Market abuse undermines the integrity of the UK financial system, eroding confidence and lowering participation, to everyone’s detriment. Firms are a vital first line of defence. They must have the right culture and safeguards to spot, report and reduce the risk of market abuse.
We want to continue to build resilience to market abuse across primary and secondary markets, ensure access to inside information is properly controlled and markets disclosures are timely and accurate. We have robust detection and investigation capabilities and deliver deterrents through a range of supervisory, civil and criminal sanctions.
Access
Outcome 1: Increased confidence in the integrity of UK markets which maintains high levels of participation across the buy-side and sell-side
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline Value | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest status (year 3 value compared to baseline) | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMA1-M01 | Increase in perceived effectiveness of FCA action to promote market integrity | FCA and Practitioner Panel survey[1] | Over the last 12 months % of firms who think the FCA have been very or fairly effective at protecting UK markets from:
| N/A |
| delayed or misleading disclosures - 63% responded very or fairly effective (2024/25) Note that for metrics based on the FCA and Practitioner Panel survey (AMA1-M01, AMA1-M02) investment management firms were included in the sample for 2023/24 and 2024/25. Further details on the implications of this and any impacts on the results[2] | Little or no change | ||
| N/A |
|
Difference between year 3 and baseline value is not statistically significant. | ||||||
| N/A |
|
Difference between year 3 and baseline value is statistically significant. | ||||||
| AMA1-M02 | Increase in cleanliness of UK markets (compared to other markets) as perceived by market participants | FCA and Practitioner Panel survey[1] | 48% of firms believe that market abuse is a big or fairly big issue in the UK
| N/A | 51% of firms (2023/24) | 47% of firms (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is not statistically significant. | Little or no change | ||
37% of firms believe market abuse is not a very big issue or an issue at all in the UK. (2022/23) | 36% of firms (2023/24) | 39% of firms (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is not statistically significant. | |||||||
42% of firms believe that we have been better in combatting market abuse in the UK compared to regulators in other global markets and 2% believe we have been worse. 23% believe about the same. (2022/23) | 44% of firms believe that we have been better in combatting market abuse in the UK compared to regulators in other global markets and 2% believe we have been worse. 25% believe about the same and 30% don’t know. (2023/24) Note- slight sum error due to rounding methodology used | 38% of firms believe that we have been better and 3% believe we have been worse. 29% believe about the same and 30% don’t know. Difference between year 3 and baseline value is not statistically significant for much or a little better. | |||||||
Confidence and fair value
Outcome 2: Timely and accurate disclosure of corporate information
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline value(s) | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest Status (year 3 value compared to baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AMA2-M01
This metric uses the same data as topline metric WFV1-M02[3] | Reduction in the number of FCA market oversight actions for potential failure of listed companies to disclose properly | FCA data | 330 actions (2021) | 391 actions (2022) | 437 actions (2023) | 410 actions (2024) | Declined | |
Outcome 3: Financial firms and issuers are more resilient to market abuse, having robust systems and controls, high-quality reporting practices and a strong anti-market abuse culture
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline Value(s) | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest status (year 3 value compared to baseline) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMA3-M01 | Decrease in values of FCA market cleanliness (MC) statistics. The MC statistic is one indicator of possible insider dealing, but it has several limitations as a measure of broader market cleanliness, especially given the fall in sample size over the past decade | FCA data market cleanliness statistics[4], calculated from FCA transaction data and prices from data vendors
| Market cleanliness:
| Market cleanliness: 25% (2022) | Data was not published as we were reviewing our methodology. | Market cleanliness: 37.8% (2024) (Methodological changes mean that the statistic is not comparable to, and systematically higher than, figures published using the previous methodology.) | Not assessed |
Abnormal Trading Volume Ratio:
| Abnormal Trading Volume Ratio: 8% (2022) | Abnormal Trading Volume Ratio: 6% (2023) | Abnormal Trading Volume Ratio: 5.6% (2024) | Little or no change | |||
Potentially Anomalous Trading Ratio:
| Potentially Anomalous Trading Ratio: 5% (2022) | Potentially Anomalous Trading Ratio: 3%(2023) | Potentially Anomalous Trading Ratio: 4.1% (2024) | Improved |
Outcome 4: Criminal, civil and supervisory sanctions are brought to bear on wrongdoers to provide effective deterrents
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline Value(s) | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest status (year 3 value compared to baseline) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMA4-M01 | Increase in enforcement actions | FCA data | Enforcement outcomes against regulated firms for failures in market abuse systems and controls – 0 (2021/22) | Enforcement outcomes against regulated firms for failures in market abuse systems and controls – 3 (2022/23) | Enforcement outcomes against regulated firms for failures in market abuse systems and controls – 0 (2023/24) | Enforcement outcomes against regulated firms for failures in market abuse systems and controls – 0 (2024/25) | Little or no change |
| Enforcement outcomes against listed issuers - 1 | Enforcement outcomes against listed issuers - 0 | Enforcement outcomes against listed issuers – 1
| Enforcement outcomes against listed issuers – 1
| Little or no change | |||
| Enforcement action against individuals for insider dealing -0 | Enforcement action against individuals for insider dealing - 5 (charging stage) | Enforcement action against individuals for insider dealing - 2 | Enforcement action against individuals for insider dealing – 3 (x 2 charged with insider dealing; x1 confiscation order for £500k) | Improved | |||
| Disruption events - Accounts closed where these were being used to commit market abuse – 221 | Disruption events - Accounts closed where these were being used to commit market abuse – 156 | Disruption events - Accounts closed by regulated firms where these were suspected of being used to commit market abuse – 255 | Disruption events - Accounts closed by regulated firms where these were suspected of being used to commit market abuse – 357 | Improved |
What the latest metric values tell us
Over our 3-year strategy we set out to achieve the following outcomes:
- Increased confidence in the integrity of UK markets which maintains high levels of participation across the buy-side and sell-side.
- Timely and accurate disclosure of corporate information.
- Financial firms and issuers are more resilient to market abuse, having robust systems and controls, high-quality reporting practices and a strong anti-market abuse culture.
- Criminal, civil and supervisory sanctions are brought to bear on wrongdoers to provide effective deterrence.
Overall, we made progress against some of the outcomes we set out to achieve but have more to do through our new strategy.
We are very encouraged by the improvement in the measure of firms’ anti-market abuse culture through the closures, since January 2023, of over 700 UK-based trading accounts due to market abuse concerns. This means that it is increasingly more difficult for nefarious market participants to seek to gain an unfair advantage over others.
A critical factor in the improvement has been our engagement with industry; we have developed a clear communications plan to ensure industry understands our expectations. We have broadcast our messages through forums for trading firms and advisors, publications (MarketWatch, Primary Markets Bulletin), and externally hosted webinars.
We are pleased to have seen an improvement in our sanctions and interventions. Our Enforcement investigations have delivered the most impactful deterrence. In 2024/25 we charged 2 individuals with insider dealing (trial set for 2026) and confiscated £500,000 from someone previously convicted of insider dealing. Our longstanding investigation into Barclays Bank’s failure to disclose relevant information to the market was resolved resulting in a £40m fine for the bank. We also fined an individual £123,500 for market abuse and fined a firm £99,200 for serious transaction reporting failures. Over the 3 years, we have secured 2 convictions for insider dealing and fined regulated firms over £17m for market abuse systems and controls failures. In May 2025, 2 individuals pleaded guilty to insider dealing offences. We have also intervened with firms and individuals and imposed supervisory sanctions which, in some instances, prevent firms from onboarding new customers.
We have taken a more proactive approach to our enquiries of potential failure of listed companies to disclose information properly. This inherently increased the number of FCA market oversight actions in this area (AMA2-M01) and as such, it is difficult to interpret the differences in this metric as a reflection of a change in behaviour. We will continue working with issuers and industry to improve the quality and timeliness of corporate disclosures.
We also monitored a range of additional indicators. Over the last 3 years we have not seen a significant change in abnormal price movements but we have seen a decrease in anomalous trading volumes. However, it should be noted that these values can be substantially affected by other factors such as sample size, high volatility or other market dynamics. Our latest published statistics: Market cleanliness statistics 2024/25[5] gives more information.