

BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE TEST CASE

DRAFT TRANSCRIPT

OF DAY 5 OF TRIAL (27 JULY 2020)

Pursuant to paragraph 30 of the court's order made on 26 June 2020, what follows is a <u>draft</u> transcript.

A final transcript will be published when it is available.

OPUS₂

The Financial Conduct Authority vs. MS Amlin Underwriting Limited and others

Day 5

July 27, 2020

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1	Monday, 27 July 2020	1	fertiliser currently stored in area C, they can lead to
2	(9.58 am)	2	the endangerment of life and property in area B, where
3	Submissions by MR TURNER (continued)	3	the bomb is going to be put together and planted.
4	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, Mr Turner.	4	The disruption of access to the premises in area A
5	MR TURNER: Could I start by correcting two references from	5	due to the police cordon is precisely the sort of event
6	Thursday. The first sorry, my Lord, your microphone	6	which one would expect to trigger the coverage under
7	is still on, so I am getting feedback.	7	this sort of clause. Indeed, we say it would be odd if
8	Two reference corrections from Thursday. The first	8	the coverage were not triggered simply due to the
9	transcript reference ${Day4/156:18}$, the correct bundle	9	dislocation of the emergency in area A from the area in
10	reference for paragraph 2.10 of Riley, which contains	10	which life or property would be endangered.
11	the rationale for the material damage proviso, is	11	Can I then turn, please, to sub-exclusion (b), which
12	$\{K/233/1\}$. Then transcript reference $\{Day4/160:6\}$	12	is the sub-exclusion during any period other than the
13	Mr Edelman's reference to each line in the spreadsheet	13	actual period when access to the premises was prevented.
14	making its concurrent contribution to the cause, the	14	We say this means what it says. Its effect is to
15	correct reference is $\{Day2/140:21\}$ to page 141 line 5.	15	delineate the peril insured. Why the draftsman has
16	Could I pick up with where we were in relation to	16	chosen to use an exclusion to delineate the peril does
17	RSA2. We had been looking at the relevant insuring	17	not matter. We say that given the speeches of Lords
18	provision, which is the public emergency extension,	18	Hodge and Toulson in Impact Funding at paragraphs 32 and
19	which your Lordship will find in RSA2.1 at $\{B/17/36\}$.	19	35, and just for the transcript the reference is
20	You will recall that in answer to a question from	20	$\{J/122/13\}$ to page 14, we say that such an approach to
21	my Lord Mr Justice Butcher, I had suggested that the	21	drafting cannot be characterised as an obvious error
22	insuring provision should be read as if there were	22	which the court can correct by an application of the
23	a comma after the word "emergency" in the second line ,	23	Chartbrook Leasing principle .
24	and another comma after the word "property".	24	Nevertheless, the FCA's oral submissions in effect
25	In short, our submission remains that it is the	25	invite the court to apply Chartbrook Leasing, and in
	1		3
1	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal	1	3 response to that we say the following :
1 2		$\frac{1}{2}$	
	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal		response to that we say the following :
2	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal with this at paragraph 23 of appendix 2 to our written	2	response to that we say the following : First , if this truly were an obvious error , the FCA
$\frac{2}{3}$	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal with this at paragraph 23 of appendix 2 to our written submissions which is bundle $\{1/18/38\}$.	2 3	response to that we say the following : First , if this truly were an obvious error , the FCA would have taken the point in its reply ; it did not do
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$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal with this at paragraph 23 of appendix 2 to our written submissions which is bundle {1/18/38}. In summary, normally an emergency and any relevant threat to life and property will be co-located . But if one steps back from the prism of COVID-19, the broad purpose of this clause is to provide an indemnity against the effect on access to insured premises of restrictions imposed by the emergency services , in the context of the emergency services dealing with emergencies. By their very nature emergencies, which affect access to the premises are likely to be in the vicinity of the premises. Conversely, action taken to address emergencies in other areas are unlikely to cause disruption to access to the premises. We can test that by taking the following scenario, which is perfectly plausible in the context of the police imposing cordons under section 33 of the terrorism Act 2000:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	response to that we say the following : First, if this truly were an obvious error, the FCA would have taken the point in its reply; it did not do so. Again if it were an obvious error, it would have taken the points in its written submissions; it did not do so. Paragraph 87 of the written submissions identify the exclusions which the FCA said were in issue, $\{1/1/38\}$; they do not include the sub-exclusion within the public emergency extensions in the Eaton Gate RSA2 policies. Indeed, the FCA's position, at least until Mr Edelman commenced his oral submissions, and as set out in paragraph 621 of its skeleton argument at page 212 of the document on the screen could we see that, please $\{1/1/212\}$ was that this is a standard form contract of a professional insurer. The reasonable reader would assume that care had been taken by those drafting and selling the policy, and any mistake would have been spotted and corrected. If one assumes that we are correct as to the construction of sub-exclusion (e), there is then an issue as to the meaning of the word "prevented". We say
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	emergency which needs to be in the vicinity . We deal with this at paragraph 23 of appendix 2 to our written submissions which is bundle {1/18/38}. In summary, normally an emergency and any relevant threat to life and property will be co-located. But if one steps back from the prism of COVID-19, the broad purpose of this clause is to provide an indemnity against the effect on access to insured premises of restrictions imposed by the emergency services , in the context of the emergency services dealing with emergencies. By their very nature emergencies, which affect access to the premises are likely to be in the vicinity of the premises. Conversely, action taken to address emergencies in other areas are unlikely to cause disruption to access to the premises. We can test that by taking the following scenario, which is perfectly plausible in the context of the police imposing cordons under section 33 of the terrorism Act 2000:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	response to that we say the following : First, if this truly were an obvious error, the FCA would have taken the point in its reply; it did not do so. Again if it were an obvious error, it would have taken the points in its written submissions; it did not do so. Paragraph 87 of the written submissions identify the exclusions which the FCA said were in issue, {1/1/38}; they do not include the sub-exclusion within the public emergency extensions in the Eaton Gate RSA2 policies. Indeed, the FCA's position, at least until Mr Edelman commenced his oral submissions, and as set out in paragraph 621 of its skeleton argument at page 212 of the document on the screen could we see that, please {1/1/212} was that this is a standard form contract of a professional insurer. The reasonable reader would assume that care had been taken by those drafting and selling the policy, and any mistake would have been spotted and corrected. If one assumes that we are correct as to the construction of sub-exclusion (e), there is then an issue as to the meaning of the word "prevented". We say that that requires a prohibition on the means of access

2

Day 5

1	skeleton argument; reference $\{I/13/37\}$ to 39, on which
2	you may or may not shortly hear Mr Gaisman.
3	Sorry, that should be sub-exclusion (b), not (e).
4	We then move to the question of the correction of
5	sub-exclusion (e) in RSA2.2., the page reference is 51.
6	My Lords, it is a short point, and you are either
7	going to be with me or against me. It is a statement of
8	the blindingly obvious. We say that there is an obvious
9	mistake. As formatted, the exclusion does not read
10	grammatically or naturally .
11	The fact of the mistake is both corroborated and
12	made more obvious by considering the other extensions
13	within the wording. Quite apart from the business
14	interruption extensions at (b), (c) and (g) to which
15	Mr Edelman drew your attention on Wednesday, those are
16	at pages 50 to 51 of the wording, and all involve
17	freestanding inner limits . There are a further eight
18	extensions with freestanding inner limits in the
19	material damage section, pages 21 to 23 of the wording.
20	There are 14 extensions with freestanding inner limits
21	in section 2, the contents section, pages 25 to 28 of
22	the wording. There is a formatting error in relation to
23	extension 2 of the contents section at page 26. If we
24	could see that $\{B/18/26\}$.
25	If we can go back to the previous page so you can
	-
	5
1	see how this is set up. So removal of debris, what is
2	not covered: any costs or expenses, and if the draftsman
3	wasn't allergic to punctuation he might have put a colon

Wash t allergic to punctuation ne might have put a colon
there.
Then over the page, (a), (b), and (c), so what is
not covered: any costs or expenses, any amount exceeding
the sum insured on trade contents. More naturally that
would have been a freestanding exclusion all by itself,
but again, it appears that there has been a slight
formatting error there, albeit not one that could

11 conceivably give rise to doubt or scope for argument 12about its meaning. 13 There is one extension in section 3(b), and the 14 reference for that is $\{B/18/32\}$ of the policy. You will 15see extension capital A on page 32, and we gave an 16incorrect reference to that in paragraph 30(b)(iii) of 17appendix 2 to our skeleton argument, page {I/18/41}, we 18 gave the wrong reference, but it is the extension on

19page 32 to which we should have referred .20There are then three further extensions in section 521of the wording, on page 36, which include freestanding

inner limits.
So if one steps back, there are a total of
28 extensions within this policy wording, excluding the

 $\begin{array}{rrrr} 24 & & 28 \mbox{ extensions within this policy wording, excluding the} \\ 25 & & \mbox{ one that you are concerned with, with freestanding inner} \end{array}$

6

1 limits, albeit one has been incorrectly formatted. 2 There is only one extension, the public emergency 3 extension on page 51, with an inner limit expressed in 4 ungrammatical terms on the same line as an exclusion . We say in respect of both correct grammar and 5 $\mathbf{6}$ consistency with the other policy terms, that could be $\overline{7}$ achieved or those aims could be achieved by making the correction which we propose. 8 9 My Lord, those are my submissions in relation to 10 RSA2. 11 I am now going to move, if I may, to RSA3 for which 12our written submissions are set out in appendix 3. 13reference $\{1/18/49\}$ and following. 14The wording itself is at tab 19 of bundle B. 15 $\{B/19/3\}$ under the heading "Insuring Clause" the third 16 paragraph down has a one document provision. The 17 relevant insuring clause is to be found at 18page $\{B/19/38\}$. You have already seen it . Extension 19(vii): 20"We shall indemnify you in respect of interruption 21 of or interference with the business during the 22 indemnity period following ..." 23Then (iii): 24

"any occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 25 miles of the premises."

 $\overline{7}$

1	You were taken to one of the clauses which followed
2	a sub-heading at the bottom of page 38, "Additional
3	definition in respect of Notifiable Diseases", a heading
4	which might more naturally read "Special conditions in
5	respect of Notifiable Diseases".
6	You were taken just to item 4, but could I ask you
$\overline{7}$	to start at item 2 of the additional definition .
8	"For the purposes of this clause:
9	"Indemnity period shall mean the period during which
10	the results of the business shall be affected in
11	consequence of the occurrence discovery or accident \dots "
12	The words "occurrence discovery or accident" are
13	deliberately chosen to hark back, if we can go back to
14	page $\{B/19/38\},$ to the different triggers for cover
15	within the infectious diseases exclusion, so
16	sub-extension (a) has occurrence, discovery or
17	occurrence, (b) is discovery, (c) is accident and then
18	(d) is occurrence.
19	Go back to page 39, please, and then item 4 you were
20	taken to, which is:
21	"We shall only be liable for the loss arising ought
22	those premises which are directly affected by the
23	occurrence discovery or accident"
24	Could I ask you to note the basis of settlement
25	provisions which apply. Those can be found on pages 34

1	to 35, $\{B/19/34\}$ to 35. Could you go there, please.
2	On page 34 is the basis of settlement if the
3	coverage is written on a gross profit basis . Item (b):
4	"The insurance is limited to loss of gross profit
5	due to"
6	Item (b):
7	"The sum produced by applying the rate of gross
8	profit to the amount by which the turnover during the
9	indemnity period shall fall short of the standard
10	turnover in consequence of the incident"
11	And the "in consequence of" formulation again
12	appears in the first subclause beneath that in the third
13	line .
14	You will find similar wording in the gross revenue
15	basis settlement clause which follows .
16	There is also a special provision
17	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Where do I find the definition of
18	" incident ", Mr Turner?
19	MR TURNER: The definition of "Incident" includes "material
20	damage". Let me just it is page 33, my Lord.
21	$\{B/19/33\}$ item (a). I think we looked at it on Thursday
22	afternoon .
23	So this falls within the overall scope of the
24	submissions I was making on Thursday afternoon about the
25	engagement of the quantification machinery within the

9

1	non-damage extensions to various policies .
2	Back on page $\{B/19/34\}$ there is also , under the
3	heading of "Vicinity", a special provision applicable to
4	the extension which is a trends or adjustment clause.
5	${\sf I}$ use those words as shorthand and as shorthand only.
6	But again, those words impose a requirement to conduct a
7	"but for" analysis for the purposes of the
8	quantification of loss . Again on the assumption that
9	that provision is engaged by a non-damage extension, as
10	we say it is .
11	Moving on, could I go forward to page $\{B/19/91\}$.
12	The start of the general exclusions which are expressed
13	to apply to all sections of the policy unless otherwise
14	stated . One sees that at the top of page 91.
15	Then on page 93, you have already seen general
16	exclusion L, which is stated to be applicable to all
17	sections other than the employers and public liability
18	covers, and it is then headed " Contamination or
19	Pollution Clause".
20	In the context of its heading of " Contamination
21	or Pollution Clause" could I then take you to page
22	$\{B/19/86\},$ where you have general conditions in relation
23	to interpretation , some of which are numbered and some
24	of which at random are not. Under 10.9 you will find

25a separate general condition in relation to

10

1	interpretation :
2	"In this policy
3	Then item (e):
4	"The headings are for reference only and shall not
5	be considered when determining the meaning of this
6	policy ."
7	My Lord, there are, I would suggest, three
8	particular
9	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You draw our attention to that because
10	that is a point against you, effectively .
11	MR TURNER: No. Mr Edelman relies on the heading "
12	Contamination or Pollution Clause" for the purpose of
13	construing the subclauses which follow . He explicitly
14	did so in his oral submissions.
15	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Okay. I mean, in a sense it just
16	doesn't really help very much.
17	MR TURNER: I'm going to move on for now, my Lord, but we
18	will come back to it in a moment.
19	My Lord, there are three issues specific to RSA3 at
20	a high level . I am going to address two of them this
21	morning.
22	The first one is: does the word "following " within
23	the relevant insuring provision indicate a requirement
24	for a looser test than "proximate causation"?
25	The second is the proper construction and effect of

The second is the proper construction and effect of

11

1	general exclusion L.
2	The third would be the relevance and effect of the
3	adjustments special provision , but I'm not going to
4	address that separately in oral submissions because it
5	comes under the cover of the submissions which I made on
6	Thursday afternoon at a level of generality . And you
7	know that we say that that provision does apply to
8	non-damage extensions, and we say it should be construed
9	and applied in a manner which is faithful to its
10	wording.
11	Turning to the first of the two issues which I am
12	going to address, which is: does the word "following"
13	import a requirement for a looser test than "proximate
14	causation"? The starting point is section 55 of the
15	1906 Act and the requirement that a proximate causal
16	relationship is required unless the policy provides
17	otherwise .
18	In making its assessment as to whether the policy
19	does otherwise require, the court should not draw nice
20	distinctions between varieties of phrases used; and for
21	that we cite the Insurance Disputes book at
22	paragraph 7.14, reference $\{K/204/8\}$ to page 9. The
23	relevant text is based upon Lord Justice Potter's
24	judgment in the Court of Appeal in the Lloyds TSB v
25	General Insurance case and Lord Justice Potter was

Day 5

1	himself citing Lord Sumner's speech in Becker Gray at	1	
2	$\{J/42/12\},$ and we looked at that passage on Thursday.	2	
3	MacGillivray is at one with the Insurance Disputes book	3	
4	on this point at paragraph 21-004, reference $\{K/203/4\}.$	4	
5	Both Insurance Disputes and MacGillivray confirm	5	
6	that clear words are required to displace the	6	
7	requirement of proximate causation.	7	
8	Our starting point is that the word "following ",	8	
9	even if it were to be construed in isolation , would not	9	
10	displace the requirement for proximate causation, but	10	
11	your Lordships don't need to consider the word in	11	
12	isolation , because the extension includes two special	12	
13	conditions which confirm beyond scope for a sensible	13	
14	dispute that "following" should indeed be construed as	14	
15	requiring proximate causation.	15	
16	First, special condition or additional definition	16	
17	number 2 and if we could see that, please, on the	17	
18	screen, it is at page 52 sorry, it is not. It is	18	
19	page 39. $\{B/19/39\}$. This is the provision to which	19	
20	Mr Edelman didn't refer on Wednesday, despite it being	20	
21	cited in our written submissions. That clause, we say,	21	
22	confirms that the extension requires that the results of	22	
23	the business must be affected, and I quote, "in	23	
24	consequence of" the occurrence of notifiable disease	24	
25	within 25 miles of the premises. And the words "in	25	
	13		
1	consequence of" have long been recognised as indicating	1	
2	a requirement for proximate causation; and we refer you	2	
3	to MacGillivray .	3	
4	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Sorry, could you just point out,	4	
5	Mr Turner, the precise words?	5	
6	MR TURNER: "For the purposes of this clause:	6	L
7	"Indemnity period shall mean the period during which	7	
8	the results of the business shall be affected in	8	Μ
9	consequence of the occurrence discovery or accident \dots "	9	L
10	The words "in consequence of" have long been	10	Μ
11	recognised as indicating a requirement for proximate	11	
12	causation, and I would refer you to MacGillivray again	12	L
13	at paragraph 21-004.	13	Μ
14	Second, the fourth special condition or additional	14	
15	definition , which is the clause that Mr Edelman did	15	
16	refer you to on Wednesday, confirms that the extension	16	
17	provides an indemnity only for loss arising at those	17	
18	premises directly affected by the occurrence.	18	
19	The use of the words " directly affected " make clear,	19	
20	again we say beyond scope for dispute, that indirect	20	
21	effects of the occurrence are not encompassed within the	21	
22	extension. Again, it is only consistent with	22	
23	a requirement for proximate causation.	23	
24	If one were to take the example at paragraph 219 of	24	
25	the third and fifth defendants' skeleton argument, that	25	

14

is $\{1/12/114\}$, that provides a rather meatier example of the distinction encompassed within special definition or additional definition 4, in operation than the example given by Mr Edelman of cleaners. And we say that that is consistent with a requirement that the losses of the insured should be proximately caused by the peril and therefore the "following" is to be construed in that way. The FCA for its part, in its oral submission, submitted in terms that the word "following" recognised that the notifiable disease peril would not be having a direct effect of its own on the business. That was {Day3/72:10} to 14, and we say that submission is very obviously flawed First, it simply ignores additional definition 2 and the light which it sheds on the meaning to be given to the word "following" in the insuring clause. Second, even indirect impacts require "but for" causation, and we can take that from paragraph 18 of Lord Phillips ' judgment in the Blackburn Rovers case, {K/119/6}. Not only does the FCA ignore such basic $% \left({{{\mathbf{FCA}}} \right)$ principles , it also, and we blatantly, ignores the language used in special condition 4 which makes plain that indirect impacts are not within scope. 15

If it is necessary to go further then, assuming you are with me as to the relevance of quantification machinery, one can also look to that as being consistent with our analysis of the requirement for proximate causation. ORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Just remind us which paragraph of Lord Phillips ? MR TURNER: It is paragraph 18, my Lord. ORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. MR TURNER: Could I turn now to the proper construction and effect of general exclusion L. ORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. MR TURNER: The starting point is that all policy terms are expressly subject to the general exclusions. General exclusion L expressly applies to all sections of the policy, with the exception of the employers and public liability covers. As a matter of principle , the court should seek to construe the policy in such a way as would give all clauses effect. We set that out in paragraph 29 of the joint skeleton argument on construction . 1/52/12. If we can see that, please. Sorry, it is tab 5 I think. $\{I/5/12\}$. If we go to the next page, please, $\{I/5/13\}$, could I ask you just to read the quotation within that page, with particular emphasis on what Lord Goff of Chievely said in the

Day 5

1	Hong Kong case.
2	Questions of repugnancy would only come into play if
3	and only if it is not possible to fashion a construction
4	of a relevant provision in such a way that they can live
5	alongside each other, but even then the ability of the
6	court simply to strike through exclusions would be
7	limited, as Lord Justice Longmore's decision in Great
8	North-Eastern Railways exemplifies ; paragraph 31 of that
9	decision, $\{K/96/7\}$.
10	My Lords, it is no accident, we say, that the FCA's
11	oral submissions started and focused on the presence of
12	the word "disease" within the exclusion in subclause
13	(a). That is because the FCA, instead of heeding what
14	Lord Goff said in the Hong Kong case, seeks to persuade
15	you to conclude that there is an irreconcilable
16	inconsistency between the disease extension and the
17	exclusion for epidemic.
18	If one takes the example of the localised bread and
19	butter outbreak of a notifiable disease, which was
20	raised on the first day of the trial by my Lord
21	Lord Justice Flaux, it is perfectly possible to give
22	effect both to the disease extension and also to an
23	extension for epidemic. Even though, as the FCA
24	effectively and rightly recognises in paragraph 973 of
25	its skeleton, the COVID pandemic amounts to an epidemic.
	17
1	The reference is $\{1/1/309\},$ we don't need to turn that

3 The FCA's next tactic, having set out to construe 4 the provisions in a way which is designed to magnify $\mathbf{5}$ inconsistency rather than resolve it, the next tactic is 6 to seek to persuade you that the words " pollution $\operatorname{and}/\operatorname{or}$ 7 contamination" in subclause (a) bis, so the second 8 subclause at (a), should be construed as having been 9 intended to be a reflection of the title to this clause, 10 {Day3/75:3} to line 6.

 11
 Leaving to one side the almost impenetrable opacity

 12
 of subclause (a) bis, there are three obvious reasons

 13
 why the FCA's submissions should be rejected.

14First, if the parties had intended to refer back to15the title of the clause so as to provide a guide for its16interpretation, they would as a minimum have used the17words in the same order as they appear in the title of18the clause. They did not.

19Second, the fact that the words " pollution and/or20contamination" are in bold capitalised in (a) bis is not21something on which it is possible to place the slightest22weight. As we explain in paragraph 24, subparagraph (b)23of appendix 3 of our skeleton argument, reference

24 {I/18/61}, the words " pollution and contamination" 25 appear in a number of places in the wording embolden

25 appear in a number of places in the wording, emboldened

18

1 and capitalised or unemboldened and uncapitalised, 2 seemingly at random. 3 Third and fundamentally, the parties have expressly 4 agreed that the heading is for reference only and cannot 5be considered to determine the meaning of the policy. $\mathbf{6}$ Accordingly, we say that subclause (a) bis only applies $\overline{7}$ to pollution and contamination, small "p" and small "c" 8 because neither is a defined term within the policy. 9 Even if it had been potentially capable of applying to 10 a disease, the peril not excluded would be "disease not 11 amounting to an epidemic". The subclause provides no 12assistance to the FCA. 13In its oral submissions the FCA sought for the first 14time to shore up its position by reference to subclause 15(b) bis. You are certainly entitled to place at least 16 forensic weight on the FCA's failure to draw attention 17to that subclause at any earlier stage, just as 18Mr Justice Morison did when confronted with a late 19developed argument of contractual construction in 20Eagle Star v Cresswell at paragraph 18, reference 21 {K/115/10} 22 If we go back, please, to the wording of the 23exclusion . It is on the screen, so $\{B/19/93\}.$ It is 24 very difficult to divine the purpose of subclause (b)

bis . Its language is ordinarily to be found as a saving $$19$\,$

1	or for the avoidance of doubt provision at the end of
2	a policy endorsement, and it does not sit naturally as
3	a component of an exclusion clause. Certainly it cannot
4	and should not be construed in such a way as to defeat
5	the very exclusions which have just been spelt out in
6	the first subclause (a). If it makes any sense at all ,
7	we submit that it can only be as a limitation upon
8	whatever carve out is made in subclause (a) bis.
9	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The last bit of it, and especially "the
10	exclusion shall not be superseded by this clause" is
11	really saying no more, isn't it, than to the extent
12	there is a specific exclusion elsewhere in the policy in
13	relation to what would otherwise be an insured peril ,
14	say, that this general exclusion doesn't supersede it,
15	so it doesn't cut down the scope of any specific
16	exclusion . Whether there is anything of that kind is
17	obviously a different question, but as to what the
18	purpose of the provision is , that seems to be at least
19	a purpose, none of which, you would say, assists the
20	FCA.
21	MR TURNER: We would say if that is the purpose it doesn't
22	assist the FCA. We would proffer an alternative , which
23	is that (b) bis is actually only referring to (a) bis,
24	and then it makes sense. Quite what it adds is open to
25	debate.

 $\mathbf{5}$

 $\mathbf{6}$

 Day 5

1	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
2	MR TURNER: If one steps back, we say that you should give

effect to general exclusion L.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We are spending a lot of time on this
provision, and you only rely on it because you say it
indicates an exclusion of epidemics.
MR TURNER: Correct.
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: So you use it, in a sense, to shore up
your primary argument on the notifiable disease
provision , which is the relevant insuring clause .
MR TURNER: Yes, but it could go wider because it could be
engaged by a Leicester scenario .
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I see what you mean. Yes, okay.
MR TURNER: My Lord, you have my submissions. I am going to
move on to RSA4. $\{B/20/1\}$
Our submissions in relation to RSA4, we don't need
to turn them up, are $\{1/18/70\}$ and following.
Appendix 4 to our written submissions.
If we go to page 2 under the heading "Underwritten
by RSA", you will see a one contract provision . If we
jump forward, please, to page $\{B/20/51\}$ which is in the
sample schedule, there is cover for any one single
business interruption loss, on page $\{B/20/51\}$ and that
term, "Single Business Interruption Loss" is defined at
page $\{B/20/33\}$, and we are in definition 105,

1	sub- definition (i):
2	"With all business interruption loss and amounts
3	payable under extensions that arise from, are
4	attributable to or are in connection with a single
5	occurrence"
6	"Covered Events" in the definitions , page $\{B/20/23\}.$
7	In the right-hand column, definition number 17 means the
8	events, small "e", as described featuring in a number of
9	insuring clauses including, so far as is relevant,
10	clause 2.3.
11	Just pausing there, we say that this is a policy
12	which provides insurance against events, not states of
13	affairs . We say that the COVID-19 pandemic is not an
14	event in the ordinary usage of the term. Mr Edey said
15	that the attempt to cross-refer to the aggregation
16	cases, that is particularly to AXA v Field, doesn't hold
17	water; the reference for his submission is $\{Day3/185:22\}$
18	and following, but he didn't explain why. Neither
19	aggregation nor the policy in this case require any
20	special meaning to be applied to the word "event" and,
21	as Lord Mustill observed in AXA v Field, page 1035 G
22	$\{J/74/10\},$ the construction of the word "event" is
23	a question of ordinary speech, and that is
24	a construction which leads to it being something that
25	happens at a particular time at a particular place in

1	a particular way. It is not a cause, and it cannot be
2	a continuing state of affairs .
3	Can we go to page 7 of the policy then, $\{B/20/7\}$.
4	"Business Interruption ", the insuring clause 2.3,
5	"Specified Causes":
6	"In the event of interruption or interference to the
7	insured's business as a result of"
8	Then (viii):
9	" Notifiable Diseases and Other Incidents ."
10	That is a defined term that we will come to in
11	a moment. And criterion (d) is :
12	"occurring within the vicinity [defined term] of an
13	insured location
14	"during the period of insurance."
15	Then (xii) is "Prevention of Access - Non-Damage",
16	again a defined term, with a time deductible of eight
17	consecutive hours.
18	We divide, for reasons that will become apparent,
19	the clause 8 perils into two. So there is a notifiable
20	disease peril and another incidents peril, and we will
21	look at those in a moment.
22	Business interruption loss definitions , you were
23	shown by Mr Edelman page 32 of the policy sorry ,

page $\{B/20/23\}$ of the policy has the definition of

"Business Interruption Loss", which includes the

1	reduction in turnover. Page $\{B/20/32\}$ defines
2	"Reduction in Turnover" as the amount by which the
3	turnover falls short of the standard turnover.
4	"Standard Turnover" is defined on the next page, page
5	$\{B/20/34\}$, and requires adjustments to be made to take
6	into account variations affecting the insured's business
7	either before or after the covered event, or which would
8	have affected the insured's business had the covered
9	event not occurred, so that the figures thus adjusted
10	will represent as nearly as may be reasonably
11	practicable the results which but for the covered event
12	would have been obtained during the indemnity period.
13	So it invites and requires the application of
14	a counterfactual for the purposes of quantifying loss.
15	We say that is to be given its natural meaning, not the
16	convoluted meaning advanced by the FCA.
17	Before we move on to the definitions of the perils ,
18	could we look at the definition of "Vicinity", page
19	$\{B/20/35\},$ common, it appears, in all of the perils with
20	which you are concerned:
21	" an area surrounding or adjacent to an insured
22	location in which events that occur within such area
23	would be reasonably expected to have an impact on an
24	insured or the insured's business."
25	We say that that is a term which is plainly intended

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2425 Day 5

1	to act as a limiting factor for the purposes of the	1	policy .
2	insured perils . We say its meaning is to be divined at	2	As to whether what has happened could reasonably
3	the date of inception of the policies , it is	3	have been expected, your Lordships need go no further
4	prospective . And there is a single	4	than Mr Edelman did at {Day2/118:18} to line 21:
5	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You would say that the FCA's	5	"Insurers would have hoped and expected" that
6	interpretation of this "Vicinity" definition focuses on	6	nothing as serious and as dramatic as what has happe
7	the words "within such area would be reasonably expected	7	to the country this year.
8	to have an impact", and hence Mr Edelman's submits:	8	Well, quite how the FCA or the hospitality
9	well, that would encompass the entire country. But that	9	interveners can say that what has happened could
10	really ignores the opening words, which is "an	10	reasonably have been expected, which is a test which
11	surrounding or adjacent to the insured location ".	11	imposes a high degree of prospective probability , is
12	MR TURNER: It ignores lots of things, my Lord. It ignores	12	yet unexplained.
13	"surrounding or adjacent to". It treats "events" as if	13	Moving on from vicinity , could we go back to $B/2^d$
14	it is referring to the specific insured event which has	14	and look at the notifiable diseases peril .
15	occurred, rather than engaging in a prospective	15	Sorry, could we go to page $\{B/20/7\}$ to start with
16	exercise . And in so doing it puts a bright red line	16	remind ourselves what the introductory words are. So
17	straight through "might reasonably be expected".	17	has to be, under 2.3(viii), interruption as a result
18	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: It also ignores the meaning of the word	18	notifiable disease occurring within the vicinity of a
19	" vicinity " and I seem to remember Lord Hoffmann had said	19	insured location. The definition of "Notifiable
20	that even if it is a defined term, the term which the	20	Diseases" is at page 29 $\{B/20/29\}$. Notifiable
21	parties are defining is itself an indication of what	21	diseases means in fact we have in fact three
22	they may mean.	22	definitions of "Notifiable Diseases" in (i), (ii) and
23	MR TURNER: Your Lordship is quite right. You have in mind	23	(iii). So it is specified diseases in (i); then any
24	the Birmingham City Council case $\{K/129/5\}$.	24	additional disease notifiable under the regulations ,
25	Sorry, could I ask my Lord Lord Justice Flaux to	25	with a deeming provision that it was notifiable from
	25		27
1	mute?	1	initial outbreak once it has been made notifiable .ar

1	mute?
2	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. Sorry.
3	MR TURNER: If we go to $\{K/129/5\},$ and it is paragraph 11.
4	It is just by side letter F:
5	"Although successor is a defined expression"
6	My Lords, we deal with this submission in detail in
7	paragraphs 26 to 32 of appendix 4 $\{1/18/10\}$ and
8	following . I am not going to repeat those submissions,
9	it is obvious that you already have them well in mind.
10	The oral submissions made by the hospitality
11	interveners , in fact if we start with their written
12	submissions at paragraph 86, $\{1/2/22\}$.
13	You start with what has happened and then you work
14	back. If you do that, it is no surprise that when you
15	ask the question what area has been impacted, you get
16	the answer: the whole of the UK. But that is not the
17	question that is posed by the definition . If we look at
18	what they said in their oral submissions, Day 3,
19	page 182, lines 15 to 24 {Day3/182:15}:
20	" can only sensibly be a reference to whatever
21	event has in fact occurred, in respect of which the
22	insured seeks to establish cover."
23	That is not an attempt to give effect to the policy
24	definition , it is an attempt to subvert it , to rewrite
25	it and to remove the vicinity requirement from the

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Edelman did at {Day2/118:18} to line 21: urers would have hoped and expected ..." that as serious and as dramatic as what has happened ountry this year. quite how the FCA or the hospitality ers can say that what has happened could ly have been expected, which is a test which a high degree of prospective probability , is as plained. ing on from vicinity , could we go back to B/20at the notifiable diseases peril . , could we go to page $\{B/20/7\}$ to start with to ourselves what the introductory words are. So it e, under 2.3(viii), interruption as a result of e disease occurring within the vicinity of an location . The definition of "Notifiable is at page 29 {B/20/29}. Notifiable means -- in fact we have in fact three ns of "Notifiable Diseases" in (i), (ii) and So it is specified diseases in (i); then any I disease notifiable under the regulations , eeming provision that it was notifiable from its

initial outbreak once it has been made notifiable . and the notifiable disease has to occur within the vicinity of the insured location.

We say that the causal link , the mandatory causal link between the occurrence of the notifiable disease within the vicinity of the premises and the interruption or interference is established by using the words "as a result of" within the insuring provision . You already have my submissions in relation to proximity requirements in general, and notifiable diseases in general, so I am not going to repeat them in

the context of the notifiable diseases peril within RSA4 If we then look at the "Other Incidents" definition

within paragraph 69, and that is at (v) $\{B/20/29\}$: "Defective sanitation or any other enforced closure

of an insured location by any government authority or agency or a competent local authority for health reasons or concerns."

So that would be an other incident which again has to occur within the vicinity of the insured premises. One goes back to the insuring clause.

In short order, first, only closure under legal compulsion will suffice . The word "enforced" has to be bringing meaning to a clause, so there has to be

1	a closure which either is or is legally capable of being	1	schedule, the reference is $\{B/20/51\}, for the notifiable$
2	enforced in order to have enforced closure.	2	disease and other incidents perils the inner limit on
3	Premises which were allowed to continue trading	3	the sample schedule is 2.5 million , for the prevention
4	cannot bring themselves within this peril .	4	of access on damage it is 500,000, and obviously there
5	Premises which were prohibited from trading can	5	may be variations between different insureds on those
6	bring themselves within the peril, but only from the	6	figures .
7	date on which the relevant closure requirement took	7	We say that this peril is to be construed in a way
8	effect under the regulations .	8	that actions outside the vicinity of the insured
9	There has to be a causal link between the enforced	9	locations and actions which do not prevent or hinder the
10	closure and the loss, that is made clear from the	10	use of or access to the insured locations are simply not
11	standard turnover definition . And the health reasons or	11	within the scope of the peril insured.
12	concerns which are the cause of the closure have to be	12	Again, tying it back to the definition of "Covered
13	specific to the vicinity of the premises. That is not	13	Events" and the use of the word "events", small "e",
14	to say they can't be wider in geographic scope, but the	14	within that definition , because the actions of the
15	health reasons or concerns within the vicinity of the	15	police, et cetera, have to be an event, they have to be
16	premises have to be the cause of the enforced closure.	16	actions at a particular time, a particular place. In
17	The word "for" should be construed as meaning "because	17	short, they do have to be specific to the vicinity , even
18	of".	18	if they could have an effect which goes beyond the
19	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Just remind me what categories of	19	vicinity . But for causal purposes one focuses on
20	insureds have RSA4. It is wholesalers but	20	whether the causing a relationship between the vicinity
21	MR TURNER: We have manufacturers, we have private health	21	and the relevant actions is established , rather than
22	companies. There is a very wide variety , both in terms	22	looking at something wider ranging.
23	of categories of business and also size of business.	23	Social distancing measures, we say, do not come into
24	There are obviously hospitality industry insureds,	24	play. Can I give you an example of that. Let's take
25	because there are interveners who come from the	25	the example of a small hotel with a booking for a coach
	29		31
1	hospitality industry. None of the interveners is	1	party of 20 people. Just as the coach is about to turn
2	actually an RSA insured. But this is a general combined	2	into the hotel it is intercepted by the police, who are
3	commercial policy which covers a wide variety of	3	waiting for it and its occupants, and the party is
4	different insureds. So hospitality industry,	4	arrested and they spend the next 24 hours in custody
5	wholesalers , manufacturers , retailers , it is a very	5	under investigation .
6	broad spectrum, my Lord.	6	On the FCA's case, the actions of the police, which
7	I can then go on to the "Prevention of Access"	7	were undoubtedly in the vicinity of the hotel, have
8	definition . Again, if we can go back to page 7 just to	8	hindered access to the premises and the hotel can
9	set the context.	9	recover for the ensuing interference with its business.
10	My Lord, I can feel Mr Gaisman's breath hot on my	10	We say that is a nonsensical result and cannot have been
11	neck.	11	intended. And the reason why the hotel cannot recover
12	$\{B/20/7\}$, so interruption or interference to the	12	for prevention or hindrance of access in those
13	insured's business as a result of prevention sense of	13	circumstances is because the actions of the police were
14	access - non-damage.	14	directed towards the individuals , rather than the
15	Then go forward to page 30 for the relevant	15	premises. They are not within the scope of the peril;
16	definition , please $\{B/20/30\}$, item 87. I ask you to	16	the access to the premises is neither hindered not
17	note the examples given in (i) and (iii), and then (ii)	17	prevented.
18	is :	18	My Lords, the FCA gives a café example in
19	"The actions or advice of the police or other law	19	paragraph 588 of its submissions $\{I/1/204\}$.
20	enforcement agency, military authority, governmental	20	Paragraph 588:
21	authority or agency in the vicinity of the insured	21	"Take for example [in line 2] a café located in the
22	locations \dots " which prevent or hinder the use of access	22	suburbs of a city"
23	to insured locations during the period of insurance.	23	We say that that again repeats the FCA's error of
24	My Lord, there is a lower inner limit on this peril	24	reducing the proximity requirement to a question of
25	than the other two. If one were to look at the sample	25	ticking a box rather than treating it as an integral
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			. –

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Day 5

1	part of the insured peril .
2	My Lord, the complaint is made by the FCA that we
3	give no meaning to the part of the clause which reads,
4	in the "Vicinity" definition , "in which events that
5	occur in such an area will be reasonably expected to
6	have an impact".
7	That complaint was made on $\{Day3/183:13\}$ to line 25.
8	I think in fact it was Mr Edey for the hospitality
9	interveners .
10	In response to the charge that we are giving no
11	meaning or content to the definition of "Vicinity" we
12	say simply this: it means what it says. Its application
13	is going to be fact - sensitive for any given location .
14	Hence, we are reluctant to try to produce a one size
15	fits all definition or meaning. We can give you an
16	example; an obvious example would be where you have an
17	insured location on an industrial estate with a single
18	route of access or egress. Plainly anything which
19	happens on that single route of access or egress is
20	likely to have an impact upon the insured premises.
21	In relation to overlapping cover this is the
22	final point in relation to RSA4, and again this was
23	raised by the hospitality interveners were you to
24	find that there are overlapping perils in play which are
25	engaged, then we accept that for the purposes of the
	33
1	adjustments provisions within the policy those perils
2	cannot be played off against each other to cancel each
22 23 24 25	final point in relation to RSA4, and again this was raised by the hospitality interveners were you to find that there are overlapping perils in play which are engaged, then we accept that for the purposes of the 33 adjustments provisions within the policy those perils

1	adjustments provisions within the policy those penis
2	cannot be played off against each other to cancel each
3	other out.
4	My Lords, those are my submissions in relation to
5	RSA4, and those are my submissions unless I can assist
6	you any further .
7	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: No, I don't have any questions. Thank
8	you very much, Mr Turner.
9	MR TURNER: Thank you.
10	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right, is it now Mr Gaisman?
11	MR GAISMAN: It is, if your Lordships can hear me.
12	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We can hear you, Mr Gaisman. All I was
13	going to say was, given that it is nearly $10 \ { m past} \ 11$
14	would it be sensible to take the break now and then you
15	will get a clean run at, let's say, 20 past 11?
16	MR GAISMAN: I am in your Lordship's hands. I have some
17	introductory remarks which would take me a little
18	longer, it would take me to 11.30 or slightly beyond.
19	I am in your Lordship's hands.
20	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think it would be sensible if we
21	broke now and we will say 20 past. My clock says 11.08,
22	so if we say just before 20 past. All right?
23	(11.08 am)
24	(Short break)
25	(11.20 am)

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1 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: If you are ready, Mr Gaisman. $\mathbf{2}$ MR GAISMAN: Yes, my Lord. Can your Lordships see and hear 3 me? LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes. 4 $\mathbf{5}$ Submissions by MR GAISMAN $\mathbf{6}$ MR GAISMAN: My Lords, in the Hiscox wordings there are two 7clauses which have been invoked by insureds, the NDDA 8 clause and the public authority clause. Typical 9 examples are in the Hiscox 1 lead wording. We asked for 10 your Lordships to be supplied with a physical bundle of Hiscox wordings, which I hope is convenient. The 11 12reproduction on the screen is taxing when the print is 13small. 14My Lords, if we may start with the public authority 15clause and establish the taxonomy. Like the joint 16 skeleton on causation, paragraph 63, the components of 17 the public authority clause may be stated in their 18 correct causal sequence as A an occurrence of a disease, 19a notifiable disease, followed in a causal sense by B, 20the restrictions imposed by public authority , causing C, 21 the insured's inability to use the insured premises, 22 causing D, an interruption which must be the sole and 23direct cause of loss.

Your Lordship will knows that the page references are in 42 and 42 in the bundle behind divider 6.

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1	We need to analyse these clauses and the stem from
2	which they branch without any presumption that they
3	offer cover in respect of pandemics or that they should.
4	We need to approach them without hindsight as to the
5	extraordinary events which we have all experienced this
6	year. Thus, in deciding whether the parties intended
7	prospectively, and without knowledge of those
8	extraordinary events, to apply the usual rules of
9	insurance law to their contract so that only loss that
10	would not have occurred but for the insured peril is
11	recoverable, or whether they must be taken to have
12	intended to abrogate them or even modify them, we should
13	not test that with the knowledge of the present
14	situation , as opposed to the simpler sort of case that
15	was clearly the paradigm. That is to misuse hindsight.
16	We also need to be aware that when the FCA invokes
17	what the parties must have meant, the intention or at
18	least the effect of that phrase is often to camouflage
19	those points in its argument where there is nothing but
20	bare assertion . Testing the operation of clauses on the
21	basis that it cannot have been intended X or Y because
22	that wouldn't provide cover in the present situation , is
23	also to beg the question.
24	So I intend, in a necessary corrective to the FCA's
25	submissions, to start as it were in a neutral frame of

1 mind and focus on the language of the wordings as 2 reasonably perceived at the date of the contract. 3 Now, a number of discrete points, some of them in 4 a sense overlapping, on the two clauses arise. 5If Hiscox succeeds in demonstrating that neither 6 clause applies to the present facts, there will be no $\overline{7}$ cover. That, obviously, is its primary aim in making 8 these submissions. g Now suppose, however, that Hiscox falls short of 10 that aim. It might then be thought that the greater the 11 number of points on which Hiscox is held to be right and 12 the narrower the ambit of the insured perils which are 13held to operate, the more confined the indemnity is 14likely to be. Because the narrower the ambit in my 15 taxonomy of B, C and D, the smaller the loss that is 16 likely to flow from their successive effects, which is 17what this insurance is against. 18 Your Lordships will already have appreciated that it is a remarkable feature of the FCA's submissions on 1920causation that unless Hiscox has a complete win on 21 coverage, it may as well not bother making submissions 22 on many aspects of coverage. Because on the FCA's case, 23 even if Hiscox is right on many of those submissions, it 24won't do it any good. Once A is shown to cause B, C and 25D, Hiscox, according to the FCA, is liable for all the 37

1 consequences of A, $% \left({{{\mathbf{A}}_{\mathbf{A}}}} \right)$ irrespective of how narrow B, C and D $\mathbf{2}$ are shown to be, and how little loss is caused by those 3 factors in combination. 4 That is a sure sign, one of many, that the FCA's 5approach cannot be right. Indeed, it is not right. 6 First , the FCA seeks to characterise , as your by now 7 Lordships well know, and I am not going to reinvent the 8 wheel, seeks to characterise everything that happened as 9 one indivisible peril; the disease itself, the economic 10 and social consequences, the whole of the government 11 reaction and all the losses. But nowhere have the FCA 12 sought to explain why this extreme abrogation of 13 separate facts in different categories is an appropriate 14 standpoint. It is simply a metaphyseal assumption, an 15unexamined first premise which is never justified. But 16it is wrong. I won't go over the effective 17demonstration that Mr Kealey conducted on Day 4 of the 18 way in which the FCA summarises the true cause of 19 everything in its skeleton and Mr Kealey demonstrated 20that that summary bears no recognisable relationship to 21 any insured peril in any Hiscox wording. 22Secondly, we all know that how a court should 23properly characterise a set of circumstances depends on 24 the purpose for which the characterisation is being 25made. That is Lord Hoffmann in the Environment Agency

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1 case and your Lordships have it well in mind. 2 The only legitimate perspective here is to 3 characterise the facts in light of the ambit of the 4 perils which the parties agreed were to be insured and 5matters which on the true construction of the wordings, 6 the parties agreed were not insured. The distinction $\overline{7}$ between these two categories of thing has, we 8 respectfully submit, to be reflected and carried through g in the court's treatment of the facts and the indemnity, 10 because otherwise it is rewriting the parties' bargain. 11 It cannot be right to recast the bargain on the 12basis of an assertion, which is all that it is, that 13everything is inextricably interlinked . This is because 14the contract, read as typically applying to fact 15situations where, as I will submit, no undue difficulty 16 will arise, read against the background of the general 17law, read against the contract provisions, including the 18 trends clauses, requires the court to distinguish 19between different things, to recognise that certain conditions have to be satisfied , so that it is only loss 20 21 caused by the effect of and in combination which is 22 insured. 23 I shall return to this point if I have time later . 24 Cases of truly indivisible loss are few and far between, 25and the court sets its face against them.

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1	Your Lordships will have picked up the wise words of
2	Lord Justice Laws in the Area Rose(?) case, which
3	I shall come back to. Only if there is no rational
4	basis does the court throw its hands in the air and say:
5	well, this is a case where people were reading four
6	newspapers at breakfast and who is to tell which
7	newspaper, all of which contain the same libel , caused
8	the damage.
9	Now
10	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is a classic example of the two
11	people who shoot at somebody at the same time and you
12	can't say who actually caused the death.
13	MR GAISMAN: That is yes, although that fact pattern,
14	that example normally arise in a different context but
15	your Lordship is right.
16	Can I just develop the point, though. Intrinsic to
17	the whole of the FCA's approach is the assumption that
18	any construction or attitude to legal principle other
19	than its own places an intolerable burden on the assured
20	in proving its loss.
21	Well, at the outset I want to put down a challenge
22	to that entire assumption. Why, in the ordinary case of
23	the operation of these clauses, which is all that the
24	parties can be taken prospectively to have contemplated,
25	why would this be so, typically ? A person commits

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Day 5

1	suicide in a flat above a shop and the building is
2	closed. Loss is suffered. Why would anyone suppose
3	that but for the public authority action any customer of
4	the shop would even have known about it? The obvious
5	assumption in the counterfactual there is that the loss
6	would not have been suffered anyway, and so the insured
7	recovers .
8	When your Lordships go out to dinner in
9	a restaurant, perhaps instead of a cancelled trip to the
10	opera, you usually do not know if a previous customer
11	has sustained food poisoning at it. But supposing that
12	person conscientiously complains to the authorities and
13	the restaurant is shut down, the assumption in the
14	counterfactual again is that the loss would not have
15	been suffered anyway and there is no obstacle to the
16	insured making a full recovery.
17	Conversely, in my Lord Mr Justice Butcher's comment
18	on the lorry spill case, on $\{{\sf Day1}/118{:}1\}$ of the
19	transcript , it may be that all the loss was caused by
20	the spill , albeit that the public authority reaction
21	ensued from it . Or to take a case of a problem with
22	drains, if a restaurant filled with effluent and later
23	is closed down, in circumstances where it is obvious
24	that open or closed no one would have gone to it , why
25	should the insurer not be entitled to say: the public

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1	authority action didn't cause you any loss?
2	Now, there may be more difficult cases, but then you
3	get the loss adjustors in . There is not the slightest
4	evidence in this case, from any loss adjuster, that they
5	would be defeated in a paradigm case or indeed in this
6	sort of case, and there is no reason to think that they
7	would be. The big leap in the FCA's case is to ascribe
8	to the parties a unique, legally startling and
9	unequivocal prospective intention to abdicate any
10	attempt to work out what loss was caused by the insured
11	peril and what loss would have occurred anyway, on the
12	basis that they must have assumed in advance that the
13	problem of quantification of loss would be so difficult ,
14	in a business interruption insurance of all things, that
15	the normal rules governing the measure of indemnity
16	should be discarded.
17	There is nothing unusual about difficult questions

of quantification in business interruption insurance, as
the trends clauses expressly contemplate. I do want to
submit that there is simply no basis in the evidence,
there is no basis in the law and there is no basis in
the contract, in other words, there is no basis
anywhere, for this radical assertion.
Now if I could inflict a metaphor on your Lordships,

25 always a dubious exercise, the position is simply this.

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1 Imagine that the pandemic is a large bore pipeline 2 through which liquid flows. The liquid is the loss 3 which the pandemic causes people, businesses. We will 4 call that pipeline A. At a certain point in the 5pipeline there is a flange at which several smaller bore $\mathbf{6}$ pipelines lead off the main pipeline, each of them $\overline{7}$ taking a small proportion of the liquid flowing through pipeline A. One of them, one of those smaller 8 9 pipelines, is called public authority action, and we 10 will call it pipeline B. In due course it leads to 11 pipeline C and to pipeline D but we will leave those out 12of the equation for simplicity . Let us assume that 13pipeline B receives 25% of the total liquid . Other 14pipelines , which we will call X, Y and Z, take the other 1575% of the liquid from A. 16 The insurance here is against the loss caused by 17public authority action following or caused by -- we 18will come back to that -- among other things an 19occurrence of disease. It therefore only insures against the loss coming out of pipeline B. 2021 As Mr Kealey explained on {Day4/51} to 53, and 60, 22 we are not leaving A in the counterfactual and only 23reversing B, C and D. A is the reason why there is any

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liquid coming through at all . We reverse A to the

extent that A supplied liquid to B:

Now, given that Mr Kealey dealt with this all on Thursday, and I will come back to causation if I have time at the logical place in my submissions, and I want to get on to the Hiscox wordings themselves, I just want to make I think three or perhaps four points by way of supplement on this.

First, of course counterfactuals are relevant to the general causation question, the "but for" the insured peril . In addition to the points that my learned friend Mr Kealey made on Thursday, may I remind your Lordships that on $\{Day1/92:1\}$ the FCA's counsel said this :

"The court is not being asked to disapply, rule on or modify the rules of proximate or 'but for' causation as they apply to the law of obligations. What it is being asked to do is to rule on their application within the confines of specific BI insurance policies."

17That statement appears to us to acknowledge that the 18 "but for" test has to be applied and satisfied . We are 19 not all wrong about this. In the Hiscox case, as 20 your Lordship will see from page 44 of the bundle which 21 your Lordships have open, the loss of income clause 22expressly, as it were, leaves the counterfactual 23hanging, but inevitably so. So on page 44, a third of 24the way down, loss of income, the amount we will pay to 25for each item, "The difference between your actual

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account.

Day 5

1	income during the indemnity period and the income it is
2	estimated you would have earned during that period \dots "
3	And the court has to supply the
4	My Lord, can I make a second point which is to do
5	with reversing out the counterfactuals . This is an
6	additional point to Mr Kealey's. The debate as
7	presented by the FCA is between extreme alternatives .
8	The FCA says that one is one must reverse out the
9	disease altogether , and the FCA accuses the insurers of
10	failing to reverse it at all . But as I have said , it is
11	not I only speak for Hiscox, unlike Mr Kealey on
12	Thursday it doesn't matter how often this is said by
13	the FCA, it is still not true. It is not Hiscox's case
14	that we are failing to reverse out the disease. We are
15	not cherry-picking. We are not ignoring the dominoes,
16	to use my learned friend Ms Mulcahy's metaphor, because
17	she made the same charge as Mr Edelman did and it is no
18	better founded. Indeed, and I know there was a lot to
19	read, but we did make this all pretty clear in our
20	skeleton that we are reversing out the disease, but only
21	insofar as the disease causes the public authority
22	action, et cetera.
23	You will find that in paragraph 365 of our skeleton

You will find that in paragraph 365 of our skeleton,
 and it has not been answered, it has just been ignored
 so far. All of this is orthodox causation reasoning,

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 reversing the insured peril, properly described, and its

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 consequences. There is no magical difference between BI

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 covers with complex triggers and any other insurance.

4 The third point I want to make is this: your 5 Lordships are well aware, this is as to the extent to 6 which it is the FCA that is tearing up the rule book on 7 causation, that it extends its case to saying that the 8 indemnity should extend to covering a loss of turnover 9 even before the insured peril has operated, the 10 approaching hurricane and so forth.

11 Your Lordships expressed a little scepticism about 12this. My point is that this isn't really a severable 13 the part of my learned friend 's analysis . As usual, it is justified on the basis of the parties ' intentions , 14 15which begs the question, and because, so the FCA says. 16it is ridiculous to sever the approaching hurricane from 17the actual hurricane, it is all inextricably 18 interlinked

19My Lords, this chain of unsupported assertions is20not just wrong, it is the 13th chime on the FCA's whole21causation edifice . Why should insurers pay for more22than the loss caused by A that comes out of the end of23pipeline B.? That is what they have agreed to pay. And24although the FCA denies, in the passage that I read to25your Lordships from my learned friend Mr Edelman's

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1 submissions on Day 1, although it apparently denies that 2 it is disapplying or even modifying the rules, your 3 Lordships are actually being invited to voyage to a very 4 strange place indeed. 5Now, my Lords, I hesitate to make the next point, $\mathbf{6}$ it is so obvious. English judges decide the cases $\overline{7}$ before them on the basis of principle , and that makes 8 our law predictable, coherent and certain; it consists 9 of an objective and principled set of rules. Those 10 advantages, on which your Lordships do not need a homily 11 from me, become clearer still on the rare occasions when 12the judges, no doubt for good and sufficient reason in 13one sense, abandon those rules. 14 Now, my learned friend Mr Edelman does not dwell on 15the Fairchild Enclave and we are not surprised. But the 16 truth is it is a cautionary tail, that decision and its 17progeny, and I just ask your Lordships to bear in mind 18something that Lord Sumption said in IEG v Zurich, at 19paragraph 114, I don't think we need to look it up, 20where he talked about how, as a result of the original 21 Fairchild decision, the law had moved from each one of 22 expedient to the next, generating knock-on consequences

I do submit, my Lord, if I am permitted to do so,

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which we are not in the position to predict or take into

1	that the abandonment of principle by one court can
2	create untold problems for future courts, and that in
3	our commercial law above all is a course to be avoided.
4	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That was demonstrated in the context of
5	the Fairchild Enclave by the dispute which I had to
6	arbitrate in MMI v Equitas, which as I understand it is
7	Not going to the Supreme Court because it settled , but
8	was due to go to the Supreme Court, no doubt where they
9	might have had something to say about the Fairchild
10	Enclave and the mess it has got us into.
11	MR GAISMAN: Lord Justice Males had already said something
12	about it, my Lord.
13	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, he certainly did.
14	MR GAISMAN: Effectively it was, "Come on chaps, the party
15	is over", if I can put it this way without disrespect.
16	I have said enough on this. Can I come back to the
17	two Hiscox clauses . To save time I am going to deal
18	with certain points which are common to both first,
19	your Lordships have them well in mind, and your
20	Lordships have I hope has read our skeleton and seen how
21	the points go logically under each clause.
22	Now can I first say something about the FCA's
23	approach. We complained in our skeleton, and this is
24	not really my point but I do make the complaint, about
25	the atomistic approach to the isolation of certain words

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Day 5

1 and the failure to construe them in context. I don't 2 need to say any more about that. But there is something 3 authority problematical in that, and I recognise the 4 burden that the FCA is under in this case but the 5process of taking words from individual insurers 6 policies, grouping them together, submitting that they $\overline{7}$ must all mean the same thing, it's very difficult . And 8 your Lordships have got dozens of wordings, it is very g difficult to keep one's eye on the ball . And I don't 10 want to be solipsistic by saying it is Hiscox wordings 11 and nobody else's that for the moment I am inviting your 12 Lordships to look at. 13LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That was precisely the reason why at 14the second case management conference we refused 15Mr Turner's application to adduce evidence of yet more 16 wordings which weren't before the court, because we are 17not assisted by, as it were, cross-fertilisation of 18 wordings. That is not an appropriate way of construing 19contracts at all. 20MR GAISMAN: No, but my point is -- I respectfully adopt 21 what your Lordship says. My point at the moment is 22 a slightly different one, which is that this omnium 23 gatherum approach has a particular defect so far as 24Hiscox is concerned. It tends to draw attention away 25from the very specific nature of the events which have

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1to be present as what you might call initial triggers ,2or initial elements of the trigger , under are both of3these clauses and, in some sense at least , to cause the4ensuing action . Those are the first two elements under5both clauses that the FCA needs to establish .6Now, just for example, when we look -- and I am not

- asking your Lordships yet to turn it up -- at the
 particulars of claim paragraph 43, rather to our
 surprise we see that the same facts are pleaded as both
 an incident, which is a rather small sounding word, and
 an emergency, which is a rather large sounding word.
 Now, my clients' policies don't insure against
- emergencies. I would like, as I say, to focus on -this where is I am going next -- the qualifying
 conditions for cover and the true cause of the
 government action in March.
- 17To trigger one or other of the Hiscox clauses the18FCA must show, I hope your Lordships have pages 41 and1942 open which will do, they must show an incident or an20occurrence of a notifiable disease, to paraphrase. If21the FCA cannot show that, the claims against Hiscox will22fail at the outset.
- 23Furthermore, it is inevitably common ground that24as regards the NDDA clause the incident must be a local25one, within a 1 mile radius, or occasionally the

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vicinity . The Hiscox 4 wordings also have an express 1
mile radius in the public authority occurrence clause.
Moreover, and as is common ground and admitted,
there has to be a causal relationship between the
incidence and the occurrence and the subsequent public
authority actions .
Now, what sort of a thing in principle is an
incident or an occurrence? As my Lord
Lord Justice Flaux rightly stressed at the outset of the
FCA's submissions on this clause, an occurrence, not
lots of occurrences but an occurrence, $\{Day2/130{:}2\}$ to
5, and indeed also an incident .
In a case too well-known to require citation but
I seem to be citing it , Lord Mustill in AXA v Field, in
relation to an event, said that it was something that
happens at a particular time, at a particular place, in
a particular way. And the same is true of an incident
or an occurrence. The FCA's skeleton at footnote 329 on
page 133 equates the three terms. That is also the
ordinary way in which we use these words.
Now, the fact that AXA was a reinsurance case and
the issue there was one of aggregation is neither here
nor there. Lord Mustill's dictum has been applied more
widely in the insurance context, for example in

Zurich Insurance v Maccaferri $\{J/136/1\}$ where the notice

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clause in a product liability policy required that the insured give notice in writing as soon as possible after the occurrence of any event likely to give rise to a claim. It was common ground between counsel that Lord Mustill's definition of "event" was apt, and counsel included my learned friend Mr Edelman.

Now the words "incident" and "occurrence", an incident, an occurrence, could not be more different from abstract, potentially widespread words like "danger" or "emergency".

These words, "incident " and "occurrence", are particular, concrete, confined. Read without hindsight, nobody could seriously argue or would seriously argue that they applied to a national or an international state of affairs. Now, the FCA's case is that whatever it was that

Now, the FCA's case is that whatever it was that
triggered these clauses was an incident or an
occurrence. "Occurrence" is pleaded in paragraph 38 of
the particulars of claim, and "incident" is pleaded in
paragraph 43 of the particulars of claim.
The funny thing is that the FCA's primary case on

the meaning of these words, and how they are proved, is put in two completely different ways, which is odd, because since they are similar words you would think

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Day 5

1 that the FCA would address them in similar ways. But 2 the FCA cannot make up its mind. 3 As regards the public authority clause, which 4 requires an occurrence, the FCA adopts a granular 5approach. It says that an occurrence happened -- this 6 is paragraph 38 -- as soon as COVID became a notifiable 7 disease, and that was on 5 March, which was also the 8 date upon which the first COVID death was reported, as g paragraph 18.7 of the particulars of claim reminds us. 10 In other words, it doesn't matter if there was only one 11 case or how many cases there were or, in a sense, how 12 few there were, the individual cases of the disease were 13the occurrence, once it was notifiable as required by 14the public authority clause. When it comes to "incident", an incident, which is 15

16 what is required by the NDDA clause, however, the FCA 17turns the telescope round and looks through the opposite 18 end. Instead of focusing on the individual case, the 19FCA adopts the most soaring of birds' eye views. The 20"incident", which one might have thought was a rather 21 specific sort of word, is the nationwide emergency; that 22 is paragraph 43.

23 Now, this ambivalence reflects the FCA's perennial 24 problem, which is this: the individual local incident or 25granular occurrence was not the cause of the government

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1 measures in any sense. And the true cause of the $\mathbf{2}$ government measures, the pandemic emergency, is not an 3 incident or an occurrence within either of the clauses. 4 That, we say, is the bind which the FCA is in. 5What do I mean by saying that it was the pandemic 6 emergency which caused the government measures? Indeed, 7 what was it that caused the government measures? The 8 answer given by the FCA, and perhaps we can look at 9 $\{A/2/28\}$, is in the particulars of claim, paragraph 43. 10 It is the first sentence: 11 "The pandemic was a nationwide emergency arising out 12of a highly contagious disease ..." 13 Now that statement rightly recognises two things: 14 first, it treats the pandemic as an emergency; and 15secondly, it contrasts both the pandemic and the 16emergency with the disease out of which the pandemic 17emergency is said to have arisen. 18 The pandemic emergency, my Lords, is not the case of 19 the disease in Alnwick which the FCA says will trigger 20the cover of a businessman in Ilfracombe.

21 Let's assume they are right on that for the moment. 22A pandemic, the pandemic is not even the aggregation of 23the total number of cases on any date you care to choose 24 in March. If the government had thought that was all 25there were ever going to be, it is most unlikely it

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would have done anything. No, the pandemic emergency and the true cause of the government measures was much more than that. Crucially, it was the future. It was the government's and the scientists ' fear of what was to come. It was all the future projected cases of the pandemic. Importantly, and as my learned friends reminded your Lordships on Day 1, it was the real concern that the NHS would be overwhelmed unless the measures were taken. That was mentioned several times 10 on Dav 1. 11 My learned friend Mr Edelman also mentioned.

12obviously an associated point, the fear of what he 13called much higher mortality if preventive measures weren't taken, {Day1/141:1} to page 142. Sources in the materials which are before your Lordships mention the figure of 500,000 deaths if preventative measures weren't taken, but I am sure your Lordships remember that anyway. In the Prime Minister's words, which we 19don't need to look at, it is $\{C/2/371\}$, he said in May: "It is a fact that by adopting those measures we have prevented this country from being engulfed in what could have been a catastrophe in which the reasonable worst case scenario was half a million fatalities . There is also in the bundle an article in The Lancet, in the agreed facts, which refers to disease

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1 modellers whose initial forecast was that in the absence 2 of suppressive measures COVID could have resulted in the 3 deaths of 500,000 people in the UK, and that this had 4 been widely credited with persuading the UK Government $\mathbf{5}$ to reverse course and institute a strict lockdown. 6 Again, my learned friend Mr Edelman on {Day1/130:1} 7 talked about government action having been driven in 8 part by what he called apprehension. 9 It is all the same point. The government's reaction 10was not a response to any particular incident or 11occurrence, whether within a 1 mile radius or at all, 12 but to a general fear of what might come, which operated 13 on a vastly wider scale. Only that, only that could possibly have led the government to introduce what, one 14 15needs to remember, was an unprecedented abrogation of 16personal freedom. 17Now, in the light of that one comes back to the two 18 Hiscox clauses, which if your Lordships still have, I am 19 sure your Lordships know them very well. Let me pose 20 the question the other way round. Can the pandemic or 21 the emergency, as I have explained its true nature. 22really be said to have been an incident within a 1 mile 23radius, an occurrence of the disease? Let it be assumed 24for the moment an occurrence of the disease anywhere. 25Surely the pandemic emergency was the antithesis of

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Day 5

1	something that happens at a particular time, at
2	a particular place, in a particular way, which is
3	Lord Mustill again.
4	Whatever it was
5	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I certainly see in relation to an
6	incident within a 1 mile radius, Mr Gaisman, you say
7	that the words speak for themselves. But in relation to
8	the occurrence of the disease, surely action by the
9	public authority is always there, in a sense, concerned
10	with the future, with the possibility of the disease
11	spreading.
12	MR GAISMAN: My Lord, of course I understand that point, and
13	if I may say so I do dispute it .
14	In the case where Legionnaires' disease is found in
15	a shower, your Lordship is quite right that there is, in
16	a sense, at the back of the public $authority's mind \dots$
17	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: We have lost you again.
18	MR GAISMAN: Can you hear me now?
19	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes.
20	MR GAISMAN: Of course I accept in principle my Lord
21	Mr Justice Butcher's point, but in the case of the
22	Legionnaires' disease , there is simply there is the
23	shortest possible causal chain. The local authority
24	receives a report, bang, it closes down. I don't
25	dispute that, as it were, at the back of the local

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1	authority's mind there is: well, what happens if we
2	don't? And this is a fact- sensitive question to an
3	extent. But what I am seeking to do is not to dispute
4	the point that has been put to me but to seek to argue
5	that on the facts of the present case the occurrence is
6	not causal in any sense. Indeed, it is what in
7	a Freudian slip the FCA calls part of the factual
8	background; that is paragraph 60 of the particulars of
9	claim .
10	So I take my Lord's point, but what I am inviting
11	your Lordships to do is to look at what happened in this
12	case and ask whether it can truly be said, on the facts
13	of the present case, that the public authority's
14	reaction sorry, I have got two thoughts in my mind at
15	once. But a reasonable observer would say: well, if you
16	have got a case of Legionnaires' disease in the showers,
17	you are going to be closed down, mate. It is just
18	falling off a log; it is an obvious consequence.
19	What happened here, my Lord, was no doubt, if one
20	thinks of other pandemics for example, or other
21	countries, what happened here was utterly extraordinary,
22	and the causal chain between the occurrence and the
23	subsequent government measures incorporated so many
24	extraneous elements which are far beyond and outside the
25	purview of the occurrence that we are simply in

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1 different territory . 2 So that would be my answer. I am going to come back 3 to this when I deal specifically with the public 4 authority clause. But my overall point is that whatever $\mathbf{5}$ it was that did cause the government measures, it was 6 not an incident or an occurrence. 7The FCA is trying to cram something which is far too 8 big, far too amorphous, far too prospective and so much 9 more than even the total sum of the cases of the disease 10 at present, or give a date in March, into two clauses, 11 both of which, not just one but both of which, and it is 12unsurprising that they go together, contemplate events 13on a wholly different scale and of a wholly different 14nature 15Of course I haven't forgotten that the FCA is not 16 saying that the pandemic was the occurrence; that is 17 paragraph 38 of the particulars of claim. But if it 18 commits itself to a granular definition of "occurrence", 19which it does, it cannot credibly assert that the 20individual occurrence or few occurrences of the disease 21 in any sense caused the government measures. And it is 22 in that sense, that is why we respectfully submit Hiscox 23is right to say that its BI covers do not insure

pandemics. It is impossible to say that the cause of the government measures, which was the pandemic

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1	emergency, was an incident or an occurrence in the AXA v
2	Field or in any normal sense.
3	If I am right or anything like that point, perhaps
4	with the modification, if it is a modification,
5	introduced by my Lord Mr Justice Butcher's guestion, the
6	FCA's bind, as I call it, on these clauses is
7	inescapable, and it means that the claims against Hiscox
8	should fail .
9	That is that point. Can I now move on to two
9 10	
	smaller points on the clauses taken together.
11	The first is this, it is a short point: these
12	clauses and this BI cover is invariably an adjunct to
13	property cover, as we explain in our skeleton. In fact,
14	as my learned friend Mr Kealey explained on Day4, it is
15	an adjunct to an adjunct, the non-damage extension to
16	the BI extension to the property cover. Now the fact
17	that the cover is an adjunct to property cover, I don't
18	say it is decisive but it supports the conclusion that
19	the two relevant clauses are objectively intended to
20	address risks local and specific to the insured, its
21	business or its premises, rather than universal risks.
22	This point is reinforced by the subject matter of
23	the other restrictions within the public authority
24	clause, but I am making a simpler point, that with
25	property insurance the objective aim is, normally, to

1	cover misfortunes that happen specifically to the	1	at a late
2	insured. Of course it may be in company with others,	2	your Lor
3	but not misfortunes whose character is to affect the	3	to find a
4	whole nation indefinitely .	4	course it
5	The FCA skeleton deals with its point,	5	than a c
6	paragraph 355, by saying that the government	6	Buta
7	restrictions are in fact "specific to every insured ".	7	We expla
8	That is a misuse of language. Restrictions which apply	8	anticipat
9	indifferently to all cannot be described as specific .	9	depressin
10	My next short point is about the loss of attraction	10	FCA, in p
11	cover. Now, in relation to both clauses the FCA, if	11	not going
12	your Lordship wants a page reference it is on page 41 of	12	go to tha
13	tab 6 of the lead type 1 policy .	13	read it a
14	Now, in relation to both clauses the FCA argues that	14	back to
15	they cover diminution in custom. Its frequent assertion	15	of attrac
16	is that a business whose customers who cannot use it	16	interrupt
17	normally has suffered an inability to use or a denial or	17	why the
18	hindrance of access; for example, its skeleton	18	below the
19	paragraph 365 and 725. We will submit that those	19	down the
20	arguments are wrong on their own terms and we will deal	20	and cano
21	with them.	21	Lordships
22	It is, however, worth pointing out that in some of	22	But
23	the Hiscox wordings, I think 13 out of 40, and many of	23	a cautior
24	those which include the NDDA cover, eight out of 14,	24	The
25	there is separate provision for loss of attraction ,	25	Hiscox 1
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1	ie loss of customer footfall . So why are insureds who	1	your Lore
2	have the benefit of loss of attraction cover from Hiscox	2	because
3	not invoking it? The answer is because it depends on	3	be borne
4	physical damage, so it is not available . For that	4	opening,
5	reason, the insureds have to try and shoehorn an	5	limited of
6	overused word in this case, I apologise this head of	6	arise at
7	loss into another cover, and to argue that loss of	7	Just
8	customer footfall is to be re-presented as an inability	8	look at -
9	to use or a hindrance of access.	9	annex 2,
10	I want to make two supplementary points about that.	10	lead Hise
11	The first is, although it is out of order, I would like	11	and far f
12	to pick up my Lord Mr Justice Butcher's point on	12	so far as
13	{Day 2/159:1} when my learned friend Mr Edelman was	13	is betwe
14	making submissions about the meaning of " interruption ".	14	very hel
15	As I have just said, this clause, the loss of	15	denial of
16	attraction clause, is in fewer than one third of our	16	suppliers
17	wordings, but it is in 13 out of 40. And the point that	17	my Lord
18	was put, it was my Lord's point, not the FCA's, was that	18	customer
19	the meaning of " interruption " must take its colour from	19	available
19 20	the loss of attraction cover, which refers only to	20	public i
20 21	a shortfall .	20	The
$\frac{21}{22}$	My Lord, the first point about that is that that	21 22	temptatio
22	observation, if I may say so, proves too much. This	22	meaning
23 24	extension of cover has nothing to do with interruption	23 24	your Lore
24	extension of cover has nothing to do with interruption	24	your Lor

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 extension of cover has nothing to do with interruption

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 in any possible sense of the word, and I will come back

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er stage of my submissions to show rdships that there is no case we have been able anywhere which construes interruption , and of it depends on the policy, to mean anything other cessation. I will come back to that. a shortfall is not interruption in any sense. ain this clause and we deal with what we ted would be the point, although it is slightly ing that it came from my Lord and not from the paragraph 285 of our skeleton argument. I am ng to -- it may be, who knows. I am not going to hat now, my Lord. Can I ask your Lordships to and in due course to accept it. When I come interruption , I will say that the tail of loss action can't possibly wag the dog of ption, and there is an obvious explanation as to clause is there, and in fact it should have been ne line, which we will see on page 43 halfway e page. It belongs with employees' lottery win cellation abandonment. I am just giving your os a reference there to paragraph 285. can I make one other point, and this is onary note, not a criticism of anybody. FCA spent most of its time looking at the 1 wording, which is on pages 41 and 42. I sense 63

your Lordships have too. It is very tempting to do that because it is the fullest wording. However, it should be borne in mind, and your Lordships have annex 2 to our opening, that many of the Hiscox wordings have far more limited cover and many of these points simply don't arise at all.

t let me give your Lordship one example. If you -- as I say, this is all in our skeleton at an but if you go to $\{B/7/25\}$, here we have the scox 2 wording, and there is far narrower cover fewer special covers. All that is covered is, as relevant to our case: public authority, which een the two hole-punches -- sorry , that is not elpful if your Lordship is looking at the screen; of access, but only where damage; financial loss; rs but not customers, and I will come back to Lord Justice Flaux's point on specified ers later in my submission, but it is not a point e on this wording because it isn't there; and utilities temptation of elegance, surely the most tempting ion of all, is to give these words the same

temptation of all, is to give these words the same meaning across the board, but it is very important that your Lordships, unappetising as the task is, recognise that in many cases the Hiscox type 1 policy simply

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Day 5

1	doesn't apply, and it would be misleading your Lordships
2	for anyone to suggest that it does, not that I am
3	suggesting that anyone has.
4	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: This is the hairdressers' policy, is
5	it?
6	MR GAISMAN: It is salons, my Lord. Whether one gets
$\overline{7}$	anything in a salon other than one's haircut I shudder
8	to think.
9	My Lords, can I then come on to a slightly more
10	important topic in a sense, which is the essence of the
11	insured peril under the clauses . What are these two
12	clauses insuring against? What is the insured peril?
13	Usually that is not a difficult question to answer. But
14	in the case of business interruption insurance where
15	there are composite elements, it is often the case that
16	one has to analyse multiple elements to get to the core
17	of the peril . This characterisation is particularly
18	relevant to causation.
19	Before the opposite is said, or even written down,
20	by my learned friends , this does not mean that I am
21	denying or ignoring any of the elements, the composite
22	elements of the insured peril , nor am I cherry-picking
23	or ignoring what has to be reversed out in the
24	counterfactual . But it goes to this question, my Lords,

whether the parties can really have intended there to be

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1 an indemnity for all the consequences of disease, once $\mathbf{2}$ public authority action occurs, et cetera, as opposed to 3 the narrower effects of the disease in combination with 4 the other elements of the clause.

- 5My Lords, the core of the peril yields the answer to 6 the scope of the indemnity. The identification of the 7 core of the peril yields the answer to the scope of the 8 indemnity.
- 9 The fact that the separate elements in the clauses 10 have to be causally related makes it clear that this is 11 not a discrete insurance for each of them separately. 12 So one has to ask the question: what is the essence of 13 the insured peril? And I ask that question quite 14 unapologetically, having dealt with the only specious 15accusation as to why this shouldn't be being done. 16But I am fortified , my Lords, by the fact that the 17FCA actually agrees that one has to ask the question: 18 what is the core of the insured peril? If your 19 Lordships look at our skeleton argument at 20paragraph 352. If we have it on the screen, it is 21 $\{1/13/112\}$. Picking it up five or six lines from the
- 22bottom -- well, picking it up at line 5, what is 23fundamental, we say, is that the cover is not for
- 24 murder, disease, et cetera, provided only that there is
- 25something extra in the form of public authority action.

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Cf, the FCA's position is "The cover is for the effects 1 2 of murder or suicide, but only where there is public 3 authority intervention -- that is the 'something extra ' " 4 5Then we say this is to turn the clause on its head. $\mathbf{6}$ The cover is for public authority restrictions , provided $\overline{7}$ they have been imposed following murder, bad drains, 8 disease. It is not for murder, bad drains, disease --9 provided only that there is consequent public authority 10 action 11 In a back-handed compliment, the FCA says that is 12 really the heart of the matter. So that exchange, that 13statement and what the rival cases are demonstrates that 14 there is agreement about the methodology; you have to 15 look for what the core or the essence of the insured 16 peril is . It is just that we disagree about what the 17core or the essence in fact is. 18 The FCA's case is clear from those passages, and if 19we could just remind ourselves what its counsel said on 20 Day 1: insurers are insuring against the effects of 21 contagious diseases and that includes not just the

reaction of the authorities but also the reaction of the public. That was {Day1/98:1}. So if the public would have refused to eat in a restaurant awash with effluent . that is covered too as long as the authorities react.

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On page 99, the subject matter of the clause is notifiable diseases. The subject matter of the clause is notifiable diseases . Page 100, disease is the true nature of the insured peril Page 121, my learned friend had moved on to rats, but rats, he said, is what the cover is all about. Those propositions are all unjustified as a matter of construction . Hiscox's case is that under these 10clauses it is essentially insuring the consequences of restrictions or denial, hindrance of access, imposed by the competent authorities, it is not insuring all the losses caused by the underlying reason for the restrictions . That is clear from, in this case, unlike in RSA's case, the headings, which are an admissible aid to construction, there being no provision that says that one can't have regard to them. Neither of them refers to any underlying cause, but they refer either to the 20 restriction or to the authority imposing it . It is clear from other clauses in the wordings, which refer to restrictions as the peril . My learned friend says that is a signpost. It is not a signpost, it is a summary of what the core of the peril is. The other clauses that we have in mind are

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Day 5

1	identified in paragraphs 150 and 151 of our skeleton
2	argument, where we also make specific and careful
3	submissions about the structure of the public authority
4	clause, and how the concept of restrictions imposed sits
5	at the heart of the clause as a matter of meaning and
6	syntax.
7	My Lords, in the NDDA clause, the reason for
8	referring to the incident at all is because the
9	draftsman wishes to make clear that it is not all
10	denials of access by the authorities that will trigger
11	cover, but only those which are caused by an incident
12	within a 1 mile radius . The word "incident" is the hook
13	whereby a 1 mile radius, or the vicinity, is attached to
14	the clause.
15	Likewise, in a public authority clause, the presence
16	of subclauses (a) to (e) is because the draftsman wishes
17	to make clear that it is not all restrictions imposed by
18	the authorities which will trigger cover, but only those
19	imposed for the reasons identified in those clauses.
20	If those were not present, obviously there could be
21	no doubt that the insured peril would be the denial of

21 22 access or the public authority restrictions imposed. 23 But what is clear, and your Lordship has heard this 24 submission previously, but what is clear is that the 25local nature of the incident and the underlying causes

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1 (a) to (e) are there to limit and qualify the public $\mathbf{2}$ authority action which is within the cover. In other 3 words, they cut down the breadth of the insured peril by 4 making it clear that it only responds to a sub-set of 5possible causes of denial of access, hindrance of 6 access, restrictions imposed. It is therefore, in 7 principle , obvious that these limitations would be 8 unlikely to have the effect of expanding the insured 9 peril or expanding the indemnity. Nor does it change 10 their character.

11 But one of the striking features , as we have seen 12 from paragraph 352 of our skeleton, about the FCA's case 13 on causation (1/13/112) is the way in which cover for X, 14 but only on condition that Y happens, is transformed in 15the cover for Y but only on condition that X happens. 16Here we see why they are wrong. Since the local 17incident and the occurrence of disease are not insured 18 perils in their own right, but rather their function is 19 only to qualify and define the type of action which 20triggers the cover, and therefore are not also perils in 21 their own right but only subsidiary elements in 22a composite peril, it cannot in principle be correct to 23require the insurer to indemnify the insured as if they 24 were independent insureds perils . 25

One of the curious facts about this case is that if

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1 one conducts the experiment of two insurers, one 2 insuring pandemics in the broadest and most explicit 3 possible terms, and the other, an insurer like Hiscox, 4 writing cover on the basis of these two clauses, the 5astonishing thing about the FCA's case is that they are 6 both going to end up paying the same indemnity. That is $\overline{7}$ not logically impossible but it would give one pause for 8 thought. 9 Curiously, my Lords, there are times, and this is 10 really no more than a tease, when the FCA inadvertently 11 agrees with us about this. For example, in 12 paragraph 354 of its skeleton. $\{1/1/135\}$ it savs: 13"The burden of the clause [and it is talking about 14our clause, the public authority clause] is authority 15action affecting the premises, not a disease occurring 16 within a specified distance." 17Of course they are dealing with a point about 18 distance, which is the 1 mile radius point is absent 19from Hiscox 1 to 3, but I quite like "The burden of the 20clause is authority action affecting the premises". 21 Although it is a Freudian slip, perhaps it is 22 a recurrent one because, as I told your Lordship 23 a minute ago, the irresistible rise of the disease to 24 the status of the insured peril itself, as in

paragraph 421 of the skeleton of the FCA, it has been

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1 a remarkable rise from humble beginnings my Lords, $\mathbf{2}$ because, as I told your Lordships earlier, in 3 paragraph 60 of the particulars of claim the FCA was 4 referring to vermin, disease and so on, ie the reasons $\mathbf{5}$ in subclauses (a) to (e), as merely "part of the factual 6 background". We agree. 7 What a contrast there is between that case, as 8 formulated in the particulars of claim, and what is now 9 said about vermin in the FCA's skeleton, as I say, in 10paragraphs 421 and 422, where the vermin have been 11 promoted to the insured peril , and the requirement for 12 public authority action is explained as being there 13 first to ensure that only claims are made where the rats 14 are really big rats and, secondly, to enable the insured 15to prove that they are. My Lords, though that is 16a slightly mischievous paraphrase, I have not failed 17accurately to -- as your Lordships can see if your 18 Lordship read it for yourselves, that is the 19 justification for the public authority action put 20forward in paragraphs 421 and 422 of the FCA's skeleton. 21 What does this come down to? We say this is going 22to look difficult on the page because the transcript 23won't emphasise the words I want to be emphasised, but 24the insured peril under these clauses can be expressed 25in this way so as to reflect where the centre of gravity

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Day 5

1	of the clause is .
2	If we take the NDDA clause, it is an interruption
3	caused by imposition by the relevant authority of
4	a denial or hindrance in access, so long as it results
5	from an incident within a 1 mile radius or the vicinity .
6	Then can we capitalise these words in the transcript :
7	AND NOT AN INCIDENT WITHIN A 1 MILE RADIUS OR THE
8	VICINITY SO LONG AS IT CAUSES IMPOSITION OR THE DENIAL
9	OF OR HINDRANCE IN ACCESS .
10	Likewise, under the public authority clause, what it
11	insures against is an interruption caused by
12	restrictions imposed by a public authority causing the
13	insured's inability to use, so long as though
14	restrictions follow and are in some sense caused by one
15	of the five reasons set out in (a) to (e). Then in
16	capital the two words AND NOT each of the five reasons
17	in (a) to (e) so long as these are followed by, and in
18	some sense cause, restrictions imposed by a public
19	authority causing the insured's inability to use.
20	That question of construction is obviously at the
21	heart of the dispute between my learned friends and my
22	myself, between the FCA and my clients, and I leave that
23	there with your Lordships for now.
24	I want to move to a different topic, which is
25	restrictions imposed, or imposed. The words

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" restrictions imposed" are in the public authority 1 $\mathbf{2}$ clause. The word in the NDDA clause is just "imposed". 3 denial of access or a hindrance of access imposed by 4 various local authorities . I want to deal with both. 5These words, we submit, both individually and in 6 context, clearly denote that which is mandatory and only 7 that which is mandatory. The phrase or the word cannot 8 be applied to guidance, advice or instructions which may 9 be ignored by the recipient without infraction or legal 10 sanction. It naturally suggests, and indeed the FCA 11 agrees that it suggests, something compulsory. 12 The only things in this country which are compulsory 13 for the population at large are those which have the force of law. A number of sub-points flow from that 14

15basic submission. 16First, this is the natural and dictionary meaning of 17the word "imposed"; see our skeleton at paragraph 193. 18 Secondly, the fact that the imposer is stated to be 19 a public authority or similar body is a clue, because 20these are bodies that have legal powers to impose, well, 21 most obviously closure of a restaurant where there are 22rats in the kitchen, but in all other cases too. 23Thirdly, the references to denial of access and 24 inability to use are to the same effect. In a free

25 \qquad country, somebody can access insured premises and use

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them, and if that person is denied access or unable to use them, his own premises, because of restrictions imposed by a public authority , that can only be by operation of law. Fourthly, my Lord, the March regulations were made by the Secretary of State pursuant to the 1984 Public Health Act, section 45C(3)(c), which empowered him to make regulations "imposing or enabling the imposition of restrictions ...' We don't need have it on the screen but for the transcript it is $\{J/5.1/16\}$. This language was reflected in the preamble to the March regulations themselves. Let's get those up $\{J/16/1\}$, please. Where two-thirds of the way down the page, in the third paragraph of the preamble, it is recited that: "The Secretary of State considers that the restrictions and requirements imposed by these regulations are proportionate ..." Something that he has to certify under the statute. So this is all or should all be plain sailing . Fifthly, my Lords, we demonstrate in detail in

paragraph 199 of our skeleton, $\{1/13/63\}$ that all the matters falling within subparagraphs (a) to (e) of the public authority clause naturally fall within identifiable legal or statutory powers.

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1 $\mathsf{Sixthly}\,,\,\,\mathsf{if}\,\,\mathsf{the}\,\,\,\mathsf{distinction}\,\,\,\mathsf{is}\,\,\mathsf{not}\,\,\mathsf{between}\,\,\mathsf{what}\,\,\mathsf{is}\,\,$ $\mathbf{2}$ mandatory and what is voluntary, in the sense in which 3 I have used those expressions, how on earth is one to 4 apply it? How does anyone know where they are in $\mathbf{5}$ relation to this important contractual trigger? 6 There is a point on certainty here. Surely the 7 natural point at which restrictions are imposed is when 8 regulations are passed which have the effect of, as they 9 themselves say, imposing restrictions . 10Sixthly, and this is important my Lords, unusually 11for a point that comes sixthly, I have already said that 12 one has to construe the wordings at the time of entering 13 the contract and without knowledge of the unprecedented 14 events of the last few months, in which the government 15has told people to behave in all sorts of highly 16intrusive ways. Falling short of legal regulation. 17We have all been unable to resist examples which, 18 according to taste, involve five helpings of fruit and 19 veg a day or some implausibly small number of alcoholic 20 units per week, and in a sense they are on one side, but 21 the important point is this -- those are obviously not 22mandatory -- that the whole idea, viewed from the 23perspective of the contract date, of the government 24ordering us to do things in a non-legally binding way is 25completely unfamiliar. The whole concept of

- 1 restrictions imposed other than with legal authority or 2 authority of law is bizarre. Indeed, to people 3 interested and concerned about the rule of law in this 4 case it has been a troubling feature of this crisis . 5If one had asked the parties at the time of entering 6 into these contracts: do you contemplate restrictions $\overline{7}$ imposed by a public authority other than by operation of 8 law? The answer would have been: what are you talking
- 9 about? What sort of a country do you think we live in?
 10 Faced with this language, the FCA has to accept that
 11 the phrase denotes only things which are mandatory and
 12 compulsory. It is therefore common ground that the
 13 parties would have agreed that only compulsion or
 14 prohibition can qualify as restrictions imposed.
- 15We naturally accept that insofar as regulations were16promulgated by statutory instrument, requiring people to17do or not to do something, they qualify as restrictions18imposed, obviously. So the simple question that remains19is whether any pronouncement, fiat, advice, ukase, not20contained in regulations was mandatory.
- 21Now the FCA's case, as your Lordships know, is that22everything that the Prime Minister or other ministers,23and I expect government scientific advisers too, I am24not quite clear how far it goes, everything that the25government said by way of guidance, exhortation, urging

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- 1 and instruction was mandatory and compulsory and, 2 insofar as it asked or told people not to do things, was 3 a prohibition . That is taken from paragraph 13.1 of the 4 reply $\mathbf{5}$ My Lord, I understand that the FCA has undertaken to 6 put forward policyholder's arguments in this test case, 7 but there must be a limit , my Lord, and the way in which 8 the FCA puts this case in its skeleton is remarkable. 9 That which the government would expect UK citizens 10 to comply with is compulsory; that is paragraph 123. In 11 paragraph 375 we get the idea of compulsion on the 12"say-so" of the government. This extends to "advice"; 13 to what the government was "asking" people to do; what 14 they "should" do; and what, in a peculiar phrase, the 15government would "no longer be supporting". I don't 16blame my learned friends for that phrase, I have no 17doubt it came from the Prime Minister or one of his 18 ministers . 19 It is said in paragraph 376, but my learned friend 20
- 20by mistake, as I will show your Lordships, retreated21from it, but it is said that all of this is "not22voluntary "; paragraph 376. And in a curiously Victorian23phrase, reminiscent of Frances Hodgson Burnett, in24paragraph 377 we are told it is all a question of how25these statements would be received by the "populous".

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1	Perhaps most Orwellian of all was the FCA's
2	suggestion on $\{Day1/63:1\}$ that the guidance should be
3	regarded as mandatory may we just get that up,
4	please lines 8 to 9 on the screen . Yes. At line 6:
5	"Behind the government's announcement [this is my
6	learned friend Mr Edelman] telling people what they thus
7	do was an appeal to comply [that must be ' voluntarily ']
8	in order to avoid or minimise the government being
9	enforced to invoke the law."
10	My learned friend, with respect to him, misspoke
11	there. His case is that it wasn't voluntarily . But if
12	that is right, he has given the game away and what, in
13	this Orwellian phrase of my learned friends , your
14	Lordships are invited to suggest is that the request
15	that guidance be complied with voluntarily should be
16	regarded as compulsory, because it carried the threat
17	that the law could always make.
18	My Lords, all of this is fallacious and it is not
19	necessary to spend any time on it . The
20	Amlin/ Ecclesiastical skeleton treats the arguments
21	crisply at paragraph 33, and we echo in our own inferior
22	way these points in our skeleton at paragraph 210.
23	But I need to say a little more on this . First , it
24	is important to understand why the FCA commits itself to
25	this extremely unattractive argument. It is an

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1	important part of its overall goal of blurring every
2	different thing into one indivisible amorphous mass. If
3	the Hiscox wordings, on their true construction,
4	however, require a distinction between mandatory
5	restrictions and non-mandatory guidance, one would have
6	thought that the rational reaction was to ask which were
7	mandatory, in the sense I have suggested, and which were
8	not, and to recognise that the wordings only respond in
9	the event and to the extent of the former.
10	But that approach will not serve the FCA's purpose.
11	Of course its primary aim, as we have seen, is to render
12	insurers liable for all the consequences of A; but if it
13	can't do that, its next aim is to expand B as widely as
14	possible so as to make B encompass everything that
15	happened, and in due course they will do the same with C
16	and D.
17	it follows from our submission, if we are right,
18	that voluntary guidance, for example social distancing,
19	falls outside the clause and cannot be relied upon as or
20	in the context of denial of access or inability to use
21	or for the purposes of causation and counterfactual.
22	But it also means this, my Lord, and it is time to
23	correct something that your Lordships were told on
24	Day 1, it also means that the effects of people
25	voluntarily staying away from businesses cannot be

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Day 5

1	within the clauses. Let us take the lockdown
2	regulation, lockdown 6.
3	We will submit in due course that the lockdown does
4	not engage either of the clauses that we are concerned
5	with, but suppose that we are wrong about that, just for
6	a moment. Even so, the lockdown was subject to the
7	regime in regulation 6(2). $\{J/16/4\}$, please. There is
8	regulation 6.
9	By way of example, any category 3 businesses , namely
10	those identified within part 3 of schedule 2 of the
11	26 March regulations, were expressly permitted to stay
12	open; see regulation $6(2)(a)$. The FCA agrees; see
13	paragraph 64.3 of its skeleton . It follows that there
14	must, ipso facto, have been a reasonable excuse to visit
15	them, or at least that there could have been
16	a reasonable excuse to visit them. There is a symmetry
17	in the regulations between the businesses that are
18	allowed to stay open, and the justifications in the form
19	of reasonable excuses for people leaving home.
20	For example, to identify businesses within Part 3 of
21	Schedule 2 referred to there, psychiatrists, dry
22	cleaners, agricultural supply shops, osteopaths. I am
23	not seeking to apply the ejusdem genesis rule to those
24	categories , but they are four categories within Part 3
25	of Schedule 2 that were expressly allowed to stay open.

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1 If we could have page 11 {J/16/11}. It is $\mathbf{2}$ paragraphs 24 to 42, but your Lordship gets the flavour 3 of it from that page: all the businesses in Part 3. 4 So if people chose not to visit those sorts of 5professionals , albeit that they had or may have had 6 reasonable excuse to do so, that cannot have been as 7 a result of restrictions imposed by public authorities , 8 because there were none. 9 It is difficult to see how any person carrying on 10 a business identified there, the osteopaths and the 11 agricultural shops and so on, could bring a claim under 12 either clause. But I can tell your Lordship that people 13 within Part 3 of Schedule 2 have brought such claims. 14 Now I need to correct something that my learned

friend Ms Mulcahy said on {Day1/37:37}. It is an
understandable mistake, if I may say so. She told your
Lordships on Day 1 at page 37 that 26 March regulations
imposed restrictions on Category 3 businesses. Does
your Lordship see that at lines 5 to 6.

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1 if possible, thank you -- the Explanatory Note says 2 after the first sentence in the third line : 3 "... restrictions are imposed on businesses listed 4 in Part 3 of Schedule 2 which are permitted to remain 5open." $\mathbf{6}$ She is right that that is what the note says. The $\overline{7}$ trouble is the note is wrong. There are no restrictions on Category 3 businesses in these regulations, ie those 8 9 named in Part 3 of Schedule 2. You will search the 10 regulations in vain for any. It won't take you long 11 There are none. 12The likely explanation for the mistake in 13Explanatory Note is that the word "not" has been left 14 out in haste before the word "listed " in the fourth 15 line. And that explanation, if we insert that, brings 16 the Explanatory Note, if we can go back to page 3, into 17line with regulation 5.1 $\{J/16/3\}$, where we see the 18 restrictions on business in regulation 4: 19"A person responsible [I am reading 5.1] for 20carrying on a business not listed in Part 3 of Schedule 21 2 must ' 22 There we see the restrictions . Anyway, I am sure my 23 learned friends have plenty to do in reply, but if they 24 could prove us wrong by showing us the restrictions on 25businesses in Part 3 of Schedule 2 in these regulations

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I will apologise.

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 $\mathbf{2}$ Now that is all I want to say by way of submissions 3 on matters which are common to both clauses. I will 4 leave the question of interruption over to a later $\mathbf{5}$ stage. It is convenient to deal with that immediately 6 after " inability to use", because the two in a sense go 7 together. 8 So I am now going to go on to the NDDA cause. The 9 argument for an indemnity under the NDDA clause is so 10feeble that even the HAG Interveners, the Hiscox Action 11Group Interveners are not bothering to advance it. 12 There are four points. It seems a pity to spend 13 valuable time on this, but I must, partly because it helps to set the tone as it were for the debate under 14 15the public authority clause. There are four points 16identified in our skeleton at paragraph 84. First there 17was no incident . Secondly, there was no incident within 18 one mile of the insured premises, or occasionally the 19 vicinity of the insured premises. Thirdly, there was no 20 denial of or hindrance in access imposed. Fourthly, 21 even if there was a denial of or hindrance in access 22imposed it was not the incident within a 1 mile radius 23or the vicinity which resulted in the denial of or 24hindrance in access, the causation requirement within 25the clause.

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Day 5

1	Can I then spend a moment on and this is by way	1
2	of supplement to the general submission that ${\sf I}$ made at	2
3	an earlier point this morning can I come back to the	3
4	word "incident", "an incident". For the moment I am	4
5	going to no, that is what I am going to do.	5
6	We have seen what is meant in law and in ordinary	6
7	parlance by an incident . It is important not to	7
8	construe the word in isolation . So what helps does the	8
9	clause give us as to the meaning of "incident ". The	9
10	incident has to be one which, as the clause	10
11	contemplates, is the sort of incident that can be said	11
12	and verified to occur within a 1 mile radius or the	12
13	vicinity .	13
14	Secondly, it has to be the sort of incident that the	14
15	parties at the time of contracting would have	15
16	contemplated was liable to cause the public authorities ,	16
17	or the other authorities named, to deny or hinder	17
18	access. It is that sort of incident with those	18
19	characteristics that is meant.	19
20	We can all easily imagine the sort of incident which	20
21	the clause contemplates as paradigm: a burst water main,	21
22	a gas leak, a traffic accident, a crime.	22
23	Clearly a global pandemic which led to unprecedented	23
24	measures could hardly be further away from this sort of	24
25	incident that the parties must have had in mind. Indeed	25
	85	
1	if you were trying for the purposes of an academic	1
2	exercise to think of something least like an incident	2
3	a pandemic would come pretty close.	3
4	It is worth reminding oneself, so eloquent is	4
5	Mr Edelman, that one has to remind oneself that this	5
6	clause makes no mention of disease at all . It is the	6
7	most formidably Procrustean undertaking on the part of	7
8	the FCA to try to force COVID into this clause in the	8
9	first place.	9
10	However, the FCA will have none of this . It says in	10
11	paragraph 714, it actually says about this clause:	11
12	"A pandemic is contemplated".	12
13	That is its primary case. We will to agree to	13
14	differ on that.	14
15	Of course the FCA needs the incident to be the	15
16	pandemic because, looking ahead to a later element in	16
17	the clause, nothing less than a pandemic caused the	17

17the clause, nothing less than a pandemic caused the 18 government reaction which is the alleged denial or 19 hindrance in access. But as I have already submitted, 20an incident like an occurrence is not a national or 21 international state of affairs which has persisted and 22appears likely to persist indefinitely . The pandemic, 23as we say in our skeleton, is too geographically 24 dispersed, too prolonged, too variegated, too 25non-specific to qualify as an incident within the

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ordinary meaning of the word. I have already explained that the cause of the government measures, and indeed the pandemic itself, is a whole set of things extending into the future; a great mass of unpredictable causal influences on the government's decision to take these astonishing measures But even if one were to accept that the pandemic is no more than the set of individual cases of the disease in existence at the time of the measures. The set of the incidents is not itself an incident. Outside the obscurer regions of Russell's paradox a set is not a member of itself. Hence the examples of the blitz and of recent protests that we give in our skeleton at paragraphs 91 to 92. The FCA's alternative case is that there is an incident within the clause when someone with the disease is shown to be within the radius. Now this alternative definition of "incident ", even if it were made out, is of course not going to help the FCA because even if one puts entirely on one side major

FCA because even if one puts entirely on one side major questions about proof of prevalence it is going to be quite impossible for the FCA to prove that anything which happened within the radius caused the government measures.

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But for the moment the question is this : is the presence, and I emphasise the word "presence", of someone within the circle the sort of incident contemplated by the clause.

Note this is how it is put by the FCA. They have got an eye to difficulties of proof, and so they don't seek to say, as one might have thought they might, that the infection within the radius is the incident. It is the presence of a person that is said to be the incident.

But this is even more hopeless. Even if one regards the government as somehow reacting to an individual case of disease within the radius, it is the fact that the person has acquired the disease that matters, not the precise movements of that person either side of an imaginary circular line that matter. They are not of the slightest interest to anybody.

So as an incident, meaning the sort of incident which this clause contemplates causing a denial of access, the person with COVID crossing this notional line is a nonstarter. He might come and go without ever knowing he had the disease; he would behave in just the same way he was asymptomatic as if he was not infected; people would look at him and not know he was infected. Such an undetectable happening cannot be the sort of

Day 5

1	thing which the clause contemplates as an incident	1	it . The radius requirement is obviously in the clause
2	liable to result in a denial of access.	2	to confine cover to local events, very local in the case
3	Moreover, as we say in your skeleton, paragraph 267,	3	of 1 mile. A pandemic is the antithesis of a local
4	in the context of the public authority clause, let us	4	event.
5	assume that the whole of the FCA's case on prevalence is	5	The FCA says that the pandemic was everywhere in the
6	made good. That means that the existence of an incident	6	UK. Well of course, as we know, that is not even true
7	within 1 mile of an insured's premises can be proved by	7	of cases of the disease itself . It may be true in
8	an analysis of data: the application of averages and the	8	a general sense of the emergency or of the government
9	use of an undercounting regime. Assuming that all this	9	measures taken in response. But I want to ask a rather
10	is allowable, it will in many cases prove for the first	10	more fundamental question. What does it mean to say
11	time the existence of the disease within a particular	11	that the pandemic was everywhere in the UK? The
12	area.	12	pandemic of COVID is different from the individual
13	So the presence of someone with the disease will	13	cases, but to say that COVID is everywhere in the UK is
14	have been proved not in March, not today, but at some	14	actually a figure of speech.
15	point in the future.	15	The statement operates on a quite different plane of
16	Now of course, as we are reminded by the FCA, trees	16	meaning from the requirements stipulated by the clause.
17	fall in woods even when they are not seen to do so.	17	Let me give an obvious example. Assume that the room
18	I hope we are not guilty of saying anything different .	18	from which I am speaking contains neither a sufferer
19	That is not the point. The question is whether the	19	from COVID nor the virus itself . To say that the
20	parties were contemplating as an incident resulting in a	20	pandemic is everywhere in the UK does not mean that the
21	public authority action, the sort of thing which nobody	21	pandemic is in this room. Far from being a necessary
22	might know about for many months, if ever. And we	22	corollary to the statement that the pandemic is
23	submit that the answer is no.	23	everywhere in the UK, to say that the pandemic is in
24	My Lord, it has been a longish morning. I am happy	24	this room is actually a nonsense statement. It is like
25	to pause there, or I have got another heavy it might	25	saying that World War II was in a library in Newcastle
	89		91
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1	take me a little more than five minutes.	1	on the second Tuesday in January in 1943. It is
2	take me a little more than five minutes. LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If	$\frac{1}{2}$	on the second Tuesday in January in 1943. It is meaningless.
2	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If	2	meaningless.
$\frac{2}{3}$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right.	$2 \\ 3$	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic
2 3 4	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm)	$2 \\ 3 \\ 4$	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment)	$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5$	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but
2 3 4 5 6	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm)	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular. And even if the FCA was right to
2 3 4 5 6 7	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman.	2 3 4 5 6 7	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident occurring within the radius". This issue only arises on the FCA's primary case as to the meaning of "incident ". Clearly, if someone with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within the radius.
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident occurring within the radius". This issue only arises on the FCA's primary case as to the meaning of "incident ". Clearly, if someone with the disease is what an incident means, someone with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within the radius. The requirement that an incident must occur within
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident occurring within the radius ". This issue only arises on the FCA's primary case as to the meaning of "incident ". Clearly, if someone with the disease is what an incident means, someone with the disease within the radius is within the radius. How one	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within the radius. The requirement that an incident must occur within a 1 mile radius is a stipulation of a specific
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14$	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident occurring within the radius". This issue only arises on the FCA's primary case as to the meaning of "incident ". Clearly, if someone with the disease is what an incident means, someone with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within the radius. The requirement that an incident must occur within a 1 mile radius is a stipulation of a specific geographical condition which must be satisfied . To say
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Why don't we break now for lunch. If we say just before 2 o'clock. All right. (12.56 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.58 pm) LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you're ready, Mr Gaisman. MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the next heading is "Incident occurring within the radius". This issue only arises on the FCA's primary case as to the meaning of "incident ". Clearly, if someone with the disease is what an incident means, someone with the disease within the radius is within the radius. How one might prove that is a different question, which I'm not addressing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	meaningless. It is equally meaningless to say that the pandemic is within 10 yards of this room, or 100 yards of this room, or 1 mile of this room. It is everywhere, but nowhere in particular . And even if the FCA was right to say that "within" means both inside and outside the radius, the pandemic is not and no part of it is within the radius. The requirement that an incident must occur within a 1 mile radius is a stipulation of a specific geographical condition which must be satisfied . To say that the pandemic is everywhere is poetic, but does not satisfy that unpoetic condition. But in fact insurers are also right, although they
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 $1 \mbox{ case the radius requirement serves no useful purpose at } 2 \mbox{ all }.$

3 The sort of ordinary incident contemplated by this 4 clause would ordinarily have no difficulty in satisfying 5 this criterion . Of course there might be borderline 6 cases, but this is not a borderline case. Clearly the 7 pandemic is in no sense local .

8 The next requirement under the NDDA clause, the 9 third condition, is access, which has to be denied or 10 hindered. The clause requires a denial of or hindrance 11 in access. This access is a specific concept; it means 12 a way or means of approach or entrance. That is its 13 common ground meaning, as we see from the FCA's skeleton 14 at paragraph 153.

15 It means that a notional person nearing a building 16 or at its front door is stopped or hindered from 17proceeding any further. In the normal case of a gas 18 leak, a crime scene or a traffic incident, the denial or 19hindrance of access will be obvious and uncontroversial. 20and there is no need to give these words a strained 21 meaning but that is exactly what the FCA does. It is an 22 abuse of language to say that someone who sets out from 23 his home, 100 miles away, intending to visit a business 24 and who finds that the local bus which he needs to take 25to the station to catch the train to the business is not

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3 Not only is it not an available use of language but 4 also our submission is consistent with an American case 5cited in footnote 115 of Zurich's skeleton, a case 6 called Bienville v ACA, which decided that the Federal 7 Aviation Authority's closure of all the airports in 8 America after 9/11 did not constitute a denial of access 9 to a particular New Orleans hotel. Hardly a surprising 10 result .

11 It is a misuse of language to say that a man 12confined to his house in Manchester has been denied 13 access to every business that he wants to visit . He is 14 not denied access to a business in London. He is, to 15the extent that he is, denied egress from the home in 16Manchester. Accessing a building is different from 17using it. Use is dealt with in the public authority 18 clause. They are different concepts. As is proved by 19 the fact that you need access to a building in order to 20use it , but that simply shows they are different things . 21 Moreover, you may be permitted to access a building but 22not permitted to use it, like the restaurateur who lives 23over the shop, so to speak. They are different things. 24 Now, use of premises may have been rendered legally 25impossible, depending on the type of business and

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1 whether it was required to close . Inability to use, as 2 I say, is covered by the public authority clause. But 3 giving the word its ordinary meaning, "access" was never 4 denied or hindered. Moreover, the Hiscox NDDA clause, as you see from 56 page 41 of the bundle, does not contain any pronoun $\overline{7}$ before "denial". This is to be contrasted with the 8 reference to denial of access in the general denial of 9 access clause and in the bomb threat clause in the 10 Hiscox 1 wording, both of which refer to "your access" 11 There are two possible explanations. Either the 12word "your" is to be understood as there being no reason 13to suppose that there was intended to be any difference 14between the three cases, or what is referred to is 15a general denial of access to all members of the public. 16 The denial or hindrance in access referred to has to 17apply indifferently to all members of the public, that 18 is clearly what is intended. The incident has to result 19in no one being able to access the premises or everyone being hindered in doing so. In the paradigm case of the 2021 operation of this clause, the bomb scare or the gas 22 leak, none of this would give rise to any difficulty . 23 From which it follows that it is not enough to trigger 24 the clause that a certain class of people cannot get 25access, the denial of access has to be to the public as

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a whole.

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2	There is one potential situation in which the
3	clause, the hindering of access might apply, because one
4	of the things which is relied upon in the FCA's case is
5	social distancing, and the point is made that if you
6	have to queue outside a shop because you are only
7	allowed in two by two, and then two metres apart, you
8	are being hindered in your access to the building.
9	Well, your Lordships don't need to decide whether
10	that is right or wrong if, as I submit we plainly are,
11	we are right, in our important point that I developed
12	earlier this morning, that the clause requires that the
13	denial of or hindrance in access has been imposed by the
14	relevant authority, and social distancing was not
15	imposed in that sense.
16	So we submit that our primary case is that there was
17	no denial of or hindrance in access, properly
18	understood, that term being properly understood, in
19	relation to any business . Alternatively , and if we are
20	wrong about that, any business except those required to
21	close by regulations 4 and 5 of 26 March regulations and
22	their predecessors .
23	Again, Zurich cites US authority on point. The case
24	of Syufy Enterprises v Home Insurance referred to in
25	paragraph 119 of its skeleton , $\{I/19/52\}$ was a case of

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alternative case.

Day 5

1	a dusk till dawn curfew in a city , held not to amount to	1	First , where there is a national pandemic and
2	a "specific prohibition " of access to a theatre in the	2	government intervention, what rational reason could
3	City. The result would have been no different if the	3	there be for providing cover to business A, because it
4	word " specific " had been absent.	4	so happened to be just within a mile of a care home
5	So none of curfew, house arrest, imprisonment,	5	where COVID had taken place, and not to business B,
6	regulation 6, amounts to a denial or hindrance of the	6	which was just over a mile away, when both of them have
7	right to approach and enter a place.	7	suffered business interruption loss through precisely
8	The FCA's case, by contrast, has to be that	8	the same pandemic? The assumption I am making is that
9	regulation 6 was the imposition of a denial of or	9	the pandemic is somehow covered.
10	hindrance in access to all insured premises everywhere.	10	Secondly, a connected point, if the insured has
11	Nor is there anything surprising about the	11	difficulty in proving either that illness was sustained
12	conclusion for which Hiscox argues under this clause, it	12	within the radius or that such illness caused the
13	is an extension of a property damage business	13	interruption , that is because the cover was objectively
14	interruption cover, it is workable, sensible,	14	intended to respond to a situation which was local and
15	comprehensible, has plenty of scope for application in	15	provable. In the present situation , we have not only
16	the real world. It would readily respond to action by	16	a national / international situation , but if one starts
17	the authorities, resulting from local danger or	17	trying to apply the clause to that type of situation , it
18	disturbance and in the prevention of physical or legal	18	is hardly surprising that fraught epidemiological
19	access. These are the types of situation that the	19	questions are going to arise .
20	clause was designed to meet.	20	That is all I want to say about the NDDA clause and
21	The fourth and final point is, of course, causation	21	I turn to the public authority clause.
22	within the NDDA clause. This is perhaps the most	22	Much of what I have already said is relevant to this
23	difficult for the FCA of all a hotly contested	23	clause . In particular , I have already pointed out that
24	title it is the fact that the incident within the	24	the clause requires nothing more and nothing less than
25	1 mile radius did not result in the imposition of or	25	an occurrence of a notifiable disease as the reason why
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1	denial of hindrances in access, as the clause says it	1	the public authority restrictions are imposed. I have
2	must.	2	explained why it does not make sense to treat the
3	I have already identified what I call the bind which	3	circumstances which led to the government's measures
4	the FCA is in . Just to repeat it , the pandemic	4	of March 2020 as an occurrence. I will come back to
5	emergency, as I have explained it, caused the government	5	that. It is actually a point which needs to be added in
6	measures, but was not an incident within the 1 mile.	6	as an additional point in the summary in our skeleton at
7	Whatever was within the 1 mile, nonsensically a little	7	154.
8	bit of the pandemic or, so the FCA says, an individual	8	Can I first say something very briefly , because
9	case, albeit in many cases only to be proved by	9	I have really covered this ground, about the structure
10	scientific evidence hereafter, did not in any sense	10	of the public authority clause.
11	cause the government measures.	10	Your Lordships have $\{B/6/42\}$. It is now familiar
12	This bind is no surprise, because it is a function	12	territory even to your Lordships, who have dozens of
12	of the attempt to make this clause and also the public	12	different wordings to grapple with. We look at this and
14	authority clause, as we will see, apply to a situation	14	we wonder how anybody can call that public authority
			clause a disease clause. It almost beggars belief.
15 16	for which it was never intended.	$15 \\ 16$	
	There is no need to spend long on this point separately . We have dealt it with in our skeleton ,	10	However, that is exactly what the FCA does call it. We
17			collect the references in existence at the time in
18 10	where, for example in paragraph 129, we draw attention	18 10	footnote 151 of our skeleton. But on Day1, loyal to the
19 20	to paragraph 53 of the particulars of claim, and its	19 20	position which the FCA takes, both my learned friends
20 21	tortured parentheses all apparently within the	20 21	Mr Edelman and Ms Mulcahy referred to it in these terms.
21	understanding of the reasonable citizen whose spectacles	21	Just as one example, my learned friend Ms Mulcahy
22	we are supposed to put on while construing this	22	referred to the "Hiscox disease clauses"; that is
23	contract.	23	page 55, line 14. {Day1/55:14} This is a complete

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I just add two points in relation to the $\ensuremath{\mathsf{FCA's}}$

a rather important question. And of course the reason 100

misnomer and an unvarnished attempt to beg the question,

Day 5

1	why the FCA does this is because it has an eye on	1	First, it is not a question of the implication of
2	causation and it wants to soften up the ground in	2	terms at all. We have disposed of this canard in
3	preparation for submissions such as are contained in	3	paragraphs 219 to 222 of our skeleton . Both sides
4	paragraph 421 of its skeleton, the cover is for the	4	invite the court to construe certain terms in the
5	effects of disease as long as there is something extra.	5	wordings by supplying additional words which are not
6	Now we have already covered this ground. As I said	6	there. So, for example, the FCA says that " inability to
7	this morning, we conduct a careful analysis of the	7	use" means inability to use in whole or part. I am not
8	structure and syntax of this clause in our skeleton at	8	accusing, of course I am not, the FCA of trying to imply
9	paragraphs 149 to 153. $\{I/13/48\}$ I have already made	9	a term. That would be a very wooden accusation. I say
10	submissions about how the restrictions are the core of	10	that they are wrong, but what they are doing is
11	the insured peril, and I am relying on, as I said, the	11	a perfectly legitimate thing in principle , which is to
12	title of the clause, the language and structure of the	12	invite the court to understand the meaning of words in
13	clause, the substance of the clause, and other	13	a contract. That is not implication of terms, whichever
14	non-coverage provisions , in particular the indemnity	14	side is doing it .
15	period, the under-insurance clause, in some cases the	15	Secondly, to reduce the argument to an attempt to
16	trends clauses, which refer to the peril as the	16	draw a radius around the circle is to oversimplify it .
17	" restriction ".	17	The question is not simply whether a case in Alnwick is
18	So taking my earlier submissions as it were	18	an occurrence for the purposes of a business
19	incorporated by reference , I now come back to the	19	interruption cover in Ilfracombe, it is much more than
20	meaning of the word "occurrence". To be quite clear ,	20	that, and much of my argument does not even require me
21	the phrase is "an occurrence of any" I paraphrase	21	to be right on that point, although it will follow, or
22	" infectious or contagious disease ".	22	it may follow, that I am.
23	Now, we have a positive case on this and a negative	23	I have already addressed the reasons why the
24	case on this, and one is simply the obverse of the	24	emergency which caused the government restrictions were
25	other. The negative case is to say that this phrase	25	something of a quite different order of magnitude from
	101		103
1	does not mean, nor encompass, the emergency, the	1	an occurrence as contemplated by the clause. It is an
2	pandemic as it was in March, in the sense that	2	argument that takes its point of departure from
3	I described it this morning, the conglomeration of	3	paragraph 43 of the particulars of claim, which I read
4	existing cases, apprehensions of future development,	4	to your Lordships this morning. But there are several
5	scientific modelling, the imperative need to protect the	5	further points which support my submission, and some of
6	NHS, and the vast range of considerations which were the	6	these are reactive to things that were said during the
7	true cause of the government measures, as the occurrence	7	course of argument.
8	has in some senses caused the measures here.	8	As I have already submitted, my Lord
9	The positive case, which is simply the obverse of	9	Lord Justice Flaux was, with respect, right to stress at
10	the negative, as I say, is that the phrase "an	10	the outset of the FCA's submission this clause
11	occurrence of any infectious or contagious disease"	11	stipulates for an occurrence, not lots of occurrences,
12	therefore means something limited, small scale, local	12	but an occurrence; $\{Day2/130:1\}$. The way in which my
13	and in some sense specific to the insured . It may be	13	learned friend Mr Edelman came back on that was to say:

14ah but look, it is an outbreak. An occurrence of any 15human disease, an outbreak of which must be notified to 16the local authority.

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17	There is nothing in the word "outbreak" which
18	implies some alteration of the order of magnitude of the
19	occurrence. An outbreak can after all mean one or two
20	occurrences. All that the word "outbreak" is doing is
21	indicating that it must be a disease which, if an
22	outbreak occurs, is notifiable .
23	To say, as the FCA did, that "outbreak" is apt to
24	cover a multitude of cases is, in context, either wrong

cover a multitude of cases is, in context, either wrong or beside the point. Indeed, for good measure, I am

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of its skeleton. That is wrong in two respects. 102

difficult to define those criteria with absolute precision , but that is often true of contractual terms

and the court is not writing an essay, as was observed

performing the everyday exercise of construing a clause

Now, the FCA caricatures this argument as merely an

limitation to the occurrence; for example, paragraph 345

at the first case management conference, but simply

and answering the question of whether a given set of

facts falls within the clause and in either case,

whether it does or it doesn't, providing reasons.

attempt on Hiscox's part to imply a geographical

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Day 5

1	sorry about this wrinkle, in all the Hiscox 2 wordings	1	London, or you can have a small local event like the
2	the word "outbreak" is not even present in the public	2	house next door going up in flames, but both of those
3	authority clause, but only in the definition of	3	events are local. And if there is a huge storm across
4	a Notifiable Disease. The same is also true of the	4	the UK, then insureds in both Alnwick and Ilfracombe
5	Hiscox 4 wordings. Would your Lordship like me to make	5	might face property damage causing a business
6	that point good? It is $\{B/7/25\}$, clause 5(b).	6	interruption . But if there is an outbreak of measles in
7	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: "Notifiable Disease" is defined in	7	Alnwick, the overwhelming likelihood, viewed
8	terms of an outbreak which must be notified .	8	prospectively , is that that is not going to cause a
9	MR GAISMAN: It is, my Lord, yes, that is true. But if one	9	restriction making an insured in Ilfracombe unable to
10	is looking at the clause itself , it reinforces my point	10	use its premises.
11	that the word "outbreak" is merely there to define that	11	Moving on, my Lords, I am going to have something to
12	which it is which must be reported, namely an outbreak.	12	say about noscitur a sociis , and it is not confined to
13	That is all I am saying. I would not try to say any	13	lists . Before I get there, before I get to that common
14	more than that.	14	sense anti- literalist maxim, consider the fact , if we
15	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Hiscox 2 just says "Notifiable	15	can go back to the public authority clause in Hiscox 1
16	Disease", defined as being a disease, an outbreak of	16	on page 42, that the public authority that is being
17	which has to be notified to a local authority . Hiscox $f 1$	17	referred to in that clause is the same public
18	simply spells it out. But your point is that either way	18	authority I am not saying that the word can't embrace
19	what it is talking about is a notifiable disease. It is	19	national government, but let's look at the clause as
20	not saying that there is only an occurrence in	20	a whole. The public authority that is contemplated by
21	circumstances where there has been an outbreak in the	21	that clause is the same public authority as is going to
22	locality so that it has been notified , because if that	22	impose restrictions in the event of vermin, in the event
23	is all it meant it would say so, and it doesn't.	23	of food poisoning, in the event of a local crime or
24	MR GAISMAN: Yes, the point is in a sense the converse.	24	suicide . In other words, a local authority of some sort
25	I am not making much of the fact, or indeed I don't	25	reacting to a small scale local event.
	105		107
1	think I am making any anything of the fact that in	1	These are pointers. None of these is a point which
2	Hiscox 1 it says "local authority", and that is simply	2	is, as it were, a knock-out blow, but what we are doing

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2 Hiscox 1 it says "local authority", and that is simply 3 describing the criterion of notifiability . 4 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Yes, I understood that. It seemed to 5me that when one first read that clause you might think 6 that that was a pointer towards locality , but as 7 I understand it you don't make that point at all , you 8 just say that that is a way of defining the disease, 9 which could also be described as a notifiable disease. 10MR GAISMAN: My Lord, there would be no point, of course, 11 which I would not adopt if I thought it helped, but I am 12struggling to adopt that one. 13 LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Right. 14 MR GAISMAN: Where we go from there is this that the FCA 15says, on {Dav2/132:1} they say: well, Hiscox say that 16they can't have been intended to cover misfortune whose 17character is that they may affect the whole nation. And 18 my learned friend then gave examples of widespread 19 storms and floods which he said could affect "the whole 20nation"; that is $\{Day2/133:4\}$. 21 My Lord, those are far-fetched examples indeed. A 22nationwide flood or storm has, as far as I'm aware, 23never happened in the UK and cannot be presumed to have 24 been within the parties' contemplation. To be sure one 25can have a large local event, like the great fire of 106

is, as it were, a knock-out blow, but what we are doing 3 is accumulating, textually and by reference to the language of the clauses and the wordings, clues as to what the parties must have meant. By the same token, my Lords, there is in certain ${\sf Hiscox}\ 1$ and ${\sf Hiscox}\ 4$ wordings cancellation cover, and 8 your Lordships see that on page 43. $\{B/6/43\}$. It is towards the foot of the page. 10What we see here again is a distinction between the 11sort of local event that we say is contemplated by the 12 public authority clause and the exclusion from the 13 cancellation all risks cover, because that is what it is, right at the foot of the page (iii): 14 15"Any action taken by any national or international 16body or agency directly or indirectly to control, 17prevent or suppress any infectious disease." 18 Now, the FCA makes the facile argument that the

absence of that exclusion outside the cancellation cover 20 proves or tends to prove that Hiscox did not intend to 21exclude the effect of pandemics except in the cancellation cover. 23There are many things wrong with that argument and

we summarise them in paragraphs 33 to 44 and 248 of our skeleton. However, the main point, ignored by the FCA

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Day 5

1	in its oral as well as its written submissions, is that
2	this cancellation cover, unusually, because it is an add
3	on, is all risks cover.
4	The true position is that the contrast between this
5	sort of language in the cancellation cover and the more
6	prosaic confined wording in the public authority clause
7	suggests that coverage of something altogether more
8	local was objectively intended by the latter .
9	Then, my Lords, there is the cyber attack cover in
10	all but one of the Hiscox 1 wordings and two of the
11	Hiscox 4 wordings, including the lead. We can see that
12	on page 44 {B/6/44}.
13	I'm sorry, we are going to go to paragraph 44 in
14	a minute. The definition of "Cyber Attack" sorry the
15	cyber attack cover is on page $\{B/6/42\}$ and the
16	definition is on page $\{B/6/40\}$.
17	Now, a cyber attack sounds pretty far-reaching and
18	serious , and indeed they can be for obvious reasons .
19	But if we note the definition of "Cyber Attack" on
20	page 40 $\{B/6/40\}$ it is extremely confined to the
21	activities of either a third party, that is in (a), or
22	(b) a hacker who specifically targets you alone.
23	The cyber cover itself, as I said, is on page 42,
24	and on page 44 $\{B/6/44\}$ we find at the top of the page
25	under the heading "What is not covered", we find this :
	109
	109
1	109 "We will not make any payment:
1 2	
	"We will not make any payment:
2	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities
2 3	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly , or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in
2 3 4	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with
2 3 4 5	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates
2 3 4 5 6	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or
2 3 4 5 6 7	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker."
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11$	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly , or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related , than the words in the computer virus exclusion . It is an obvious statement that given the level of
$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ \end{array} $	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly , or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related , than the words in the computer virus exclusion . It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion. It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology, computer viruses, just like a pandemic, have the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 $ $	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion. It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology, computer viruses, just like a pandemic, have the capacity to reek global havoc, indiscriminately making
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 $ $	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion. It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology, computer viruses, just like a pandemic, have the capacity to reek global havoc, indiscriminately making businesses unable to function and causing devastating
$ \begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \\ 23 $	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion. It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology, computer viruses, just like a pandemic, have the capacity to reek global havoc, indiscriminately making businesses unable to function and causing devastating impacts upon normal, economic and social life , and this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 $ $	"We will not make any payment: 1. For any interruption to your activities directly, or indirectly caused by, resulting from or in connection with "(b) any virus which indiscriminately replicates itself and is automatically disseminated on a global or national scale or to an identifiable class or sector of use unless created by a hacker." And a hacker is somebody who is defined as somebody who targets the insured. Now, it is not a merely verbal point to say that the nearest thing to a coronavirus contemplated by this policy is a computer virus. And we say in our skeleton, at paragraph 246 that there can no clearer objective indication of Hiscox's reluctance to accept liability in respect of pervasive events, especially non-damage related, than the words in the computer virus exclusion. It is an obvious statement that given the level of society's dependence upon information technology, computer viruses, just like a pandemic, have the capacity to reek global havoc, indiscriminately making businesses unable to function and causing devastating

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If one had time, one could look at many of the other 2 special covers in those cases like Hiscox 1., where they 3 apply. The picture that emerges, and we deal with this 4 in our skeleton at paragraphs 234 to 244, it is quite 5clear that the potentially wide cover for business $\mathbf{6}$ losses has been carefully circumscribed by the draftsman $\overline{7}$ of these wordings with a whole variety of limiting 8 factors; the need for material physical damage, insured 9 damage, in many cases being just one example. 10 Now let's get to the precise point. The FCA's case 11 is apparently this, that in the case of an occurrence of 12disease alone the Hiscox underwriters are to be treated 13as having thrown caution to the winds and assumed an 14unfettered liability for the consequences of any 15notifiable disease anywhere, with no proximity, 16 locality, connection with the insured or its business, 17other than the fact of an inability to use, and all as 18an adjunct to an adjunct to properly cover. Indeed, 19this is what the FCA says, in paragraph 350, was what 20was clearly intended. 21 We submit that not only is this highly improbable 22 from an objective standpoint, but on the contrary it is 23objectively obvious that Hiscox intended no such thing.

> in my voice. I put it that way, my Lord, because the 111

I hope your Lordships won't have noted desperation

1 FCA describes the argument that I have just addressed to $\mathbf{2}$ your Lordship as "desperate" in their skeleton at 3 paragraph 345. 4 Well, really. But in that spirit , and since one $\mathbf{5}$ might as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb, 6 I suggest, on the contrary, that any experienced 7 insurance lawyer who looked at the public authority 8 clause would have the same immediate reaction. Of 9 course this clause was not objectively intended to cover 10the international and national emergency which, together 11with all of its ramification , caused the unprecedented 12 government actions in March. 13 The FCA's literalist argument to the effect that 14 "the words can be made to mean that" -- when I say 15quote. I don't mean that I'm quoting the language that 16they have used, I am paraphrasing their argument that 17the words can be made to mean this -- is in effect 18 a submission that coverage for this pandemic was 19 coverage extended by mistake. 20 My learned friend Mr Edelman himself agreed, and 21I am now quoting him, " ordinarily one would only expect 22a local outbreak to have the effect " of creating an 23inability to use premises; $\{Day2/131:7\}$ to line 8. 24Indeed. And that expectation is a good reason for

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concluding that coverage should not be extended.

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Day 5

1 Now, it is time to get on, whether or not in the 2 forbidden Latin, to noscitur a sociis. Now, my learned 3 friend has misunderstood the main way in which we deploy 4 this argument because, as we make plain in our skeleton 5at 224 to 231, we are analysing, and I emphasise this, 6 primarily the other covers within the public authority 7 clause, in other words, (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), and 8 we seek to show how they of their nature, and by g reference to the sorts of public authority powers which 10 they contemplate, must be referring to small scale local 11 events. Of course (b) is the one we are arguing about, 12 but I am referring to (a), (c), (d) and (e). That is 13the context in which we rely on the maxim.

14 Now, my learned friend said this was a maxim to do 15with lists , and at one point my Lord Lord Justice Flaux 16 agreed with him, on Day 2, page 134. {Day2/134:1} With 17great respect, my Lord, it is not a maxim confined to 18 lists, although it is exemplified by lists. The 19authority mentioned by my learned friend says as much. 20He cited Lewison on Contracts; we don't need to look at 21 it but it is $\{K/202/57\}$, where the learned author 22 summarises the effect of the maxim in a sentence: 23 "Put shortly, it stresses the importance of 24 context.'

Of course lists provide a context, but they are not

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1 exhaustive; it is not only in the case of lists that 2 context is important. We have found an authority, and 3 no doubt given more time we might have found more, where 4 the maxim was specifically applied other than in the 5context of lists ; the decision of Mr Justice Morison, 6 called Swiss Rev United India Insurance, and that is at 7 $\{K/122.1/9\}$ to page 10. I don't need to take 8 your Lordship to it. 9 But more importantly and as I say, my learned 10 friend , as you will see if you re-read $\{Day2/134{:}1\}$ to 11 page 135, completely passed over the fact that the 12primary way in which we deploy this maxim is within the 13 public authority clause, and that is a list . 14 Now if we look at cover (a), (c), (d), (e), of the

15other matters within the clause, subclauses (c) and (e)16are expressly confined to the insured premises. Of the17other two, (a) and (d), it cannot seriously be suggested18that they relate or could relate to drains problems or19murders, other than at or in the vicinity of the20premises.

21The same must be true, we submit, of the occurrence22of the disease in (b). The FCA says that the necessary23nexus with the premises is provided by the words in the24introductory part of the clause " inability to use the25insured premises", but that is not the point. I am

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1 deploying the maxim and the principle of construction, 2 which has regard to context, to the nexus which is in or 3 plainly implicit in the subclauses themselves. 4 My learned friend then quoted Lord Justice Diplock 5in Letang v Cooper, and I congratulate him on his 6 pronunciation, saying that the maxim is treacherous $\overline{7}$ unless you know the societas to which the socii belong. 8 That was $\{M/5/16\}$. Within subclauses (a) to (e) the 9 genus, or the societas is clear enough; it is causes at 10 or local to the insured premises. 11 Now we do, I accept, broaden the analysis, although 12 this isn't relevant to many of the covers, to other 13cases within the Hiscox 1 wording where, in 14paragraphs 234 to 244, we make the point that the other 15insuring clauses comprising the special covers branching 16 off the stem are similarly local or specific either to 17the insured or the business or the premises. 18 That is the argument, my Lords, on occurrence, and 19I hope your Lordships see that it is not merely an 20 exercise with a compass and a pencil. It is a more 21 substantial argument than that, although the compass and 22 the pencil, so to speak, follow in its wake. 23 There is also a non-point, which we have dealt with 24 in paragraph 261 of our skeleton, which both the FCA and

the Hiscox interveners take, that because there is \$115\$

1 a 1 mile radius in Hiscox 4, it must be assumed that $\mathbf{2}$ there was a deliberated eschewal of any limit in Hiscox 3 1 to 3. That is a non-point, and it doesn't become any 4 more of a point when Mr Edelman makes a sort of half $\mathbf{5}$ allusion to the date at the bottom of Hiscox 4. That 6 doesn't help him at all, because he hasn't established 7 that the date at the bottom of Hiscox 4 is the first 8 time when the geographical radius of 1 mile is put in. 9 So much, unless your Lordships have any questions, 10for the meaning of the word "occurrence" as it occurs in 11context in the public authority clause. 12 I need then very briefly to move on to causation within the public authority clause. There really is no 13 14 distinct issue here. The parties are agreed that the 15word "following" in that clause denotes a causal 16element. A looser one than proximate clause, I'm not 17sure what proximate clause has to do with anything in 18 this clause but anyway, never mind that, but a causal 19 element nonetheless. That is paragraph 60 of the 20 particulars of claim, and the amended defence, we got it 21 right at the second time of asking, paragraph 101. The 22FCA accepted that causal relationship in its oral 23submissions on {Day2/140:1}. 24So unless the occurrence is construed broadly enough 25to include what I call the real cause of the government

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Day 5

measures, it follows that the FCA will not be able to 1 2 prove the required causal connection between an 3 occurrence, wherever it is, even in Alnwick, and the 4 restrictions imposed. 5The FCA does not plead that an occurrence was the 6 nationwide pandemic, and even if it did, it obviously $\overline{7}$ wasn't. The occurrence relied on appears to be the 8 g individual case or cases of a notifiable disease, but 10 that didn't cause the government measures. Whatever the 11 meaning and whatever the geographical ambit of an 12 occurrence, it is not the pandemic or the emergency and. 13therefore, it didn't cause the restrictions . That is 14true not just of the Hiscox 4 wordings but of all of 15 them. 16 Indeed, there is obviously a knock down argument on 17 Hiscox 4, but my learned friend Mr Edelman doesn't even 18 accept that, because he said on {Day2/138:16} that if 19a case of COVID-19 happened within a mile under 20Hiscox 4, well then they have cover. But that totally 21 disregards the force of the word "following" and the 22 obvious difficulty , which I don't need to say any more 23 about, in demonstrating that an event within a 1 mile

- 24 radius caused anything.
- 25 I now was going to move on, my Lords.

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1	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Whatever else "following" means, and
2	you are probably right that it is a looser causal
3	connection than other phrases like "in consequence of",
4	and I fully take your point that we are not dealing
5	really with proximate cause at all here, that is
6	a different concept in a different context, that is to
7	do with whether the insured peril has caused a loss, but
8	" following " has to mean, doesn't it , that there is an
9	occurrence, and you have addressed us about that, which
10	leads to or which causes in some respect the imposition
11	of restrictions by the relevant public authority?
12	MR GAISMAN: That is our submission, my Lord.
13	I was going to move on now to different questions,
14	the questions of inability to use, and then
15	interruption . Because if we go now to the public
16	authority clause, I have so far said nothing about what
17	is meant by "your inability to use the insured
18	premises ".
19	What is the issue here? The issue is that Hiscox
20	submits that the expression "your inability to use the
21	insured premises" means what it says, namely that the
22	insured must be unable to use the insured premises, and
23	I will come back to what it means.
a 4	

24But the FCA says that any impairment of normal use,25any impairment of normal use, constitutes your inability

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1 to use the insured premises. So there is a big gap 2 between the parties here 3 The first question: whose inability to use is 4 referred to. That is easy; it is the assured's use only 5that is relevant, because it says "your inability to use $\mathbf{6}$ the insured premises". $\overline{7}$ The FCA agrees, paragraph 363 of its skeleton. The 8 Hiscox interveners do not, paragraph 127 of their

skeleton; they are obviously wrong and it couldn't be clearer.

So whatever is meant by " inability to use", the term identifies and assumes that the insured has a purpose, and that the use of the premises is its use for the purpose of conducting its business at the premises. It is not the customer's use and purpose that is relevant.

So these simple premises follow: the fact that the only use which is relevant is the insured's use, and the only person whose purposes in use are relevant is the insured's. The customer's use, in the sense of use for a purpose, is outside the ambit of the clause. Again, I remind your Lordship of the loss of attraction cover in some of the wordings. The customer's purposes, it follows, are also irrelevant. They are not attending the insured's premises for the insured's purposes but for their own.

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1 We will come on to consider how that argument works $\mathbf{2}$ when I come on to consider, because this is what it is 3 relevant to, whether the lockdown regulation, 4 regulation 6, engages this clause. ${\sf I}$ am not overlooking the possibility that the $\mathbf{5}$ 6 customer's presence might fulfil the use of the insured, 7 but I am delaying that point until we get to a slightly 8 later point in the argument. All $\,$ I am seeking to do now 9 is to identify whose use and whose purpose are relevant . 10I hope that is clear. 11Next the phrase "in context". Now, again we need 12 look at this phrase in its context, and the various 13 subclauses (a) to (e) are an important part of the context. They clearly envisage situations in which 14 15public authority action means there is likely to be 16total inability to use. Murder, bad drains, vermin, 17Legionnaires' disease, et cetera, are likely to result 18 in total closure for a time, not merely some form of 19 departure from normal usage. So the clause has plenty 20 of scope for operation on that basis and that is the 21 natural way to read the words. 22Although the FCA called our construction a wholly 23uncommercial construction of the words in their context, 24{Day2/143: 1}, the FCA did not in fact address the 25context at all, and your Lordships were never told why

Day 5

- 1 Hiscox's construction was uncommercial. It is
- $2\,$ $\,$ a narrower construction than the FCA's, it is true, but
- 3 epithets like "uncommercial" are just used by the FCA
- 4 when it has nothing substantive to say.
- 5 On behalf of the Hiscox interveners, my learned 6 friend Mr Lynch on {Day4/2:1} to page 4, seemed to
- $\begin{array}{lll} 6 & \qquad \mbox{friend Mr Lynch on } {\rm Day4/2:1} \mbox{ to page 4, seemed to} \\ 7 & \qquad \mbox{advance a submission, as I understood it, that where} \end{array}$
- 8 words are capable of a broader or narrower meaning they 9 should either be given the broader meaning or treated as 10 embracing both, which is the same thing. I am aware of 11 no such principle of construction.
- Our next submission, my Lord, is that " inability to 12 13use" means what it says. Now, the first thing we see is 14that this phrase is unqualified . The FCA takes a very 15bad point in saying: oh it doesn't say "total inability 16 to use". We have answered that point in our skeleton in 17paragraph 159 and I am not going to dignify it by taking 18up any time on it. But it doesn't help to say that the 19clause doesn't say "total inability to use", which it 20doesn't, because it also doesn't say " inability to use 21 in whole or part". So the question of what the clause 22 does not say, unsurprisingly , is neutral. Because you 23can supply any words you like to make the point you want 24to make
 - The clause invites a simple question: is the insured

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1	unable to use its premises or not? That is a binary
2	question to which the answer must be yes or no. And
3	ultimately, and this is important, it is a question of
4	fact. Can the insured use its premises or not?
5	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I follow that you say it is binary and
6	the answer must be yes or no, but it is at least
7	possible that there are degrees of use which might
8	qualify and might not.
9	MR GAISMAN: Your Lordship is absolutely right. I haven't,
10	as it were, done more than lay the groundwork for the
11	argument yet.
12	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: I am sorry, Mr Gaisman, you are coming
13	to that.
$\frac{13}{14}$	to that. MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part
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14	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part
$\frac{14}{15}$	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it
14 15 16	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument
14 15 16 17	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am
14 15 16 17 18	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am saying and what I am not saying, although I hope that
14 15 16 17 18 19	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am saying and what I am not saying, although I hope that was clear from our skeleton argument.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am saying and what I am not saying, although I hope that was clear from our skeleton argument. My learned friend calls our approach an absolutist
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am saying and what I am not saying, although I hope that was clear from our skeleton argument. My learned friend calls our approach an absolutist one, {Day2/143:1}, but all I am saying is this, in
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR GAISMAN: Of course. But your Lordship's may in part have been influenced, or perhaps it wasn't, I hope it wasn't, by a mischaracterisation of what our argument is. Because it is very important to be clear what I am saying and what I am not saying, although I hope that was clear from our skeleton argument. My learned friend calls our approach an absolutist one, {Day2/143:1}, but all I am saying is this, in disagreement with the FCA: an insured is not ipso facto

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1 iPhone does not mean, obviously, that I am not using it. 2 Why is the use of insured premises any different ? But 3 I stress the words "ipso facto". I do not deny that on 4 given facts partial use may be sufficiently nugatory, 5vestigial as to amount to inability to use. I don't $\mathbf{6}$ deny that at all, and we never have. But inability to $\overline{7}$ use is not proven simply or merely by showing partial 8 inability . That is our submission. g Now, I have had to spend time on that because the 10 FCA caricatured our argument, and I am quoting from 11 ${Day2/144:1}$, as saying that unless the insured can 12prove that he is unable to use every last square inch --13that is how my learned friend Mr Edelman put it, and he said that we had a last square inch argument; bad luck, 1415there is a square inch over there you can use, therefore 16 you can't prove inability to use. That is a complete 17caricature . 18 If I may qualify something that my Lord 19Lord Justice Flaux said on the next page of the 20transcript, possibly induced by that characterisation of 21 our argument, there is not just a question of fact which 22 arises if inability does not mean total inability , there

constitute such an inability to use that it satisfies 123

raises the question: does this inability to use

is a question of fact in every case, because every case

the clause?

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2	But what my learned friend is saying is any
3	departure from normal usage ipso facto satisfies the
4	clause . I hope your Lordship sees the difference
5	between our position . I don't need to caricature my
6	learned friend 's argument, because I am able simply to
7	quote his exact words; his position is, and he uses as
8	an express example, that where you have a Chinese
9	restaurant , 90% of whose business is always take-away,
10	but it has two tables where, if you want, you can sit
11	and eat your dim sum, he says that is an inability to
12	use, and he said that 10% could be very important to the
13	bottom line. No doubt it could. But it doesn't follow
14	from that that a restaurant that is prevented from using
15	the two tables in what is, to a vast majority, premises
16	which are used for the purposes of a take-away, he says
17	that is ipso facto an inability to use.
18	I say that is a very good example of something that
19	is not merely ipso facto not an inability to use, but on
20	the facts isn't an inability to use.
21	Now, whatever
22	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It will all depend on the facts, won't
23	it? But turning it around, if you have a restaurant
24	which before the pandemic had 100 tables and it had, on
25	average, 5 take-away customers a week, so basically it

1 didn't really do take-aways at all, it now finds itself 1 The FCA says that if you adapt to the new 2 in a situation where it can't actually use any of the 2 circumstances, the very fact that you have to adapt 3 100 tables for people to eat in, but it can increase its 3 4 capacity for take away to a limited extent, then 4 5depending upon exactly how the facts pan out, that may 5 $\mathbf{6}$ amount to an inability to use. $\mathbf{6}$ $\overline{7}$ $\overline{7}$ MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the short answers is yes. It is 8 difficult to paraphrase this question, but my best 8 g g effort at a paraphrase is to ask: can the insured use 10 10 the premises at all or to any meaningful extent? If it 11 can, it is not unable to use them. And it is the 11 1212fact-finder's prerogative in any given case to reach the 1313conclusion that so nugatory is the use which the insured 1414can make of its premises that it can't use them to any 15meaningful extent. That is the fact-finder's 15interruption . 16 16 prerogative, as long as it applies the correct legal 1717framework. 18MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: It might dangerous to paraphrase it 18 1919though, may it not? Supposing we essentially agreed 20with the submission, it might be dangerous to go further 2021 21 than to say it's inability to use. be stated. 22 22 MR GAISMAN: Yes, it rather depends whether some --2323difference . I understand the danger of using paraphrases. But 2424whatever your Lordships say, assuming you were 25sympathetic to the submission, I think everybody would 25125

1	agree that it would be helpful if you could at least
2	give some guidance. So, for example, it is very
3	important, in our submission, to make clear that mere
4	partial ability to use does not prove inability to use,
5	which is a submission I made at
6	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I think we have your submission and you
7	essentially put it in two ways: you said partial use may
8	be sufficiently vestigial to be an inability to use, and
9	then you put the same point in a slightly different way,
10	saying it may be that you can't use the premises to any
11	meaningful extent and that therefore is an inability to
12	use. So I think we understand the point that you are
13	making. Even though, obviously, anything you say is
14	going to be as a matter of principle as opposed to any
15	particular facts .
16	MR GAISMAN: No, my Lords. One notes with a rather sour
17	smile the limited role which the assumed facts are
18	playing in this case, despite the hundreds of hours that
19	were spent in attempting and indeed eventually
20	succeeding in agreeing them. But your Lordship is of
21	course right . I mean, we do have a very clear division
22	between the sides . You may not think it wise for your
23	Lordships to adopt the sort of paraphrase, but somehow
24	one has to expose the fact that what is being alleged
25	against me let 's just see how extreme this is .

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means you are unable to use your premises because you can't use them the way you were using them before. The mere fact that -- this is the Chinese take-away example -- that your usage is in some way inferior, so you have lost 10% of your turnover, that mere fact is sufficient to establish inability to use. I mean, most astonishingly of all , both the Hiscox interveners and the FCA make the submission that the adoption of social distancing in a shop, say, constitutes an inability to use. That is the Hiscox interveners' skeleton, paragraph 127, and my learned friend on {Day2/154:1}, albeit in the context of But even for those of us who, clad in Marigolds and other devices to ward off the virus, spent 45 minutes queuing outside Waitrose at least once will have found it hard to accept the submission that Waitrose were unable to use the premises. The proposition only has to I have probably said enough to expose the

LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: To quote a judge who almost said he never went inside a Waitrose, let alone queued outside

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1	one. It's a quotation from Lord Justice Hobhouse in
2	some case or other. The proposition only has to be
3	stated to be rejected .
4	MR GAISMAN: All I will say to add to what I have said is
5	that short of whatever it is that amounts on given facts
6	to an inability to use, we don't accept that our
7	construction is at all uncommercial because, as I have
8	already submitted to your Lordships, the clause is aimed
9	at situations which will typically cause total
10	cessation .
11	We also have to bear in mind, we have been dealing
12	with a crisis that has lasted for months and months, but
13	the average case of defective drains or vermin or
14	a police investigation of a crime or suicide typically
15	is measured in days. One just does need to remember
16	that.
17	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You can say that in relation to these
18	types of matter which are in (a) to (e) there is
19	a reason why insurers might not want to insure an
20	interference which (inaudible) one which causes an
21	inability to use.
22	MR GAISMAN: I am sorry, my Lord, I lost the middle of
23	your Lordship's point but I'm sure I'm going to agree
24	with it.
25	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Insurers might not want to insure (a)

1	to (e) unless it led to restrictions which led to	1	in all cases for which access to or use of the premises
2	a complete inability to use.	2	by the owners/employees/customers was material"
3	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: The classic example is somebody has	3	Then each of the following , and we are concerned
4	been murdered in the flat above the restaurant, the	4	with 46.2, inability to use the premises for the
5	police are investigating, they need to do forensic work	5	purposes of Hiscox 1 to 4.
6	within the restaurant, so it is closed. Complete	6	To the same effect in its skeleton, paragraph 360,
7	inability to use. Albeit for a short period of time, as	7	which talks of using the premises for or with its
8	you say.	8	intended aim or purpose. And the Hiscox interveners '
9	MR GAISMAN: The same is true, my Lord, it is hard to	9	skeleton, paragraph 125, refers to an inability to use
10	believe that if a restaurant had vermin the inspectors	10	the premises normally.
11	will say, well, you have got to close the Portofino Room	11	We submit that this is all far too broad. We have
12	but the rest of the restaurant you can keep open. Not	12	conceded, as your Lordships will have seen in
13	perhaps how one experiences local authorities, not that	13	paragraph 172 of our skeleton, that a business ordered
14	I have much experience, my Lord.	14	to close down by regulations 4 or 5 of the 26 March
15	Just moving on then, there is a point that my	15	regulations, and relevant predecessors, may well be able
16	learned friend Mr Edelman took on {Day2/146:1} in	16	to prove an inability to use, assuming it was made out
17	reliance on the rent clause. That is a bad point and it	17	on the facts. We discussed restaurants, I won't say
18	is answered in our skeleton at paragraph 161.	18	ad nauseam, that is a different clause, but let me give
19	More substantively, however, there is a further	19	one or two other examples.
20	point. The clause makes clear that inability to use	20	Business premises ordered to close, which are used
2 1	needs to have been due to restrictions imposed. If I am	20 21	to solicit or fulfil online or mail order businesses ,
22	right in the submissions I made earlier that this means	22	are clearly being used. The business may be less
23	mandatory measures, in the sense of measures imposed by	23	active, but they will still be being used. We give the
24 24	law, the only sort of government measures which would	20 24	example in our skeleton at paragraph 185 of a tailor
25	qualify as relevant restrictions causing an inability to	25	attending her cutting-room to work on her backlog of
10	quality as relevant restrictions causing an inability to		attending her catting room to work on her backlog of
	129		131
1		1	
$\frac{1}{2}$	129 use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them.	$\frac{1}{2}$	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of
2	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them.		orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by
$\frac{2}{3}$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps,	2	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered
2 3 4	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away	$2 \\ 3 \\ 4$	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she
2 3 4 5	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the	$\frac{2}{3}$	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises.
2 3 4 5 6	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of	$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6$	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton :
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an	2 3 4 5 6 7	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is	$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6$	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton :
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton: "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use."
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$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ $	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars of claim, paragraph 46, is overbroad on all fronts.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its regular pupils is clearly being used. The FCA says, in
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 15 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars of claim, paragraph 46, is overbroad on all fronts. First, because it includes all government measures,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its regular pupils is clearly being used. The FCA says, in a submission which does not pay much regard to the
$2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars of claim, paragraph 46, is overbroad on all fronts. First, because it includes all government measures, including advice. Secondly, and this is how broadly	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its regular pupils is clearly being used. The FCA says, in a submission which does not pay much regard to the language of the clause, that a school without children
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$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \end{array}$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars of claim, paragraph 46, is overbroad on all fronts. First, because it includes all government measures, including advice. Secondly, and this is how broadly it is put, if we just look at {A/2/30}, the bottom half of the page, assuming your Lordships can read that: "The advice, instructions and/or announcements as to social distancing, self-isolation, lockdown and restricted travel and activities , staying at home and home-working given on 16 March [that is before the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its regular pupils is clearly being used. The FCA says, in a submission which does not pay much regard to the language of the clause, that a school without children is not much of a school {Day2/148:1}. But the question is whether it is being used as a school; and if it is being used to educate vulnerable children or key workers' children it is being used as a school, or it is typically being used as a school. Of course it will be a question of fact and degree.
$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ \end{array}$	use are compulsory measures in the sense in which I define them. It follows that all voluntary measures and steps, including social distancing, for example, staying away from category 3 businesses, they all fall outside the clause and they can't be relied upon in the context of inability to use, even if, as it were, they establish an inability to use taken on its own. Because it is restriction posed which cause an inability to use, so one has to ask oneself what are the restrictions imposed. Just to make good my point, although I am sure your Lordships have it, the FCA's case in their particulars of claim, paragraph 46, is overbroad on all fronts. First, because it includes all government measures, including advice. Secondly, and this is how broadly it is put, if we just look at {A/2/30}, the bottom half of the page, assuming your Lordships can read that: "The advice, instructions and/or announcements as to social distancing, self-isolation, lockdown and restricted travel and activities, staying at home and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	orders, assuming tailors still do have backlogs of orders, or execute new ones that have been solicited by any of the permitted means. Her shop has been ordered to close to the public, but it does not follow that she is unable to use the premises. But the FCA says in paragraph 365 of its skeleton : "If the government prohibits a non-food shop from carrying on its business, then there is inability to use." No, there isn't. Now schools. A school which is being used for key workers' children or preparation or delivery of online assembly or lessons or other interaction with its regular pupils is clearly being used. The FCA says, in a submission which does not pay much regard to the language of the clause, that a school without children is not much of a school {Day2/148:1}. But the question is whether it is being used as a school; and if it is being used to educate vulnerable children or key workers' children it is being used as a school, or it is typically being used as a school.

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 $\begin{array}{rcl} 24 & & \mbox{amounted for all businesses on that date, alternatively} \\ 25 & & \mbox{on such subsequent date to be determined by the court,} \end{array}$

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departure from normal use is ipso facto your inability $$132\end{scalar}$$

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1	to use the insured premises; and that, with great	1	insured to use the premises? Because that is what needs
2	respect to the FCA and my learned friends, has got to be	2	to be shown. The words "due to" ensure that that is the
3	squashed.	3	case.
4	It is tedious to go on with this, but one sees the	4	Now, this is a question of characterising the
5	same sort of overstatement in paragraph 366.1 of my	5 6	relevant " restrictions ". The restrictions must be of
$\frac{6}{7}$	learned friend's skeleton argument. If we look or have	0 7	a character which creates the inability . That must be
	that on the page, please, it is $\{I/1/138\}$. Thank you	8	common ground. They must be restrictions which cause an
8 9	very much: "Premises cannot be used without people. It is not	° 9	inability to use. Therefore, moving beyond the common
9 10	only a matter of customers. The owner herself or	3 10	ground, because everything I have said so far must be
10	himself, or the business' employees, could not legally	10	common ground, they naturally look, in terms of the character of the restrictions, to the position of the
12	attend work."	11	insured.
13	That is an oversimplification if one reads the	12	If one asks the question, "What is the natural and
14	regulations :	13 14	objectively intended meaning of your inability to use
15	They were ordered to 'stay at home' (save for	14	due to restrictions imposed?" the sort of restrictions
16	certain businesses)."	15 16	imposed would be those directed to the insured and
17	Quite a lot of businesses . For example, in	10	directed to its use of the premises. Once again, the
18	category 3 and category 5. And anyway, always subject	18	context here is all -important. Closure of a restaurant
19	to a reasonable excuse, and so on.	10	due to food poisoning, closure due to vermin in the
20	It is an illustration of the failure to give any	20	kitchen, problems with the drains, Legionnaires' disease
20 21	proper recognition to the effect of the significant	20 21	in the waterworks, a suicide in the office; all of those
22	qualifications and exceptions to regulation 6 and the	21	are restrictions directed to the insured and the
23	position of category 5 and category 3 businesses .	23	insured's use of the premises.
24	Anyway, I think I have said enough about inability	24	Of coursers, the effect of all of these is that
25	to use. I want to come back to an important question,	25	customers cannot attend. The effect. But that
	133		135
1	which is can we please have bundle B, the public	1	non-attendance of customers is the result of the
2	authority clause again. Your Lordships have it open.	2	inability to use, not the cause.
3	I see the time, my Lord. Would it be convenient to	3	What the clause, we submit, is directed to is
4	have the break now or would your Lordship like to go on	4	a regulation which tells the insured business that it
5	a bit?	5	may not use its premises for one of the five stated
6	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, it probably would be sensible to	6	reasons.
7	have a break now. My clock says 16 minutes past, so	7	By contrast, and maybe we should have them to hand,
8	I will say just after 25 past, please.	8	regulation 6 of 26 March, which is $\{J/16/4\},$ regulation
9	(3.16 pm)	9	$\boldsymbol{6}$ is not directed to the insured's abilities to use at
10	(Short break)	10	all, it has a completely different subject matter;
11	(3.26 pm)	11	regulation 6 is directed at individuals ' movements. An
12	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: When you are ready, Mr Gaisman.	12	requirements in legislation for businesses to close or
13	MR GAISMAN: My Lords, the question I was coming to is	13	cease operations are not the same as restrictions on the
14	whether the lockdown regulations, let's just focus on	14	free movement of the individuals who use them.
15	regulation 6 of 26 March, fall within the public	15	Nor do they become equivalent, and I am sure this
16	authority clause, your inability to use the insured	16	point isn't seriously run, because they are contained in
17	premises due to restrictions imposed by a public	17	the same statutory instrument as regulations 4 and 5.
18	authority . We say the answer to this question is no.	18	The clause and the causation exercise which would
19	Now, the preparatory ground which I have laid has,	19	follow , if it were activated , requires one to ask: what
20	if I am right, established that the clause contemplates	20	is the ambit of the restrictions imposed, what falls
21	only the insured's inability to use for the insured's	21	within them and what falls outside them? One cannot
22	purposes. The customer's use and purposes are	22	lazily answer that question by saying: well, they are
23	irrelevant . Can it nonetheless be said , this is another	23	all in the same enactment so let's treat them all as
24	way of putting the question, that the restrictions on	24	a job lot .
25	the customers creates an inability on the part of the	25	But better than all of these reasons is there is

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But better than all of these reasons is there is

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- 1 a very good reason why the construction which I am 2 advancing must be correct been. We have all got used to 3 the idea of a lockdown in the last several months. But 4 once again I have to ask your Lordships to adopt the 5correct perspective of putting yourself back in 6 a pre-COVID era, when this contract was notionally made. $\overline{7}$ The very idea that a public authority could impose 8 a form of modified house arrest, subject to exceptions, g on the entire population, so that people were not 10 allowed to leave home to visit their favourite shop or 11 to get their haircut, would have been thought the stuff 12 of nightmares, completely unthinkable.
- 13So the idea that the notional parties would ever 14have contemplated that an insured business in the UK 15 would be reduced to a state of inability to use by suspension of the entire public's freedom of movement, 16 17something which the FCA concedes in its skeleton was 18 unprecedented, would have appeared impossible. It would 19have appeared ridiculous . Or, to put the point another 20way, the FCA's argument makes illegitimate use of 21 hindsight. Because if one looks, now going back to the 22 public authority clause itself , it wouldn't cross 23 anybody's mind that the word " restrictions imposed" to 24apply to anything less or anything else than the 25premises

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1 MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: Mr Gaisman, I am slightly troubled by $\mathbf{2}$ that, by reason in particular of (a) a murder or 3 suicide. What would be the likely way in which 4restrictions were imposed as a result of that? I would 5have thought that at least one possibility is that 6 a cordon would be put round the premises, and there the 7 restriction may be on people getting to the premises 8 rather than on the premises. Now I know that overlaps 9 with the non-damage denial of access cover, but is it 10 realistic to think that a suicide will lead to 11 a specific restriction being imposed on the premises? 12And if so, under what? 13 MR GAISMAN: My Lord, most obviously in a form of closure of 14 the building, because it is a crime scene. Perhaps 15I speak for myself when I say we are all obsessed with 16restaurants , but if you imagine a small solicitor 's 17office , for example, where somebody has committed 18 suicide, I mean it is not impossible, of course, that 19 the place itself , the insured premises itself could be 20the crime scene, and the most obvious example in all 21 cases is a closure of the premises. I am not disputing 22that it is not impossible for a police cordon to be put 23up and that might engage -- actually , that would be 24 a case which would be more likely to engage the 25non-damage denial of access clause, because the police

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1 cordon is the paradigm example. But there are plenty of 2 cases where a murder or suicide could simply prevent the 3 use of the premises because the premises have been 4 closed 5Even if it is possible to think of cases such as $\mathbf{6}$ your Lordship has put to me, it is much harder to do so $\overline{7}$ when one gets on to (b), (c), (d) and (e), which 8 directly engage the health, if I can put it that way -g well, in all four cases, the healthiness and the safety 10 of the premises. So I would submit it doesn't make much 11 of a difference . 12So the paradigm remains, my Lord, and what my 13learned friends are saying, they are not talking about 14 a murder or a suicide, they are saying that the parties 15to this case are to be assumed sufficiently to have 16 contemplated the possibility of lockdown to have 17naturally accepted that restrictions caused by -- sorry, 18 restrictions resulting in an inability to use would 19naturally embrace what tendentiously I will call house 20 arrest. But the truth is that nothing could have been 21 further from their minds. That is certainly my 22 submission, my Lord, but then I don't read much science 23fiction .

My Lord, there are other points too. The FCA has to argue that regulation 6 -- this is a necessary corollary

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1	of the FCA's argument as soon as it is passed,
2	summons into existence a simultaneous inability to use
3	on the part of all insureds everywhere whose business
4	relies to any extent on the physical presence of
5	customers, because a customer confined to his home in
6	Manchester creates an inability to use in Exeter.
7	I have already made submissions of this type in the
8	context of a non-damage denial of access clause, and
9	they will not improve on repetition . But if we are
10	going to find a restriction imposed causing an inability
11	to use, let's look at regulation 6 and see where we can
12	find it . It is on the screen $\{J/16/4\}.$
13	Regulation 6 doesn't create an inability to use at
14	all . Insofar as it mentions businesses, it mentions
15	businesses that people can use. In particular ,
16	businesses in part 3 of schedule 2. Furthermore,
17	regulation 6 is subject to various qualifications , the
18	broad qualification of reasonable excuse and then the
19	enumerated examples.
20	So you cannot tell by looking at regulation 6
21	whether an inability to use has arisen, except in the
22	case of businesses named in part 3 of schedule 2, where
23	it is clear that no inability to use has arisen by
24	reason of schedule 6.
25	None of this is surprising , because regulation 6 has

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none.

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1	nothing to do with inability to use. That is the
2	purview, and then only to a limited extent, of
3	regulations 4 and 5.
4	Even where a business is required to close by
5	regulations 4 and 5, it is subject to exceptions; mail
6	order, take-away, online, and so on.
7	As I have been submitting to your Lordship a little
8	earlier , that may enable an assured to show is an
9	inability to use or it may not, it all depends on the
10	facts . But it doesn't matter how hard one stares at
11	regulation 6, you won't get the answer to that question.
12	So we have got, as I have already mentioned,
13	businesses in part 3 of schedule 2, where there are
14	plainly no restrictions and the explanatory note is
15	wrong, unless I am. Then there are all the category 5 $$
16	businesses, which were not required to close.
17	Now, people could only visit them if they had
18	a reasonable excuse. So we now seem to have got to
19	a situation in which inability to use is bound up with
20	the question of reasonable excuse, to leave home. But
21	those are two separate questions.
22	That leads on to the next point. What about
23	a business where the insured owner can reach out to
24	people in their homes via Skype or Zoom or telephone or
25	email? The fact that customers are, let it be assumed,

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1 confined to their homes tells you nothing about whether $\mathbf{2}$ those customers can access the insured business or not. 3 It is just another example of the way in which there 4 simply is no correlation between the public authority $\mathbf{5}$ clause and regulation 6. They are just different things $\mathbf{6}$ intended for quite different purposes. And it is --7 sorry to repeat myself, but it really is just pure 8 hindsight to say: ah well, this is what has happened, 9 customers have been kept away from businesses in their 10droves by something that nobody foresaw, therefore it is 11a restriction imposed which causes an inability to use. 12That is not how the parties to the contract will have 13 seen it. That is all $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$ want to say, my Lord, except in 14

15a sense picking up on that last point. Even if I were 16wrong so far, and regulation 6 could somehow give rise 17to an inability to use, it does not mean that it would. 18 That is a question of fact. And in many businesses it 19 would not prevent use, especially if I am right that " inability to use" means inability to use at all or to 2021any meaningful extent. Although your Lordships aren't 22enamoured of that paraphrase.

23So unless your Lordships have any further questions, 24I then want to move on to the meaning of " interruption ". 25

For that purpose we need to turn back one page in the

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1	bundle to page 41 of B6 $\{B/6/14\}$.
2	Under the stem, your Lordships know what we mean by
3	the stem, under the stem to both relevant clauses an
4	insured needs to show an interruption to its business or
5	sometimes its activities . Whatever "interruption"
6	means, nothing less than interruption will do, because
7	that is the only term used. The term is "interruption ",
8	not disruption and, as we will see, not interference .
9	Our submission is that interruption requires that
10	the activities are interrupted, ie that they stop,
11	subject to one qualification which isn't really
12	a qualification , and I will come to it in a minute,
13	partial interruption is not enough, whatever that means.
14	Indeed, partial interruption is a form of contradiction
15	in terms.
16	Now, obviously the true construction of the word
17	" interruption " in any BI wording depends on the context
18	in which the word appears. But business interruption is
19	quite an established field of insurance, and I have to
20	tell your Lordships that not only has the FCA hitherto
21	identified no case or textbook in which the term
22	"interruption " in the BI context has been construed to

I shall come back to this point, naturally fearful 143

mean some sort of partial disruption, but we have found

1	of the fact that my learned friend Mr Edelman may
2	unearth 15 cases in his favour by the time of his reply,
3	but he hasn't yet.
4	Now
5	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: That is no doubt, at least in part,
6	because the classic BI cover is contingent on property
7	damage.
8	MR GAISMAN: My Lord, property damage could produce
9	disruption rather than interruption . Sorry, I
10	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Yes, I suppose it could, yes. Your
11	point is that you have not unearthed any case where it
12	has been suggested that partial disruption amounts to
13	interruption .
14	MR GAISMAN: Not yet, my Lord.
15	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: The gauntlet has been well and truly
16	thrown down, Mr Gaisman.
17	MR GAISMAN: I know, my Lord. That is two hostages to
18	fortune that I have got out there, which will give me
19	a sleepless night.
20	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It will serve you right if Mr Edelman
21	comes back with something.
22	MR GAISMAN: I'm always anxious to give Mr Edelman
23	professional satisfaction where I can.
24	My Lords, Hiscox's is not an unduly onerous
25	construction for two reasons. It is said against me

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Day 5

1 that it is, that is why I am making this point. 2 First, one must remember that many, if not most 3 interruptions are short-term affairs , especially the 4 sort of interruptions resulting from the clauses under 5consideration in this case. Of course they can be 6 longer, but it is important not to allow exceptional $\overline{7}$ circumstances such as obtain at the moment in the 8 present emergency unduly to colour your Lordships' g thinking. 10 Secondly, and this is the qualification $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$ made 11 earlier, this is premises-based cover. That is clear 12 from I think every clause in the wordings, and from the 13NDDA and public authority clauses in particular . 14Hiscox does not dispute that where an insured has 15

- two separate premises, the cessation required is only 16 a cessation at one of them. not both. Just as the 17inability to use or denial of access refers to these 18 things happening at an individual premises. 19
- So in that sense, and in that sense only, but it is really an exception, partial interruption is covered. 20

21 Where, however, you have a business, and let's treat 22 that as our paradigm, which operates from one location, 23 the requirement is for that business to be interrupted. 24ie to stop.

Now, as I say, we have not been able to find, just

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1 to dig myself a little deeper into this whole, any $\mathbf{2}$ English case law or textbook guidance on this question. 3 Perhaps the point has been regarded as obvious. Nor 4have we found anything useful in Australia or 5New Zealand. However, the position in the US and Canada 6 is a little less barren and the position appears to be 7 uniform 8 Now, again it helps to separate out the individual 9 Hiscox strand from the FCA's omnibus case against all 10 insurers, because they tie us in with policies involving 11 interference, which ours doesn't, and the process of 12isolating the FCA's case against my clients is a helpful

13 one. 14 What it reveals is that the case against us is far 15too broad. To demonstrate that this is so, it is hardly 16necessary to do more than to see what the FCA is saying 17about what a business interruption is against Hiscox. 18 The key criterion , according to the FCA, for 19 interruption is the requirement for "some operational 20impact"; that is the skeleton, paragraphs 159 to 160. 21 This proposition is said to derive from The Silver 22Cloud, an authority which says no such thing.

23The FCA also says that a business is interrupted if 24it is not able to carry out its operations in the manner 25it previously had and would ordinarily have been

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1 carrying out those operations, without contravening the 2 government's advice, et cetera; that is skeleton 3 paragraph 163. An interruption occurs where "any aspect 4 of the normal operations of the business" is, my choice 5of verb, impeded; $\{Day2/155: 9\}$ to line 10. $\mathbf{6}$ And again, requiring a business to keep two metres $\overline{7}$ distancing between customers and employees would ordinarily be sufficient to amount to an interruption to 8 9 the insured business' activities . It impedes access to 10 and by customers to an extent that has an major 11 operational impact, interrupting the normal functioning 12of the business: paragraph 163, {Dav2/154:1}. 13So not only has Waitrose suffered an inability to 14use its premises, but it has also had its business 15interrupted, and so has every shop in the country 16 permitted to stay open with a long queue of customers. 17Of course, what has really happened is that the 18customers have had their days interrupted by having to 19queue, which is very different from saying the businesses have had their activities interrupted . 2021 My Lords, every element of this case is wrong and we 22 have explained why in our skeleton. The FCA criticises 23 our position as extreme; that is its choice of 24 adjective, {Day2/155:1}. However, with respect, the

FCA's case is far more extreme linguistically . It

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1	involves substituting a whole range of different
2	concepts from the simple word used, so that any change
3	to normal operations constitutes an interruption . The
4	test that the FCA sets would be passed even in
5	circumstances where the activities carry on busily . And
6	we say that interruption requires much more than just
7	some sort of change in the way things are done.
8	Now, I have already answered my Lord
9	Lord Justice Butcher's point on the loss of attraction
10	cover. That is in the wrong place, it doesn't deal with
11	interruption at all, the point proves too much; see our
12	skeleton at 285.
13	I should also pick up a point made by my Lord
14	Lord Justice Flaux on {Day2/153:21} because
15	your Lordship on this occasion cited the specified
16	customer and supplier provisions in some of the Hiscox
17	wordings, for example on page 41. If your Lordship has
18	the customers and suppliers wording there, $\{B/6/41\}$,
19	what your Lordship said was:
20	"So if the business has ten specified customers, one
21	of whom has damage at his premises, so you can only deal
22	with nine of them, unless ' interruption to your
23	activities ' means disruption as opposed to complete
24	cessation, that cover is completely meaningless."

With great respect, my Lord, if ${\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}}\xspace$ 'm allowed to 148

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Day 5

I join issue with my Lord Lord Justice Flaux. First ,	1	meaning of the word?
and obviously, a specified supplier I am sure we can	2	The FCA
all agree on this might very easily interrupt	3	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: N
a business completely by failing to supply a vital	4	use" means unable to u
component.	5	meaningful extent. W
As regards a specified customer, or indeed an	6	stopped or not able to
unspecified customer, my Lord Lord Justice Flaux's	7	MR GAISMAN: My Lord, t
example makes two assumptions of fact, the first express	8	available meaning of t
or the second perhaps not.	9	" Interruption " means,
The first assumption is that the insured has a large	10	better primary diction
number of customers. That might or might not be the	11	That is the natural m
case. But the second assumption is that damage at the	12	introduce that concept
premises of one of the customers could not cause an	13	" interference ", or som
interruption to the insured's business.	14	" significant interferer
But with great respect, my Lord, it could. For	15	It is important to
example, a small IT company has a big contract which	16	" inability to use" and
means that all its staff are at present engaged in	17	concepts. As we say i
providing services installing an IT network at	18	show as an insured tha
a particular customer's premises. It is not the only	19	you are off on a 6-mo
customer, because it has work in the diary for other	20	won't have sustained a
customers, but for the time being its staff are taken up	21	not actually running t
by a large job installing IT at the premises of	22	separate and cumulativ
a customer. There is then a fire at the premises of the	23	not least because the
customer and the work has to stop. It is easily to be	24	caused by the interrup
understood, on the right facts, it all depends on the	25	but certainly by the

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1facts, that the customer might terminate or suspend the2contract and leave the insured without business for3a while.

4 Or to take another example, a manufacturing business $\mathbf{5}$ manufactures a large engine for a customer, even if only 6 one of its customers. The inability of that customer to 7 take delivery of that engine might cause a cessation of 8 the business activities if , as a result , the engine had 9 to remain occupying, as it were, the only berth in the 10 shipyard, if I can put it that way, and thereby brought 11 the business to a close.

In other words, there is nothing in these clauses
which drives one to the conclusion that the word
"interruption " should be given an eccentric, as I submit
it is, meaning.

16But also if I may just persevere with my Lord 17Lord Justice Flaux's example, in a sense it proves too 18 much, because the implication is that any effect on the 19 insured's business caused by damage at the premises of 20a specified customer qualifies as interruption . But no 21case has anywhere ever held this. Or to put the point 22another way round, my Lord's point on Day 2 leaves open 23the question: what is actually meant by an 24" interruption " if not some cessation, it may be

25 a temporary cessation, in accordance with the natural

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The FCA -LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Mr Gaisman, you say that "inability to
use" means unable to use or not able to use to any
meaningful extent. What about that for " interruption ";
stopped or not able to go on to any meaningful extent?
MR GAISMAN: My Lord, that qualification is really not an
available meaning of the use of the word " interruption ".
" Interruption " means, both etymologically and in the
better primary dictionary meanings, it means a stop.
That is the natural meaning. If people wanted to
introduce that concept, they could have had
" interference ", or some yet further point such as
" significant interference ".

15It is important to recognise, my Lord, that16" inability to use" and " interruption " are separate17concepts. As we say in our skeleton, even if you can18show as an insured that your premises can't be used, if19you are off on a 6-month world cruise your business20won't have sustained an interruption, because you are21not actually running the business at the time. They are22separate and cumulative concepts, and it is important,23not least because the loss has to be solely and directly24caused by the interruption. It may be more than that,25but certainly by the interruption. So these words --

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1	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: You would say that an example, going
2	back to your example of the lady tailor , she uses her
3	premises during the lockdown to service existing
4	customers and gets a lot more new customers through
5	online orders, and in an example such as that you could
6	not say that there had been an interruption in her
7	activities , irrespective of whether you could say there
8	was an inability to use the insured premises. But they
9	are two separate questions, aren't they?
10	MR GAISMAN: They certainly are, my Lord. And one can come
11	even closer to home. Opinions are divided about whether
12	or not the chambers in which I am sitting are chambers
13	which I have been unable to use. That is one of the
14	questions which divides the parties . But nobody
15	involved in this test case, and very few people engaged
16	in category 5, would find it possible seriously to
17	suggest perhaps I shouldn't talk broadly about
18	category 5, I will come on to it . Let's just talk about
19	solicitors and barristers , or financial advisers or
20	a whole range of professional people, the idea that
21	their businesses have been interrupted can't be
22	seriously entertained . We have had to adapt, we have
23	had to get used to working at home and dealing with the
24	sound of the hoover in the background, but the idea that
25	our business has been interrupted is absurd,

1	irrespective of whether I am right or wrong on inability	1	other party to point out that there exists a readily
2	to use.	2	available English word which the parties could have used
3	I have spent perhaps too long, in the way that one	3	had they wished to effect that meaning but did not.
4	does, on my Lord Lord Justice Flaux's case in point, but	4	Nothing wrong with that at all .
5	the final , perhaps shamelessly defensive , point that	5	Next, my Lord, the Canadian authorities which we
6	I make is that if it is a good point that my Lord put to	6	cite in our skeleton argument in paragraph 287, at
7	Mr Edelman, it is only a good point in those minority of	7	$\{1/13/96\}$, are both, if I may respectfully say so,
8	covers where there is either , to take my Lord	8	obviously right .
9	Mr Justice Butcher's point, a loss of attraction or	9	My learned friend dealt with the first case in
10	my Lord Lord Justice Flaux's point, the specified	10	paragraph 287.1, EFP Holdings, by saying that he could
11	customers.	11	live with what was said in that case by
12	Okay. Now, I have addressed your Lordships on the	12	Mr Justice Pitfield . He read out the middle sentence in
13	natural etymological dictionary meaning of the term.	13	the quotation in italics in that paragraph:
14	The parties trade not very enlightening examples	14	" Interruption contemplates a break in the continuity
15	involving production lines . This is a question of fact ,	15	of the business ."
16	and each of us trading examples at the extreme doesn't	16	Well, if he reads that as consistent with his
17	really help. But I would certainly say that just	17	submission, we will have to agree differ . But let's go
18	because one of your 3 or 5 or 8 or 2 production lines is	18	on. That is interruption :
19	down and there is some operational impact, that doesn't	19	" Interference contemplates a lesser event which may
20	prove an interruption .	20	not interrupt the business but impedes or interferes
21	Furthermore, as is obvious, glaringly obvious	21	with the profit -making capability of the business,
22	actually, the FCA is trying to broaden the Hiscox cover	22	resulting in a diminution in gross profit ."
23	to include interference .	23	It is quite obvious that this is not an authority
24	Now, I am not disobeying my own rule about	24	which supports Mr Edelman's case. Even he did not
25	construing contracts by reference to what is not in	25	attempt to argue that the next authority , the Le Treport
	153		155
	105		100
1	them, as I will explain, but some of the policies in	1	Wedding case, was an authority in his favour. In that
2	this case provide cover for interruption and	2	case, as Mr Justice Gray says in paragraph 253, quoted
3	interference . Hiscox's do not. It would be completely	3	in paragraph 287.3, it means that the business must
4	incoherent for this court, if I may say so with great	4	cease operating.
5	respect, to write a judgment, unless compelled to do so	5	The best that the FCA can say about that is that the
6	by other indications in the wordings, of which there are		5
7		6	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That
1	none, which ignore that important difference .	6 7	
8	none, which ignore that important difference . Now my Lord Mr Edelman submitted on Day 2 at		decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That
		7	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That is of no more significance than the apparent
8	Now my Lord Mr Edelman submitted on Day 2 at	7 8	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That is of no more significance than the apparent significance ascribed to the fact that the
8 9	Now my Lord Mr Edelman submitted on Day 2 at page 155, $Day2/155:1$ that interference is merely	7 8 9	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That is of no more significance than the apparent significance ascribed to the fact that the Orient-Express case settled before the Court of Appeal.
8 9 10	Now my Lord Mr Edelman submitted on Day 2 at page 155, {Day2/155:1} that interference is merely "marginally", that was the word he used, a marginally	$7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10$	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That is of no more significance than the apparent significance ascribed to the fact that the Orient-Express case settled before the Court of Appeal. May I just have a moment.
8 9 10 11	Now my Lord Mr Edelman submitted on Day 2 at page 155, {Day2/155:1} that interference is merely "marginally", that was the word he used, a marginally wider term than "interruption ". That is quite wrong.	7 8 9 10 11	decision is under appeal. With respect, so what? That is of no more significance than the apparent significance ascribed to the fact that the Orient-Express case settled before the Court of Appeal. May I just have a moment. We have, since drafting the skeleton argument, done
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- 1 I will give your Lordships the references . A case 2 called Keetch v Mutual Insurance Company, a decision of 3 the Court of Appeals in Washington State $\{K/2/78.1\}$. 4 My Lords, that is a 1992 decision. It was a claim by 5a hotel for losses resulting from a decrease in guests 6 and a reduction in the quality of service caused by the 7 volcanic eruption of Mount St Helens. The hotel was 8 buried in six inches of ash but boldly remained open, g and the policy had a loss of earnings endorsement 10 covering loss of earnings resulting directly from 11 necessary interruption of business caused by the perils 12 insured against. 13The insured was held not entitled to recover because 14there was no interruption, and after a review of 15 authority the court concluded that the purpose of 16 business interruption insurance is to indemnify for the 17loss due to inability to continue to use insured 18 premises. Here the insured did not suspend its business 19activity, its business was not interrupted as provided
- In the later case a few years later , in 1998,
 Quality Oilfield v Michigan Mutual Insurance {K/2/86.1}
 the Court of Appeal of Texas, the insured manufacturer
 of oilfield equipment suffered a burglary of engineering
- 25 drawings, computer disks and design information. It

for in the loss of earnings endorsement.

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1 claimed business interruption losses on the basis that $\mathbf{2}$ the items were the centre of its operations and caused 3 an interruption of normal activity . The policy provided 4 cover for loss resulting directly from the necessary 5interruption of business caused by damage to or 6 destruction of real or personal property. Coverage was 7 denied, by the court, on the basis that the operations 8 were not suspended, and the court held that after 9 considering the policy as a whole, and persuasive 10 authority from other jurisdictions , "we find that 11 ' interruption of business' is an unambiguous term 12 meaning cessation or suspension of business."

13 I should say in both cases, my Lord, support for the 14 court's conclusions was provided in the form of 15a mitigation clause which required the insured to 16mitigate by a "complete or partial resumption of 17operation of the policy ". However, the presence of that 18 clause in each case only buttressed the conclusion which 19 the court reached anyway on the understood meaning, in 20the business interruption context, of the word 21 " interruption ". 22My Lords, I return to the FCA's proposition that

23 interruption requires some operational impact. Of
24 course it does. That is paragraph 159. But that
25 proposition is of no assistance to the FCA unless it is

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1 to be read as something far more ambitious, which is 2 that interruption only requires some operational impact. 3 I have already said, but I am going to say it again, 4 the authority cited in support of that proposition is 5The Silver Cloud and I am not going to waste time 6 looking for something in an authority which isn't there. $\overline{7}$ My Lord, a business that can carry on in part has in 8 principle, and of course it will depend on the facts, 9 not been interrupted , because the business activities 10 have not ceased. Therefore, although the example cited 11 in the FCA's skeleton at paragraph 165, of the factory 12with three production lines, two of which are put out of 13action, is a clear case of non-interruption, unless the 14two production lines being put out of action means that 15the business has to stop. There is nothing remarkable 16 about that at all 17Of course it is a guestion of fact. Of course there 18 will be cases near the borderline, that is always 19possible. But the test which the fact-finder must apply 20in each case is : did the business activities stop? In 21 principle, therefore, and although one cannot exclude 22 all cases, the only businesses which are likely to be

by what became regulations 4 and 5 of the 26 March 159

able generally to prove that they were interrupted are

those which were ordered to close or to cease business

regulations

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2	Even then, and given the substantial exceptions
3	within those businesses , the tailor , the take-away, the
4	online mail order exceptions, there is no doubt that
5	many businesses falling within regulations 4 and 5 will
6	have been able to carry on, and their businesses were
7	therefore not interrupted .
8	But again, my Lord, consistent with its case on
9	" interruption " meaning mere operational impact, the FCA
10	argues that these businesses too were interrupted
11	unless, prior to the regulations, they were wholly
12	take-away, wholly online or wholly mail order. Given
13	the time I won't take your Lordship to paragraph 47 of
14	the particulars of claim but that is what is said.
15	This is once more, with respect to my learned
16	friend, obviously wrong, and produces easily imagined
17	results which are unable as a matter of ordinary
18	language, such as, for example, the Chinese take-away
19	with two tables.
20	But can I just come back briefly to category 5
21	businesses , which I mentioned earlier . This is
22	a category in which Hiscox is particularly interested ;
23	65% of our insureds are in category 5.
24	These are businesses which were not ordered to close
25	or to cease; they were permitted to remain open and

active . As your Lordships know they include
accountants, lawyers, consultants, advisers, lots of
other different types of professional . They also are
people who, clearly, found it easiest to work from home.
Insofar as they did so, their businesses were in
principle not interrupted . Insofar as they could not
reasonably work at home, they didn't have to; they could
leave home and go anywhere where their work took them,
where that work could not reasonably be done at home.
It is very important to appreciate what regulation
6(2)(a) says about this . But whether or not they left
home, the full panoply of modern communication tools was
available to them. Nonetheless, many category 5
businesses have submitted claims.
Now as we said, if we could just get on the screen
our skeleton argument, paragraph 27, $\{I/13/11\}.$ I think
I mean paragraph 28. I mean paragraph 28. Can we just
move the page up a little . Thank you very much.
Your Lordships will be familiar with this paragraph,
it came comfortingly early on in our skeleton argument,
but it is very, very important. We have made

- 22 a complaint here that even though they know who our 23 insureds are, the one worked example that the FCA of
- insureds are, the one worked example that the FCA offersagainst Hiscox is of a clothes shop with no online
- 25 business, as if that is somehow typical of our

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1	clientele , and it isn't.
2	There is nothing in its obsession with restaurants
3	with no take-aways or shops with no online facilities ,
4	there is no sign in the FCA's skeleton of any
5	acknowledgment of what we all know happened for many, if
6	not most, category 5 businesses . The fact is that for
7	many insureds in category 5 life carried on, maybe not
8	as normal, and with adaptations, with increased use of
9	online facilities and so on, but I can't resist saying
10	once that the fact that we are holding this test case as
11	smoothly as we are is an evident demonstration that none
12	of our businesses have been interrupted .
13	The FCA's counsel disagrees with all of this and at
14	one point said
15	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It is the interruption to your
16	activities . The opening words of the provision talk
17	about an interruption to your activities caused by, in
18	this instance the restrictions , et cetera, leading to an
19	inability to use the insured premises. And the short
20	point is, in relation to category 5, whatever the impact
21	was on the premises, you say there wasn't an
22	interruption of their activities .
23	MR GAISMAN: There is most unlikely to have been, my Lord.
24	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Sorry, say that again.
25	MR GAISMAN: There is most unlikely to have been. I don't

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1	want to commit myself to
2	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I follow. I follow.
3	MR GAISMAN: an absolute proposition, because there will
4	be findings of fact, and I don't want to be theological
5	about this .
6	By contrast, the FCA's counsel at one stage was
7	persuaded to say this about category 5, on $\{Day2/156:1\}$:
8	"I would invite Hiscox perhaps to reflect on the
9	extremity of the position they have adopted, because if
10	there is this restriction on their cover through the
11	word ' interruption ' it really undermines the commercial
12	purpose of it, and one wonders what cover it would
13	actually provide for any category 5 business because
14	they could never suffer an interruption , as Hiscox would
15	have it, because some work could always be done from
16	another location ."
17	My Lord, that is not a good point. A fire at
18	a solicitor 's office destroying its computer systems and
19	backups could easily give rise to an interruption .
20	A police order to evacuate an office immediately due to
21	some emergency could do so. These are, of course,
22	unlikely events. But professional businesses, generally
23	advised, as in these cases, by professional insurance
24	brokers, insure against those remote contingencies

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1	Just coming back to a point that my Lord
2	Mr Justice Butcher made to me a minute ago, interruption
3	too is a question of fact . Although it is a different
4	question from loss of use, there may come a point, on
5	the facts , where, to use the same adjectives as ${\sf I}$ used
6	the, business activity is so nugatory or vestigial that
$\overline{7}$	to all practical intents and purposes it ceases.
8	It is not going to be the same test as the inability
9	to use test, and there still has to be, and the
10	fact-finder must direct herself or himself directly ,
11	there still has to be the test of a cessation of
12	activities . A break. But I am not being absolutist
13	about this . Who knows what the facts are
14	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You seem to have slightly warmed to
15	I think the point which I was putting to you last time,
16	at which point you totally disagreed with it.
17	MR GAISMAN: My Lord, apart from the fact that I hadn't come
18	to the relevant position in my notes, I thought what
19	your Lordship was putting to me was that it was the same
20	sort of question as would arise in the context of
21	inability to use.
22	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: What I was trying to put to you was
23	that there must be an equivalent to the inability to use
24	if the use is not meaningful, and I was thinking to
25	myself that there might be a similar qualification to

1	interruption .	1	MR JUSTICE BUTCHER: You are on mute, Mr Gaisman.
2	MR GAISMAN: Similar in an adjectival sense, if I can put it	2	MR GAISMAN: Thank you. I was going to ask either tomorrow
3	that way, but it raises a different question of fact and	3	morning or Wednesday morning for an extra half an hour
4	it in no way follows from an inability to use that there	4	on the basis that there were two extra half hours in the
5	will be an interruption, assuming my vestigial	5	FCA interveners' time last week.
6	qualification to both, because they are separate	6	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Subject to my Lord I am happy to start
7	questions. And actually, I think I do maintain that in	7	at 10.00 am tomorrow.
8	the case of interruption it is a slightly brighter line	8	MR GAISMAN: My Lord, can I turn to paragraph 381 of the
9	test , because inability to use is just a sliding scale ,	9	FCA's skeleton on page 142. $\{I/1/142\}$ The trouble with
10	whereas there needs to be a threshold crossed in the	10	this paragraph is that it indicates the sort of cast of
11	case of interruption , which I submit is , in a sense , an	11	mind with which the authors of this skeleton are
12	easier thing to recognise but therefore , conversely ,	12	approaching these sort of cases, including category 5
13	a harder thing for the insured to prove.	13	cases.
14	So I am not really doing any more than saying yes,	14	I think I can pick it up in line 4:
15	it is a question of fact, and I am not being theological	15	"Hiscox raises the argument"
16	about it, but the legal test required is a cessation of	16	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: It has not come up yet, Mr Gaisman.
17	business .	17	MR GAISMAN: Right. {I/1/142}
18	Now, my Lord, can we just	18	Could we just make that a bit bigger, please, and
19	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: I know we are not looking at issues of	19	I am starting in line 4:
20	fact , but I just want to try and get in my own mind what	20	"Hiscox raises the argument that if work could
21	sort of situation we might be talking about then.	21	reasonably be done at home then the insured's business
22	Taking your example of a small firm of solicitors .	22	did not sustain an interruption . This is wrong. The
23	There is an office fire that destroys all the computers	23	fact that an insured may be able to restart some of its
24	and all the records, but the solicitor carries around in	24	activities from another location does not mean that its
25	his head the addresses of all his clients . So he writes	25	normal business or business activities have not been
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1	all his clients a letter over the week after the fire in	1	interrupted ; it simply means that the insured has taken
2	which he says, "Terrible sorry, I am afraid there has	2	efforts to minimise losses , as required by the policies
3	been a fire . We can't service your case at the moment.	3	(and if it has increased cost of working cover such
4	But the moment that we have sorted out all the problems	4	increased costs will be recoverable). Once there has
5	from the fire we will be back in touch".	5	been an interruption there is an indemnity for the
6	In one sense the sending of those letters is part of	6	period during which the business is affected ."
$\overline{7}$	his activities . But in another sense I think he would	7	I will come back to that:
8	say in that example that his activities have been	8	"Any small contributions made by home-working to
9	interrupted and what he is doing really is just	9	gross profit will of course be taken into account in
10	a vestigial as it were holding the line until he can	10	a quantum calculation."
11	actually commence his activities again.	11	Now, my Lord, there are several examples in that
12	MR GAISMAN: There is very good reason why your Lordship is	12	short passage of tendentiousness, begging the question,
13	almost certainly right, because the solicitor who	13	slanting the case in the most unfavourable way to the
14	charged for those letters would be a bold solicitor	14	facts that we all know have been the typical experience
15	indeed.	15	of category 5 businesses who are being referred in this
16	I see that we are getting close to the end of today,	16	paragraph. The use of the word "restart " begs the
17	but I haven't got much more ground to cover. I will	17	question. We have obviously got far too broad
18	take a little time, but probably not very much time,	18	a definition in terms of normal business activities
19	tomorrow morning. But can I just get as far as I can	19	having been interrupted . It is assumed that any
20	this evening. I am within my agreed allocation as	20	contributions from home-working are small contributions.
2 1	generously extended by grants from the likes of	20 21	What is the justification for that. And I will come
22	Mr Howard and Mr Kealey.	22	back, because in a sense that is a most serious fallacy
23	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Before you do, Mr Gaisman, just so	23	of all, to the sentence:
24	I know, what time tomorrow morning is it proposed to	24	"Once there has been an interruption there is an
25	resume?	25	indemnity for the period during which the business is
			in the provide the provided to

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1	affected ."	1	My Lords, as a general proposition nothing could be
2	But also the word "restart " doesn't only beg the	2	less self - evident .
3	question, but it also implies that a professional who	3	Take a category 5 business which relocates to
4	chooses to spend a working day rather than a weekend day	4	home-working. Let it be assumed in my learned friend 's
5	carrying files , computers, equipment, whatever tools of	5	favour that the adaptation is so complicated and
6	the trade he needs, in his car from his office to his	6	difficult that on the facts there is an interruption ,
7	home, that such a person has suffered a business	7	let's say for a week, and then the business is up and
8	interruption . That is extremely unlikely .	8	running again. Working from home is not ideal and
9	Nor to pick up the other point which we get in	9	general COVID effects reduce the amount of business, and
10	paragraph 380 $\{{\sf I}/1/141\}$ I think it is 380. There is	10	the turnover, but the business activities have resumed.
11	a suggestion that our construction punishes those	11	From the date of the resumption it would be impossible
12	assureds who are adaptable enough to avoid or to	12	to say that the interruption continues.
13	minimise any interruption .	13	In the passage I have just read your Lordship from
14	I am just trying to find the quotation. It is the	14	paragraph 381 the FCA says once there has been an
15	top of the same page we are looking at:	15	interruption there is an indemnity for the period during
16	"Construing interruption to require a full cessation	16	which the business is affected .
17	would punish actions taken by a policyholder ."	17	As a description of the indemnity period that is
18	Now my learned friend, as I understand it, concedes	18	unexceptionable. But the losses , as we see, have to be
19	in the passage that I have read, and also on	19	solely caused by the interruption . That is what the
20	$\{Day2/147:1\}$ that the costs of adaptation would	20	clause says.
21	ordinarily be recoverable under the increased costs of	21	In the case of the category 5 business that has
22	working. He is right. But then he says, so you gain	22	painfully relocated, it is highly unlikely that once it
23	the costs of setting up your take-away service at the	23	is up and running again the loss, the diminution in
24	price of losing your business interruption cover.	24	profits that it experiences as a result of general
25	Even though it is 26 minutes past 4 it will be	25	COVID-related activities , will have been solely caused
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1	immediately obvious that my learned friend assuming in	1	by the interruption , or indeed caused by the
2	the FCA's favour the very question we are debating,	2	interruption at all
3	which is whether he has lost anything at all ; what is	3	Of course, if there is some specific business
4	the scope of the cover in the first place and does it	4	opportunity which has come and gone specifically and
5	cover any departure from normal working.	5	solely as a result of the interruption , that is
6	My Lords, in the time available can I make one more	6	different . But in the ordinary case where you have
7	point, but it is an important point, and if it takes me	7	a short period of interruption and then you carry on as
8	five minutes not three will that inconvenience your	8	best you can, working from home, clearly carrying on
9	Lordships? I hope not.	9	working, and your business is affected because
10	Can we go back to page 41 in the Hiscox wordings and	10	everybody's business is affected, economic activity is
11	the step. It is the words "solely and directly ".	11	down, how can that be said, that loss, after the
12	$\{B/6/41\}$. Your Lordship is very familiar with where	12	resumption, to be caused solely or indeed at all by the
13	these sit. But there is an issue between the parties,	13	interruption . The answer is that it can't.
14	and I am not on this issue , I am on a different point.	14	If we apply this sort of example and this is my
15	The issue between the parties is what words "solely	15	last point to the FCA's paragraph 394.3 $\{I/1/146\}$,
16	and directly " qualifies . Assume I am wrong about that.	16	please, paragraph 394.3, my learned friends say things
17	One thing that is quite clear is that the interruption	17	like in the middle of the paragraph:
18	has to be the sole and direct cause of the loss . Nobody	18	"What is left if one takes away the interruption to
19	could argue to the contrary. So concurrent proximate	19	the business (not the cause of the interruption ; the

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little ."

Then it goes on:

activities to the business ..."

20causes of loss are excluded.21Now the rhetorical question which the FCA poses in22its skeleton at paragraph 394 -- it is quite generally23put -- did losses result solely and directly from the24interruption . In general terms of course they did, it25says .

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a separate cause. It was caused by the interruption in

interruption $% \left({{{\mathbf{T}}_{{\mathbf{T}}}}_{{\mathbf{T}}}} \right)$ is an analytic of the theorem of the term of term of

" \ldots the fall in economic activity is not

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Day 5

1	And you can read to the end of the paragraph.	1	INDEX
2	In the instance I have given, which will be typical	2	PA
3	of a lot of businesses, the loss of a resumption will	3	Submissions by MR TURNER (continued)1
4	not have been caused solely by the interruption but by	4	Submissions by MR GAISMAN35
5	other broader COVID-related factors.	5	
6	The truth is that once one understands what is being	6	
7	said by the FCA this is part of its jackpot	7	
8	argument once it gets its fruits in a row on the	8	
9	fruit machine the fruit machine pays out a jackpot, but	9	
10	this is in a sense only an exemplification of my point	10	
11	that you have to look and see what the clause requires .	11	
12	I have talked about pipelines , and it is time for me	12	
13	to stop making submissions to your Lordship, but the	13	
14	last pipeline after pipeline (d) is that the	14	
15	interruption must be the sole cause of the loss . And in	15	
16	the example I have given, and many similar examples,	16	
17	that will simply not be the case. But the FCA seems to	17	
18	think it axiomatically follows. The reverse is true.	18	
19	I am sorry to have taken a bit longer than I should	19	
20	have done.	20	
21	LORD JUSTICE FLAUX: Very well. Not to worry, Mr Gaisman.	21	
22	We will break there until 10.00 am tomorrow morning,	22	
23	please . Thank you.	23	
24	(4.33 pm)	24	
25	(The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday,	25	
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1	28 July 2020)		176
2			

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