all insurers make in their joint causation skeleton at paragraph 61.3, that cover relating to notifiable diseases is in fact extremely fertile ground for looking for cover which applies when there is a pandemic.

It is not, of course, our case that the policy provides specific cover for pandemics, which is the Aunt Sally set up in QBE's skeleton at paragraph 51; and that's the reference that I just gave.

Our case is simply that with a notifiable disease cover provided by the policy extends to a case where the notifiable disease becomes a pandemic, as well as to less widespread diseases.

In fact, QBE accepts that in theory the policies may provide cover in the event of a pandemic, because it accepts that cover is not, in its words, per se lost because the disease spreads more widely. It just says

we can't prove causation.

My Lords, the second point is the question which seemed to be troubling your Lordships a little on Monday, which was the purpose of the area requirement. We say the answer to that is simple: it precludes cover if you don't have cases of the relevant notifiable disease in the relevant area. And that is an important purpose, albeit one which necessarily gives rise to the postcode lottery to which QBE refer on their case as much as ours.

The fact that in the case of a notifiable disease which is everywhere, including within the relevant policy area, and to which the government has responded because of the cases everywhere, including within the policy area, that there is, on our case, cover, that doesn't mean something has gone wrong, unless, that is, you start from the assumption which insurers make, that the radius was intended to achieve what they wanted to achieve. And that, of course, begs the very question which is before you. And indeed it gives rise to the more telling question: if the purpose of the area requirement was to preclude cover for pandemics, why on earth not just preclude cover for pandemics?

Can I then turn to the question of what the insured peril is . For both QBE and RSA, we say that the insured

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peril starts with the words "interruption or interference ", and includes everything which follows.

Just looking at QBE1, which is at  $\{B/13/31\}$ , I will just ask you to note that it is common ground with QBE that the words "loss resulting from" should be read in before the words "interruption and interference". That is their skeleton argument at paragraph 255.

However, in their defence and their skeleton argument at paragraph 214, that is at  $\{I/17/76\},\,QBE$  mis- identify the insured peril , because they remove the words " interruption or interference ", and they then use throughout the skeleton argument the term "BI loss" to embrace "loss resulting from interruption or interference ".

RSA does the same thing, and you will see that in its skeleton argument at paragraph 17 to paragraph 18  $\{1/18/74\}$ .

We say, you'll see it there, 17, "The Insured Perils":

"The peril insured against is ..."

Then they have omitted the words. And we say the missing words are plainly part of the insured peril , as, for example, Hiscox rightly identifies in paragraph 340 of its skeleton argument,  $\{1/13/108\}$  and indeed in various other places in that document.

That it is also consistent, my Lords, with what is said by all the insurers in their joint skeleton argument at, for example, paragraph 64. It is also, notably, how RSA correctly pleaded the insured peril in their defence. I just show you that, it is paragraphs 86 to 88 at  $\{A/12/29\}$ , which stands in stark contrast to the relevant paragraphs in their pleading in their skeleton argument, where you will see have seen at the first stages, you see the pleaded case, number 1, "interruption or interference", contrast to what I just showed you in the skeleton argument, where those words have just been omitted.

We say this is not, as Mr Howard characterises it, an arid debate or a matter of semantics. That is so because it is important obviously to start from the right place in the analysis to avoid in particular going down the wrong path in we say three particular respects.

First, it may matter when you are considering what causal link is required within the insured peril. The starting point is not proximate cause, as their entire argument, QBE's argument, on "arising from" or "in consequence of", at paragraphs 216 and following in their skeleton argument, wrongly presupposes.

That is the standard required causal link between an insured peril or an excluded peril and loss . And that

is what the cases and the textbooks are talking about. It is not orthodoxy the text that applies within the description of the insured peril .

Indeed again I just ask you to note what is said in the joint causation skeleton at paragraph 21 {I/6/13}. If it is not coming up I am just going to move on, my Lords. Again, similarly Hiscox -- there it is, paragraph 21:

"... enquiries as to proximate cause is only for the purpose of answering one question: was the insured peril the or a proximate cause of the loss."

 $\label{lem:correct:} \mbox{ Correct. It has nothing to do with the causal test within the insured peril .}$ 

Similarly -- and I will just give you the reference -- see what Hiscox say at paragraph 324 of their documents, where they distinguish between what Mr Gaisman calls true causation issues and "causation" in inverted commas, his inverted commas, which are in reality coverage points.

The second reason that it is important to start with the right insured peril, my Lords, is that in order to apply the "but for" test at the stage of determining whether the loss is proximately caused by the insured peril, to the extent that counterfactuals are helpful at all -- and that is the point the FCA has addressed --

one has to posit a counterfactual that strips out the insured peril entirely, including all elements of what establishes the insured peril.

If you omit the interruption / interference from the description of the insured peril when you get to the counterfactuals you are almost bound to go wrong, as QBE do.

The correct question is not, as QBE poses: would the BI losses, using their rolled-up formulation, have happened "but for" and were they proximately caused by the cases within the area. The correct question is: would the loss have happened "but for", and was it proximately caused by the proven, on this hypothesis, interruption / interference arising from a manifestation or occurrence of COVID cases within 25 miles or 1 mile.

Getting the insured peril right therefore helps you see why you cannot possibly strip out the government's unitary response to COVID-19 in the area in any relevant counterfactual, because it is the unitary response which gives rise to the interference or interruption, and is an essential ingredient in the insured peril. You cannot include in a counterfactual a key part of your proven insured peril.

My Lords, of course if loss was proximately caused by the insured  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right)$  peril , here for example the required

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closure, then if insurers wish to say that the same amount of loss or part thereof would have been suffered in any event by a different route, for example if the premises had not been closed by the government, then they bear the burden of proving it. That is the Dalmine case, with the cracks only in defective pipes there being here, for example, the shutting of businesses only when ordered to do so by the government.

Just as in Dalmine, the correct incidence of the burden of proof reflects the position in the pleadings. It is QBE who in their defence at paragraph 68.2(i) at  $\{A/11/23\}$  avers that the same loss would have been suffered in any event. I am sorry, it is over the page at  $\{A/11/24\}$ . Could you go back to 23; it spans 23 and 24. It is at the bottom:

"... would have been suffered in any event whether or not the insured peril occurred".

And it is for it to allege that and it to prove that.

It is important, my Lords, that you decide that for these insureds because they can't, we say, sensibly be expected to have to allege and then prove the negative.

In other words, even if they had not been required to shut they would not have lost the same revenue for some other reason.

In that context can I just correct one point in our skeleton argument at paragraph 167  $\{I/2/48\}$ . We there refer in parenthesis to the Swedish point, and I am sure you know what I mean by that, as an example of the sort of point an insurer might want to raise , and we say would have to prove at this stage of the argument.

In fact, of course, that is obviously not a point relevant to disease clauses. If it is a point that arises at all, it might be relevant only in public authority cases. So I would ask you just to delete that

The further reason we say identifying the correct peril matters is because it ensures one does not fall into the error of seeking to introduce the trends clause, if it applies at all, into the analysis of what is required within the insured peril, where it simply does not belong. That is the error which you will see in QBE's skeleton argument at paragraphs 77 to 78, for example, and 226.6. I am not going to take you there.

My Lords, that all said, I accept of course that none of that avoids the need to grapple with causation within the insured peril , and QBE, which is the key point to which I now turn.

That raises first a legal question and second a factual question, albeit the factual one takes account

of the contractual context.

The legal question is what is the test required by the relevant causal link within the insured peril . In QBE1 that is "arising from" and in QBE2 to 3 it is "in consequence of".

We say they do not require satisfaction of the proximate cause test, but something looser than that, akin if you will to what the FCA says "following" means.

We give the reasons for that in our skeleton argument at paragraphs 138 and 142 to 143. I don't have time to go over that but can I just summarise very briefly; as I have already touched upon, the relevant words are part of the insured peril, not the causal link between the peril or excluded peril and the loss, so the starting point simply is not proximate cause. That is the test between insured peril and loss: see section 55 of the MIA.

While I am afraid I don't have time to go through authorities and textbooks relied upon by QBE on the meaning of "arising out of" or "in consequence of", when you do look at them, either with Mr Howard, as part of his four hours on this policy, or alone, you will see that none of them say the phrases mean proximate cause in the context of a description of the insured peril.

So, for example, the passage in MacGillivray which

is referred to in their skeleton argument at paragraph 220  $\{1/17/77\}$ , is in the context of the usual rule of proximate cause as between insured or excluded peril and loss.

There is a similar error, we say, in Arch's skeleton argument at paragraph 28. It is nothing to do with establishing any causal link required within the insured peril itself.

Second, outside of the context of defining the required causal link between insured or excluded peril and losses, there are many cases that treat "arising out of", which we say is akin to "arising from", as involving a relatively loose causal link.

We refer to those authorities at footnote 37 of our skeleton argument at  $\{1/2/39\}$ , which I will not ask you to turn up, but can I just give you one more, which is the Cultural Foundation v Beazley Furlonge case, which is in  $\{J/137/1\}$  at paragraphs 162 to 164.

The third point is that, as the cases make plain, everything depends on context. Contrary to the suggestion in QBE's defence at 226.5  $\{1/17/82\}$ , that the relevant phrases here standalone, they plainly do no such thing, as we explain in our skeleton argument at paragraphs 142 to 143.

In that regard, can I just ask you to note that in

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their skeleton argument at paragraph 38.2, which is at  $\{1/17/18\}$ , QBE misstates what the test is under the primary property damage BI cover in QBE1 and 3. It does not say "arising from, "caused by" or "in consequence of". It refers , my Lords, in QBE1, to "resulting directly from".

It is that distinction which is one of the features on which we rely in support of this argument.

So we say, my Lords, it is not proximate cause test in this part of the debate. It is looser than that.

But, in any event, moving to the factual question, we say that as a matter of fact the proximate cause test is satisfied and that is the right test.

The FCA has dealt with this at some length and I only want to add a few points  $\cdot$ 

The FCA has identified some of the important concessions made by QBE, and you will find a summary of some of those at paragraph 238 of its skeleton. But just note too that unlike Argenta QBE explicitly accepts that government response caused by or arising from, or in consequence of, a local occurrence of a disease will be covered.

So there is rightly no suggestion from QBE that the government response to notifiable diseases breaks the chain of causation. You will find that in their

skeleton argument at 235.4  $\{I/17/85\}$ .

But despite those concessions QBE argues that if there were cases within and without the relevant policy area, and the government therefore lock down an area including but larger than the relevant policy area, then there would be cover only to the extent that the insured could show that it was the case, that it was the cases within the area that caused the response. That is paragraph 239 of their skeleton argument. They say, "Ah, the insureds can't do that, of course, because they would have been in lockdown within the area even if they didn't have the cases there, because once there were cases outside and around the relevant area the government would have locked down the relevant area in any event."

We say that in the context of notifiable diseases that simply makes no sense.

The facts on which our case on causation are premised, are premised, as opposed to the conclusion, is not even seriously in dispute.

If you look at paragraph 89 of their skeleton argument  $\{I/17/38\}$ , paragraph 89 at the bottom of the page, if you ignore, as you should, the reference to "worldwide", since the government here was plainly responding to what was happening here, those facts get

us where we need to go.

The FCA has explained why on those facts the entire thing, COVID-19 and the response to it, should be seen as one indivisible thing on which the cases in the area are a part, and if that is right then we are home. I have summarised that no doubt inelegantly but you know the point.

But the alternative case is that each occurrence of COVID should be seen as a concurrent cause. Although, with respect, on that alternative QBE in paragraph 89 goes wrong, we say, are the final words "by itself". There is no need for the single piece, ie the single case anywhere in the country, to be the sole cause whatever causal test you apply.

Even if proximate cause is required it is satisfied because each piece of the puzzle is as dominant and effective as any other piece. It is only the combination of all the pieces that as it were reveal to the government the message on the jigsaw "Act now and act everywhere".

There is nothing to suggest that any one piece was more important than another. And QBE does not suggest otherwise. Rather their case is effectively that none of the individual pieces were a cause. Common sense tells you that cannot possibly be right.

Just take my Lord's, Lord Justice Flaux's, example, he gave a moment ago of London. The government even thought about closing down London and in fact also the Midlands first, as you will recall, because they were ahead of the curve. That is item 76 in the chronology at  $\{C/1/36\}$ .

We know from the government data to which the agreed facts refer that by 16 March every one of the 32 London boroughs, making up the Greater London, had at least one confirmed case of COVID. Ten of those 32 had over 50 cumulative cases. By 20 March nine of the 32 had over 200 cumulative cases.

On the basis of all that an insured in London must plainly be able to say that a cause, indeed if necessary a proximate cause, of the shutdown was the cases in London.

The idea that there would have been a lockdown even if there had been no cases in London, which is the extreme position QBE is forced to adopt in its skeleton argument at paragraph 247  $\{I/17/90\}$ , is therefore completely unreal.

Once that is accepted, as it must be, everything else becomes obvious. Why didn't the government just shut down London, because of the confirmed and unconfirmed, expected but no less real cases, which had

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spread everywhere else in the other cities , towns and rural locations where there were cases confirmed or not.

There is simply no basis, and I put it that high before you, for a contrary assertion that even if there had not been all of the cases that there in fact were, including in the relevant policy area, the same measures would have been taken by the government in any event.

That is why we say repeatedly and with no apology that the case advanced by QBE defies common sense, not only for the 25-mile radius, but also for the 1 mile radius, always, always my Lords, on the assumption that there was in fact at least one case confirmed or otherwise within that area at the relevant time.

Mr Howard's Shops A to D prove, with great respect, absolutely nothing the other way. Even with their highly contrived facts there is cover for Shops B to D for the reasons that Mr Edelman gave, and for the reasons that I have just given.

My Lord, can I then turn to RSA4. If we are right on QBE it will almost certainly inevitably follow that there is also cover under at least the notifiable disease clause in RSA4. That is because unless the term "vicinity " in RSA4 is read as narrower than the radiuses in the QBE wordings, which we would say is an impossible reading, we can be no worse off under this notifiable

disease cover.

My Lords, the converse however is not true. Even if we were wrong on QBE1-3 we still would say there is cover under RSA4 for essentially three reasons.

First, because under RSA4, the notifiable disease clause, there is no fixed area within which the cases of COVID must have occurred and from which the interruption / interference results even if cases, as opposed to COVID more generally, are required on this wording. You have heard the FCA on that.

If cases are required they must have occurred within the vicinity as defined at  $\{B/20/35\}$ . That is a flexible definition to which the key is the area within which events that occur within it would be reasonably expected to have an impact on the insured or its business.

We say the reference to events that occur can only, it is on the right-hand side of 120, can only sensibly be a reference to whatever event has in fact occurred in respect of which the insured seeks to establish cover.

So here the relevant event would be the occurrence of cases of COVID-19 or its emergence in the UK, and it would be reasonably expected that cases of COVID anywhere in the UK would have an impact on any insured or its business: in other words, interfere with or

interrupt with their business.

By contrast, although RSA accepts that the definition is flexible up to a point it says that it requires close spatial proximity to the premises; and it varies only depending upon the nature of the business and the location. As a result it says you can give no answer to what "vicinity" means here; it all depends.

Save, it says, it cannot ever be the whole of the UK, and it cannot even mean necessarily the village, town, city or other development within which the premises sit.

My Lords, RSA is wrong about all of that for the reasons that we have given in our skeleton argument at paragraphs 59 to 72.

Crucially RSA's approach gives no meaning at all to the key part of the clause which reads, "in which events that occur within such area would be reasonably expected to have an impact".

Indeed, while at paragraph 29 of their skeleton argument they are keen to tell you that it doesn't mean what we say it means for a number of reasons, all of which are bad, nowhere in their skeleton argument do they tell you what it means or how they would apply it, or how close their spatial proximity definition works with it

What is the event we are hypothetically talking about if it is not the events which we are actually interested in .

I don't have the time, my Lords, given the time, have time to go through the points that we would make in response to the vicinity arguments, but truly my Lord there is nothing in them. We will deal with them very briefly in reply if we need to.

But for example to suggest that we are trying to give a meaning to a clause after the inception of the policy, we are doing no such thing.

The content and what fills that definition can obviously change afterwards. Unsurprisingly Mr Justice Popplewell, as he then was, in the Lukoil case, says nothing to the contrary.

You can see that their close spatial proximity test cannot possibly be right simply by looking at their own 57(b) at  $\{1/18/95\}$ , where they accept that it could embrace an area of a 25-mile radius. In other words almost 2,000 square miles. They say you just don't know how far. 2,000 square miles is nobody's idea of close spatial proximity, my Lords. Their test doesn't work. It doesn't work with what they themselves accept, and they do not give an answer as to how this works. The answer is the one with respect that we have given.

| 1      | My Lords, if we are right about that and it embraces   | 1   | Mr Edey.  |
|--------|--|-----|---|
| 2      | in this case all of the UK then we are home for that   | 2   | We will finish for today now. Tomorrow we are           |
| 3      | additional reason.   | 3   | sitting at 10.00 am again with I think Mr Lynch having  |
| 4      | The second reason why we can get home on RSA is that   | 4   | half an hour on behalf of the Hiscox Action Group.      |
| 5      | there is cover for interruption as a result of   | 5   | There was a request to my clerk from Mr Gaisman to      |
| 6      | government action or advice within the vicinity , which  | 6   | sit at 10.00 am on Monday. I don't know if the message  |
| 7      | prevents or hinders the use of or access to the insured  | 7   | has got through from my clerk but if it has not         |
| 8      | location, and there is really no answer to the claim   | 8   | Mr Justice Butcher and I have discussed that and we are |
| 9      | under that clause in relation to the effect of social  | 9   | happy to sit at 10.00 am on Monday as requested.        |
| 10     | distancing measures or closure measures, no matter how   | 10  | Otherwise we will see you at 10 o'clock tomorrow.       |
| 11     | wide or narrow is the area covered by the vicinity . The   | 11  | (4.32 pm)   |
| 12     | FCA has dealt with that.   | 12  | (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Thursday,      |
| 13     | But the suggestion, my Lords, that "within" means  | 13  | 23 July 2020)   |
| 14     | that there is no cover if the government, the national   | 14  |   |
| 15     | government, acts both within and without the vicinity ,  | 15  |   |
| 16     | is simply untenable. It is not what it says anywhere.  | 16  |   |
| 17     | Finally , my Lords, the third basis of cover under   | 17  |   |
| 18     | RSA is the enforced closure:   | 18  |   |
| 19     | "Interruption / interference as a result of enforced   | 19  |   |
| 20     | closure by the government for health reasons or concerns   | 20  |   |
| 21     | in the vicinity ".   | 21  |   |
| 22     | Again there is not actually a sensible argument that   | 22  |   |
| 23     | there weren't health reasons or concerns in the vicinity   | 23  |   |
| 24     | no matter how close that is to the insured premises.   | 24  |   |
| 25     | The attempt by RSA to get to a contrary conclusion   | 25  |   |
|        | 185  |     | 187   |
| 1      | he hate along to the second of second below from   | 1   | INDEX   |
| 1      | by bringing in the concept of events taken from  | 2   | INDEX<br>PAGE   |
| 2<br>3 | aggregation clauses and therefore to get the three particularities of place, time and manner into this | 3   | Submissions by MR EDELMAN                               |
| 4      | clause, and then to say that the health concerns or  | 3   | (continued)   |
| 5      | reasons must relate to that, simply doesn't hold water.  | 4   | (continued)   |
| 6      | Finally, my Lords, just one last point. We   | 4   | Submissions by MS MULCAHY22                             |
| 7      | obviously say we have cover under RSA4 on three  | 5   | Submissions by Wis Molechiti22                          |
| 8      | alternative bases.   | · · | Submissions by MR EDELMAN43                             |
| 9      | In their skeleton argument at paragraphs 40 to 44  | 6   | Submissions by Wife EBELLINING                          |
| 10     | RSA make some points about what happens if there is  | Ŭ   | Submissions by MS MULCAHY95                             |
| 11     | overlapping cover. What they curiously don't mention is  | 7   | Cabinissions by the modernian minimum.                  |
| 12     | general condition 8( iii ) at {B/20/20}, which makes it  | •   | Submissions by MR EDELMAN119                            |
| 13     | clear that under this policy there may well be cover   | 8   | Cabinisticis by this Es Elimini                         |
| 14     | under different provisions, and in that event only one   |     | Submissions by MS MULCAHY153                            |
| 15     | limit whichever is the largest applies.  | 9   | Cabinisticité by inc mozer un                           |
| 16     | That puts beyond doubt what we say would in any  | Ŭ   | Submissions by MR EDEY165                               |
| 17     | event be the position , namely that RSA plainly cannot   | 10  |   |
| 18     | try to cancel out cover in respect of each insured peril   | 11  |   |
| 19     | by reference to facts which give cover on the basis of   | 12  |   |
| 20     | different insured perils .   | 13  |   |
| 21     | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right.   | 14  |   |
| 22     | MR EDEY: My Lords, unless I can help you further those are   | 15  |   |
| 23     | the submissions on behalf of the interveners   | 16  |   |
| 24     | I represent .  | 17  |   |
| 25     | LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, thank you very much indeed,  | 18  |   |
|        |  | 19  |   |
|        | 186  | 20  |   |
|        |  | 21  |   |
|        |  | 22  |   |
|        |  | 23  |   |
|        |  | 24  |   |
|        |  | 25  |   |
|        |  |     | 188   |
|        |  |     | 100   |

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